The aim of normative ethics is to inform us of our moral obligation by providing us with rules or guidelines against which we judge our behavior. For most of the history of ethics these rules have been anthropocentric, or human centered, insofar as they have focused on human well being. For example, stealing is wrong since it violates the property rights of humans. On this view, environmental responsibility is only indirect, and derived from human interests. For example, we have a responsibility to protect rain forests so that the greenhouse effect can be prevented. The greenhouse effect, in turn, is bad because it is a threat to human existence. In recent years, however, it has been argued that environmental well being should be a direct focus of moral obligation, and not one merely derived from human interests. It is the height of human arrogance to presume that human interests are the only interests that count. Instead, forests, plant and animal species, and eco-systems in general have a direct moral standing in and of themselves, and therefore demand direct moral consideration. This view is called eco-centrism.
Clearly, an eco-centric principle of morality cannot be derived from traditional moral principles, such as prohibitions against stealing, killing or lying, since such principles are human-centered. Consequently, eco-centrism is unique in its attempt to introduce a new principle into our value system. Exactly what is this new normative principle which is being introduced? Eco-centrist principles have been formulated in both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist versions. By examining several versions, I argue that eco-centrism fails as a normative principle. Consequentialist versions of eco-centrism must be rejected since they cannot generate traditional moral principles and may in fact be inconsistent with traditional morality. Eco-centrism will therefore only make sense as a nonconsequentialist principle, particularly as a prima facie duty-based principle. Unfortunately, duty-based eco-centrism also fails since the list of environmental duties it recommends will be exactly the same as the list recommended on a purely anthropocentric approach. In short, eco-centrism is irrelevant to the process of both arriving at our environmental duties, and resolving conflicts with human duties.
Most normative formulations of eco-centrism draw from Aldo Leopold's brief essay "The Land Ethic," published in 1949 in his A Sand County Almanac. His essay is important both for its concise statement of eco-centrism and as a sounding board for further formulations of eco-centric obligation. According to Leopold, ethics has evolved throughout the years in three distinct stages. The first stage involves the co-operative relation between individuals (as seen in the Mosaic Decalogue), and the second stage involves the relation between the individual and society (as seen in the Golden Rule). The third stage is the extension of ethics to "man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it."(1) He calls this stage the land ethic and notes that it "simply enlarges the boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land."
ACT-CONSEQUENTIALST ECO-CENTRISM. The key to Leopold's eco-centrism
is usually seen as his dictum that,
The most straightforward reading of this principle is to see it as an act-consequentialist normative principle which establishes the preservation of the biotic community as the highest good. This interpretation of Leopold's principle is especially justified given its similarity to Mill's consequentialist utilitarian principle: "...actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."(2) Indeed, Leopold's wording is so close to Mill's wording that perhaps Leopold intentionally structured his principle on Mill's. In any case, as a consequentialist account of morality, the above principle would function as the single and highest principle against which the morality of all actions are judged. Thus, on this principle, clear-cutting rain forests would be wrong since this would undermine the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.
However, what implications does this criterion have on traditional moral duties, such as prohibitions against stealing, killing, or lying? The answer seems to be none. On Mill's principle of utility, stealing is clearly wrong since this would produce more pain than pleasure. But on the principle of act-consequentialist eco-centrism, acts of stealing would be morally neutral since these would have no impact on the preservation of the biotic community. William Aiken argues further that the logical consequence of this view is the elimination of 90% of all human animals since such a reduction would clearly advance the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.(3)
RULE-CONSEQUENTIALIST ECO-CENTRISM. An alternative interpretation
of Leopold's principle would be to view it as a rule-consequentialist
theory, according to the tendency of an act to serve environmental
well being:
This would parallel more closely Mill's rule-utilitarianism, which focuses on the tendency of actions, as a rule, to produce the greatest happiness. On this interpretation, environmental rules or secondary principles would have an obvious connection to Leopold's first principle. For example, one can easily derive the rule that rain forests ought to be protected. But, again, rule-consequentialist eco-centrism will not generate the traditional moral duties regarding stealing, killing, or lying. In fact, rule-consequentialist eco-centrism may even imply that we are morally obligated to steal or lie. For, given that (a) a civilized community cannot exist where stealing is permissible, and (b) civilized communities are responsible for most environmental damage, then a rule allowing stealing would clearly be better for the environment than the status quo. Thus, rule-consequentialist eco-centrism is incompatible with some traditional moral principles. There are further problems with this theory that affect non-human animals as well. For, we could not derive from this principle the rule that it is wrong to maliciously inflict pain upon sentient creatures. The environment is not threatened by the sadistic torturing of a fox or an elephant (or even all foxes and all elephants), so long as their species do not become endangered in the process.
