Since the appearance of the Treatise in 1739, Hume's writings have been branded atheistic and anti-religious. He attacked the character of the clergy, questioned the veracity of any miracle account, criticized theistic proofs, and reduced religious belief to psychological principles of the imagination. His contemporaries also accused him of more clandestine mischief. William Jones, for example, suggested that the main aim of Hume's life was "to invent a sort of philosophy that should effect the overthrow of Christianity."⁽¹⁾

Given Hume's notorious reputation as an enemy of religion, it is interesting that questions remain about Hume's precise views on the subject. Capaldi argues that Hume accepted the design argument for God's existence.⁽²⁾ O'Higgins and Gaskin argue that Hume was a qualified deist.⁽³⁾ For Noxon, Hume is an agnostic.⁽⁴⁾ Mossner and Livingston argue that Hume advanced his own humanistic religion.⁽⁵⁾ Kemp Smith and Williams argue that Hume's religion consisted of merely holding open the possibility of an intelligent creator.⁽⁶⁾ Most of this debate traces back to passages in the "Natural History of Religion," and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in which Hume seems to endorse the design argument.⁽⁷⁾ However, since other passages in Hume's writings directly attack the design argument, interpretation becomes complicated. Scholars today resolve this interpretational problem by maintaining that in at least some of these passages Hume's true religious views are camouflaged by literary devices.

Interestingly, Hume's 18th century critics also recognized his use of literary devices. Indeed, the early commentaries on Hume's religious writings are dominated by attempts to identify and decode Hume's concealed religious views. Little work has been done in Hume scholarship to understand the nature and scope of this aspect of his early critics. The purpose of the present essay is to resurrect the discussions of the "Natural History" and the Dialogues in which Hume's 18th century critics attempt to uncover his concealed meanings. It is beyond the scope of this study to systematically examine either Hume's religious writings or his critics' reactions. I have attempted only to catalog and interpret individual passages from Hume's critics which acknowledge Hume's technique of concealment. I will argue that these critics had definite opinions about where Hume concealed his religious views in his texts, and what he was concealing. The 200 years which separate us from Hume do not prevent us from detecting his concealment. However, Hume's contemporaries clearly had the advantage of historical context. I conclude by noting that their overall assessment of Hume's concealed religious views was more skeptical than the assessment of the contemporary commentators noted above.

Over the years, many Hume commentators have attempted to shed light on Hume's religious writings by appealing to anecdotal stories where Hume appears to affirm theism. Presumably, if Hume the man avowed theism, then this has some implication on the religious views of Hume the philosopher.⁽⁸⁾ Such behind-the-scenes accounts seem particularly relevant given both the personal nature of the subject of religion and the indirect manner in which Hume approaches the subject in his writings. Adam Ferguson, for example, related a story to his son where Hume looked at the sky one night and said, "Oh, Adam, can any one contemplate the wonders of that firmament, and not believe that there is a God?"⁽⁹⁾ Unfortunately, even if an event similar to this took place, the absence of a context of this story makes it impossible to know the sincerity of Hume's statement.

But, an anecdote by Diderot about Hume's first meeting with the French philosophes has a more clear context, and is therefore taken more seriously:
 

The first time that M. Hume found himself at the table of the Baron [D'Holbach], he was seated beside him. I don't know for what purpose the English philosopher took it into his head to remark to the Baron that he did not believe in atheists, that he had never seen any. The Baron said to him: "Count how many we are here." We are eighteen. The Baron added: "It isn't too bad a showing to be able to point out to you fifteen at once: the three others haven't made up their minds.⁽¹⁰⁾

Several scholars argue that this amounts to a denial of atheism on Hume's part.⁽¹¹⁾ But, assuming Diderot's account is accurate, this inference is not immediately obvious. Diderot himself is puzzled by the purpose behind Hume's remark. Further, Hume was particularly cautious about what he said publicly. A brief character sketch of Hume, penned partly by himself, makes this aspect of his personality particularly clear: "Licentious in his pen, cautious in his words, still more so in his actions."⁽¹²⁾ Since this was Hume's first meeting in that circle, it is reasonable to think he would have been cautious in his words.

David Berman argues that the Diderot anecdote must be seen in the context of an 18th century dispute about whether genuine speculative atheism was possible. For Berman, Hume was purposefully provoking an admission of speculative atheism from D'Holbach. Berman concludes that Hume's message to D'Holbach "amounted to a repudiation of the word 'atheism' and an affirmation of something close to atheism."⁽¹³⁾ Given the emotional overtones of the word "atheism," Berman's suggestion that Hume suppressed or disavowed this term is reasonable. However, the issue remains whether at that meeting Hume disbelieved in divine being, in spite of his rejection of the atheistic label.

Anecdotes such as Ferguson's and Diderot's must be balanced against other anecdotes which imply that Hume the man rejected the existence of God. For example, Boswell recounts the following story from the close of Hume's life:
 

Speaking of his singular notion that men of religion were generally bad, he [i.e. Hume] said, 'One of the men' (or 'The man'-I am not sure which) 'of the greatest honour that I ever knew is my Lord Marischal, who is a downright atheist. I remember I once hinted something as if I believed in the being of a God, and he would not speak to me for a week.'⁽¹⁴⁾

This story relates that Lord Marischal assumed Hume shared his "downright atheism" until Hume played his prank.⁽¹⁵⁾ Although this anecdote seems to be the antithesis of the first two, it falls short of a reliable confession of "downright atheism." At minimum, though, both Boswell's and Diderot's anecdotes raise an important question about what it meant to be a "downright atheist"⁽¹⁶⁾ in the 18th century.

