Contemporary commentaries on Hume often fall into two extreme groups, each suited for specific purposes and audiences: (1) exegetical works, with minimal historical context, and (2) historical works with minimal exegesis. The present volume is a collection of 12 essays, most of which fall into the second category. Eleven of the essays are previously unpublished, and one (by Owens) is a revised reprint. Its historical emphasis is expected from earlier publications by the book's editors and contributors. Historically oriented commentaries, in general, are most valuable when they present new information, rather than simply reshuffle previously known facts under the guise of a new slant. Most of the essays in this volume succeed in this regard. The topics covered are mainly on Hume's ethical and religious views.

The first essay, by historian Roger L. Emerson, is titled "The 'affair' at Edinburgh and the 'Project' at Glasgow: the Politics of Hume's Attempts to Become a Professor." The bulk of the essay covers Hume's 1744-1745 candidacy for the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Emerson goes beyond standard discussions by outlining the political allegiances of perhaps a dozen key players in the decision. He also places the events in a more reliable and better documented political context. The second essay, by political scientist James Moore, is on "Hume and Hutcheson." Hume commentators typically see a close association between Hutcheson's moral theory and that of Hume, specifically their shared view that moral distinctions are the result of feeling, and not of reason. Although Moore agrees that there are some points of similarity, he argues that Hume's theory is vastly different, and it is not indebted to Hutcheson's for its origin or inspiration. The principal contribution of Moore's essay is the citations from classical authors who indeed were Hume's inspiration. The third essay, by Stephen Darwall, is on "Hume and the Invention of Utilitarianism." The essay is more exegetical than the others in this volume, and shows the influence of Hutcheson's moral psychology on Hume, how Hume diverged from Hutcheson, and how he paved the way for Bentham's utilitarianism.

The fourth essay, by Pauline Westerman, is on "Hume and the Natural Lawyers," and contrasts Hume's casual use of natural law terminology with the full-fledged natural law theories of Grotius and Pufendorf. Westerman argues that "natural laws" for Hume are rules that we consistently establish by convention. Thus, Westerman takes issue with Haakonssen who interprets Hume as a natural law theorist who empirically justifies fundamental laws. Hume also abandoned natural law as an explanation of moral motivation; instead, motivation comes from sympathy with public interest. The fifth essay, by John P. Wright, is on ?Butler and Hume on Habit and Moral Character.? Following Aristotle's account of virtuous habits, Butler argues in his Analogy of Religion (1736) that as we develop habitual actions, we are less affected by our emotions. Wright argues that Hume may have read Butler's Analogy and thus was influenced by his account of moral habit. Wright traces the notion of habit through Hume's account of calm passions and his explanation of justice. Wright comments that, for Hume, ?Through habit we become unconscious of the utility which lies at the root of our approval of artificial virtues such as justice.?

The sixth essay, by historian P.B. Wood, is on ?Hume, Reid and the Science of the Mind.? Inspired by Kuhn's account of scientific paradigms, Wood argues that Hume and Reid were instrumental in establishing 18^th century Scottish conceptions of the science of the human mind. Hume and Reid articulated their own anatomy of the mind in response to the ?canonical? philosophical texts of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Butler. Reid, in particular, drew a sharp contrast between physiological and philosophical accounts of perception. The seventh essay, by David Owen, is titled ?Hume's Doubts About Probable Reasoning: Was Locke the Target?? Attempting to make sense of Hume's account of the problem of induction, Owen looks at 18t^h century discussions of ?demonstrative? and ?probable? reasoning, emphasizing Locke's account. Owen shows how Locke grounded probability in reason, and how Hume did not.

The eighth essay is the most important piece in the volume and presents a newly discovered ?Early Fragment on Evil? written by Hume, which is edited and introduced by M.A. Stewart. Paralleling the reasoning offered by Philo in various parts of the Dialogues, Hume argues in the fragment that the issue of God's moral goodness hinges on the quantity of good vs. evil in the universe. The fragment cryptically opens with the heading ?Sect. 7? followed by ?Fourth Objection.? Based on handwriting comparisons and writing style, Stewart suggests that the fragment probably was originally part of the Treatise which Hume removed, as indicated in his letter of December 12, 1737 to Henry Home: ?I am at present castrating my Work, that is, cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible.? Stewart speculates that the fragment was part of Book 1, Part 4, Section 7 of a differently structured Treatise. It is reasonable to place the fragment within Book 1, Part 4 as Stewart suggests. Part 4 is titled ?Of the Sceptical and other Systems of Philosophy? and includes discussions of various ?systems? including the ?vulgar system,? the ?philosophical system? and the ?system of Spinoza.? The fragment opens describing attributes that are essential to the ?System of Theism? and, accordingly, logically fits within the context of Part 4. Placing the fragment before the conclusion also makes sense since the more controversial aspects of Book 1 successively appear near its end. Stewart will also include this fragment in the forthcoming critical edition of Hume's philosophical writings, edited by Beauchamp, Norton, and Stewart.

The ninth essay, also by Stewart, is on ?Hume's Historical View of Miracles.? Like R.M. Burns's, The Great Debate on Miracles (1981), Stewart examines authors prior to Hume who shaped the philosophical discussions of miracles. However, Stewart argues that the empirical thrust of Hume's critique (i.e., probability and testimony) was foreshadowed by other writers, including Arnauld, Wilkins, and Locke. Stewart argues that Hume turns around a philosophical tradition that had hitherto been used to bolster belief in miracles. For Stewart, ?Hume's project, in effect, is to make Locke consistent.? The tenth essay, by Michel Malherbe, is on ?Hume and the Art of Dialogue.? Drawing from dialogues by Shaftesbury, Berkeley, Addison, and Hurd, Malherbe shows how Hume's Dialogues follows 18^th century expectations about the formal structure of philosophical dialogue writing. Malherbe argues that, as a skeptical philosophical dialogue, the Dialogues make no dogmatic pronouncement against religion, and the Dialogues cannot be used as an avenue for discovering Hume's own views on religion. Malherbe's discussion overlooks two important things. First, some authors of the period, such as the Deists, wrote in dialogue form so that they could present their controversial beliefs and, at the same time, limit their liability. This follows in the 17^th century tradition of Galileo's Dialogue on Two Chief Systems which, arguably also extended to the 18^th century. Second, in point of fact, virtually all 18^th century commentators on the Dialogues attempted to decipher Hume's true views on religion from that work. If Malherbe is right then surprisingly few of Hume's contemporary critics appreciated the conventions.

The eleventh essay, by Christopher Bernard, is on ?Hume and the Madness of Religion? and discusses the psychological mechanisms that lead to religious belief. Focusing on both Hume's History and the Natural History of Religion, Bernard describes how the various passions, sympathy, and imagination contribute to the development of religious ideas, particularly those which are superstitious and fanatical. The twelfth and final essay, by Manfred Kuehn, is on "Kant's critique of Hume's Theory of Faith." Contrasting Kant and Hume's views on the rationality of faith, Kuehn argues that Hume believed that religious belief was irrational, whereas Kant held that religious belief could be supported by reason. Kuehn argues that, ultimately, a follower of Hume would be unaffected by Kant's arguments for the rationality of religious belief.

All of the essays in this volume are carefully researched and live up to the claim of the volume's title. That is, they illuminate the connections between Hume, his influences, and some of the philosophers that he influenced. Some of the essays' more questionable claims involve mainly inside scholarly disputes which even opponents will appreciate reading. The collection is among the most important historically oriented philosophical commentaries on Hume in recent years. It is especially valuable for research libraries, Hume scholars, and historians of 18^th century philosophy.