Notwithstanding these problems, John Moline has recently attempted to defend a rule-consequentialist version of eco-centrism that he believes has fewer difficulties. According to Moline, the spirit of Leopold's principle is that we are to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, and this community is identical to the moral community. And luckily, humans are members of the moral community.(4) Moline's point is that once morality is extended to include "the land," then the actual members of the biotic and moral communities are identical (since both would include soil, plants, animals and humans). But even if we grant that membership in these two communities is identical, rule-consequentialist eco-centrism is still unacceptable. For, the criteria of right and wrong are the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic nature of the moral community. The biota is represented by what Leopold describes as the land pyramid, which is the set of all food chains. On that pyramid humans share "an intermediate layer with the bears, raccoons, and squirrels which eat both meat and vegetables." Protecting human endeavors at this biotic level in no way entails non-environmental human obligations such as prohibitions against stealing. All that matters is protecting our place on the food chain.
It is clear that no consequentialist formulation of eco-centrism will generate traditional moral duties. Further, rule-consequentialist eco-centrism seems to be inconsistent with some traditional moral duties, such as prohibitions against stealing. Perhaps this is not a problem for environmentalists who genuinely believe that environmental concerns rise above all human concerns, including the existence of human societies. This, though, would be a minority view. For proponents of eco-centrism who wish to retain traditional moral duties, a less extreme understanding of eco-centrism is needed. By rejecting a consequentialist interpretation, then, we are left with the remaining alternative, which is to construe eco-centrism as a foundational nonconsequentialist duty. In this case, eco-centrism would not be the highest moral good, but simply one of several duties we have, along with traditional moral duties. Perhaps this is more in keeping with the spirit of Leopold's eco-centric vision, given his claim that "the land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the [moral] community to include soils, waters, plants and animals, or collectively: the land."
When eco-centrism is taken as one of several nonconsequentialist duties, then there is no longer the problem of trying to derive traditional moral obligations from an ultimate principle of eco-centrism. But an entirely new problem arises: resolving conflicts between eco-centric duties and human duties. An example will help illustrate this problem. Suppose a stranded mountain climber is on the verge of starvation, and can only stay alive by eating a plant that is next to him. He then sees that this plant is the last surviving member of its species. If he eats the plant, he knows he will remain alive long enough to be rescued. If he doesn't eat the plant, then the plant species will survive and flourish with the coming growing season. Two duties conflict in this example: the traditional duty of self-preservation and the eco-centric duty to preserve species diversity.(5)
When any two moral duties conflict, one of the duties must be seen as having priority over the other. Following W.D. Ross, duties that have a rank order in terms of priority are prima facie duties. That is, for any particular duty that emerges, we are under obligation to perform that duty unless a stronger duty arises. The challenge for any theory of prima facie duties is determining the rank order of conflicting duties.
CALLICOTT'S DUTY-BASED ECO-CENTRISM. J. Baird Callicott has offered
an analogy for understanding the relative strengths of our eco-centric
and traditional duties. According to Callicott, our various environmental
and non-environmental obligations are related in a manner analogous to
annular tree rings. The inner and most ancient ring of obligation includes
duties to family and friends. Successive rings involve duties to the community,
country, world community and, finally to the ecosystem. On this analogy,
each category of duties has distinct boundaries so that our social duties
are not simply a subset of our environmental duties. Callicott notes that
inner rings of obligation outweigh the outer rings:
In short, the rank order of prima facie duties begins with personal and family duties as the strongest, and ends with environmental duties as the weakest. According to this rank order, the stranded mountain climber's dilemma is resolved by giving priority to his duty of self-preservation.
The problem with Callicott's suggestion is that many of our outer-core duties in fact outweigh our inner-core duties. Suppose, for example, I am a poor parent from a poor country where the cost of educating one's children is prohibitive. If I cannot legally acquire the money to pay for my child's education (and no alternative means of education is available) I would not be justified in raising money illegally, such as by being a paid assassin or trafficking drugs. In this case, my middle-core duty to society would outweigh my inner-core duty to educate my child. Similarly, in some circumstances, our outer-core environmental duties outweigh our middle-core social duties. For example, if my airplane is out of fuel and I must choose between crashing into and destroying either an endangered species reserve or an art museum warehouse, my greater duty is to the endangered species. It cannot, therefore, be established as a rule that all inner-core human duties outweigh all outer-core environmental duties.
HEFFERNAN'S DUTY-BASED ECO-CENTRISM. James Heffernan has offered
a different interpretation of duty-based eco-centrism, and one that addresses
the limitations of Callicott's tree-ring analogy. Like Callicott, Heffernan
believes that environmental well being should be seen as a supplement to
traditional duties, and not a replacement. He also argues that eco-centrism
is best interpreted as "an additional prima facie rule of conduct
rather than a single new standard of right and wrong."(7)
Heffernan offers the following principle to reconcile conflicts between
environmental duties and traditional duties:
Unlike Callicott's rule for resolving duties, Heffernan's rule acknowledges that some outer-core obligations outweigh inner-core obligations, particularly when environmental survival interests are at odds with human nonsurvival interests. On Heffernan's principle, the dilemma of the crashing airplane would be easily resolved in favor of the endangered species reserve. For, the survival interests of the endangered species outweighs the nonsurvival human interests concerning art works.
Unfortunately, Heffernan's principle also has problems. First, the above principle does not address dilemmas where both human and environmental survival are at stake, such as the stranded mountain climber's dilemma. Second, it does not address dilemmas where neither human nor environmental survival is at stake. For example, suppose a land developer wishes to clear an old growth forest to build an industrial park. The forest in question is unique for the area, but none of the plant and animal species are endangered. On the other hand, the new industries would provide jobs for thousands of unemployed workers. The dilemma here is between nonsurvival duties to human social welfare and nonsurvival duties to the environment. Heffernan's principle neither solves this dilemma, nor provides a guideline for an attempted solution.
Third, and most importantly, Heffernan's principle does not even provide a clear solution for resolving conflicts between environmental survival interests and human nonsurvival interests (and vice versa), which is the main focus of his principle. The problem lies in the ambiguous use of the term "biotic community" in his principle, which makes the principle either too strong or too weak. If "biotic community" means the whole global ecology, then his principle is too weak since much of the environment could be damaged before the survival of the global ecology is at risk. On the other hand, if by "biotic community" he means smaller regional ecosystems, then his principle is too strong since the survival of some ecosystems (for example, my front lawn) may not be a moral issue at all.
The problem is that all ecosystems are not equal. Some are larger, more rare, more diverse, more complex, or more important than others. Although Heffernan may be right that our environmental obligations change according to the survival interests of human beings and ecosystems, he fails to note that our environmental obligations also change according to the ranked importance of a given ecosystem. Therefore, the only version of duty-based eco-centrism that is even plausible will be one that takes this ranking into account. In the following section I will temporarily speak on behalf of the eco-centrist and develop such a theory.
RANKING ECO-SYSTEMS. Traditional ethics has resisted the view that one moral agent is inherently superior to another. Every effort is taken to insure impartiality in our moral judgments so that no human arbitrarily receives preferential consideration. Ecosystems, however, are not humans and differ according to the variety of plant and animal species of which they are comprised. All other factors equal, an ecosystem with rare and endangered species members would have a greater moral consideration than an ecosystem with only abundant species members. The same would apply to the diversity, complexity and relative sizes of ecosystems. An additional factor would involve the importance of an ecosystem globally. For example, rain forests have high moral consideration not only because of their diversity, complexity and size, but they gain additional moral consideration given their key role in global ecology.
There may be other factors that weigh directly on the moral ranking of an ecosystem, but the above factors show that such a ranking is necessary. Further, it is clear that the significance of an ecosystem's survival interests hinges upon these other factors. An ecosystem which is neither rare, diverse, complex, nor large has a comparatively less significant survival interest. An ecosystem's survival interest, therefore, is only one of several factors relevant to its moral ranking, and it is not necessarily the most important one. Eco-centrism, then, is best understood as advocating a direct prima facie duty to ecosystems, such that the priority of these duties is relative to the ranked importance of the ecosystem in question (based on its rarity, complexity, diversity, size, global importance, and survival interest). For simplicity, this revised version of duty-based eco-centrism will be referred to as prioritized eco-centrism.
PRIORITIZING ENVIRONMENTAL DUTIES. Given the above understanding of our prioritized environmental duties, the problem of conflicting environmental and human duties can be addressed. Like environmental duties that are prioritized relative to other environmental duties, traditional human prima facie duties are also prioritized relative to other human duties. For example, my duty to avoid murdering others is stronger than my duty to avoid lying to others. There are, then, two lists of prioritized duties from which to work: prioritized environmental duties, and prioritized human duties.