Philosophers and theologians at that time could be branded "atheists" for objecting to any conventional tenant of religion. For example, William Belsham writes that the "essential or practical difference between Deism and Atheism... [is] the immortality of the soul."⁽¹⁷⁾ David Norton argues that in this setting, Hume scores impressively as an atheist for attacking the concept of a personal God, the immortality of the soul, and religious ethics.⁽¹⁸⁾ However, 18th century writers also make a conceptual distinction between what might be called strict atheism and less severe forms of infidelity. The reference works of the day define atheism as the denial of God's existence.⁽¹⁹⁾ Shaftesbury argues that "To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or Rule of Things, but Chance... is to be a perfect Atheist.⁽²⁰⁾ For these writers, the key criterion of atheism is denying the existence of God or a designing mind.⁽²¹⁾

Hume was also aware of the conceptual notion of strict atheism. The following entry from his "Memoranda" is particularly revealing:
 

Three kinds of Atheists according to some. 1. Who deny the Existence of a God. Such as Diagoras, Theodorus. 2. Who deny a Providence, Such as the Epicureans & the Ionic Sect. 3. Who deny the Freewill of the Deity, Such as Aristotle, the Stoics. &c.

The distinctions here, which are from Plato's Laws⁽²²⁾ and Cicero's De Natura Deorum⁽²³⁾, also appear in a 1742 letter to William Mure.⁽²⁴⁾ The first variety of atheism, especially in Plato's and Cicero's contexts, is a strict denial of God's existence. But although the conceptual notion of strict atheism was open to Hume, we can never show with certainty that Hume was a strict atheist: we have no record of a direct denial by Hume of God's existence, either anecdotally or in his philosophical writings. The most we can say about Hume's atheism is that he is an atheist in the broader sense as argued by Norton. But it is less important to determine whether the term "atheist" applies to Hume than it is to determine his views on the nature of religion and the existence of God. Evidence of this will come from Hume's philosophical writings, and not from the available anecdotes.

Hume wrote at a time when challenging traditional religious views could lead to censure, imprisonment and exile. Thomas Jefferson faced a similar problem by virtue of his own unconventional religious views. Fearing unfavorable public reaction, Jefferson tells Charles Clay that "I not only write nothing on religion, but rarely permit myself to speak on it."⁽²⁵⁾ Unlike Jefferson, Hume did not remain silent. Instead, he cautiously selected the particular religious topics he would criticize, and, more importantly, the literary approach he would take in his critique.

In the Treatise, Hume briefly discusses the psychological effects of directly criticizing people, as opposed to indirectly criticizing them through "secret insinuations" or "intimations:"
 

Every one knows, there is an indirect manner of insinuating praise or Blame, which is much less shocking than the open flattery or censure of any person.... One who lashes me with conceal'd strokes of satire, moves not my indignation to such a degree, as if he flatly told me I was a fool and coxcomb; tho' I equally understand his meaning, as if he did. (T 150-151)⁽²⁶⁾

Hume argues that direct critique is more insulting since the link between the utterance and the intended idea is more immediate, and therefore stronger. With indirect critique, the link is more "uncommon," "singular," "rare," and "particular," and therefore more weak. At the risk of reading too much into this distinction, it is interesting to see how Hume's own critiques of religion can be categorized according to their direct or indirect approaches. An example of a direct critique can be found in the "Natural History of Religion," where Hume notes the absurdity of the Roman Catholic eucharistic doctrine of the real presence.⁽²⁷⁾ This was a safe target, however, since the consequences of directly offending Catholics in 18th century Great Britain were minimal. Another less successful direct critique of religion appears in Hume's first published edition of the History of Great Britain where he argues that the first Protestant reformers were fanatical or "inflamed with the highest enthusiasm" in their opposition to Roman Catholic domination.⁽²⁸⁾ Public reaction to this passage was so severe that he printed a defense of his critique in a note in the next volume of the History. There he argues that "It is no proof of irreligion in an historian, that he remarks some fault or imperfection in each sect of religion, which he has occasion to mention."⁽²⁹⁾ In the end, both the original passage and footnote were dropped from subsequent editions of the History.⁽³⁰⁾

Although some of Hume's critiques of religion are direct, such as those above, the more extreme ones fall into his category of indirect critiques. Hume's indirect approach to attacking religion was recognized early. Joseph Priestley, for example, comments that,
 

Mr. Hume, Mr. Gibbon, and the generality of Unbelievers in England, always wrote under the mask of Christianity, and attacked it not directly, but only in an artful, insidious manner.⁽³¹⁾

Most critics attempted to shed light on Hume's "artful" and "insidious" comments. A favorite target was Hume's concluding comment in his essay "Of Miracles" about the miraculous divine intervention required for Christian belief. John Briggs, for example, charges that Hume's real point is that Christian belief requires "miraculous stupidity."⁽³²⁾ Hume's History of England was also a target. In 1756 Daniel MacQueen published his Letters on Mr. Hume's History, the purpose of which was to expose all of the "loose and irreligious sneers" Hume makes against Christianity. By the time Hume's "Natural History" was published in 1757, Hume's critics were well aware that he concealed many of his views in his writings. William Rose opens his review of Four dissertations with a general evaluation of Hume's writings.⁽³³⁾ After complimenting Hume's original and elegant writing style, he continues that,
 

It is to be regretted, however, that such a genius should employ his abilities in the manner he frequently does. In his attacks upon the religion of his country, he acts not the part of an open and generous enemy, but endeavours to weaken its authority by oblique hints, and artful insinuations.

