Berkeley: Three Dialogues

First Dialogue

Hylas could not sleep well the previous night since the evening before he was in a discussion with philosophers about those who deny the existence of matter (particularly Philonous). Hylas believes such a view is dangerous skepticism. He meets with Philonous early in the morning and they discuss this issue. Philonous also believes that skepticism is dangerous, but denies that his rejection of material existence is skeptical. The point of this first dialogue is to show that all primary and secondary qualities of sensible things exist only in the mind. The key to Berkeley's argument is the definition of a "sensible thing" is a thing perceived immediately by the senses (excluding any possible cause of that sensible thing). He concludes by briefly noting that matter does not exist (since it would be parasitic on primary qualities, but primary qualities exist only in the mind). Berkeley gives a more detailed argument against the existence of matter in the second dialogue.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Nature of Skepticism

1. H's first definition: where one doubts (suspends judgment about) everything

a) Crit: but P is not a skeptic since he clearly denounces matter

2. H's second definition: one who doubts everything or denies the reality of sensible things

a) Whether P is a skeptic depends on whether he denies the realty of sensible things. P argues that in fact belief in matter is a denial of the reality of sensible things

B. Definition of Sensible Thing

1. Things which are perceived by the senses

a) Perceived immediately

b) Does not involve the causes of the thing (e.g. cause of diversity of colors of the sky)

c) Does not involve any inferences made about the thing (e.g. meaning)

C. Q: Do qualities of sensible things reside in external objects or in the mind of the perceiver?

II. ALL SECONDARY QUALITIES EXIST ONLY IN A PERSON'S MIND

A. Tactile Qualities (heat, warmth and coldness)

1. Re: hot, painful (or cold and painful) objects

a) The heat and the pain cannot be distinguished

(1) Hence, intense heat is in the mind of the person

2. Re: warm objects

a) Degrees of heat shouldn't change this fact

b) Put a hot and cold hand in the same warm water: the perceived sensation is different

c) The painful feeling produced by a sharp pin is not a quality in the pin; the same goes for hot coals

B. Tastes (bitter, sweet)

1. Tastes are kinds of pleasures, and as such cannot reside in the object itself

2. H's reply: there is some unperceived sensible quality which is responsible our perception of bitter and sweet

a) Crit: we cannot appeal to unperceived sensible qualities according to the definition of "sensible quality" (which involves immediate sensations and not the causes of sensation)

C. Smells

1. Odors are either pleasing or unpleasing

2. Animals do not perceive vile odors as we do

D. Sounds

1. H's theory: sounds qualities in themselves are air motions, by they appear to us differently

2. Crit: motions can only be seen or felt; they cannot be heard

3. Crit: motions cannot be loud sweet, acute or grave

E. Colors

1. H's theory: Colors must exist in the object themselves since you can see the color directly on the object

a) Crit: such objects are not distinct from sensible qualities

b) Crit: colors in clouds are only apparent colors (vanish upon nearer approach); and under a microscope, all colors vanish in the same way

c) Crit: smaller animals perceive very minute details which do not appear to us (such as color); this suggests that color exists in the mid of the perceiver

d) Crit: if colors were real properties, they could admit of no alteration; but colors do change according to the light

e) H's reply: light agitates the optic nerve transmitting color

(1) Response: again H is appealing to imperceivable things, which fall outside the realm of "sensible qualities"

III. ALL PRIMARY QUALITIES EXIST ONLY IN A PERSON'S MIND

A. Extension or figure: the property of occupying space (P's arguments)

1. The same object appears to have different extension, depending on the size of the perceiver

a) E.g. the foot of a mite as perceived by us, the mite, or an even smaller creature

b) One thing cannot be in different dimensions at the same time

2. Extension varies as we approach or recede from the object

a) Hence extension is not inherent in the object

3. The same object appears both smooth and round depending on our perspective (e.g. looking through a microscope)

B. Motion (P's arguments)

1. A rapid motion involves the passing of an object through space in a given amount of time

2. Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our mind, which varies,

3. One motion may be perceived as rapid or slow

4. Therefore, the quality of motion is not inherent in the object

C. Solidity (hardness or resistance) P's arguments

1. Solidity depends on the firmness of our limbs

Q: Why is there a distinction made between primary and secondary qualities, if both exist only in one's mind?