Suppose that we could effectively prioritize environmental duties on a scale from 1-10. For example, my duty to preserve a colony of molds growing on a rotten orange will receive a 1, and my duty to preserve the Brazilian rain forest will receive a 10. Suppose further that we could effectively prioritize human duties on a similar scale from 1'-10'. For example, my duty to tell aunt Martha the truth about her new hat will receive a 1', and my duty to not commit genocide will receive a 10'. On each of these scales, duties with a higher number have priority over duties with a lower number. The problem is determining how these two scales line up relative to each other. For example, if forced to choose between the extermination of millions of people or the extermination of the Brazilian rain forest, which duty has priority? Similar dilemmas will arise between every level of the two scales. Clearly, no single principle, such as Callicott's or Heffernan's, can be appealed to for resolving all of the dilemmas arising at every level between the two scales.
An initial criticism of prioritized eco-centrism, then, is that it does not tell us how to line these environmental duties up against traditional human duties. Prioritized eco-centrism tells us only that we have direct duties to environmental collections, but no procedure is offered for resolving dilemmas with human duties. Suppose, however, that a proponent of prioritized eco-centrism argued that we will intuitively resolve such dilemmas on a case by case basis. That is, our moral faculty will supply us with the correct solution once we are presented with the actual dilemma and the facts relevant to the ranking of the eco-system in question. For example, the dilemma of the stranded mountain climber might intuitively be resolved in favor of the mountain climber's life if that plant species in question has a low ranking. However, even if such dilemmas can be resolved on a case by case basis, it is not clear how an eco-centric intuition assists in this task.
This suggests a second problem with prioritized eco-centrism: eco-centrism seems irrelevant to the intuitive process of resolving dilemmas between environmental and human duties. This problem will become clearer when comparing eco-centrism to its rival theory of environmental duties: anthropocentrism.
According to anthropocentrism, all duties to the environment are indirect and derive only from human interests and not from a direct consideration of the eco-system itself. For example, we have an indirect duty to preserve rain forests, species diversity, and the integrity of eco-systems in general since these benefit human existence. There are several ways that environmental duties can be derived from purely human interests. The survival of humans is linked to the survival of global eco-system. The quality of human life is improved by species diversity, such as pharmaceutical drugs that come from exotic rain forest plants. There are human aesthetic and religious experiences brought on by encounters with ecology.
From these and other human interests, a list of indirect anthropocentric duties to the environment emerges. These indirect duties must also be seen as prima facie duties since some environmental duties have a greater impact on human interests than other environmental duties. For example, the duty to preserve a large rain forest ranks higher than the duty to preserve a small wooded grove. Further, the factors relevant to prioritizing anthropocentric environmental duties will be the same as those factors for eco-centrism: an eco-system's rarity, complexity, diversity, size, global importance, and survival interest. For, these are the factors of an eco-system which are of greatest interest to humans. Suppose that we could effectively prioritize our indirect, anthropocentric environmental duties on a scale from 1''-10''. As with the eco-centric scale above, our duty here to preserve the Brazilian rain forest will receive a 10'' and our duty to preserve a collection of molds growing on an orange will receive a 1''. In fact, the entire anthropocentric scale of indirect environmental duties will be the same as the eco-centric scale of direct environmental duties.(8) Again, the reason is because priority in both scales based on the same factors: an eco-system's complexity, diversity, size, global importance, and survival interest. Anthropocentrism, therefore, is indistinguishable from eco-centrism in terms of its prioritized scale of duties to the environment.
Contrary to this view, Michael Hoffman argues that there is indeed a difference between anthropocentric and eco-centric environmental duties. Hoffman argues that "it is simply fortuitous if nonhuman natural interests coincide with human interests, and are thereby valued and protected." To his illustrate point, Hoffman has us consider a scenario originally put forward by Christopher Stone:
Suppose a stream has been polluted by a business. From a homocentric [or anthropocentric] point of view, which serves as the basis for our legal system, we can only correct the problem through finding some harm done to human beings who use the stream. Reparation for such harm might involve cessation of the pollution and restoration of the stream, but it is also possible that the business might settle with the people by paying them for their damages and continue to pollute the stream. Homocentrism provides no way for the stream to be made whole again unless it is in the interests of human beings to do so. In short, it is possible for human beings to sell out the stream.(9)
But Hoffman fails to make his point since he is portraying anthropocentrism in a way that the anthropocentrist herself would not accept. The overlap between human and environmental interests is not "simply fortuitous" since there is a genuine human interest in preserving the integrity, stability, and beauty of the environment. As biological organisms, there is no reason to believe that our human-centered interest in the environment is likely to diminish. Further, Hoffman's illustration is misleading since it hides the fact that conflicts between human and environmental duties will arise for the eco-centrist as well for the anthropocentrist. Depending on the specific human and environmental stakes of a given conflict, the eco-centrist may also feel that the interests of the human community outweigh the interests of the stream.
DIRECT VS. INDIRECT ENVIRONMENTAL DUTIES. Suppose the defender of prioritized eco-centrism agrees that the eco-centric and anthropocentric scales of environmental duties are the same. The eco-centrist would still argue that there is a difference in how the eco-centric and anthropocentric scales line up against the scale of traditional duties. That is, given a dilemma between environmental and human duties, wouldn't eco-centrism rule in favor of the environment more often than anthropocentrism? Even here, there would be no distinction between the two approaches. The reason is that there is no practical difference between a direct and an indirect environmental duty. Although the expression "indirect duty" seems to imply that the duty is weak, this connotation should be resisted. Strictly speaking, the general direct/indirect duty distinction only involves how logically foundational a duty is, and it has no necessary connection with the strength or weakness of that duty. For example, there is a strong indirect duty against vandalizing art treasures such as the Mona Lisa. However, even if the Mona Lisa had a direct moral standing, it is not clear that the duty against vandalizing that work would be any stronger.
Similarly, for defenders of ethical egoism and social contract theory, every duty to another human being reduces to an indirect duty (which is ultimately derived from an individual's self-interest). But the egoist's indirect duty to avoid harming others is not necessarily weaker than a foundationalist's direct duty to avoid harming others. Both would argue that the duty of non-harm has priority over most other duties, including many private duties to oneself. There is, therefore, nothing about an indirect duty that in itself makes it weaker than a corresponding direct duty.
The same reasoning applies to direct versus indirect duties to the environment. An anthropocentrist could argue that our highest moral duty is to preserve the integrity of the global biosphere since this is a prerequisite for human life and all human interests. But this is the most an eco-centrist could maintain in any event. Further, the eco-centrist and the anthropocentrist alike must acknowledge limits to our responsibility to preserve species and eco-systems. Species extinction is part of the natural process itself. In the natural order of things, the entire global eco-system is doomed to extinction when the sun finally dies. Both would also acknowledge that many species are so harmful to human life that, given the choice, our duty would be to eliminate them. Aids and polio viruses, intestinal worms, and human lice are just a few examples. Therefore, conflicts between environmental and human obligations are resolved no differently whether our environmental duty is direct or indirect.(10)
In short, prioritized eco-centrism is normatively indistinguishable from anthropocentrism in terms of (a) their respective prioritized scales of environmental duties, and (b) resolving conflicts between environmental duties and human duties. The fact that they are normatively indistinguishable is a problem for eco-centrism, and not for anthropocentrism. If eco-centrism is to be understood as one of many prima facie duties, as Callicott and Heffernan suggest, then this implies an acknowledgment of traditional human duties. But, according to the anthropocentrist, environmental duties are derived entirely from traditional human duties. The eco-centrist contribution is then redundant since it recommends only a duplicate set of duties and conflict resolutions which are derivable from traditional human duties. Thus, prioritized eco-centrism is normatively irrelevant and therefore fails as a normative theory of environmental duty.
The function of a normative ethical theory is to provide guidelines for our moral behavior. Eco-centrism begins with a bold claim that traditional morality is not complete, and that we need to acknowledge a new set of direct obligations to eco-systems. It recommends, at minimum, that new normative guidelines be added to our account of morality. It has been argued here that eco-centrism fails as both a consequentialist and nonconsequentialist normative theory. Eco-centrism fails as an act-consequentialist theory since we cannot derive traditional moral duties from a primary principle of eco-centrism. As a rule-consequentialist theory, eco-centrism fails because it is inconsistent with traditional moral rules, such as prohibitions against stealing. Although consequentialist eco-centrism does provide us with normative guidelines for preserving environmental well being, it does not advocate traditional human morals and therefore must be rejected as a normative theory.
Eco-centrism is better understood non-consequentially, as one of several prima facie duties along side traditional human duties. The problem, however, is arriving at a criterion to resolve conflicts between environmental and human duties. Callicott suggests that, as a rule, inner-core duties have priority over outer-core duties. This criterion fails, though, since outer-core duties are often more urgent than inner core ones. Heffernan suggests that environmental survival interests outweigh human non-survival interests (and vice versa). This criterion fails, though, since eco-systems vary in importance and therefore some non-survival human interests outweigh the survival interests of minor ecosystems.
The best way to understand our prima facie environmental duties is to prioritize them according to the relative importance of the eco-system in question. This rank order will then be placed along side a rank order of human-centered prima facie duties. Dilemmas across the two lists will then be resolved on a case by case basis. But when understood this way, the eco-centrist intuition is irrelevant. For, an anthropocentric account of indirect prima facie environmental duties will ideally produce both the same ranking of environmental duties, and the same solutions to dilemmas between environmental had traditional duties.
EMOTIVE VALUE OF ECO-CENTRISM. If eco-centrism is normatively irrelevant, then how does it function in the larger context of moral theory? Proponents of eco-centrism such as Callicott, Richard Routley, and Holmes Rolston maintain that eco-centrism is a metaphysical issue insofar as it stipulates that eco-systems are inherently valuable in and of themselves. Inherent value has traditionally been understood as a metaphysical quality ascribed to individual rational beings, such as humans. Advocates of eco-centrism reformulate the notion of inherent value so it can also be ascribed to eco-systems (which are non-rational collections of living things, and not rational individuals). The motivation behind these discussions is that if eco-centrism can be established metaphysically, then this will produce normative eco-centric guidelines. However, many of these metaphysical arguments are questionable, and even if successful, a metaphysical grounding of eco-centrism will not necessarily have normative implications.(11)
The importance of eco-centrism is neither as a normative account of environmental duty, nor as a metaphysical account of inherent value. Instead, its importance appears to be both emotive and prescriptive. More than any other approach to environmental ethics, eco-centrism conveys the urgency of our obligations to the environment. For eco-centrists, it is not acceptable to maintain current attitudes of environmental obligation, and to do so is even criminal. Environmental responsibility needs to be elevated to a higher level of priority. Perhaps it is this sense of urgency which makes eco-centrism attractive to an increasing number of informed environmentalists and moral theorists. Further, there is shock value to the claim that environmental collections are morally significant persons and that we are directly obligated to the environment, irrespective of human interests. This shock value has the benefit of spawning public awareness. Eco-centrism, then, is an important rhetorical device for expressing urgency and demanding change. Hopefully it will help change current behavior which is damaging to the environment. However, it is a mistake to think that eco-centrism translates into a unique set of normative guidelines.(12)
1. Aldo Leopold, "The Land Ethic," in A Sand County Almanac, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).
2. J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ed. Samuel Gorovitz, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 18.
3. William Aiken, "Ethical Issues in Agriculture," Earthbound, ed. Tom Regan, (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 269.
4. Jon Moline, "Aldo Leopold and the Moral Community," Environmental Ethics, 1986, Vol. 8, pp. 99-120.
5. The moral dilemma presented here, as well as those which follow, aims at presenting an agent with a forced choice between two mutually exclusive moral duties. The purpose of this dilemma is to determine which of the duties has priority over the other by testing our moral intuitions. Although one might plausibly construct a third alternative course of action for this dilemma, this would be counter to the intended purpose of the dilemma.
6. J. Baird Callicott, "The Conceptual Foundations of the Land Ethic," in Companion to "A Sand County Almanac", (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 208.
7. James D. Heffernan, "The Land Ethic: A Critical Appraisal," Environmental Ethics, 1982, Vol. 4, pp. 247.
8. Clearly, not every person's eco-centric scale of duties will match every other person's anthropocentric scale of duties. However, not every person's eco-centric scale of duties will be identical with all other eco-centric scales either. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that an ideal and rationally defensible eco-centric scale of duties will be identical to another ideal and rationally defensible anthropocentric scale of duties. For, both will be prioritizing environmental duties according to the same factors.
9. W. Michael Hoffman, "Business and Environmental Ethics," in Business Ethics Quarterly, 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 169-184.
10. Again, this is not say that all eco-centrists and anthropocentrists will resolve conflicts between environmental and human duties the same way (see previous note). Instead, it is only necessary to acknowledge that a complete list of such conflicts would be resolved identically by an ideal and rationally informed eco-centrist and anthropocentrist.
11. See James Fieser, "Callicott and the Metaphysical Basis of Eco-Centric Morality," Environmental Ethics, 1993, Vol. 15, pp. 171-180.
12. I express appreciation to J. Baird Callicott and Louis Pojman for their comments.