What Rose describes as "oblique hints" and "artful insinuations" many Hume scholars today describe as irony.⁽³⁴⁾ However, although Hume is undeniably ironic in many of his writings, it may be more accurate to refer to Hume's oblique hints by another name. Then, as now, the core meaning of "irony" involves speaking contrary to one's thoughts. Johnson's example of irony from his Dictionary is, "Bolingbroke was a holy man." On the rare occasions that Hume was accused of irony in the 18th century, it was understood in this sense.⁽³⁵⁾ "Irony" also implies humor. Anthony Collins in A discourse concerning ridicule and irony in writing (1729) uses the term in the context of satire, wit, humor, and drollery.⁽³⁶⁾

Often, when Hume writes between the lines, he is neither stating the opposite of his true views nor being humorous. For example, a passage from Hume's original version of the "Natural History" states,
 

Thus the deity, whom the vulgar Jews conceived only as the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, became their Jehovah and Creator of the world.⁽³⁷⁾

By specifically attacking the God of the Jews in the above, Hume is making an indirect attack on the God of the Christians. However, this passage could not be called ironic. "Concealment" is a more accurate general designator for Hume's hidden approach. "Concealment" is also a term which Hume himself uses to indicate the technique of indirect critique (T 150).

The following sections compile specific 18th century reactions to the "Natural History" and Dialogues. These show that, as a matter of policy, Hume's readers actively read between the lines of Hume's writings in an attempt to expose his concealed religious views.

The Critical Review opened its review of the "Natural History" with a general warning to the reader that,
 

[A]uthors of such acknowledged and distinguished abilities as Mr. Hume, are always to be read with care and caution, more especially on subjects of this nature [i.e. religion], because wherever there is a power to please and to persuade, there is also a power to mislead and to betray....⁽³⁸⁾

Indeed, respondents to the "Natural History" were cautious in reading Hume. The very title of the "Natural History" drew suspicion. For example, the second Appendix to Duncan Shaw's A comparative view (1776) opens noting that "The Epithet of Natural History, when applied to the account given of the natural productions of a country... we can easily see, and must at first admit the propriety of, but when applied to Religion, we must be excused, if we say it is not so apparent." He continues that Hume's title "naturally attracts attention, and which (let me say so without offence) it is probable was given as much for this reason, as for any propriety there is in it." Shaw believes that a more accurate title would be "a probable, likely account of the progress of Religion."⁽³⁹⁾

Shaw's observation correctly indicates that Hume's approach to the history of religion is different.⁽⁴⁰⁾ For, Hume is presenting a natural history of religion, as opposed to a history guided by religious presuppositions. However, Shaw unfairly accuses Hume of choosing this title solely to attract attention. Here Shaw identifies concealment where there probably is none. Elsewhere, however, Shaw naively takes Hume at his word where Hume is concealing something. Shaw argues that Hume contradicts himself by claiming that polytheism was the original religion, yet Adam, by reflecting on natural design, was a monotheist. Accordingly, Shaw is chastised in the London Review for missing Hume's concealed point. The reviewer concludes that, "We cannot help thinking, therefore, so shrewd and sceptical a logician as David Hume, still holds the theism of Adam to be, at best, problematical."⁽⁴¹⁾

The reaction of the London Reviewer to Shaw's credulity indicates that an astute reader of Hume was expected to pick up on concealed meanings. Like the London Reviewer, other critics focused specifically on Hume's hidden pronouncements against the Bible and Christianity. Rose in the Monthly Review concludes his otherwise impartial summary of the "Natural History" with the following:
 

Thus have we given a pretty full view of what is contained in Mr. Hume's first Dissertation; which abounds with shrewd reflections, and just observations, upon human nature: mixed with a considerable portion of that sceptical spirit, which is so apparent in all his works; and with some insinuations, artfully couched, against the Christian religion. (p. 133)

Thomas Stona in his Remarks upon the Natural history of religion (1758) also recognizes that Hume's true target in the "Natural History" is Christianity. But, for Stona, the issue is one of free speech. Stona opens with a letter from an inquiring friend hailing free speech since "to think is the prerogative of every rational creature, and freely to declare its sentiments, its happiest privilege." However, the inquirer continues arguing that those who endeavour to pervert or corrupt this advantage fall outside the bounds of free speech. He argues that Hume "may be suspected of some such intention, as he has advanced an opinion entirely repugnant to the profession of the Mosaic history" (pp. 2-3).

Both Rose and Stona make only general observations about Hume's concealed attack on Christianity. In his Remarks upon... the Natural History (1757), though, William Warburton attempts to expose Hume's hidden views more precisely. Warburton's first attack concerns an example Hume uses to confirm that theism arose from polytheism. Hume writes that "The Getes... were genuine theists and unitarians. They affirmed Zamolxis, their deity, to be the only true god; and asserted the worship of all other nations to be addressed to mere fictions and chimeras" (p. 53). Warburton responds that,
 

...this assertion contradicts all Antiquity, as well as the very nature and genius of Paganism itself. But what of that? It served an honest purpose: the purpose to which all his patriot endeavours tend, the discredit of Revelation. And on such an occasion a gratuitous assertion costs him nothing.⁽⁴²⁾

Warburton's point is that Hume is purposefully reading too much into the story of Zamolxis,⁽⁴³⁾ particularly that a city of pagan idolators would have developed a concept of genuine theism.

