"In many philosophy courses, especially those based on anthologies, the material is so difficult for undergraduates... to read that they soon give up trying; and anything they get out of the course comes from what they hear in the classroom." This is the ominous note upon which John Hospers opens his most recent edition of An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. It is difficult to object to Hospers's assessment of using primary philosophical texts in the undergraduate classroom. Often the instructor who insists on using such texts must face the classroom with the assumption that no one read or understood the assignment. In spite of this problem, primary texts are used and will continue to be used in lower level philosophy courses. I will discuss the use of study guides in teaching classic primary texts, and provide an example study guide to Section twelve of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
The format of the study guides I have used involves a series of questions
directed at particular sections of the text, with approximately two questions
for each page of text. For example, question one in the appended study
guide to Hume's Enquiry reads as follows:
The relevant part of the text reads as follows:
The point of this passage is that no such indubitable original principles exist, and if they did, we could never advance beyond them without error. Each of the study guide questions can be answered in a single sentence. The questions require the student to only summarize the passage referred to and do not ask for interpretation. For, prior to any evaluation of a text, a reader must understand the general point of that text. Although a mixture of summary and evaluative questions could be included in a study guide, I have opted against this. The preliminary task of understanding a text is sufficiently challenging and time consuming for a student and the evaluative element can and usually is covered in class discussion or written essays. Each study question is also accompanied with page references to the passage in question, along with an indicator as to whether the selection appears at the top, middle or bottom of that page. Directing the student to the exact location on the page minimizes hunting and inclines the student to read the entire designated section, rather than simply search page after page for key words.
In addition to asking questions, the study guides provide commentary on difficult passages and give background on the history of certain ideas. For example, Section twelve of Hume's Enquiry contains a discussion of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Students today are generally unfamiliar with Locke's distinction and thus find Hume's argument difficult. Consequently, in the study guide (appended below) I provide a summary of this particular argument.
As a rule, I neither require students to work through the study guides, nor do I refer to the study guides during lecture. However, I forewarn the students that the study guides will form the basis of the questions on the exams. This, I have found, provides the incentive for most students to work through the questions. In smaller classes I give each student a copy of the study guide. In larger classes, however, where duplication costs are a factor, I place the study guide on reserve in the library and request that the students make their own copies from that.
Study guides of the format I have described would not be appropriate for all primary texts, especially contemporary works. The time investment for writing a single study guide is justified by continual reuse. Most contemporary works quickly go out of print and have a limited and dated appeal. Also, study guides are not well suited for more difficult texts such as Kant's Critique. Here, study guides would be both too long and too difficult to compose. Further, works such as Kant's Critique are used in upper level undergraduate courses where commentaries would be more appropriate tools of assistance. Study guides are best suited for short, simple, and classic philosophical works such as Hume's Enquiry, which renders the philosophical concepts of the Treatise more accessible to the general reader.
The Enquiry is particularly appropriate for this style of exposition since Hume consciously wrote the Enquiry for a general audience.(1) But was not the only philosopher to seek readers from among the middle class. Kant's introductory comments to the Prolegomena show that this work was written for a popular audience. Mill's Utilitarianism was originally published as three articles in a popular magazine. To this list of intentionally popular philosophical writings, we may add Descartes' Meditations, Hobbes's Leviathan, Leibniz's Monadology, Becarria's On Crime and Punishment, Berkeley's Dialogues, and Reid's Inquiry.
The authors of these works have made our jobs as teachers easier by reducing the complexity of their views for their own general readership. The success of their simplifying task is attested to by the popularity of these works at the time. Why, though, are these philosophical works more inaccessible today than the histories or literary novels of the same period? Their readers were not necessarily more complex thinkers than contemporary readers (as the letters quoted in footnote 1 below inform us). There are two important reasons for their comparative inaccessibility. First, the dated vocabulary and sentence structure present obstacles. For example, the first paragraph of Mill's Utilitarianism consists of three sentences of approximately 60 words each. This alone discourages some students today from reading further. It would also be unreasonable to expect undergraduate students to gain complete command of outmoded writing styles in the course of one semester.
