Explaining why God permits suffering is among the oldest philosophical problems. Two distinct approaches to the problem of evil emerged from the heated freewill debate of Renaissance and early modern philosophy: God's allowance of suffering in a world with free creatures, and God's allowance of suffering in a world in which creatures' actions are determined. The latter version, which may be called the necessitarian problem of evil, is that if human actions are determined by a necessary causal chain of mental and physical events, then this chain can ultimately be traced back to God who is the creator. God, then, would seem to be responsible for all human evil. Philosophers and theologians of the time offered solutions to the necessitarian problem of evil from every perspective: theistic, agnostic, necessitarian, and libertarian. For example, in his Treatise on Providence, Zwingli argued that human free will is absorbed into divine activity, and humans are merely an instrument in the hands of God. Zwingli's solution is that moral standards apply to humans, and not to God.

I will examine Hume's solution in the Enquiry⁽¹⁾ in which he argues that determinism is not at all harmful to religion (E 97, cf. T 409).⁽²⁾ Hume's solution is far from clear. After examining alternative interpretations, I argue that Hume's solution follows his account of Academic skepticism. On this interpretation, Hume has uncovered a contradiction between a rational basis for disbelief in a moral God (from determinism), and a common life inclination to believe in a moral God. Since, for Hume, such contradictions are irresolvable yet each alternative naturally compelling, the implication is that one must simply go on believing in both determinism and theism, in spite of the contradiction. However, the believer must not be dogmatic and must restrict his theological speculations to common life. A more concealed message of Hume's solution is that people should keep their religious views to themselves and ultimately even abandon them. I conclude by applying this Academic skeptical interpretation to Hume's cryptic comments at the end of his chapter "Of Miracles."
 
 

Hume presents the necessitarian problem of evil in the Enquiry in terms of a dilemma:

First... if human actions can be traced up by a necessary chain, to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived, and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good and laudable. Or, secondly, if they be criminal, we must retract the attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity, and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures. (E 100-101)

These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions.... Happy, if she [i.e. philosophy] be thence sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries; and... return, with suitable modesty, to her true and proper province, the examination of common life....(E 103)

These two hypotheses, the one limiting the moral character of the Deity, the other limiting his power, seem to me to be the necessary consequences of necessity, when it is joined with Theism; and they have, accordingly, been adopted by the ablest defenders of that doctrine.⁽³⁾

Starting in the late 19^th century, Hume became less of a target of attack among critics, and more of a great philosopher for scholars to interpret. Accordingly, commentators have offer three lines of interpretation of this passage. The first takes Hume to be presenting a legitimate problem about which he offers no solution. According to Knight, Hume "explicitly left the problem unsolved. He had no solution to give us."⁽⁶⁾ Huxley argued similarly that Hume "gave no real reply -- probably because none is possible."⁽⁷⁾ For Hendel, as well, "Hume admits that he has nothing to contribute toward a solution [of this dilemma]."⁽⁸⁾ Finally, Kemp Smith echoes, "To this... [dilemma], there is, Hume frankly states, no easy or satisfactory answer. Is not this but one among the mysteries with which we are unable to cope?"⁽⁹⁾ This first class of interpretations may be easily dismissed. In some sense, Hume is clearly offering a solution by attributing this whole problem to the illegitimate use of philosophy. Perhaps Hume is saying that this problem would not even arise if we did not use reason in a topic such as this that lies outside of the proper bounds of human inquiry. An implied solution, then, might be to just stop rationally speculating about the subject, and our notion of divine goodness will be preserved.

A second interpretation of Hume's solution was first suggested by Antony Flew and later echoed by A.J. Ayer and Terence Penelhum.⁽¹⁰⁾ According to Flew, all past attempts at understanding Hume's solution to the necessitarian problem of evil failed because they overlooked Hume's use of irony. Flew argues that Hume never intended to offer a serious solution. Instead, Hume ironically referred to theological issues as "sublime mysteries," with the serious implication that philosophy should confine herself to the proper province of the human understanding. This interpretation, Flew believes, is consistent with the goal of Hume's Enquiry, which is defining the limits of rational inquiry.⁽¹¹⁾

What Flew and other Hume commentators call "irony" may be more accurately called "concealment." In "Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion" I argued that, as a matter of political protection, Hume commonly used a variety of literary devices ­ and not just irony ­ to indirectly attack religion. I note further that Hume's readers could quickly read between the lines and spot what he was concealing.⁽¹²⁾ The necessitarian problem of evil may well be another instance of a concealed attack. However, Flew's decipherment ­ that philosophy should stay out of religious matters ­ does not go far enough, especially if Hume concealed his views as a matter of political protection. Religious fideists of Hume's time from Augustinian, Lutheran and Calvinistic traditions routinely denounced rationalist theology without fear of political backlash.