In showing the absurdity of monotheism, Hume cites Islam, which gives an all powerful being the infirmities and passions of finite humans. Hume concludes that "Nothing indeed would prove more strongly the divine origin of any religion, than to find (and happily this is the case with Christianity) that it is free from a contradiction, so incident to human nature." Clearly, Hume's point is that Christian theism suffers from the same defect. Warburton detects this immediately:
 

We see what the man would be at, thro' all his disguises. And, no doubt, he would be much mortified, if we did not; tho' the discovery, we make, is only this, That, of all the slanders against Revelation, this before us is the tritest, the dirtiest and most worn in the drudgery of Freethinking.... What I quote it for is only to shew the rancour of heart which possesses this unhappy man, and which could induce him to employ an insinuation against the Jewish and Christian Religions; not only of no weight in itself, but of none, I will venture to say, even in his own opinion. (pp. 44-45)

Again, Hume argues that each person thinks his own religion to be the best, citing Claudius Rutilius Namatianus that even the credulity of children could not engage them to believe Christianity (p. 81). Warburton replies,
 

Now here, where he has been at the expence of so much fair dealing, he ought to be indulged in rewarding himself for it, which he has done in this modest insinuation, that Christianity was so false and nauseous that even children could not be brought to swallow it (p. 47).

Finally, Warburton concludes his Remarks on the theme of revealing Hume's insinuations, by quoting Alexander Pope: "Then take him to devellop, if you can, And hew the block off, and get out the Man" (p. 74).

There is little doubt that the "Natural History" contains oblique hints and artful insinuations against Christianity in particular and revealed religion in general. Further, Warburton has probably correctly identified more specific areas of concealment in Hume, and has provided reasonable interpretations of Hume's hidden meaning. However, given Hume's endless but insincere concessions to the design argument in the "Natural History," his attacks on revealed religion were seen more as deistic, rather than atheistic. For example, Caleb Fleming in his postscript to Three questions resolved... writes: "...Mr. Hume has finely exposed superstition and popery: professeth himself an advocate of pure theism. [A]nd so far as he is a theist, he cannot be an enemy to genuine Christianity" (p. 56).

Warburton himself believed that Hume in the "Natural History" affirmed the existence of God. He writes,
 

And here let me observe it to his honour that, tho' he be not yet got to THEISM, his is however of the advance and approaching to the borders of it; having been in the dregs of Atheism when he wrote his Epicurean arguments against the being of a God.⁽⁴⁴⁾

Since such "arguments against the being of God" are absent from the "Natural History," Warburton supposed that Hume was approaching the borders of theism. However, George Horne, in his Letters on infidelity (1784), disputes Warburton's assessment of Hume's religious reversal:
 

In the Natural History of Religion... [Warburton] thought our philosopher was approaching towards the borders of Theism. But I never could find that he penetrated far into the country.⁽⁴⁵⁾

The above reactions to the "Natural History" by Hume's critics have an importance beyond the patchwork of passages which they examine. The reactions all indicate the literary genre in which Hume wrote and suggest further that if we ignore Hume's concealed points we will miss his overall message. Hume's hidden attacks on Christianity and Judaism were easily detected. However, his attack on theism in general apparently (and perhaps purposefully) escaped their detection.
 
 

The Dialogues concerning natural religion involves a more complex web of concealment than does the "Natural History" and, accordingly, Hume's contemporaries took greater pains to understand the hidden meaning of the Dialogues. In Hume's day, as now, the two key interpretive questions of the Dialogues were (1) Which character, if any, represents Hume?, and (2) What are the views of that character? An early review of the Dialogues, by William Rose in the Monthly Review, illustrates such reactions. He begins his review by pronouncing Philo the true victor:

Cleanthes... defends a good cause very feebly, and is by no means entitled to the character of an accurate philosopher. Demea supports the character of a sour, croaking divine, very tolerably; but PHILO is the hero of the piece; and it must be acknowledged, that he urges his objections with no inconsiderable degree of acuteness and subtlety.⁽⁴⁶⁾

Regarding Philo's views, Rose concludes by arguing that if Philo is right about God's existence, then "the wicked are set free from every restraint but that of the laws... the world we live in is a fatherless world; we are chained down to a life full of wretchedness and misery; and we have no hope beyond the grave." Thus, Rose portrays Philo in the most skeptical light as one who denies the existence of a divine creator and judge.

The London Review's approach to the Dialogues was more flattering. Again, Philo is identified as Hume:
 

The following sentiments, which are represented as the genuine opinions of Philo, or Hume himself, seem to us so important as to deserve insertion as a specimen of the whole.⁽⁴⁷⁾

For the reviewer, the representative sections of Philo's views are the first half of Part XII of the Dialogues where Philo reduces the conflict between atheism and theism to a verbal dispute. The reviewer concludes that "This reconciliation of these two seemingly most distant opponents, is of more service to true religion than volumes of divinity...." The reviewer is reflecting the editorial slant of the London Review as a whole, which tended to be religiously skeptical. Accordingly, Philo's arguments are hailed, without pigeonholing Hume as a theist or atheist.

Thomas Hayter was particularly interested in establishing clearly that Philo, and not Cleanthes, speaks for Hume. The introductory comments to his Remarks focus exclusively on this issue. After quoting Pamphilius' portrayal of the three characters, Hayter argues,
 

From this representation one might at first be led to look for Mr. HUME himself under the mask of CLEANTHES, and to expect from the mouth of CLEANTHES the celebrated Metaphysician's own sentiments. Let us consider however that Mr. HUME, after the great nominal superiority attributed to CLEANTHES, could not possibly, without appearance of vanity, have appointed CLEANTHES his representative. The fact indeed indisputably is, that PHILO, not CLEANTHES, personates Mr. HUME. CLEANTHES assumes at times (p. 242 and 244) the tone of DEMEA: while PHILO possesses in general the sole exclusive privilege of retailing the purport of Mr. HUME's former Philosophical productions. --Every remarkable trait and feature of those productions may be traced in the parts of the Dialogue assigned to PHILO.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Other critics attempted to expose a deeper concealment on Hume's part. Joseph Milner in his Gibbon's account of Christianity considered argues that Hume is insincere when pronouncing Cleanthes the victor of the debate:
 

In his dialogues concerning natural religion, we have the substance of all his sceptical essays; and notwithstanding his declaration at the close in favour of Cleanthes, the natural religionist, it is evident from the whole tenour of the book, and still more so from the entire scepticism of his former publications, that Philo is his favourite. Sincerity constitutes no part of a philosopher's virtue.