Second, and more important, logic, metaphysics, and moral philosophy were standard subjects of the enlightenment school curriculum. Published course lectures from this period show that a broad range of philosophical topics were covered in what would be our equivalent to high-school. This provided the readers of the time with a philosophical background which our students today lack.
Thus, although the philosophical works listed above are not intrinsically difficult, they do present genuine obstacles for today's students. The study guides address the language and sentence structure difficulties of the text by providing a simple and continuous set of transitional comments and questions. The difficulty of philosophical background is addressed with explanations such as with Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
Below is a sample study guide to Hume's Section twelve of the Enquiry
with page references to Robert Paul Wolff's anthology Ten Great Works
of Philosophy. T, M, and B in parentheses below refer respectively
to the top, middle, and bottom of the page in question.
The term "skepticism" has a variety of philosophical meanings. Hume's task in this concluding section is to identify and evaluate some of these. He starts by hinting at a distinction between speculative and actional skepticism, a distinction commonly made in his day. A speculative skeptic merely uncovers theoretical problems, and an actional skeptic continues by recommending a course of action. A speculative skeptic about the existence of God, for example, would argue that the evidence suggests that God does not exist. An actional skeptic on this subject, however, would continue by recommending that we live or act as though there is no God. Critics of Hume's time believed that actional skepticism was a practical impossibility (e.g. acting as though there is no external world) and this undermined speculative skepticism (e.g. denying knowledge of an external world). In this section, Hume drives a wedge between speculative and actional skepticism by suggesting that we can be speculative skeptics while not allowing such theoretical views to influence our behavior (e.g. acting as though there is no external world).
The key distinction Hume makes with respect to skepticism is between antecedent and consequential skepticism. Antecedent skepticism is a doubting process which takes place before one begins a philosophical inquiry. Here, old ideas are cleared away so the philosopher can begin fresh. Consequential skepticism, on the other hand, is a doubting process which takes place once a philosophical investigation is complete. Here, the philosopher looks back at his best evidence on a given subject and concludes that true knowledge of this subject is impossible. Hume notes four varieties of antecedent and consequential skepticism:
Antecedent
(1) Excessive (Cartesian)
(2) Moderate
Consequential
(1) Extreme (Pyrrhonian)
(2) Moderate (or "Mitigated")
(1) Hume distinguishes between two types of antecedent skepticism, one of which is the type used by Descartes. Cartesian skepticism recommends universal doubt, so that one's knowledge may then be based on indubitable original principles. What, according to Hume, is wrong with this type of skepticism (B 284-T 285)?
(2) Describe the more moderate version of antecedent skepticism which Hume believes is a necessary preparation for a philosophical investigation (T 285).
Insofar as Hume is an antecedent skeptic in the moderate sense, he is both speculative (by exposing problems with conventional philosophical theories) and actional (by recommending that we abandon these conventional views).
Hume's main interest in Section twelve is with consequential skepticism, particularly the excessive variety, which he also refers to as "Pyrrhonism" after the ancient Greek skeptic Pyrrho. Classic Pyrrhonian skeptics argued that any and every thesis (e.g. God's existence, the existence of matter) was subject to problems or contradictions. In Hume's day, there was a revival of Pyrrhonian skepticism influenced by the writings of fourth century Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus. Hume examines many of these Pyrrhonian-type arguments here, accepting some and rejecting others. The excessive or Pyrrhonian attacks which Hume looks at are outlined as follows:
1. Arguments against the senses
He begins his examination of excessive or Pyrrhonian skepticism by looking at arguments against the reliability of the senses. The general problem concerns our perception of external objects.
(3) What are some of the more trite ways which skeptics have argued that our senses do not reliably copy physical objects (B 285)?
(4) What is the most which these trite observations tell us about our senses (B 285)?
