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Plotinus is considered to be the founder of Neoplatonism.
Taking his lead from his reading of Plato, Plotinus developed a complex
spiritual cosmology involving three hypostases: the One, the Intelligence,
and the Soul. It is from the productive unity of these three Beings that
all existence emanates. The principal of emanation
is not simply causal, but also contemplative. In his system, Plotinus raises
intellectual contemplation to the status of a productive principle; and
it is by virtue of contemplation that all existents are said to be united
as a single, all-pervasive reality. In this sense, Plotinus is not a strict
pantheist, yet his system does not permit the notion of creatio ex nihilo
(creation out of nothingness). In addition to his cosmology, Plotinus also
developed a unique theory of sense-perception and knowledge, based on the
idea that the mind plays an active role in shaping or ordering the objects
of its perception, rather than passively receiving the data of sense experience
(in this sense, Plotinus may be said to have anticipated the phenomenological
theories of Husserl).
Plotinus' doctrine that the soul is composed of a higher and a lower part
-- the higher part being unchangeable and divine (and aloof from the lower
part, yet providing the lower part with life), while the lower part is
the seat of the personality (and hence the passions and vices) -- led him
to neglect an ethics of the individual human being in favor of a mystical
or soteric doctrine of the soul's ascent to union with its higher part.
The philosophy of Plotinus is represented in the complete collection of
his treatises, collected and edited by his student Porphyry into six books
of nine treatises each. For this reason they have come down to us under
the title of the Enneads.
Table of Contents (Clicking on the links below will take you to those parts of this article)
1. Life and Work
Plotinus was born in 204 C.E. in Egypt, the exact location of which
is unknown. In his mid-twenties Plotinus gravitated to Alexandria, where
he attended the lectures of various philosophers, not finding satisfaction
with any until he discovered the teacher Ammonius Saccas. He remained with
Ammonius until 242, at which time he joined up with the Emperor Gordian
on an expedition to Persia, for the purpose, it seems, of engaging the
famed philosophers of that country in the pursuit of wisdom. The expedition
never met its destination, for the Emperor was assassinated in Mesopotamia,
and Plotinus returned to Rome to set up a school of philosophy. By this
time, Plotinus had reached his fortieth year. He taught in Rome for twenty
years before the arrival of Porphyry, who was destined to become his most
famous pupil, as well as his biographer and editor. It was at this time
that Plotinus, urged by Porphyry, began to collect his treatises into systematic
form, and to compose new ones. These treatises were most likely composed
from the material gathered from Plotinus' lectures and debates with his
students. The students and attendants of Plotinus' lectures must have varied
greatly in philosophical outlook and doctrine, for the Enneads are
filled with refutations and corrections of the positions of Peripatetics,
Stoics,
Epicureans,
Gnostics, and
Astrologers.
Although Plotinus appealed to Plato as the ultimate
authority on all things philosophical, he was known to have criticized
the master himself (cf. Ennead IV.8.1). We should not make the mistake
of interpreting Plotinus as nothing more than a commentator on Plato, albeit
a brilliant one. He was an original and profound thinker in his own right,
who borrowed and re-worked all that he found useful from earlier thinkers,
and even from his opponents, in order to construct the grand dialectical
system presented (although in not quite systematic form) in his treatises.
The great thinker died in solitude at Campania in 270 C.E.
The Enneads are the complete treatises of Plotinus, edited by
his student, Porphyry. Plotinus wrote these treatises in a crabbed and
difficult Greek, and his failing eyesight rendered his penmanship oftentimes
barely intelligible. We owe a great debt to Porphyry, for persisting in
the patient and careful preservation of these writings. Porphyry divided
the treatises of his master into six books of nine treatises each, sometimes
arbitrarily dividing a longer work into several separate works in order
to fulfill his numerical plan. The standard citation of the Enneads
follows Porphyry's division into book, treatise, and chapter. Hence 'IV.8.1'
refers to book (or Ennead) four, treatise eight, chapter one.
2. Metaphysics and Cosmology
Plotinus is not a metaphysical thinker in the strict sense of the term.
He is often referred to as a 'mystical' thinker, but even this designation
fails to express the philosophical rigor of his thought. Jacques Derrida
has remarked that the system of Plotinus represents the "closure of metaphysics"
as well as the "transgression" of metaphysical thought itself (1973: p.
128 note). The cause for such a remark is that, in order to maintain
the strict unity of his cosmology (which must be understood in the 'spiritual'
or noetic sense, in addition to the traditional physical sense of
'cosmos') Plotinus emphasizes the displacement or deferral of presence,
refusing to locate either the beginning (arkhe) or the end (telos)
of existents at any determinate point in the 'chain of emanations' -- the
One,
the Intelligence, and the Soul
--
that is the expression of his cosmological theory; for to predicate presence
of his highest principle would imply, for Plotinus, that this principle
is but another being among beings, even if it is superior to all beings
by virtue of its status as their 'begetter'. Plotinus demands that the
highest principle or existent be supremely self-sufficient, disinterested,
impassive, etc. However, this highest principle must still, somehow, have
a part in the generation of the Cosmos. It is this tension between Plotinus'
somewhat religious demand that pure unity and self-presence be the highest
form of existence in his cosmology, and the philosophical necessity of
accounting for the multiplicity among existents, that animates and lends
an excessive complexity and determined rigor to his thought.
Since Being and Life itself, for Plotinus, is characterized
by a dialectical return to origins, a process of overcoming the 'strictures'
of multiplicity, a theory of the primacy of contemplation
(theoria) over against any traditional theories of physically causal
beginnings, like what is found in the Pre-Socratic thinkers, and especially
in Aristotle's
notion of the 'prime
mover,' becomes necessary. Plotinus proceeds by setting himself in
opposition to these earlier thinkers, and comes to align himself, more
or less, with the thought of Plato. However, Plotinus employs allegory
in his interpretation of Plato's Dialogues; and this leads him to
a highly personal reading of the creation myth in the Timaeus (27c
ff.), which serves to bolster his often excessively introspective philosophizing.
Plotinus maintains that the power of the Demiurge ('craftsman' of the cosmos),
in Plato's myth, is derived not from any inherent creative capacity, but
rather from the power of contemplation, and the creative insight it provides
(see Enneads IV.8.1-2; III.8.7-8). According to Plotinus, the Demiurge
does not actually create anything; what he does is govern the purely passive
nature of matter, which is pure passivity itself, by imposing a sensible
form (an image of the intelligible forms contained as thoughts within the
mind of the Demiurge) upon it. The form (eidos) which is the arkhe
or generative or productive principle of all beings, establishes its presence
in the physical or sensible realm not through any act, but by virtue of
the expressive contemplation of the Demiurge, who is to be identified with
the Intelligence or Mind (Nous) in Plotinus' system. Yet this Intelligence
cannot be referred to as the primordial source of all existents (although
it does hold the place, in Plotinus' cosmology, of first principle), for
it, itself, subsists only insofar as it contemplates a prior -- this supreme
prior is, according to Plotinus, the One, which is neither being nor essence,
but the source, or rather, the possibility of all existence (see
Ennead
V.2.1).
In this capacity, the One is not even a beginning, nor even an end, for
it is simply the disinterested orientational 'stanchion' that permits all
beings to recognize themselves as somehow other than a supreme 'I'. Indeed,
for Plotinus, the Soul is the 'We' (Ennead I.1.7), that is, the
separated yet communicable likeness (homoiotai) of existents to
the Mind or Intelligence that contemplates the One. This highest level
of contemplation -- the Intelligence contemplating the One -- gives birth
to the forms (eide), which serve as the referential, contemplative
basis of all further existents. The simultaneous inexhaustibility of the
One as a generative power, coupled with its elusive and disinterested transcendence,
makes the positing of any determinate source or point of origin of existence,
in the context of Plotinus' thought, impossible. So the transgression of
metaphysical thought, in Plotinus' system, owes its achievement to his
grand concept of the One.
a. The One
The 'concept' of the One is not, properly speaking, a concept at all,
since it is never explicitly defined by Plotinus, yet it is nevertheless
the foundation and grandest expression of his philosophy. Plotinus does
make it clear that no words can do justice to the power of the One; even
the name, 'the One,' is inadequate, for naming already implies discursive
knowledge, and since discursive knowledge divides or separates its objects
in order to make them intelligible, the One cannot be known through the
process of discursive reasoning (Ennead VI.9.4). Knowledge of the
One is achieved through the experience of its 'power' (dunamis)
and its nature, which is to provide a 'foundation' (arkhe) and location
(topos) for all existents (VI.9.6). The 'power' of the One is not
a power in the sense of physical or even mental action; the power of the
One, as Plotinus speaks of it, is to be understood as the only adequate
description of the 'manifestation' of a supreme principle that, by its
very nature, transcends all predication and discursive understanding. This
'power,' then, is capable of being experienced, or known, only through
contemplation (theoria), or the purely intellectual 'vision' of
the source of all things. The One transcends all beings, and is not itself
a being, precisely because all beings owe their existence and subsistence
to their eternal contemplation of the dynamic manifestation(s) of the One.
The One can be said to be the 'source' of all existents only insofar as
every existent naturally and (therefore) imperfectly contemplates the various
aspects of the One, as they are extended throughout the cosmos, in the
form of either sensible or intelligible objects or existents. The perfect
contemplation of the One, however, must not be understood as a return to
a primal source; for the One is not, strictly speaking, a source or a cause,
but rather the eternally present possibility -- or active making-possible
-- of all existence, of Being (V.2.1). According to
Plotinus, the unmediated vision of the 'generative power' of the One, to
which existents are led by the Intelligence (V.9.2), results in an ecstatic
dance of inspiration, not in a satiated torpor (VI.9.8); for it is the
nature of the One to impart fecundity to existents -- that is to say: the
One, in its regal, indifferent capacity as undiminishable potentiality
of Being, permits both rapt contemplation and ecstatic, creative extension.
These twin poles, this 'stanchion,' is the manifested framework of existence
which the One produces, effortlessly (V.1.6). The One, itself, is best
understood as the center about which the 'stanchion,' the framework of
the cosmos, is erected (VI.9.8). This 'stanchion' or framework is the result
of the contemplative activity of the Intelligence.
i. Emanation and Multiplicity
The One cannot, strictly speaking, be referred to as a source or a cause,
since these terms imply movement or activity, and the One, being totally
self-sufficient, has no need of acting in a creative capacity (VI.9.8).
Yet Plotinus still maintains that the One somehow 'emanates' or 'radiates'
existents. This is accomplished because the One effortlessly "'overflows'
and its excess begets an other than itself" (V.2.1, tr. O'Brien 1964) --
this 'other' is the Intelligence (Nous),
the source of the realm of multiplicity, of Being.
However, the question immediately arises as to why the One, being so perfect
and self-sufficient, should have any need or even any 'ability' to emanate
or generate anything other than itself. In attempting to answer this question,
Plotinus finds it necessary to appeal, not to reason, but to the non-discursive,
intuitive faculty of the soul; this he does by calling for a sort of prayer,
an invocation of the deity, that will permit the soul to lift itself up
to the unmediated, direct, and intimate contemplation of that which exceeds
it (V.1.6). When the soul is thus prepared for the acceptance of the revelation
of the One, a very simple truth manifests itself: that what, from our vantage-point,
may appear as an act of emanation on the part of the One, is really the
effect, the necessary life-giving supplement, of the disinterested self-sufficiency
that both belongs to and is the One. "In turning toward itself The
One sees. It is this seeing that constitutes The Intelligence" (V.1.7,
tr. O'Brien). Therefore, since the One accomplishes the generation or emanation
of multiplicity, or Being, by simply persisting in its state of eternal
self-presence and impassivity, it cannot be properly called a 'first principle,'
since it is at once beyond number, and that which makes possible all number
or order (cf. V.1.5).
ii. Presence
Since the One is self-sufficient, isolated by virtue of its pure self-presence,
and completely impassive, it cannot properly be referred to as an 'object'
of contemplation -- not even for the Intelligence. What the Intelligence
contemplates is not, properly speaking, the One Itself, but rather the
generative power that emanates, effortlessly, from the One, which is beyond
all Being and Essence (epikeina tes ousias) (cf. V.2.1). It has
been stated above that the One cannot properly
be referred to as a first principle, since it has no need to divide itself
or produce a multiplicity in any manner whatsoever, since the One is purely
self-contained. This leads Plotinus to posit a secondary existent or emanation
of the One, the Intelligence or Mind (Nous) which is the result
of the One's direct 'vision' of itself (V.1.7). This allows Plotinus to
maintain, within his cosmological schema, a power of pure unity or presence
-- the One -- that is nevertheless never purely present, except as a trace
in the form of the power it manifests, which is known through contemplation.
Pure power and self-presence, for Plotinus, cannot reside in a being capable
of generative action, for it is a main tenet of Plotinus' system that the
truly perfect existent cannot create or generate anything, since this would
imply a lack on the part of that existent. Therefore, in order to account
for the generation of the cosmos, Plotinus had to locate his first principle
at some indeterminate point outside of the One and yet firmly united with
it; this first principle, of course, is the Intelligence, which contains
both unity and multiplicity, identity and difference -- in other words,
a self-presence that is capable of being divided into manifestable and
productive
forms or 'intelligences' (logoi spermatikoi) without, thereby,
losing its unity. The reason that the Intelligence, which is the truly
productive 'first principle' (proton arkhon) in Plotinus' system,
can generate existents and yet remain fully present to itself and at rest,
is because the self-presence and nature of the Intelligence is derived
from the One, which gives of itself infinitely, and without diminishing
itself in any way. Furthermore, since every being or existent within Plotinus'
Cosmos owes its nature as existent to a power that is prior to it, and
which it contemplates, every existent owes its being to that which stands
over it, in the capacity of life-giving power. Keeping this in mind, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to speak of presence in the context of
Plotinus' philosophy; rather, we must speak of varying degrees or grades
of contemplation, all of which refer back to the pure trace of infinite
power that is the One.
b. The Intelligence
The Intelligence (Nous) is the true first principle -- the determinate,
referential 'foundation' (arkhe) -- of all existents; for it is
not a self-sufficient entity like the One, but rather
possesses the ability or capacity to contemplate both the One, as its prior,
as well as its own thoughts, which Plotinus identifies with the Platonic
Ideas or Forms (eide). The purpose or act of the Intelligence is
twofold: to contemplate the 'power' (dunamis) of the One, which
the Intelligence recognizes as its source, and to meditate upon the thoughts
that are eternally present to it, and which constitute its very being.
The Intelligence is distinct from the One insofar as its act is not strictly
its own (or an expression of self-sufficiency as the 'act' of self-reflection
is for the One) but rather results in the principle of order and relation
that is Being -- for the Intelligence and Being are identical (V.9.8).
The Intelligence may be understood as the storehouse of potential being(s),
but only if every potential being is also recognized as an eternal and
unchangeable thought in the Divine Mind (Nous). As Plotinus maintains,
the Intelligence is an independent existent, requiring nothing outside
of itself for subsistence; invoking Parmenides,
Plotinus states that "to think and to be are one and the same" (V.9.5;
Parmenides, fragment 3). The being of the Intelligence is its thought,
and the thought of the Intelligence is Being. It is
no accident that Plotinus also refers to the Intelligence as God (theos)
or the Demiurge (I.1.8), for the Intelligence, by virtue of its primal
duality -- contemplating both the One and its own thought -- is capable
of acting as a determinate source and point of contemplative reference
for all beings. In this sense, the Intelligence may be said to produce
creative or constitutive action, which is the provenance of the Soul.
i. The Ideas and the 'Seminal Reasons'
Since the purpose or act of the Intelligence is twofold (as
described above), that which comprises the being or essence of the
Intelligence must be of a similar nature. That which the Intelligence contemplates,
and by virtue of which it maintains its existence, is the One in the capacity
of overflowing power or impassive source. This power or effortless expression
of the One, which is, in the strictest sense, the Intelligence itself,
is manifested as a coherency of thoughts or perfect intellectual objects
that the Intelligence contemplates eternally and fully, and by virtue of
which it persists in Being -- these are the Ideas (eide). The Ideas
reside in the Intelligence as objects of contemplation. Plotinus states
that: "No Idea is different from The Intelligence but is itself an intelligence"
(V.9.8, tr. O'Brien). Without in any way impairing the unity of his concept
of the Intelligence, Plotinus is able to locate both permanence and eternality,
and the necessary fecundity of Being, at the level of Divinity. He accomplishes
this by introducing the notion that the self-identity of each Idea, its
indistinguishability from Intelligence itself, makes of each Idea at once
a pure and complete existent, as well as a potentiality or 'seed' capable
of further extending itself into actualization as an entity distinct from
the Intelligence (cf. V.9.14). Borrowing the Stoic term logos spermatikos
or 'seminal reason,' Plotinus elaborates his theory that every determinate
existent is produced or generated through the contemplation by its prior
of a higher source, as we have seen that the One, in viewing itself, produces
the Intelligence; and so, through the contemplation of the One via the
Ideas, the Intelligence produces the logoi spermatikoi ('seminal
reasons') that will serve as the productive power or essence of the Soul,
which is the active or generative principle within Being (cf. V.9.6-7).
ii. Being and Life
Being, for Plotinus, is not some abstract, amorphous pseudo-concept
that is somehow pre-supposed by all thinking. In the context of Plotinus'
cosmological schema, Being is given a determined and prominent place, even
if it is not given, explicitly, a definition; though he does relate it
to the One, by saying that the One is not Being, but
"being's begetter" (V.2.1). Although Being does not, for Plotinus, pre-suppose
thought, it does pre-suppose and make possible all 're-active' or causal
generation. Being is necessarily fecund -- that is to say, it generates
or actualizes all beings, insofar as all beings are contained, as potentialities,
in the 'rational seeds' which are the results of the thought or contemplation
of the Intelligence. Being differentiates the
unified thought of the Intelligence -- that is, makes it repeatable and
meaningful for those existents which must proceed from the Intelligence
as the Intelligence proceeds from the One. Being is the principle of relation
and distinguishability amongst the Ideas, or rather, it is that rational
principle which makes them logoi spermatikoi. However, Being is
not simply the productive capacity of Difference; it is also the source
of independence and self-sameness of all existents proceeding from the
Intelligence; the productive unity accomplished through the rational or
dialectical synthesis of the Dyad -- of the Same (tauton) and the
Different (heteron) (cf. V.1.4-5). We may best understand Being,
in the context of Plotinus' thought, by saying that it differentiates and
makes indeterminate the Ideas belonging to the Intelligence, only in order
to return these divided or differentiated ideas, now logoi spermatikoi,
to Sameness or Unity. It is the process of returning the divided and differentiated
ideas to their original place in the chain of emanation that constitutes
Life or temporal existence. The existence thus produced by or through Being,
and called Life, is a mode of intellectual existence characterized by discursive
thought, or that manner of thinking which divides the objects of thought
in order to categorize them and make them knowable through the relational
process of categorization or 'orderly differentiation'. The existents that
owe their life to the process of Being are capable of knowing individual
existents only as they relate to one another, and not as they relate to
themselves (in the capacity of 'self-sameness'). This is discursive knowledge,
and is an imperfect image of the pure knowledge of the Intelligence, which
knows all beings in their essence or 'self-sameness' -- that is, as they
are purely present to the Mind, without the articulative mediation of Difference.
c. The Soul
The power of the One, as explained above, is to provide
a foundation (arkhe) and location (topos) for all existents
(VI.9.6). The foundation provided by the One is the Intelligence.
The location in which the cosmos takes objective shape and determinate,
physical form, is the Soul (cf. IV.3.9). Since the Intelligence, through
its contemplation of the One and reflection on its own contents, the Ideas
(eide), is both one and many, the Soul is both contemplative and
active: it contemplates the Intelligence, its prior in the 'chain of existents,'
and also extends itself, through acting upon or actualizing its own thoughts
(the logoi spermatikoi), into the darkness or indeterminacy of multiplicity
or Difference (which is to be identified in this sense with Matter);
and by so doing, the Soul comes to generate a separate, material cosmos
that is the living image of the spiritual or noetic Cosmos contained as
a unified thought within the Intelligence (cp. Plato, Timaeus 37d).
The Soul, like the Intelligence, is a unified existent, in spite of its
dual capacity as contemplator and actor. The purely contemplative part
of the Soul, which remains in constant contact with the Intelligence, is
referred to by Plotinus as the 'higher part' of the Soul, while that part
which actively descends into the changeable (or sensible) realm in order
to govern and directly craft the Cosmos, is the 'lower part,' which assumes
a state of division as it enters, out of necessity, material bodies. It
is at the level of the Soul that the drama of existence unfolds; the Soul,
through coming into contact with its inferior, that is, matter or pure
passivity, is temporarily corrupted, and forgets the fact that it is one
of the Intelligibles, owing its existence to the Intelligence, as its prior,
and ultimately, to the power of the One. It may be said that the Soul is
the 'shepherd' or 'cultivator' of the logoi spermatikoi, insofar
as the Soul's task is to conduct the differentiated ideas from the state
of fecund multiplicity that is Being, through the drama of Life,
and at last, to return these ideas to their primal state or divine status
as thoughts within the Intelligence. Plotinus, holding to his principle
that one cannot act without being affected by that which one acts upon,
declares that the Soul, in its lower part, undergoes the drama of existence,
suffers, forgets, falls into vice, etc., while the higher part remains
unaffected, and persists in governing, without flaw, the Cosmos, while
ensuring that all individual, embodied souls return, eventually, to their
divine and true state within the Intelligible Realm. Moreover, since every
embodied soul forgets, to some extent, its origin in the Divine Realm,
the drama of return consists of three distinct steps: the cultivation of
Virtue, which reminds the soul of the divine Beauty; the practice of Dialectic,
which instructs or informs the soul concerning its priors and the true
nature of existence; and finally, Contemplation, which is the proper act
and mode of existence of the soul.
i. Virtue
The Soul, in its highest part, remains essentially and eternally a being
in the Divine, Intelligible Realm. Yet the lower (or active), governing
part of the Soul, while remaining, in its essence, a divine being and identical
to the Highest Soul, nevertheless, through its act, falls into forgetfulness
of its prior, and comes to attach itself to the phenomena of the realm
of change, that is, of Matter. This level at which
the Soul becomes fragmented into individual, embodied souls, is Nature
(phusis). Since the purpose of the soul is to maintain order in
the material realm, and since the essence of the soul is one with the Highest
Soul, there will necessarily persist in the material realm a type of order
(doxa) that is a pale reflection of the Order (logos) persisting
in the Intelligible Realm. It is this secondary or derived order (doxa)
that gives rise to what Plotinus calls the "civic virtues" (aretas politikas)
(I.2.1). The "civic virtues" may also be called the 'natural virtues' (aretas
phusikas) (I.3.6), since they are attainable and recognizable by reflection
upon human nature, without any explicit reference to the Divine. These
'lesser' virtues are possible, and attainable, even by the soul that has
forgotten its origin within the Divine, for they are merely the result
of the imitation of virtuous men -- that is, the imitation of the Nature
of the Divine Soul, as it is actualized in living existents, yet not realizing
that it is such. There is nothing wrong, Plotinus tells us, with imitating
noble men, but only if this imitation is understood for what it is: a preparation
for the attainment of the true Virtue that is "likeness to God as far as
possible" (cf. I.1.2; and Plato, Theaetetus 176b). Plotinus makes
it clear that the one who possesses the civic virtues does not necessarily
possess the Divine Virtue, but the one who possesses the latter will necessarily
possess the former (I.2.7). Those who imitate virtuous men, for example,
the heroes of old, like Achilles, and take pride in this virtue, run the
risk of mistaking the merely human for the Divine, and therefore committing
the sin of hubris. Furthermore, the one who mistakes the human for
the Divine virtue remains firmly fixed in the realm of opinion (doxa),
and is unable to rise to true knowledge of the Intelligible Realm, which
is also knowledge of one's true self. The exercise of the civic virtues
makes one just, courageous, well-tempered, etc. -- that is, the civic virtues
result in sophrosune, or a well-ordered and cultivated mind. It
is easy to see, however, that this virtue is simply the ability to remain,
to an extent, unaffected by the negative intrusions upon the soul of the
affections of material existence. The highest Virtue consists, on the other
hand, not in a rearguard defense, as it were, against the attack of violent
emotions and disruptive desires, but rather in a positively active and
engaged effort to regain one's forgotten divinity (I.2.6). The highest
virtue, then, is the preparation for the exercise of Dialectic, which is
the tool of divine ordering wielded by the individual soul.
ii. Dialectic
Dialectic is the tool wielded by the individual soul as it seeks to
attain the unifying knowledge of the Divinity; but dialectic is not, for
that matter, simply a tool. It is also the most valuable part of
philosophy (I.3.5), for it places all things in an intelligible order,
by and through which they may be known as they are, without the contaminating
diversity characteristic of the sensible realm, which is the result of
the necessary manifestation of discursive knowledge -- language. We may
best understand dialectic, as Plotinus conceives it, as the process of
gradual extraction, from the ordered multiplicity of language, of a unifying
principle conducive to contemplation. The soul accomplishes this by alternating
"between synthesis and analysis until it has gone through the entire domain
of the intelligible and has arrived at the principle" (I.3.4, tr. O'Brien).
This is to say, on the one hand, that dialectic dissolves the tension of
differentiation that makes each existent a separate entity, and therefore
something existing apart from the Intelligence; and, on the other hand,
that dialectic is the final flourish of discursive reasoning, which, by
'analyzing the synthesis,' comes to a full realization of itself as the
principle of order among all that exists -- that is, a recognition of the
essential unity of the Soul (cf. IV.1). The individual soul accomplishes
this ultimate act by placing itself in the space of thinking that is "beyond
being" (epekeina tou ontos) (I.3.5). At this point, the soul is
truly capable of living a life as a being that is "at one and the same
time ... debtor to what is above and ... benefactor to what is below" (IV.8.7,
tr. O'Brien). This the soul accomplishes through the purely intellectual
'act' of Contemplation.
iii. Contemplation
Once the individual soul has, through its own act of will -- externalized
through dialectic -- freed itself from the influence of Being, and has
arrived at a knowledge of itself as the ordering principle of the cosmos,
it has united its act and its thought in one supreme ordering principle
(logos) which derives its power from Contemplation (theoria).
In one sense, contemplation is simply a vision of the things that are --
a viewing of existence. However, for Plotinus, contemplation is the single
'thread' uniting all existents, for contemplation, on the part of any given
individual existent, is at the same time knowledge of self, of subordinate,
and of prior. Contemplation is the 'power' uniting the One, the Intelligence,
and the Soul in a single all-productive intellectual force to which all
existents owe their life. 'Vision' (theoria), for Plotinus, whether
intellectual or physical, implies not simply possession of the viewed object
in or by the mind, but also an empowerment, given by the object of vision
to the one who has viewed it. Therefore, through the 'act' of contemplation
the soul becomes capable of simultaneously knowing its prior (the source
of its power, the Intelligence) and, of course, of ordering or imparting
life to that which falls below the soul in the order of existence. The
extent to which Plotinus identifies contemplation with a creative or vivifying
act is expressed most forcefully in his comment that: "since the supreme
realities devote themselves to contemplation, all other beings must aspire
to it, too, because the origin of all things is their end as well" (III.8.7,
tr. O'Brien). This means that even brute action is a form of contemplation,
for even the most vulgar or base act has, at its base and as its cause,
the impulse to contemplate the greater. Since Plotinus recognizes no strict
principle of cause and effect in his cosmology, he is forced, as it were,
to posit a strictly intellectual process -- contemplation -- as a force
capable of producing the necessary tension amongst beings in order for
there to be at once a sort of hierarchy and, also, a unity within the cosmos.
The tension, of course, is always between knower and known, and manifests
itself in the form of a 'fall' that is also a forgetting of source, which
requires remedy. The remedy is, as we have seen, the exercise of virtue
and dialectic (also, see above).
For once the soul has walked the ways of discursive knowledge, and accomplished,
via dialectic, the necessary unification, it (the soul) becomes the sole
principle of order within the realm of changeable entities, and, through
the fragile synthesis of differentiation and unity accomplished by dialectic,
and actualized in contemplation, holds the cosmos together in a bond of
purely intellectual dependence, as of thinker to thought. The tension that
makes all of this possible is the simple presence of the pure passivity
that is Matter.
d. Matter
Matter, for Plotinus, may be understood as an eternally receptive substratum
(hupokeimenon), in and by which all determinate existents receive
their form (cf. II.4.4). Since Matter is completely passive, it is capable
of receiving any and all forms, and is therefore the principle of differentiation
among existents. According to Plotinus, there are two types of Matter --
the intelligible and the sensible. The intelligible type is identified
as the palette upon which the various colors and hues of intelligible Being
are made visible or presented, while the sensible type is the 'space of
the possible,' the excessively fecund 'darkness' or depth of indeterminacy
into which the soul shines its vivifying light. Matter, then, is the ground
or fundament of Being, insofar as the entities within
the Intelligence (the logoi spermatikoi) depend upon this defining
or delimiting principle for their articulation or actualization into determinate
and independent intelligences; and even in the sensible realm, where the
soul achieves its ultimate end in the 'exhaustion' that is brute activity
-- the final and lowest form of contemplation (cf. III.8.2) -- Matter is
that which receives and, in a passive sense, 'gives form to' the act. Since
every existent, as Plotinus tells us, must produce another, in a succession
of dependence and derivation (IV.8.6) which finally ends, simultaneously,
in the passivity and formlessness of Matter, and the desperation of the
physical act, as opposed to purely intellectual contemplation (although,
it must be noted, even brute activity is a form of contemplation, as described
above),
Matter, and the result of its reception of action, is not inherently evil,
but is only so in relation to the soul, and the extent to which the soul
becomes bound to Matter through its act (I.8.14). Plotinus also maintains,
in keeping with Platonic doctrine, that any sensible thing is an image
of its true and eternal counterpart in the Intelligible Realm. Therefore,
the sensible matter in the cosmos is but an image of the purely intellectual
Matter existing or persisting, as noetic substratum, within the Intelligence
(nous). Since this is the case, the confusion into which the soul
is thrown by its contact with pure passivity is not eternal or irremediable,
but rather a necessary and final step in the drama of Life, for once the
soul has experienced the 'chaotic passivity' of material existence, it
will yearn ever more intensely for union with its prior, and the pure contemplation
that constitutes its true existence (IV.8.5).
i. Evil
The Soul's act, as we have seen (above), is dual
-- it both contemplates its prior, and acts, in a generative or, more properly,
a governing capacity. For the soul that remains in contact with its prior,
that is, with the highest part of the Soul, the ordering of material existence
is accomplished through an effortless governing of indeterminacy, which
Plotinus likens to a light shining into and illuminating a dark space (cf.
I.8.14); however, for the soul that becomes sundered, through forgetfulness,
from its prior, there is no longer an ordering act, but a generative or
productive act -- this is the beginning of physical existence, which Plotinus
recognizes as nothing more than a misplaced desire for the Good (cf. III.5.1).
The soul that finds its fulfillment in physical generation is the soul
that has lost its power to govern its inferior while remaining in touch
with the source of its power, through the act of contemplation.
But that is not all: the soul that seeks its end in the means of generation
and production is also the soul that becomes affected by what it has produced
-- this is the source of unhappiness, of hatred, indeed, of Evil (kakon).
For when the soul is devoid of any referential or orientational source
-- any claim to rulership over matter -- it becomes the slave to that over
which it should rule, by divine right, as it were. And since Matter is
pure impassivity, the depth or darkness capable of receiving all form and
of being illuminated by the light of the soul, of reason (logos),
when the soul comes under the sway of Matter, through its tragic forgetting
of its source, it becomes like this substratum -- it is affected by any
and every emotion or event that comes its way, and all but loses its divinity.
Evil, then, is at once a subjective or 'psychic' event, and an ontological
condition, insofar as the soul is the only existent capable of experiencing
evil, and is also, in its highest form, the ruler or ordering principle
of the material cosmos. In spite of all this, however, Evil is not, for
Plotinus, a meaningless plague upon the soul. He makes it clear that the
soul, insofar as it must rule over Matter, must also take on certain characteristics
of that Matter in order to subdue it (I.8.8). The onto-theological problem
of the source of Evil, and any theodicy required by placing the source
of Evil within the godhead, is avoided by Plotinus, for he makes it clear
that Evil affects only the soul, as it carries out its ordering activity
within the realm of change and decay that is the countenance of Matter.
Since the soul is, necessarily, both contemplative and active, it is also
capable of falling, through weakness or the 'contradiction' of its dual
functions, into entrapment or confusion amidst the chaos of pure passivity
that is Matter. Evil, however, is not irremediable, since it is merely
the result of privation (the soul's privation, through forgetfulness, of
its prior); and so Evil is remedied by the soul's experience of Love.
ii. Love and Happiness
Plotinus speaks of Love in a manner that is more 'cosmic' than what
we normally associate with that term. Love (eros), for Plotinus,
is an ontological condition, experienced by the soul that has forgotten
its true status as divine governor of the material realm and now longs
for its true condition. Drawing on Plato, Plotinus reminds us that Love
(Eros) is the child of Poverty (Penia) and Possession (Poros)
(cf. Plato, Symposium 203b-c), since the soul that has become too
intimately engaged with the material realm, and has forgotten its source,
is experiencing a sort of 'poverty of being,' and longs to possess that
which it has 'lost'. This amounts to a spiritual desire, an 'existential
longing,' although the result of this desire is not always the 'instant
salvation' or turnabout that Plotinus recognizes as the ideal (the epistrophe
described in Ennead IV.8.4, for example); oftentimes the soul expresses
its desire through physical generation or reproduction. This is, for Plotinus,
but a pale and inadequate reflection or imitation of the generative power
available to the soul through contemplation.
Now Plotinus does not state that human affection or even carnal love is
an evil in itself -- it is only an evil when the soul recognizes it as
the only expression or end (telos) of its desire (III.5.1). The
true or noble desire or love is for pure beauty, i.e., the intelligible
Beauty (noetos kalon) made known by contemplation (theoria).
Since this Beauty is unchangeable, and the source of all earthly or material,
i.e., mutable, beauty, the soul will find true happiness (eudaimonia)
when it attains an unmediated vision (theoria) of Beauty. Once the
soul attains not only perception of this beauty (which comes to it only
through the senses) but true knowledge of the source of Beauty, it will
recognize itself as identical with the highest Soul, and will discover
that its embodiment and contact with matter was a necessary expression
of the Being of the Intelligence, since, as Plotinus clearly states, as
long as there is a possibility for the existence and engendering of further
beings, the Soul must continue to act and bring forth existents (cf. IV.8.3-4)
-- even if this means a temporary lapse into evil on the part of the individual
or 'fragmented' souls that actively shape and govern matter. However, it
must be kept in mind that even the soul's return to recognition of its
true state, and the resultant happiness it experiences, are not merely
episodes in the inner life of an individual existent, but rather cosmic
events in themselves, insofar as the activities and experiences of the
souls in the material realm contribute directly to the maintenance of the
cosmos. It is the individual soul's capacity to align itself with material
existence, and through its experiences to shape and provide an image of
eternity for this purely passive substance, that constitutes Nature (phusis).
The soul's turnabout or epistrophe, while being the occasion of
its happiness, reached through the desire that is Love, is not to be understood
as an apokatastasis or 'restoration' of a fragmented cosmos. Rather,
we must understand this process of the Soul's fragmentation into individual
souls, its resultant experiences of evil and love, and its eventual attainment
of happiness, as a necessary and eternal movement taking place at the final
point of emanation of the power that is the One, manifested in the Intelligence,
and activated, generatively, at the level of Soul.
iii. A Note on Nature (phusis)
One final statement must
be made, before we exit this section on Plotinus' Metaphysics and Cosmology,
concerning the status of Nature in this schema. Nature, for Plotinus, is
not a separate power or principle of Life that may
be understood independently of the Soul and its relation
to Matter. Also, since the reader of this article
may find it odd that I would choose to discuss 'Love and Happiness' in
the context of a general metaphysics, let it be stated clearly that the
Highest Soul, and all the individual souls, form a single, indivisible
entity, The Soul (psuche) (IV.1.1), and that all which affects
the individual souls in the material realm is a direct and necessary outgrowth
of the Being of the Intelligible Cosmos (I.1.8). Therefore, it follows
that Nature, in Plotinus' system, is only correctly understood when it
is viewed as the result of the collective experience of each and every
individual soul, which Plotinus refers to as the 'We' (emeis) (I.1.7)
-- an experience, moreover, which is the direct result of the souls fragmentation
into bodies in order to govern and shape Matter. For Matter, as Plotinus
tells us, is such that the divine Soul cannot enter into contact with it
without taking on certain of its qualities; and since it is of the nature
of the Highest Soul to remain in contemplative contact with the Intelligence,
it cannot descend, as a whole, into the depths of material differentiation.
So the Soul divides itself, as it were, between pure contemplation and
generative or governing act -- it is the movement or moment of the
soul's act that results in the differentiation of the active part of Soul
into bodies. It must be understood, however, that this differentiation
does not constitute a separate Soul, for as we have already seen, the nature
and essence of all intelligible beings deriving from the One is twofold
-- for the Intelligence, it is the ability to know or contemplate the power
of the One, and to reflect upon that knowledge; for the Soul it is to contemplate
the Intelligence, and to give active form to the ideas derived from that
contemplation. The second part of the Soul's nature or essence involves
governing Matter, and therefore becoming an entity at once contemplative
and unified, and active and divided. So when Plotinus speaks of the 'lower
soul,' he is not speaking of Nature, but rather of that ability or capacity
of the Soul to be affected by its actions. Since contemplation, for Plotinus,
can be both purely noetic and accomplished in repose, and 'physical' and
carried out in a state of external effort, so reflection can be both noetic
and physical or affective. Nature, then, is to be understood as the Soul
reflecting upon the active or physical part of its eternal contemplation.
The discussion of Plotinus' psychological and epistemological theories,
which now follows, must be read as a reflection upon the experiences of
the Soul, in its capacity or state as fragmented and active unity.
3. Psychology and Epistemology
Plotinus' contributions to the philosophical understanding of the individual
psyche, of personality and sense-perception, and the essential question
of how we come to know what we know, cannot be properly understood or appreciated
apart from his cosmological and metaphysical theories. However, the Enneads
do contain more than a few treatises and passages that deal explicitly
with what we today would refer to as psychology and epistemology. Plotinus
is usually spurred on in such investigations by three over-arching questions
and difficulties: (1) how the immaterial soul comes to be united with a
material body, (2) whether all souls are one, and (3) whether the higher
part of the soul is to be held responsible for the misdeeds of the lower
part. Plotinus responds to the first difficulty by employing a metaphor.
The Soul, he tells us, is like an eternal and pure
light whose single ray comes to reflected through a prism; this prism is
matter. The result of this reflection is that the single ray is 'fragmented'
into various and multi-colored rays, which give the appearance of being
unique and separate rays of light, but yet owe their source to the single
pure ray of light that has come to illumine the formerly dark 'prism' of
matter.
If the single ray of light were to remain the same, or rather, if it were
to refuse to illuminate matter, its power would be limited. Although Plotinus
insists that all souls are one by virtue of owing their being to a single
source, they do become divided amongst bodies out of necessity -- for that
which is pure and perfectly impassive cannot unite with pure passivity
(matter) and still remain itself. Therefore, the Higher Soul agrees, as
it were, to illuminate matter, which has everything to gain and nothing
to lose by the union, being wholly incapable of engendering anything on
its own. Yet it must be remembered that for Plotinus the Higher Soul is
capable of giving its light to matter without in any way becoming diminished,
since the Soul owes its own being to the Intelligence which it contemplates
eternally and effortlessly. The individual souls -- the 'fragmented rays
of light' -- though their source is purely impassive, and hence not responsible
for any misdeeds they may perform, or any misfortunes that may befalls
them in their incarnation, must, themselves, take on certain characteristics
of matter in order to illuminate it, or as Plotinus also says, to govern
it. One of these characteristics is a certain level of passivity, or the
ability to be affected by the turbulence of matter as it groans and labors
under the vivifying power of the soul, as though in the pangs of childbirth
(cf. Plato, Letter II. 313a). This is the beginning of the individual
soul's personality, for it
is at this point that the soul is capable of experiencing such emotions
like anger, fear, passion, love, etc. This individual soul now comes to
be spoken of by Plotinus as if it were a separate entity by. However, it
must be remembered that even the individual and unique soul, in its community
(koinon) with a material body, never becomes fully divided from
its eternal and unchanging source. This union of a unique, individual
soul (which owes its being to its eternal source) with a material body
is called by Plotinus the living being
(zoon). The living being remains, always, a contemplative being,
for it owes its existence to a prior, intelligible principle; but the mode
of contemplation on the part of the living being is divided into three
distinct stages, rising from a lesser to a greater level of intelligible
ordering. These stages are: (1) pathos, or the immediate disturbance
undergone by the soul through the vicissitudes of its union with matter,
(2) the moment at which the disturbance becomes an object of intelligible
apprehension (antilepsis), and (3) the moment at which the intelligible
object (tupon) becomes perceived through the reasoning faculty (dianoia)
of the soul, and duly ordered or judged (krinein). Plotinus call
this three-fold structure, in its unity, sense-
perception
(aisthesis). We may best understand Plotinus' theory of perception
by describing it as a 'creation' of intelligible objects, or forms, from
the raw material (hule) provided by the corporeal realm of sensation.
The individual souls then use these created objects as tools by which to
order or govern the turbulent realm of vivified matter. The problem arises
when the soul is forced to think 'through' or with the aid of these constructed
images of the forms (eide), these 'types' (tupoi). This is
the manner of discursive reasoning that Plotinus calls dianoia,
and which consists in an act of understanding that owes its knowledge (episteme)
to objects external to the mind, which the mind, through sense-perception,
has come to 'grasp' (lepsis). Now since the objects which the mind
comes to 'grasp' are the product of a soul that has mingled, to a certain
extent, with matter, or passivity, the knowledge gained by dianoia
can only be opinion (doxa). The opinion may indeed be a correct
one, but if it is not subject to the judgment of the higher part of the
soul, it cannot properly be called true knowledge (alethes gnosis).
Furthermore, the reliance on the products of sense-perception and on dianoia
may lead the soul to error and to forgetfulness of its true status as one
with its source, the Higher Soul. And although even the soul that falls
the furthest into error and forgetfulness is still, potentially, one with
the Higher Soul, it will be subject to judgment and punishment after death,
which takes the form, for Plotinus, of reincarnation. The soul's salvation
consists of bringing its mind back into line with the reasoning power (logos)
of its source, which it also is -- the Soul. All order in the physical
cosmos proceeds from the power of the Soul, and the existence of individual
souls is simply the manner in which the Soul exercises its governing power
over the realm of passive nature. When the individual soul forgets this
primal reality or truth -- that it is the principle of order and reason
in the cosmos -- it will look to the products of sense-perception for its
knowledge, and will ultimately allow itself to be shaped by its experiences,
instead of using its experiences as tools for shaping the cosmos.
a. The Living Being
What Plotinus calls the "living being" (zoon) is what we would
refer to, roughly, as the human-being, or the individual possessed of a
distinct personality. This being is the product of the union of the lower
or active part of the soul with a corporeal body, which is in turn presided
over by the Higher Soul, in its capacity as reasoning power, imparted to
all individual souls through their ceaseless contemplation
of their source (I.1.5-7). The "living being," then, may be understood
as a dual nature comprising a lower or physically receptive part, which
is responsible for transferring to the perceptive faculty the sensations
produced in the lower or 'irrational' part of the soul through its contact
with matter (the body), and a higher or 'rational'
part which perceives these sensations and passes judgment on them, as it
were, thereby producing that lower form of knowledge called episteme
in Greek, that is contrasted with the higher knowledge, gnosis,
which is the sole possession of the Higher Soul. Plotinus also refers to
this dual nature as the 'We' (emeis), for although the individual
souls are in a sense divided and differentiated through their prismatic
fragmentation (cf. I.1.8, IV.3.4, and IV.9.5), they remain in contact by
virtue of their communal contemplation of their prior -- this is the source
of their unity. One must keep in mind, however, that the individual souls
and the Higher Soul are not two separate orders or types of soul, nor is
the "living being" a third entity derived from them. These terms are employed
by Plotinus for the sole purpose of making clear the various aspects of
the Soul's governing action, which is the final stage of emanation
proceeding from the Intelligence's contemplation of the power of the One.
The "living being" occupies the lowest level of rational, contemplative
existence. It is the purpose of the "living being" to govern the fluctuating
nature of matter by receiving its impressions, and turning them into intelligible
forms for the mind of the soul to contemplate, and make use of, in its
ordering of the cosmos. Now in order to receive the impressions or sensations
from material existence, the soul must take on certain characteristics
of matter (I.8.8-9) -- the foremost characteristic being that of passivity,
or the ability to undergo disruptions in one's being, and remain affected
by these disturbances. Therefore, a part of the "living being" will, of
necessity, descend too far into the material or changeable realm, and will
come to unite with its opposite (i.e., pure passivity) to the point that
it falls away from the vivifying power of the Soul, or the reasoning principle
of the 'We.' In order to understand how this occurs, how it is remedied,
and what are the consequences for the Soul and the cosmos that it governs,
a few words must be said concerning sense-perception and memory.
b. Sense-Perception and Memory
Sense-perception, as Plotinus conceives it, may be described as the
production and cultivation of images (of the forms residing in the Intelligence,
and contemplated by the Soul). These images aid the soul in its act of
governing the passive, and for that reason disorderly, realm of matter.
The soul's experience of bodily sensation (pathos) is an experience
of something alien to it, for the soul remains always what it is: an intellectual
being. However, as has already been stated, in order for the soul to govern
matter, it must take on certain of matter's characteristics. The soul accomplishes
this by 'translating' the immediate disturbances of the body -- i.e., physical
pain, emotional disturbances, even physical love or lust -- into intelligible
realties (noeta) (cf. I.1.7). These intelligible realities are then
contemplated by the soul as 'types' (tupoi) of the true images (eidolon)
'produced' through the Soul's eternal contemplation of the Intelligence,
by virtue of which the cosmos persists and subsists as a living image of
the eternal Cosmos that is the Intelligible Realm. The individual souls
order or govern the material realm by bringing these 'types' before the
Higher Soul in an act of judgment (krinein), which completes the
movement or moment of sense-perception (aisthesis). This perception,
then, is not a passive imprinting or 'stamping' of a sensible image upon
a receptive soul; rather, it is an action of the soul, indicative of the
soul's natural, productive power (cf. IV.6.3). This 'power' is indistinguishable
from memory (mnemes), for it involves, as it were, a recollection,
on the part of the lower soul, of certain 'innate' ideas, by which it is
able to perceive what it perceives -- and most importantly, by virtue of
which it is able to know what it knows. The soul falls into error only
when it 'falls in love' with the 'types' of the true images it already
contains, in its higher part, and mistakes these 'types' for realities.
When this occurs, the soul will make judgments independently of its higher
part, and will fall into 'sin' (hamartia), that is, it will 'miss
the mark' of right governance, which is its proper nature. Since such a
'fallen' soul is almost a separate being (for it has ceased to fully contemplate
its 'prior,' or higher part), it will be subject to the 'judgment' of the
Higher Soul, and will be forced to endure a chain of incarnations in various
bodies, until it finally remembers its 'true self,' and turns its mind
back to the contemplation of its higher part, and returns to its natural
state (cf. IV.8.4). This movement is necessary for the maintenance of the
cosmos, since, as Plotinus tells us, "the totality of things cannot continue
limited to the intelligible so long as a succession of further existents
is possible; although less perfect, they necessarily are because the prior
existent necessarily is" (IV.8.3, tr. O'Brien). No soul can govern matter
and remain unaffected by the contact. However, Plotinus assures us that
the Highest Soul remains unaffected by the fluctuations and chaotic affections
of matter, for it never ceases to productively contemplate its prior --
which is to say: it never leaves its proper place. It is for this reason
that even the souls that 'fall' remain part of the unity of the 'We,' for
despite any forgetfulness that may occur on their part, they continue to
owe their persistence in being to the presence of their higher part --
the Soul (cf. IV.1 and IV.2, "On the Essence of the Soul").
c. Individuality and Personality
The individual souls that are disseminated throughout the cosmos, and
the Soul that presides over the cosmos, are, according to Plotinus, an
essential unity. This is not to say that he denies the unique existence
of the individual soul, nor what we would call a personality. However,
personality, for Plotinus, is something accrued, an addition of alien elements
that come to be attached to the pure soul through its assimilative contact
with matter (cf. IV.7.10, and cp. Plato, Republic 611b-612a). In
other words, we may say that the personality is, for Plotinus, a by-product
of the soul's governance of matter -- a governance
that requires a certain degree of affectivity between the vivifying soul
and its receptive substratum (hupokeimenon). The soul is not really
'acted upon' by matter, but rather receives from the matter it animates,
certain unavoidable impulses (horme) which come to limit or bind
(horos) the soul in such a way as to make of it a "particular being,"
possessing the illusory quality of being distinct from its source, the
Soul. Plotinus does, however, maintain that each "particular being" is
the product, as it were, of an intelligence (a logos spermatikos),
and that the essential quality of each 'psychic manifestation' is already
inscribed as a thought with the cosmic Mind (Nous); yet he makes
it clear that it is only the essence (ousia) of the individual soul
that is of Intelligible origin (V.7.1-3). The peculiar qualities of each
individual, derived from contact with matter, are discardable accruements
that only serve to distort the true nature of the soul. It is for this
reason that the notion of the 'autonomy of the individual' plays no part
in the dialectical onto-theology of Plotinus. The sole purpose of the individual
soul is to order the fluctuating representations of the material realm,
through the proper exercise of sense-perception, and to remain, as far
as is possible, in imperturbable contact with its prior. The lower part
of the soul, the seat of the personality, is an unfortunate but necessary
supplement to the Soul's actualization of the ideas it contemplates. Through
the soul's 'gift' of determinate order to the pure passivity that is matter,
this matter comes to 'exist' in a state of ever-changing receptivity, of
chaotic malleability. This malleability is mirrored in and by the accrued
'personality' of the soul. When this personality is experienced as something
more than a conduit between pure sense-perception and the act of judgment
that makes the perception(s) intelligible, then the soul has fallen into
forgetfulness. At this stage, the personality serves as a surrogate to
the authentic existence provided by and through contemplation of the Soul.
4. Ethics
The highest attainment of the individual soul is, for Plotinus, "likeness
to God as far as is possible" (I.2.1; cf. Plato, Theaetetus 176b).
This likeness is achieved through the soul's intimate state of contemplation
of its prior -- the Higher Soul -- which is, in fact, the individual soul
in its own purified state. Now since the Soul does
not come into direct contact with matter like the 'fragmented,' individual
souls do, the purified soul will remain aloof from the disturbances of
the realm of sense (pathos) and will no longer directly govern the
cosmos, but leave the direct governance to those souls that still remain
enmeshed in matter (cf. VI.9.7). The lower souls
that descend too far into matter are those souls which experience most
forcefully the dissimilative, negative affectivity of vivified matter.
It is to these souls that the experience of Evil falls.
For this reason, Plotinus was unable to develop a rigorous ethical system
that would account for the responsibilities and moral codes of an individual
living a life amidst the fluctuating realm of the senses. According to
Plotinus, the soul that has descended too far into matter needs to "merely
think on essential being" in order to become reunited with its higher part
(IV.8.4). This seems to constitute Plotinus' answer to any ethical questions
that may have been posed to him. In fact, Plotinus develops a radical stance
vis-a-vis ethics, and the problem of human suffering. In keeping with his
doctrine that the higher part of the soul remains wholly unaffected by
the disturbances of the sense-realm, Plotinus declares that only the lower
part of the soul suffers, is subject to passions, and vices, etc. In order
to drive the point home, Plotinus makes use of a striking illustration.
Invoking the ancient torture device known as the Bull of Phalaris (a hollow
bronze bull in which a victim was placed; the bull was then heated until
it became red hot), he tells us that only the lower part of the soul will
feel the torture, while the higher part remains in repose, in contemplation
(I.4.13). Although Plotinus does not explicitly say so, we may assume that
the soul that has reunited with its higher part will not feel the torture
at all. Since the higher part of the soul is (1) the source and true state
of existence of all souls, (2) cannot be affected in any way by sensible
affections, and (3) since the lower soul possesses of itself the ability
to free itself from the bonds of matter, all particular questions concerning
ethics and morality are subsumed, in Plotinus' system, by the single grand
doctrine of the soul's essential imperturbability. The problems plaguing
the lower soul are not, for Plotinus, serious issues for philosophy. His
general attitude may be summed up by a remark made in the course of one
of his discussions of 'Providence':
"A gang of lads, morally neglected, and in that respect inferior
to the intermediate class, but in good physical training, attack and overthrow
another set, trained neither physically nor morally, and make off with
their food and their dainty clothes. What more is called for than a laugh?"
(III.2.8, tr. MacKenna).
Of course, Plotinus was no anarchist, nor was he an advocate of violence
or lawlessness. Rather, he was so concerned with the welfare and the ultimate
salvation of each individual soul, that he elevated philosophy -- the highest
pursuit of the soul -- to the level of a divine act, capable of purifying
each and every soul of the tainting accruements of sensual existence. Plotinus'
last words, recorded by Porphyry, more than adequately summarize the goal
of his philosophy: "Strive to bring back the god in yourselves to the God
in the All" (Life of Plotinus 2).
5. Suggestions for Further Reading
Elmer O'Brien, S. J. (1964) tr., The Essential Plotinus: Representative
Treatises From The Enneads (Hackett Publishing).
This fine translation of the more accessible, if not always most relevant,
treatises of Plotinus serves as a valuable introduction to the work of
a difficult and often obscure thinker. The Introduction by O'Brien is invaluable.
Plotinus, The Enneads, tr. Stephen MacKenna, with Introduction
and Notes by John Dillon (Penguin Books: 1991).
Stephen MacKenna's rightly famous translation of Plotinus is more interpretive
than literal, and often less clear to a modern English reader than what
is to be found in O'Brien's translation. However, before delving into the
original Greek of Plotinus, one would do well to familiarize oneself with
the poetic lines of MacKenna. The Penguin edition, although unfortunately
abridged, contains an excellent Introduction by John Dillon, as well as
a fine article by Paul Henry, S. J., "The Place of Plotinus in the History
of Thought." Also included is MacKenna's translation of Porphyry's Life
of Plotinus.
Plotinus, The Enneads, tr. A. H. Armstrong, including the Greek,
in 7 volumes (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard-London: 1966-1968).
This is a readily available edition of Plotinus' Greek text. Armstrong's
translation is quite literal, but for that reason, often less than helpful
in rendering the subtleties of Plotinus' thought. For the reader who is
ready to tackle Plotinus' difficult Greek, it is recommended that she make
use of the Loeb edition in conjunction with the translations of O'Brien
and MacKenna, relying only marginally on Armstrong for guidance.
Porphyry, Launching-Points to the Realm of Mind, tr. Kenneth
Guthrie (Phanes Press: 1988). [A translation of Pros ta noeta aphorismoi]
This little introduction to Plotinus' philosophy by his most famous
student is highly interesting, and quite valuable for an understanding
of Plotinus' influence on later Platonists. However, as an accurate representation
of Plotinus' thought, this treatise falls short. Porphyry often develops
his own unique interpretations and arguments under the guise of a commentary
on Plotinus. But that is as it should be. The greatest student is often
the most violently original interpreter of his master's thought.
Frederick Copleston, S. J. A History of Philosophy: Volume 1, Greece
and Rome, Part II (Image Books: 1962).
This history of philosophy is considered something of a classic in the
field, and the section on Plotinus is well worth reading. However, Copleston's
analysis of Plotinus' system represents the orthodox scholarly interpretation
of Plotinus that has persisted up until the present day, with all its virtues
and flaws. The account in the history book is no substitute for a careful
study of Plotinus' text, although it does provide useful pointers for the
beginner.
Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Harvard
University Press: 1970).
This is a complete English translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente
der Vorsokratiker, the standard edition of the surviving fragments
of the Pre-Socratic philosophers. The study of these fragments, especially
Parmenides,
Heraclitus, Empedocles,
and Anaxagoras,
provides an essential background for the study of Plotinus.
Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, tr. David B. Allison (Northwestern
University Press: 1973).
The essay "Form and Meaning: A Note on the Phenomenology of Language,"
in this edition, literally has Plotinus written all 'oeuvre' it.
To understand Plotinus in the fullest fashion, don't forget to familiarize
yourself with Plato's Symposium, Phaedrus, Phaedo,
the Republic, and the Letters (esp. II and VII), not to mention
Aristotle,
the Stoics
and the Epicureans,
the Hellenistic Astrologers,
the Gnostics, the Hermetic Corpus,
Philo and
Origen.
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