He continues that Hume's aim is to "reduce Polytheism, Spinozism, Christianity, and all sorts of views of the divinity to the same level of evidence, or rather of no evidence; and on the ruin of all, to establish his horrible universal scepticism."⁽⁴⁹⁾ Again, Hume is not branded an atheist in name, but his design, for Milner, certainly includes the rejection of God.

Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of Philo was given by John Ogilvie in his Inquiry into the causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times. Like his contemporaries, Ogilvie argues that Philo is Hume's mouthpiece.⁽⁵⁰⁾ However, Ogilvie charges further that even Philo's concessions cannot be taken at face value:
 

...Philo expresseth, in very strong terms, his belief of a Deity, such as he represents him. He even thanks this Being, or Mind, or Thought, that atheists are very rare. And, notwithstanding his love of singular argument, he professeth to pay to him profound adoration. P. 232. But, as Philo's declarations upon this subject are contradictory, I construct his notions most favourably, when I consider him as excluding a Deity from the universe.

For Ogilvie, Hume is involved in double concealment. First, he conceals his views behind the veil of the character of Philo. Second, Philo himself is concealing his true views by making empty concessions toward God's existence. Ogilvie's discussion of Philo's concealment is particularly relevant in view of the 20th century commentators, noted above, who take Philo's concessions as sincere.

Ogilvie continues that, for Philo, the options for believing in the creation of the universe are between "a blind nature" or "an Omnipotent Tyrant, having neither wisdom, justice, goodness, nor any perfection." Ogilvie argues that it would please us "much better to think that this world was formed by a fortuitous concourse of atoms... rather than to view it as framed by an intelligent Mind to be an immense Lazar-house, crowded with the victims of disease...." Given Philo's view of the intelligent mind, Ogilvie asks that we
 

...judge whether he who looks up to such a Being can seriously worship Him with 'profound adoration.' I repeat, therefore, that I construct his contradictory assertions most favourably when I consider 'a blind nature' as the object of his belief, rather than such a cause of all things as being entitled to his homage.

Ogilvie concludes by focusing on Philo's concession of thanks to the creator "that Atheists are rarely to be met with." Ogilvie asks,
 

To whom, Sir, let me ask, are your thanks addressed upon this occasion? Are they offered to that Intelligence who "involves individuals in ruin and misery?" Are they due to the "coarse Artificer, the Author of physical and moral evil, &c. &c. &c.?" With much more reason may you thank Him for having so framed His work, as that His miserable creatures by denying His existence, may turn from objects that cannot be viewed with other feelings than those of horror and detestation.

This feature of double concealment was also recognized by George Horne in his Letters on infidelity (1784). In that work Horne presents "A dialogue between Thomas and Timothy on philosophical skepticism" which exposes Hume's literary device. Horne's dialogue opens,
 

Tim. ... Where art [you] going this morning?

Tom. I am going to be made a Christian.

Tim. The very last thing I should have dreamed of. But pray, who is to make you one?

Tim. David Hume.

Tom. David Hume? Why, I thought he was an Atheist.

Tim. The world never was more mistaken about any one man, than about David Hume. He was deemed a sworn foe to Christianity, whereas his whole life was spent in its service. His works compose altogether a complete Praeparatio Evangelica. They lead men gently, and gradually, as it were to the Gospel... here is chapter and verse for you. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 263, "To be a philosophical sceptic, is, in a man of letters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound believing Christian." (pp. 49-50)

Horne's dialogue proceeds farcically with Timothy and Thomas each producing evidence from Hume's Dialogue in defense of their respective interpretations of Hume. Horne, of course, did not believe that Hume's life was spent in service of Christianity (as Timothy does in Horne's dialog). The value of Horne's observation is that it shows the absurdity of seeing Philo as a champion of religion, especially in the pivotal Part XII of the Dialogues. From Horne's perspective, contemporary commentators who take Part XII as evidence for Hume's theism, such as Capaldi, O'Higgins, and Gaskin, have fallen into Hume's trap.

From the previous sections, it can be concluded at minimum that Hume's contemporaries believed (1) Hume purposefully concealed his skeptical religious views in his writings, and (2) with a little reflection Hume's concealed views could and should be uncovered. Further, their efforts at interpreting Hume also help identify specific passages in Hume's writings where concealment is likely. Finally, their assessments of Hume's hidden meaning are at least suggestive, if not correct.

The reactions of these early critics may also help us understand a more global attack on religion by Hume which emerges when the arguments of the "Natural History" and the Dialogues are combined. In the mind of Hume's contemporaries, proper religious belief is founded on either natural religion (involving theistic proofs) or revealed religion (involving divinely inspired scripture). Hume opens the "Natural History" redrawing these traditional lines of distinction. Hume recognizes, at least in theory, the discipline of natural religion. However, the whole subject of revealed religion is replaced with what he calls vulgar religion. Divine revelation is not even an issue, and he focuses instead on the psychological factors which have inclined the masses toward theistic belief over the millennia. Hume had earlier attacked revealed religion in his essay "Of Miracles," by arguing that any belief in a reported miracle was irrational. But the approach in the "Natural History" is more devastating since the divine inspiration of texts has no bearing on a person's belief in God. Critics such as Rose and Warburton recognized Hume's concealed attempt to reduce the domain of revealed religion to mass psychology. But, given Hume's endless concessions to the design argument in the "Natural History," no respondent accused Hume of denying natural religion.

The rejection of natural religion, the other foundation of religion, came with the Dialogues.⁽⁵¹⁾ Virtually all of the critics mentioned above (except perhaps for the London Review) understood Philo's arguments as a rejection of natural religion. Hume anticipated this reaction, as seen in the following letter to William Strahan, and thereby endorsed their reaction:
 

I there introduce a Sceptic, who is indeed refuted, and at last gives up the Argument, nay confesses that he was only amusing himself by all his Cavils; yet before he is silenced, he advances several Topics, which will give Umbrage, and will be deemed very bold and free, as well as much out of the Common road.⁽⁵²⁾

Thus, with neither a revealed nor a rational foundation of religion remaining, religion, as conceived by Hume's contemporaries, becomes groundless.

A similar line of reasoning was suggested by Lord Brougham in his essay "Hume" in Lives of Men of Letters (1848). Taking Hume's arguments in "Of Miracles" and "Of a Particular Providence," Brougham argues,
 

The one argument shows supernatural evidence to be impossible; it shuts out light from above: the other shows natural evidence to be non-existent; it shuts out light from the world around us. The two together amount to a plain and practical atheism, as far as such a belief is compatible with sanity of mind.⁽⁵³⁾

A consequence of Hume's use of concealment is that it allows for a spectrum of interpretations, ranging from the more optimistic views of the contemporary commentators noted at the outset, to the more pessimistic interpretations of his early critics. Although the interpretations of the early critics may not be decisive, their contributions to understanding Hume's concealed religious views cannot be neglected.

1. William Jones, Memoirs of the life, studies, and writings of the Right Reverend George Horne.... London, 1795, J. Favis, pp. 123-133.

2. Nicholas Capaldi, "Hume's Philosophy of Religion: God Without Ethics," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 233-240.

3. For O'Higgins, Hume accepted the rationality of the design argument, but remained skeptical about the entire enterprise of reasoning. Hume, then, reluctantly concedes to God's existence, yet denies that God concerns himself with governing the world. See "Hume and the Deists: a Contrast in Religious Approaches," Journal of Theological Studies, 1971, Vol. 23, pp. 479-501. In Hume's Philosophy of Religion (Atlantic Highlands, 1988), J.C.A. Gaskin describes Hume's attenuated deism as a weak probability that natural order results from an intelligence remotely analogous to our own. This unites with our subjective feeling that natural order springs from a designer, hence we assent to the existence of a designer (although this being has no moral claim on us).

4. James Noxon argues that no one of the characters speaks consistently for Hume, and this expresses Hume's view about the limits of human understanding. For Noxon, this suggests that Hume was agnostic. "Hume's Agnosticism," in Hume: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. V.C. Chappell (New York, 1966), and "In defence of 'Hume's Agnosticism,'" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1976, Vol. 14, pp. 469-473.

5. Ernest C. Mossner argues that Hume denied all supernatural and conventional religion, but advanced a "religion of man" insofar as he optimistically believed that the enlightened determine the fate of humanity and are the measure of all things. See "The Religion of David Hume," Journal of the History of Ideas, 1978, Vol. 39, pp. 653-663. Donald Livingston argues that Hume offers a "philosophical theism" which is an historically determined natural belief, yet one which eschews the writings and rituals of the theistic tradition. See "Hume's Conception of True Religion," in Hume's Philosophy of Religion (Winston-Salem, 1986), pp. 33-73. Even if Mossner and Livingston have captured Hume's views, it is difficult to see how this could qualify as a religion by 18th century standards, and it is hard to believe that Hume would want to classify it as such.

6. Norman Kemp Smith argues that religion for Hume consists exclusively in an intellectual assent to the proposition "God exists." He concludes, though, that religion for Hume ought not to have any influence on human conduct (Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, p. 24). Kemp Smith bases his view on the conclusions to the "Natural History" and Dialogues, and Hume's 1743 letter to William Mure. B.A.O. Williams argues that Hume did not reject the possibility of a creator with something like human intelligence; see "Hume on Religion," in David Hume A Symposium, e.d. D.F. Pears, London, 1963, pp. 77-88.

7. Although the "Natural History" is antagonistic to revealed and popular religious belief, in no less than nine passages Hume seems to defend the design argument. Although the Dialogues is antagonistic to natural religion, Cleanthes, the defender of natural religion, wins the debate, and Philo, the religious skeptic, eventually concedes that "the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence." Thus, at face value, both the "Natural History" and the Dialogues support the belief in God through the design argument, yet destroy all other aspects of religious belief.

8. On face value it is reasonable to assume that a person's personal religious beliefs are at least consistent with what she may write on the subject. Interestingly, though, the essay "David Hume" in Quarterly Review, 1880, Vol. 149, p. 287-330 argues otherwise noting that "Hume never took his own philosophy seriously.... [A]fter logically annihilating the whole compass and wealth of human knowledge, [he] turned his back on his own conclusion, and by his subsequent life and writings gave assurance to the world that he himself was really not of that mind at all" (pp. 290-291).

9. As related in "David Hume," Quarterly Review, p. 310.

10. Reprinted in E.C. Mossner's Life of David Hume, p. 483.

11. In the 19th century, Burton takes this anecdote as proof that Hume disliked the scornful infidelity of the Parisian circle, Life, 1846, Vol. 2, p. 220. The essay on Hume in Quarterly Review cites this anecdote to illustrate that "outside metaphysics he never pretended to doubt of the existence of an intelligent Author of the universe" (p. 310). For 20th century accounts, see Gaskin, Hume's Philosophy of Religion, p. 220, Terence Penelhum, Hume (New York, 1975) p. 166, Kemp Smith, Dialogues, p. 37.