So much for the trite arguments against the senses. Hume next looks at more profound arguments which attempt to make the same point. These arguments require some background, which Hume provides by discussing several theories of sense perception (286-288).
(5) The common sense view of perception, which we grew up with, is often called naive realism. What is this view (T 286)?
(6) What problem does the slightest bit of critical reflection (or philosophy) reveal about naive realism (M 286)?
Hume believes that the most popular alternative to naive realism is the view that our perceptions are merely images of objects and these objects have uniform and independent existence. This view is often called epistemological dualism. Hume criticizes this theory for three reasons.
(7) What is Hume's first criticism of epistemological dualism (B 286-T 287)?
(8) In his second criticism of epistemological dualism, Hume notes that it is a question of fact whether our sense perceptions are produced by external objects. Further, Hume argues that this fact can only be verified by experience. How, according to Hume, does this affect the theory of epistemological dualism (T-M 287)?
(9) Finally, Hume claims that epistemological dualism, or the general veracity of our senses, cannot be defended on the grounds that God is not a deceiver. That is, contrary to philosophers such as Descartes, Hume believes it is wrong to infer that God would not allow us to erroneously believe our perceptions resemble external objects. Why (M 287)?
Still providing background, Hume discusses the theory of perception given by John Locke. Locke argued that there is an important distinction between primary and secondary qualities in objects. Primary qualities are those which objects actually possess, such as shape, number and size. Secondary qualities, on the other hand, are viewer-dependent qualities, such as color, taste, and smell, and merely appear to belong to an object.
(10) Hume believes the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is unfounded. Why (T 288)?
(11) Why cannot the theory of primary qualities be defended by the notion of abstraction (M 288)?
The background is now complete, and Hume gives the "profound" Pyrrhonian arguments which undermine the reliability of the senses. There are two distinct Pyrrhonian arguments. The first involves a conflict between naive realism and epistemological dualism. If we adhere to naive realism, which is our instinctive view, then we contradict reason (or the slightest philosophy). If, on the other hand, we adhere to epistemological dualism, which seems reasonable, we (1) must ignore the problems with epistemological dualism noted earlier, and (2) contradict our natural inclination to realism (B 288). Given only these two options, both with problems, it seems that we cannot rely on our senses.
(12) The second Pyrrhonian argument against the reliability of the senses is launched against Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities. What is this problem (starting with "The second objection goes farther..." T-M 289)?
Continuing with his discussion of excessive consequential skepticism, Hume next takes up Pyrrhonian arguments against reason or the understanding. First he looks at arguments which undermine abstract reasoning. One problem arises with the notion of the infinite divisibility of space (as represented by Euclidean geometry). In geometry one can argue that any segment on a line may be divided again and again, on to infinity. This notion of the infinite divisibility of space contradicts our common notion of space as composed of finite or atomic particles (289). A second but similar contradiction arises with the concept of time. According to our abstract notions, time consists of an infinite succession of shorter moments, but this idea strikes us as absurd. In both of these cases, then, we have a contradiction between what our reason or understanding tells us about space and time and what our common instincts would have us believe (290).
Moving on, Hume examines Pyrrhonian arguments against our knowledge of "moral evidence," or, more properly, against matters of fact.
(13) What are some of the popular (or trite) objections Pyrrhonians have raised against knowledge about matters of fact (T 291)?
(14) What problem does Hume find with these objections (T-M 291)?
(15) There is, however, a philosophical objection which a Pyrrhonian might raise against knowledge about matters of fact. What is this objection (M-B 291)?