A: Secondary qualities involve pleasure and pain, which are clearly subjective. We seem to be indifferent to sensations of primary qualities

IV. LEFTOVER ARGUMENTS

A. Sensible vs. Absolute Extension

1. H: Sensible extension is the space objects appear to have to us, and absolute extension is the space an objects has in its abstraction

2. P: Abstract ideas are only particular ones which are attached to a general term; hence there is no idea of absolute extension apart from sensible extension

a) Crit: mathematicians use the abstract notion of quantity

(1) Reply: words aside, they are not the pure ideas of extension

b) Crit: absolute extension comes from the pure intellect

(1) Reply: pure intellect involves things like God, and virtue, not figures

B. Sensations vs. Objects

1. H: Sensations involve an act of the mind, and objects do not

2. P: Sensations (e.g. color) are passively perceived, with no volitional action; hence the distinction between sensation and object disappears

C. Matter or Material Substratum (P's arguments)

1. Matter is spread beneath all qualities; but such spreading requires extension, which is mentally dependent

2. Same argument works for any metaphor (supporting or standing)

D. Primary and Secondary Qualities taken Together

1. H: can conceive of a house independent of the mind

a) P: this conception itself is clearly dependent on the mind

2. H: the fact that objects appear at a distance suggests they are distinct from the mind

a) P: distance is learned; a blind man who regains his sight could not perceive distance in his field of vision

b) P: distance is measured in a strait line from our eye, which we can never see

3. H: matter is perceived mediately (like perceiving a person based on a picture), not immediately (like color)

a) P: so-called mediate perception is merely knowledge

4. H: the idea of matter is at least logically possible

a) P: variable perceptions cannot be copies of fixed objects

b) P: sensible things (such as color) cannot be like matter, which is insensible

Second Dialogue

The second dialogue shows that matter (however described) does not exist. This the clear implication of the rejection of matter is idealism, where only perceiving minds and perceptions (or ideas) exist. On this theory, God is responsible for feeding our minds all sense data. Berkeley begins by distinguishing his position from Malbranche's (where God is also responsible for providing the human soul with ideas).

V. INTRODUCTION

A. Basic Metaphysical Divisions

1. Monism: one kind of thing exists

a) Some believe it is matter (materialists) others believe it is mind (idealists)

2. Dualism: two kinds of things exist

a) Matter

b) Spirit

3. Pluralism: more than two kinds of things exist

B. Ideas are Traces in the Brain

1. Animal spirits in our veins communicate sensory information to the brain, and leave traces (ideas or perceptions) upon the brain

2. Crit: The brain is a sensible thing and therefore exists only in the mind

3. Crit: Cannot be a connection between the motion of nerves and the perception of sound

C. Idealism

1. Rejection of skepticism

a) H: affirms now that no sensible things have real existence

b) P: This view is too skeptical since sensible qualities have real existence in the mind of God

2. Proof for God's Existence

a) When looking out in the world, it is (intuitively) clear that sensible objects exist apart from us (although they cannot exist apart from mind)

b) It follows that there exists some all perfect mind which continually perceives all sensible objects

3. Argument for God's existence is not based on contrivance, but the bare existence of the sensible world

D. Whether we see all things through God (a la Melbranche)

1. The immaterial soul cannot directly encounter material things, perceive; consequently, God, who is pure spirit (and can encounter both the material and immaterial)

2. Crit: (ockham's razor) there is no real need for the external world, hence would be a useless creation

VI. AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER (variously described)

A. Matter Discovered by Reason

1. H: perhaps there is matter in this limited sense where it is not sensible but discovered by reason

2. P: Matter, as generally understood, is a sensible object with extension (etc.); it is an abuse of language to call this rationally understood thing matter

a) Alternatively, H abuses language by calling God "matter"

B. Matter as Causal Motion

1. (not sure what the point is here)

C. Matter as an Instrument

1. H: God uses matter as an instrument to cause our ideas

2. P: But this kind of instrument would be devoid of all sensible qualities, even extension

3. H: Matter may be an instrument in a very general sense

4. P: Instruments are used only when there is a need, but God has no need

D. Matter as an Occasion for God to Give us Perceptions

1. H: The presence of matter is the occasion at which God excites ideas in our minds

2. P: God's power alone can account for these ideas without

E. Matter as a Confused Perception

1. Crit: of the perception of this

a) It is perceived either mediately (which requires a rational train of inference) or immediately (which requires that we specify the sense by which we perceive it)

2. Crit: of this matter itself

a) It must be a cause, substrate, instrument or occasion, which have already been refuted