12. "Character of -- [David Hume] written by himself," included in the RSE Hume manuscripts, reprinted by Greig in David Hume, New York, 1931, pp. 411-412.

13. David Berman, "David Hume and the Suppression of 'Atheism'" in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1983, Vol. XXI, p. 385.

14. This story is not given in Scott and Pottle's Private Papers of James Boswell (1931), which was based on Boswell's original manuscript of March 3, 1777. A copy of this interview by Boswell's clerk (discovered after Scott and Pottle) contains some corrections by Boswell, along with three paragraphs of "Additions from Memory 22, January 1778." This version includes the above paragraph, and appears in the 1970 trade volume of Boswell's papers, Boswell in Extremes 1776-1778, ed. McC.Weis and Pottle, New York, McGraw-Hill, p. 14.

15. Interestingly, Gaskin uses this same passage to suggest that Hume was not a strict atheist (Hume's Philosophy of Religion, p. 221). Although this story does not amount to a confession of strict atheism on Hume's part, the phrase "as if I believed in the being of a God" suggests that he was not a theist. Considering the larger context of Boswell's interview during which Hume denies the immortality of the soul, the atheistic interpretation is all the more appropriate.

16. The expression "downright atheist" did not always connote strict atheism, that is, a denial of God's existence. John Jortin, for example, relates an anecdote of a clergyman who said "If any one denies the uninterrupted succession of bishops, I shall not scruple to call him a downright Atheist," Tracts, philological, critical, and miscellaneous, London, Benjamin White, 1790, Vol. I, p. 436. However, the context of Hume's use in the above indicates that he means the complete denial of God.

17. William Belsham, Essays philosophical and moral, historical and literary, London, G.G. and J. Robinson, 1799, Vol. I, p. 361. Joseph Priestley makes a similar point that "In foreign countries this fact [i.e. the rejection of an afterlife] is notorious, and they are therefore generally called Atheists; and indeed, when the doctrine of a future life is abandoned, men may almost as well reject the belief of a God also." The institutes of natural and revealed religion, in The theological and miscellaneous works (1817-1832), Vol. II, p. 103.

18. David Fate Norton, "Hume, Atheism, and the Autonomy of Morals," in Hume's Philosophy of Religion, pp. 210-213.

19. Johnson defines "atheism" as "The disbelief of a God," and "atheist" as "One that denies the existence of God." The 1768, 1777, and 1788 editions of the Encyclopedia Britannica define "atheism" as "the disbelief of a deity," and "Atheist" as "a person who does not believe in the existence of a Deity." The 1788 edition also relates the story of martyred 17th century Italian atheist Lucilio Vanini.

20. Shaftesbury, Characteristics, 1711, I, I, Sect. 2.

21. An anonymous article for the Critical Review presents a detailed taxonomy of religious attitudes, distinguishing between atheism, theism, polytheism, monotheism, deism, and several varieties of monotheistic belief in revelation. Review of Joshua Toulmin's The injustice of classing unitarians with deists and infidels, in Critical Review, 1798, Vol. 22, pp. 465-466. The reviewer agrees with Toulmin, and offers his taxonomy of religious attitudes to show that unitarians are not in the same class with deists and infidels.

22. Plato, Laws, 885b: "Either, as I say, he does not believe, or again, he believes that they are, but are regardless of mankind, or lastly, that they are lightly to be won over by the cajoling of offerings and prayers."

23. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, Bk. I, 2-3: "...Diagoras of Melos and Theodorus of Cyrene held that there are no gods at all.... there are and have been philosophers who hold that the gods exercise no control over human affairs whatever.... There are however other philosophers... who believe that the whole world is ruled and governed by divine intelligence and reason."

24. Hume to William Mure, June 30, 1743: "...Plato says there are three kinds of Atheists. The first who deny a Deity, the second who deny his Providence, the third who assert, that he is influenc'd by Prayers or Sacrifices."

25. Jefferson to Charles Clay, January 29, 1815. An October 12, 1813 letter from Jefferson to John Adams shows how radical Jefferson's views were. In describing how he selected particular passages which were the genuine moral teachings of Jesus, he writes that certain passages were "evidently his and which is as easily distinguished as diamonds in a dung-hill." The extent to which Jefferson wished to preserve the secrecy of his Bible is further attested to by it having remained a secret from even his grandchildren for several decades after his death. See Cyrus Adler, Introduction to Jefferson's The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth (Chicago, Manz Engraving Company).

26. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, second edition, (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1978).

27. David Hume, The Natural History of Religion, ed. James Fieser, (New York: MacMillan, 1992), pp. 48-49.

28. David Hume, The History of Great Britain, (1754). This passage is reprinted in the Foreword to the Liberty Classics edition of Hume's History of England (1983), pp. xiv.

29. History of Great Britain, 1757, Vol. 2, pp. 449-50.

30. In addition to the critical passage on Protestantism, Hume also dropped a passage which labels Roman Catholicism a superstition which "like all other species of superstition... rouses the vain fears of unhappy mortals." This passage also prompted a negative public reaction since it was taken as a general attack against Christianity, and not simply against a Catholic doctrine.

31. Joseph Priestley, A continuation of letters, in The theological and miscellaneous works, Vol. 21, p. 133.

32. John Briggs, The nature of religious zeal, in two discourses, London, T. Payne, 1775.

33. William Rose, Monthly Review, 1757, Vol. 16, p. 122. Rose is probably referring to Hume's first volume of Essays, the first Enquiry, and first published volume of his History. The Monthly Review appeared in 1949, and did not contain reviews of Hume's first volume of Essays (published in 1741) and the first Enquiry (published in 1748). However, in his favorable review of the second Enquiry, Rose begins noting that it is "free from that sceptical turn which appears in his other pieces...." His review of Hume's Political Discourses are equally favorable. Roger Flexman's 1754 review of Hume's first volume of the History is particularly harsh. Rose picks up the second volume in January 1757 (one month prior to his review of Four dissertations), and argues that it "has given us more pleasure than we received from the perusal of the first."

34. See especially J.V. Price, The Ironic Hume, (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1965); Antony Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief, (London, Routledge, 1961).

35. For example, the English Review makes the following comment regarding Hume's essay "Of the Immortality of the Soul": "That the 'physical arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul' we readily allow. And on the whole we believe sincerely, what Mr. Hume expresses ironically...." (1783, Vol. 2, pp. 418-426). Also, an anonymous author attacks S.J. Pratt's controversial Apology for the life and writings of David Hume arguing that "Any person may easily find out your ironical scoffs against christians" (A Letter to Courtney Melmoth, Esq [i.e. S.J. Pratt]; occasioned by his Apology..., 1777, Richardson and Urquhart). As Pratt is accused of following Hume, the comment might indirectly apply to Hume.

36. Anthony Collins, A discourse concerning ridicule and irony in writing, London, J. Brotherton, 1729, p. 19. Collins's work cites many published examples of ridicule and irony, defending these techniques "only as is for polite persons to use," and rejecting abusive raillery (p. 77). In all cases, though, irony involves humor (see page 16 for what he considers an ideal example of irony).

37. Noted in David Hume: The Philosophical Works, ed. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose, (London: Longmans, 1886).

38. Critical Review, 1757, Vol. 3, pp. 97-98.

39. Duncan Shaw, A comparative view (1778), pp. 270-271.

40. Warburton makes a similar observation about Hume's title: "You ask why he chuses to give it this title. Would not the Moral history of Meteors be full as sensible as the Natural history of Religion?" Warburton continues noting sarcastically that since Hume is offering only a deistic view of God, and not that of a "moral Governor of the world," then Hume's title makes a remote sense. Warburton, Remarks, London, 1757, pp. 8-9.

41. Review of Shaw's A comparative view, in London Review, 1776, Vol. 3, pp. 111-118, 219-223.

42. William Warburton, Remarks, London, 1757, pp. 35-36.

43. According to Herodotus, Zamolxis (or more properly Zalmoxis) was alleged to have first been a Thracian man in the sixth century B.C. Originally a slave of Pythagoras, Zamolxis obtained his freedom, became rich, and returned home to lecture his fellow Thracians (or Getes) on immortality. After disappearing for three years into a room he dug beneath his house, he emerged and thus, in the minds of the Thracians, confirmed his doctrine of immortality; Herodotus, History, Bk. IV, Ch. 95-96.

44. Warburton is referring to the dialogue "Of a particular providence" in Hume's first Enquiry and the attacks they contain on the design argument.

45. George Horne, Letters on infidelity, Oxford, 1784, p. 14. Horne wrote his Letters after Hume's Dialogues appeared in 1779, and thus had the advantage of seeing that Hume sustained his attack on the design argument. Other later critics were also unconvinced about the sincerity of Hume's concession toward the design argument. For example, the author of the essay "David Hume" in Quarterly Review argues, "To avoid suspecting these statements of irony is scarcely possible, but there are many of the same kind in his works" (p. 311).

46. William Rose, Monthly Review, 1779, Vol. pp. 343. Rose believes Hume's Dialogues are the most elegantly written of his works, but "Nothing new, however, is advanced on the subject." But on the philosophical merit of the Dialogues, he concludes that "every impartial judge must pronounce them unworthy of a writer of such distinguished abilities as Mr. HUME."

47. London Review, 1779, Vol. 10, pp. 365-373.

48. Thomas Hayter, Remarks on Mr. Hume's Dialogues, concerning natural religion, Cambridge, 1780, T. Cadell. Interestingly, the connection between Philo and Hume's earlier writings is seen differently by James Noxon: "...no one of the characters in the Dialogues... speaks consistently for Hume. Every attempt to identify Hume's spokesman could be forestalled by quoting lines given to that speaker which were inconsistent with statements published elsewhere under Hume's own name." See "In Defence of 'Hume's Agnosticism,'" Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1976, Vol. 14, p. 470.

49. Joseph Milner, Gibbon's account of Christianity considered: together with some strictures on Hume's Dialogues concerning natural religion, London, 1781, G. Robinson and T. Cadell, pp. 199-221.

50. John Ogilvie, Inquiry into the causes of the infidelity and scepticism of the times, London, 1783, Richardson and Urquhart. After considering Philo's four hypotheses concerning the causes of the universe, Ogilvie writes "Philo, the author's sceptical dialogist, is the speaker upon this occasion. But, as his opinions are not impugned or confuted by Cleanthes, they appear to be those of the author" (pp. 68-69). The context of Ogilvie's other comments on the Dialogues make it clear that Philo speaks for Hume except when Philo concedes the existence of a creative Mind.

51. Although published 20 years apart, the "Natural History" and the Dialogues were written at the same time in Hume's life and, undoubtedly, are to be taken together in expressing his views on religion.

52. Letters, Vol. II, pp. 323-324.

53. Lord Brougham, "Hume," in Lives of Men of Letters. Brougham suggests further that it would be a mistake to construe Hume as even an agnostic who neither believed nor disbelieved in the existence of God: "Mr. Hume's argument, if solid, shows that there is no evidence, and not that there are doubts; consequently the inference from his argument is, not that we have reason for doubting whether or not there is proof, but that we have no proof, and, therefore, if consistent with ourselves, admitting his argument, we must not believe; that is, we must disbelieve."