A third group of interpretations, however, is more interesting. Cavendish writes that Hume's "attitude to questions of this sort is a little ambiguous, and it may well be that he would reject one or more of the three propositions involved [i.e. God's omnipotence, omnibenevolence, or the existence of evil]."⁽¹³⁾ More directly, MacNabb argues that Hume's solution to this dilemma is found in the Dialogues. For Macnabb, Hume is arguing that "God is not a human being; there is, therefore, no more sense in calling him unjust or unkind than there is in calling an alligator unjust or unkind. Experience affords no evidence that the Creator's sentiments are at all similar to ours."⁽¹⁴⁾ According to Macnabb, then, Hume would resolve this issue by arguing that the Creator's notions of morality are significantly different from human notions, hence God could be the origin of evil in the human sense, but not in the divine sense. As Gaskin reads the Dialogues, though, the causal regress brought on by determinism "goes back to a non-moral original source (which could be called 'god' if we feel so disposed)."⁽¹⁵⁾ For Gaskin, it is not that the creator has a different concept of evil, as MacNabb suggests, but that the creator entertains no concept of morality.

To better evaluate what may be called the MacNabb-Gaskin interpretation, we will look at its textual support within Hume's writings. Although these two commentators appeal only to the Dialogues for support, from his earliest writings Hume discusses the problems in ascribing morality to God. This is seen most clearly in an early letter to Hutcheson:

If morality were determined by reason, that is the same to all rational beings: but nothing but experience can assure us, that the sentiments are the same. What experience have we with regard to superior beings? How can we ascribe to them any sentiments at all? They have implanted those sentiments in us for the conduct of life like our bodily sensations, which they possess not themselves. (L 40)

In the Dialogues, however, the character of Demea argues more strongly that morality cannot apply to superior rational beings:

All sentiments of the human mind, gratitude, resentment, love, friendship, approbation, blame, pity, emulation, envy, have a plain reference to the state and situation of man, and are calculated for preserving the existence and promoting the activity of such a being in such circumstances.... And as the ideas of internal sentiment, added to those of the external senses, compose the whole furniture of human understanding, we may conclude that none of the materials of thought are in any respect similar in the human and in the divine intelligence. (D 156)

The MacNabb-Gaskin interpretation, then, does seem plausible. That is, when faced with the dilemma that determinism traces moral culpability back to the Creator, Hume would deny any basis for claiming that God's concept of morality is similar to that of humans. This interpretation is also consistent with Hume's usual concealed attacks on religion, which if said directly would prompt retaliation from political or religious officials. Specifically, retaliation would be likely if Hume said directly that God has no concept of morality. There are, nevertheless, two limitations with the MacNabb-Gaskin interpretation. First, like Flew's interpretation, this interpretation may also not go far enough in uncovering Hume's ultimate point. Perhaps Hume hopes to send his readers down a slippery slope of disbelief such as this: (1) If determinism is true, then it traces all evil to the divine creator; (2) If the creator is the source of all evil, then the creator has no concept of morality; (3) If the creator has no concept of morality, then we should be psychologically compelled to reject the existence of a creator.⁽¹⁷⁾ Hume's point, then, might not simply be to deny the moral character of God, but to urge the reader to abandon theistic belief. A second and more exegetical problem is that Hume does not offer or even hint at the MacNabb-Gaskin solution in the Enquiry itself. Even if the MacNabb-Gaskin solution accurately captures Hume's intimate views on the moral character of an alleged God, Hume may have a completely different strategy in mind in the Enquiry ­ which is unique to the skeptical structure of the Enquiry itself. If fact, in Section 11 of the Enquiry Hume implies that ascribing divine justice to God hinges on whether we experience justice here in the world. And, if we do experience justice here, then we are justified in ascribing it to divine beings.⁽¹⁸⁾ Thus, Hume's in the Enquiry concerning the moral character of God may not only be different than his views in the Dialogues, but, for rhetorical purposes, may even be inconsistent with his views in the Dialogues.
 

I will argue here that, within the Enquiry, Hume's concealed point of the necessitarian dilemma involves what he calls mitigated consequential skepticism and associates with the ancient Greek Academic skeptics. That is, Hume has uncovered a contradiction in the understanding between a rational belief that undermines the notion of God (namely determinism), and a naturally grounded, common life inclination to believe in God. For Hume, if both notions are impossible to ignore, yet unresolvable, then we have no alternative but to believe both, in spite of the contradictions. However, such belief should be modest, and should not become fanatic by extending beyond the limits of common life.

To defend this interpretation, we must look at Hume's account of Academic skepticism. In the Conclusion to his Enquiry, Hume describes Academic skepticism as a doubting process that takes place once a philosophical investigation is complete. Here, the philosopher looks back at his best evidence on a given subject, and concludes that true knowledge about it is theoretically impossible. In this way, classic skeptics, such as Sextus Empiricus, argued that any and every thesis was subject to contradiction. Hume essentially agrees that all ideas of the understanding are ultimately contradictory. In the conclusion to the Enquiry, Hume points out three main contradictions, connected with the issues of space, time, and external objects. In all three cases, according to Hume, we have a contradiction between what our reason would have us believe, and what our common life inclinations would have us believe. For example, with the concept of space ­ as Euclidean geometry --, one can rationally argue that any segment on a line may be divided again and again, on to infinity. However, this notion of the infinite divisibility of space contradicts our natural, or common life notions that see space composed of finite or atomic particles. It is important to note that, for Hume, these contradictions are inevitable and are neither the result of bad philosophical theories nor sloppy analysis. Rather, Hume argues that our human understanding is inherently contradictory.⁽¹⁹⁾ It is simply an unalterable fact of life.

Such contradictions have inclined some skeptics to adopt universal agnosticism by abstaining from belief on every subject. But Hume does not go this far. Instead, he argues that instinctive principles of the human mind force us to hold common life views of space, time, and external objects, in spite of the contradictions that these beliefs inevitably produce. Hume then argues that his skepticism entails two recommendations. First, we should avoid dogmatism by entertaining "a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner" (E 162). Second, he recommends that we confine all rational inquiry to very narrow limits and "never be tempted to go beyond common life" (E 162).

In short, there are three features that make up Humean Academic skepticism, which we can use as criteria to identify specific instances of it elsewhere. First, there is the presence of an irresolvable conflict in the understanding between a rational belief, and a common life belief. Second, there is a recommendation for us to be philosophically modest, and, third, there is a recommendation that we should not breach the bounds of common life.

We find Hume apply an Academic skeptical method in earlier sections of the Enquiry, most notably Section 5, titled "Skeptical Solutions to these Doubts." In Section 5, Hume attempts to explain the basis of inductive reasoning. The dilemma is that, although induction is valid from a common life perspective, it "is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding." Although Hume explains the inductive process by appealing to the psychological principle of habit, nevertheless, induction is not rationally grounded. At the outset of this section Hume directly states that his solution is in the Academic skeptical tradition, a tradition that he describes as follows:

The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgment, of danger in hasty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nor need we fear that this [academic skeptical] philosophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, should ever undermine the reasonings of common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.

When we now examine Hume's solution to the necessitarian problem of evil in Section 8 of the Enquiry, we see that all three conditions of Academic skepticism are present there as well. As to the first of these conditions, it is clear that the necessitarian problem of evil is a conflict between determinism and theism. Hume even uses the term "contradiction" in reference to the problem. It is also clear that, according to Hume, determinism is a rational concept, as he has spent an entire chapter arguing so. It also seems that theism, for Hume, is a common life belief. Although he does not specifically say this in the Enquiry, in The Natural History of Religion, Hume argues that, "the universal propensity to believe in invisible, intelligent power, if not an original instinct... [is] at least a general attendant of human nature" (NHR 75). It seems, then, that the necessitarian problem of evil meets the first condition of Academic skepticism.

As to the second of the three conditions above -- the recommendation of philosophical modesty --, in his solution, Hume specifically notes that philosophy should maintain a "suitable modesty." Finally, as to the third condition above -- that philosophy should be restricted to common life --, Hume also recommends that philosophy return to "her true and proper province, the examination of common life" (E 103). Given the fulfillment of these three conditions, we may conclude that Hume is advancing an Academic skeptical solution. Hume's solution to the necessitarian problem of evil, then, should be understood the same way as his solution to any of the three contradictions discussed in the conclusion to the Enquiry, such as the problem of space, or the problem of induction discussed in Section 5. That is, we accept both contentions that are in conflict with each other. In this case, we adhere to both our rational belief in determinism, and our common life belief in a good God. We do this because natural inclinations prevent us from doing otherwise. We then must accept both beliefs, so long as we are philosophically modest about them, and do not reason beyond common life.

The clear benefit of this interpretation is that it coincides with Hume's Academic skepticism in the Enquiry, and perhaps even his account of skepticism in the conclusion to Book I of the Treatise. For, once we recognize Hume's skeptical trademark -- the unlucky detection of a contradiction between rational belief and common life belief -- it is clear that his solution to the necessitarian problem of evil is just one more instance of this.
 

For the sake of argument, let us grant that Hume offers an Academic solution to the necessitarian problem of evil as analyzed above. There are three problems with this solution, which suggest that there is yet another level to Hume's "solution" beyond this one. First, a theist would probably reject this solution for being too confining. On the surface, Hume appears to extend an olive branch by recognizing the believer's right to hold to a rationally inconsistent belief in a good God. This is the same right granted to those who believe in the existence of external objects, even though such belief is inconsistent with what we rationally may conclude about external objects. However, the price paid for the right of theistic belief is dogmatic silence. For, once the believer proclaims dogmatically that such and such is the will of God (or "'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable"⁽²⁰⁾) he has trespassed beyond the bounds of common life and must be reminded of the hidden inconsistency in his theism. So, Hume's concession of the believer's right is not as generous as it first appears. On the terms Hume offers, the believer is likely to be dissatisfied with a right to believe which bars a right to assert. It is harder to remain within the bounds of common life in religious matters than it is with more abstract matters, such as with the existence of external objects. Even the most rigorous science can function remarkably well when remaining uncommitted to external existences. However, traditional theism, by its very nature, is a transcendent enterprise requiring assertions and commitments such as the commitment to do God's will -- a commitment which extends beyond common life. The committed theist, then, will most likely reject Hume's solution to the necessitarian problem of evil for being too confining.

A second problem is that Hume is perhaps a bit dishonest when he parallels theistic belief with common life beliefs, such as belief in external objects. It seems that Hume would call such common life beliefs primary instincts (E 156-157), that is, instincts which are "found absolutely universal in all nations and ages" (NHR 21).⁽²¹⁾ Hume admits, though, that theistic beliefs are based on secondary instincts (NHR 21). That is, they are founded on several general instincts as opposed to one specific instinct. This presents a problem. Academic skepticism, as we have seen, involves an unavoidable contradiction. Since theism is not instinctive in the primary sense, then the conflict between theistic belief and determinism is not unavoidable: there is nothing to prevent us from becoming agnostics. Hence, there may be no basis for being an Academic skeptic on this issue. Perhaps, in the Enquiry, Hume believed that religion was a primary instinct. Perhaps Academic skepticism does not require a contradiction between primary instincts. For, it is possible that beliefs due to secondary instincts may become so entrenched in a person that they become as irresistible as beliefs based on primary instincts. With either of these suppositions, though, there still appears to be a fundamental difference between theistic belief and belief in external objects.

A third problem is that this interpretation does not easily coincide with Hume's apparent denial of an anthropomorphic God discussed above with the MacNabb-Gaskin interpretation. That is, in the Dialogues Hume seems to encourage us to reject traditional theism, and here he seems to say that we should not reject it any more than we would reject common life views of external objects. Although it is popular now in Hume scholarship to interpret Hume as a type of theist, I believe that we should resist this approach, principally because Hume's contemporaries did not interpret him this way. ⁽²²⁾ Consequently, if we take Hume's solution at face value, it runs counter to themes that dominate Hume's other writings on religion.

All three of these problems may be adequately addressed if we distinguish between Hume's short-range and long-range concealed messages. In view of the above problems, perhaps the short-range concealed message of his solution is people will unfortunately believe in God, whether it is rational or not, and they should at least keep it to themselves. This message is sufficiently controversial to justify presenting it in a concealed manner. It is also consistent with Hume's implied recommendation in the Dialogues that we should reject theism. The long-range concealed message of Hume's solution may be that if we understand why we should keep our irrational religious beliefs to ourselves, then we should be psychologically compelled to reject our religious beliefs. This long-range concealed message is consistent with the slippery slope of disbelief described earlier, which may be the unifying theme of all of Hume's attacks on religious belief.

If we know that Hume applied the Academic skeptical method as a matter of course in the Enquiry, it may be reasonable to look for indications of it in hot spots throughout the Enquiry. We might, for instance, find this pattern in the concluding comments to his chapter on miracles. He concludes his assault on the rationality of belief in miracles with the following:

...whoever is moved by faith to assent to it [i.e. the veracity of miracles], is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience. (E 131)

^1. Part II of his chapter "Of Liberty and Necessity." David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), hereafter abbreviated T; Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), ed. Selby-Bigge, hereafter abbreviated E; Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), hereafter Abbreviated D; The Natural History of Religion, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1992), ed. James Fieser, hereafter abbreviated NHR; The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Greig, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), hereafter abbreviated L.

^2. According to Flew, at the top of E 97 Hume does not claim to show that determinism is consistent with religion, but only with morality: "It is... significant that in the definitive edition he omits the words and religion, which had previously followed morality," Hume's Philosophy of Belief, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), 141. Flew believes this supports his interpretation that Hume makes no real attempt to show that determinism is consistent with religion. Further down the same page, however, Hume argues that even if someone makes his concept of determinism stronger than Hume intended, this "can be of no consequence to morality or religion...." This passage seems to conflict which Flew's interpretation. On my interpretation, though, the discrepancy between the two passages may be resolved. Whereas it may be true for Hume that determinism and religion may never be consistent, I will argue that he does offer a skeptical solution, which makes the inconsistency "of no major consequence."

^3. Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton, (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1872), Vol. 2, p. 634.

^4. Adherents to soft determinism, or what has been called "Lockean freedom," include Thomas Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Richard Price, Anthony Collins, and Jonathan Edwards. On the notion of Lockean freedom, see William Rowe's "Two Concepts of Freedom," presidential APA address, Central Division, 1987.

^5. 1809, "E.N.", "Objections to the Doctrine of Necessity," Monthly Repository, Vol. 4, pp. 548-551.

^6. William Knight, Hume, (London: Kennikat Press, 1886), 203. For Knight, it was enough for Hume to have recognized the problem which, he believes, few other determinists did.

^7. Thomas H. Huxley, Hume, (New York: D. Appleton, 1896), 223. After arguing that this dilemma poses a serious problem to any branch of monotheism, Huxley evaluates how Collins and Edwards addressed this problem.

^8. Charles W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 256.

^9. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, (London: Macmillan, 1941), 434. For a recent account of this interpretation, see Barry Stroud's Hume, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), 153.

^10. See Ayer, Hume, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 79, and Terence Penelhum, Hume, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 121. It seems that Macnabb has adopted Flew's interpretation as well; see his entry under "David Hume" in Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

^11. Antony Flew, (1961), 162; David Hume: Philosopher of Moral Science, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 131; "Inconsistency within a Reconciling Project," Hume Studies, 4 (1978): 1-6.

^12. "Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion and his Early Critics," Journal of Philosophical Research, 1995, Vol. 20, pp. 83-101.

^13. A.P. Cavendish, David Hume, (New York: Dover, 1958), 111.

^14. D.G.C. Macnabb, David Hume: his theory of Knowledge and Morality, (London: Hutchinson House, 1951), 203.

^15. J.C.A. Gaskin, Hume's Philosophy of Religion, (London: Macmillan Press, 1978), 57.

^16. It is important to note that the argument here, as Hume presents it to Hutcheson, also appears in the Treatise, only less direct. He tells us in Book III that we cannot prove a priori that rationalist notions of moral relations, "if they existed and were perceiv'd, would be universally forcible and obligatory" to all rational beings (T 455-456). He tells us further that all knowledge we have of rational beings comes from experience and we ought never extend ourselves beyond experience in this regard (T 456). What he fails to tell us here, though, is that we have no experience of superior beings, hence we have no a posteriori proof that morality applies universally to all rational beings. When the reader provides this obvious premise, though, the conclusion is that we have no knowledge of morality applying to rational beings-precisely what he argued in his letter to Hutcheson.

^17. In "Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion and his Early Critics" (cited above) I argue that at times Hume seems to advanced such a slippery slope of disbelief.

^18. In that section, the lead character speaks the following: "Are there any marks of a distributive justice in the world? If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If you reply in the negative, I conclude, that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent; I answer, that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself."

^19. Manfred Kuehn suggests that these contradictions within the understanding are similar to Kant's antinomies. "Hume's Antinomies," Hume Studies, 9 (1983): 25-45.

^20. T 274.

^21. The account of primary instincts in The Natural History of Religion is apparently different than Hume's earlier account in the Treatise. Compare T 280-281 with NHR 21.

^22. For a critique of this approach, see "Hume's Concealed Attack on Religion and his Early Critics," cited above.