F. Matter as Defined Negatively

1. H: matter is some indescribable entity with no positive notion

2. P: "Matter" in this sense amounts to nothing

a) It is reasonable to assume the existence of something when there are causes, effects, or signs of this thing which are observable; but there are no such clues indicating the existence of matter

3. Reply: belief in Matter is Necessary for Reality

a) Crit: the reality of the intangible cannot be proof of the tangible

G. Matter is Possible

1. Crit: this makes matter only on the same level as a golden mountain

2. Crit: the matter is impossible

a) An idea is impossible when it contains an internal repugnancy

b) The idea of extended matter is internally repugnant

c) The idea of an indescribable matter is a vacuous idea, hence cannot be repugnant in itself (but is just as bad)

Third Dialogue

VII. INTRODUCTION

A. Against Skepticism

1. H: Denies that absolute knowledge is possible about anything

a) Although he may know that a rock is before him, he cannot say what the nature of the rock is

2. P: This skepticism results from taking the denial of matter too far

a) Denying matter does not entail denying external reality

VIII. EXISTENCE IS BEING PERCEIVED

A. Common Sense Approach to Reality

1. P takes things in a common sense way, as they appear to his senses

2. He believes in external existence since he cannot help it

B. God Sustains All Things by Perceiving Them

1. H: it is unreasonable to think that an object disappears once we are through perceiving it

2. P: God is always perceiving things, hence they continue to exist even when we do not perceive them (i.e. even when God does not feed us sense data)

IX. VARIOUS CRITICISMS

A. God vs. Matter

1. Crit: We have no idea of God, hence we cannot conceive of things existing in his mind

a) Reply: We have an idea of ourselves; when we strip away the imperfections in this idea, we then have some idea of an active thinking God

2. Crit: If we can conceive of God without a perception of him, why can't we conceive of matter in the same way?

a) Reply: Matter is neither perceived directly nor through reflection

3. Crit: There is still no proof of spiritual substance, yet P believes in it (at the expense of material substance)

a) Reply: the idea of spiritual substance may be derived from reflection, but the idea of material substance is internally repugnant

B. Idealism and the Common Man

1. H: The average person would deny that existence is being perceived

2. P: On the contrary; the average person would say he believes that a tree exists because he can see it.

C. Idealism Cannot Distinguish Dreams from those in Reality

1. H: dreams and reality are equally dependent upon the mind

2. P: dreams and products of the imagination are faint, and depend on the will; sense impressions are more lively and do not depend on the will

D. Denying Corporeal Causes is Extravagant

1. P: It is more extravagant to say that an inert thing operates on the mind

2. P: The scriptures represent God as the sole and immediate author of all things

E. God would be the Author of Evil

1. P: if God were a mediator between matter and mind, then he would be responsible for evil; but God is not a mediator

2. P: evil does not consist of outward actions, but inward attitudes

a) The same action may be good or bad depending on the motive

3. P: our mental motions are within control of our own wills

F. Consensus is Against Idealism

1. P: A survey would show that most people affirm material existence

2. H: If the questions were worded impartially, people would deny matter in favor of idealism

G. Idealism Cannot Explain Optical Illusions

1. H: Since people judge reality by their senses, how can they be mistaken about certain perceptions?

2. P: An error in judgment occurs when we connect the ideas we apprehend to those immediately perceived

a) i.e. to assume all perceptions of the same event (even up close) would be represented in the same way

H. Alternatives to a Spiritual cause

1. H: Perhaps the cause of perceptions is something in between spirit and matter

2. P: The cause of perceptions is active, hence proper use of words makes us call this cause spirit

I. God and Pain

1. H: With idealism, our pain would be pain in God

2. P: No external being can affect God since God does not perceive things by senses as we do

3. P: God knows everything (which is a perfection) but he does not feel pain (which would be an imperfection)

J. Matter, Gravity and Motion

1. H: The quantity of matter is proportioned to the gravity of a body

a) Proof: the quantity of motion in a body is proportional to the velocity and matter together

2. P: This is not a proof for matter, since it assumes matter

3. P: The idea of "proportional to sensible qualities" presupposes a substratum

K. Science and the Denial of Matter

1. H: Denying matter goes against scientific discoveries which suppose the existence of matter

2. P: The existence of matter in no way helps a scientist arrive at his theories

a) Such ideas are produced by knowledge and will; matter would help little with such explanations

3. P: Scientists have been reasoning about the connection of ideas, which has been both useful and entertaining