In total, Hume has presented five Pyrrhonian claims which seek to undermine knowledge: (1) the claim that there is a dilemma between realism and dualism, (2) the claim that the doctrine of primary qualities ultimately implies the existence of an inexplicable "something," (3) the claim that the infinite divisibility of space conflicts with our common notions, (4) the claim that the infinite divisibility of time conflicts with our common notions, and (5) the claim that all knowledge of matters of fact is based on an instinct (habit), which, like any instinct, is faulty. At this point one might ask whether Hume believes that these claims succeed in undermining knowledge. With all but the last of these, Hume is purposefully unclear. However, from his Treatise we know that the first and second problems are genuine for Hume (Treatise 218, 231). The third and fourth problems apparently pose no real problem since Hume suggests a solution to these dilemmas in a footnote (B 290). But the fifth and final problem is one which Hume obviously recognizes as serious.
Thus, Hume would classify himself as a Pyrrhonian or excessive skeptic, for he does hold that the understanding has at least three contradictions (i.e. the first, second and fifth contradictions noted above). Further, he takes these three problems to be inevitable, being neither the result of bad philosophical theories nor sloppy analysis. Instead, Hume would argue that our human understanding is inherently contradictory, and it is simply an unalterable fact of life.
Even though Hume endorses three of the above Pyrrhonian arguments, his endorsement is only speculative, not actional. That is, he does not suggest that we act as though our senses and our understanding cannot be trusted.
(16) What is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive or Pyrrhonian skepticism when it is actional (B 291)?
(17) What would happen if actional Pyrrhonism had a constant influence on the mind (T-M 291)?
Hume's point is that even though our understanding is contradictory in nature, our natural instincts prevent us from being actional consequential skeptics. Instinctive principles of the mind force us to rely upon our senses and our understanding. This leads to Hume's final category of skepticism: mitigated (i.e. moderate) consequential skepticism. Here, the skeptic accepts speculative Pyrrhonism, but draws more moderate actional conclusions.
(18) Describe the first kind of mitigated consequential skepticism which Hume finds both durable and useful (B 292).
(19) What is the second type of mitigated consequential skepticism which may be advantageous to humankind (M 293)?
(20) The result of the above two forms of mitigated skepticism is that all rational inquiry should be confined to very narrow limits. What are the two principles which determine the limits of rational inquiry (294-295)?
(21) What are some areas of study which are legitimate subjects of rational inquiry (M 295)?
(22) What do these areas of study have in common (M 295)?
(23) Hume rejects all remaining areas of study which (a) claim to establish truths about the world, but (b) are about neither quantity and number (relations of ideas) nor matters of fact. What does he suggest that we do with books that contain such studies (B 295)?
1. During the enlightenment, a new readership emerged
among the growing middle class, and this became the audience for most writers
of the period. To write without this audience in mind would prove disastrous.
Hume's experience with the publication of his Treatise is a case
in point. The following letter from Oswald of Dunkier to Henry Home, subsequent
to the publication of the Treatise, indicates the problem Hume's
friends had in recommending the work to their own acquaintances:
Thirty years later, after Hume's fame was well established, the Treatise was still plagued with the same problem, as suggested in the following letter from John Gregory to James Beattie:
You are well aware of the antipathy which the present race of readers have against all abstract reasoning, except what is employed in defence of the fashionable principles; but though they pretend to admire their metaphysical champions, yet they never read them, nor, if they did, could they understand them. Among Mr. Hume's numerous disciples, I do not know one who ever read his "Treatise on Human Nature." [John Gregory to James Beattie, January 1, 1768, in William Forbes's An Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie..., New York, Isaac Riley, 1806, p. 76.]
Both of these letters blame the disinterest shown toward the Treatise on the literary tastes of the general readership, which would be best described as superficial. It is in this context that we should understand Hume's own assessment of the failure of the Treatise: "I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter...." With a better understanding of the limits of his readers, Hume recast the Treatise into his two Enquiries.
But, appealing to popular middle class tastes necessarily involved compromising
on detail. For example, in the Treatise, Hume labors at drawing
minute distinctions among our emotions, and argues at length that the sentiment
of moral approval is a particular type of emotion. However, buried in a
footnote to an appendix to the second Enquiry, we find Hume all
but dismissing this taxonomy of moral emotions as unimportant for his popular
readers: