Perhaps the first written attack against Hume's moral theory was by William Wishart in 1745, which Hume responded to in A Letter from a Gentleman. One of Wishart's charges is that Hume sapped the foundations of morality "by denying the natural and essential difference betwixt right and wrong, good and evil, justice and injustice; making the difference only artificial, and to arise from human conventions and compacts."(1) The basis of this charge is Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues.
This distinction is controversial in view of the virtues that Hume catalogs under the heading "artificial," which include justice, keeping promises, allegiance, and chastity. By contrast, the natural virtues include benevolence, meekness, charity, and generosity. Contrary to what one might expect, the key virtues which are necessary for a well-ordered state are deemed by Hume to be artificial whereas only the more superogatory virtues are classed as natural. For Schneewind, artificial virtues correspond with what have historically been called perfect duties, and natural virtues correspond with imperfect duties.(2)
Although the distinction between natural and artificial virtues is subdued in Hume's Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751),(3) the distinction is the cornerstone of his moral theory in Book III of the Treatise.(4) Unfortunately, Hume does not provide a single systematic analysis of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues, and an account of it must be elicited from the text.
In contrast to traditional discussions of this subject, I will argue that the primary distinction between natural and artificial virtues lies in the motivational factors of the moral agent. Natural virtues, then, are instinctive character traits of the agent which give rise to passions, which in turn motivate the will to action. Artificial virtues are intentions which hold out an artificially instilled prospect of pleasure or pain; these evoke passions which in turn motivate willful actions. I begin by clarifying Hume's general notion of virtue and vice.
Hume's account of the natural and artificial virtues is complicated
by his free use of the terms "virtue" and "vice":
From these two passages virtues could be an agent's actions, sentiments, character traits, mental actions or qualities. In other passages he even refers to the spectator's feeling of moral approval and the power of producing love or pride within the spectator as virtues.(5) To add precision to Hume's account of "virtue" and "vice," three preliminarly points of clarification can be made.
A first point of clarification is that, strictly speaking, virtues and vices must be seen as features which belong to the agent and not the spectator. Elsewhere I have argued that Hume's moral theory must be understood in terms of a division of labor between the moral agent who performs a morally significant action from virtuous or vicious motives, and the moral spectator who approves or disapproves of the action.(6)
A second preliminary point of clarification is that virtues and vices
are confined to some aspect of the agent's motives, rather than her actions.
This is evident in the following which may be called Hume's durability
Hume's argument is this:
Support for premise (1) is given throughout the Treatise (T 296, 473, 574, 575, 591). Indeed, the connection between moral pleasure and ancillary feelings of love, hate, pride and humility is so pronounced in Hume, that Ardal has argued that these ancillary feelings are the spectator's moral sentiments of approval and disapproval.(8) Premise (2) has its basis in Book II where Hume argues that the agent's action alone cannot produce feelings of love or hate in the spectator: "this relation alone is too feeble and inconstant to be a foundation for these passions. It reaches not the sensible and thinking part, and neither proceeds from any thing durable in him, nor leaves any thing behind it; but passes in a moment, and is as if it had never been" (T 349). From these two premises it follows that a spectator's moral approval/disapproval is of an agent's durable motive. This durable motive of the agent, and not her action, is then the locus of virtue and vice.
A final preliminary point of clarification is that virtues and vices are character traits of the agent, and not passions. That they are character traits is suggested by statements such as "if any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character" (T 575). Yet virtues and vices are also intimately connected passions: "no action can be laudable or blameable, without some motives or impelling passions" (T 483). Classically, virtues and vices are seen as character traits from which good or bad actions arise, as is most evident in Aristotle's claim that the virtue of a man "will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well."(9) For Aristotle, virtues and vices are not passions "because we are not called good or bad on the grounds of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions... but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed."(10)
Hume would agree with Aristotle that passions themselves cannot be the object of blame. For, it is only when there is a "propensity to any of these disagreeable passions [e.g. fear, anger, grief, and melancholy], that they disfigure the character, and by giving uneasiness, convey the sentiment of disapprobation to the spectator" (E 251). The precise relation between virtue-related character traits and passions is that the character traits cause the passions. In turn, these passions are responsible for directly motivating willful action, as indicated in T 413-418, "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will."(11) The exact connection between character trait--passion--will--action will be explored below when focusing natural and artificial virtues individually.
Thus, virtues are (1) features of an agent, as opposed to those of a spectator, (2) durable motives, as opposed to actions, and (3) character traits, as opposed to passions. In view of these points, Hume's distinction between natural and artificial virtues can now be explored.
There is a long history of misunderstanding regarding Hume's distinction
between natural and artificial virtues. The most pessimistic assessment
is given by T.H. Green who argues in his introduction to the 1874 edition
of Hume's works that Hume simply fails to articulate the difference between
the natural and artificial virtues:
Although Hume's criterion of distinction between natural and artificial virtues is not always clear, it is an overstatement to say, as Green does, that Hume provides no substantive criterion.
Thomas Reid, the only eighteenth-century philosopher to systematically
explore Hume's moral theory, offers the following criterion in his Essays
on the Active Powers of Man (1788):
Reid continues noting that the natural virtues "are those natural affections of the human constitution which give immediate pleasure in their exercise." Artificial virtues, by contrast, "are such as are esteemed solely on account of their utility...."(13) For Reid, then, natural virtues are those character traits which are immediately agreeable, and artificial virtues are useful. The reviewer of Reid's Essay in the Critical Review accepts this interpretation: "In Mr. Hume's improvement on the system of Epicurus, and his addition of the useful to the pleasurable, it was not easy to avoid making justice an artificial virtue, because our view of its morality must be derived from its ultimate tendency."(14) In this century, Kemp Smith echoes Reid's interpretation when noting the connection between "Hume's treatment of the 'artificial' virtues and of the principle of utility upon which they rest...."(15)
However, Reid, his reviewer, and Kemp Smith are mistaken by identifying the natural/artificial virtue distinction with the agreeable/useful distinction. The natural/artificial distinction involves the motivations behind the agent's action, whereas the agreeable/useful distinction involves the tendency of actions as they affect the spectator. Further, Hume's classification of particular virtues cuts across the above distinctions, since several virtues are unequivocally designated as both useful and agreeable at the same time, such as benevolence (E 257), and courage (E 254).
A second suggested criterion of distinction with an equally long history is that natural virtues are those which naturally give rise to a spectator's approval, whereas artificial virtues do not naturally give rise to a spectator's approval. An early example of this interpretation is found in the anonymous essay "An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice" (1793).(16) The author argues in the case of justice that justice must be a natural virtue since it involves a spectator's feelings of gratitude and resentment and, "it is acknowledged by all... that gratitude and resentment are natural ingredients in the frame of the human mind, no less than the appetites of hunger and thirst." In his Outlines of moral Philosophy (1793), Dugald Stewart argues similarly that we have a natural impulse to check injustice through resentment.(17)
J.L. Mackie falls in line with this interpretation when arguing that
"a natural virtue, for Hume, is a disposition which people both naturally
have and naturally approve of, while an artificial one is a disposition
for which neither of these holds."(18)
Mackie is suggesting that, in addition to a distinction between natural
and artificial virtues at the level of the agent's obligation, there is
another difference at the level of the spectator where natural virtues
are approved of naturally and artificial virtues are not. However, there
is no support for this interpretation in Hume's writings. Throughout Book
III Hume frequently comments that the spectator's approval of artificial
virtues is the same as that with the natural ones. This is most clearly
seen in the following reference to justice:
At T 499 he also argues that justice is approved of through sympathy. After noting that justice has utility, Hume argues that the spectator feels a sympathetic pleasure for those who benefit from justice and this pleasure constitutes the spectator's moral approval of justice. Hume concludes that although politicians may attempt to evoke a strong feeling of approval toward justice, "if nature did not aid us in this particular" through sympathy, then all such attempts would be in vain (T 500, cf. 579).
In the final part of Book III Hume argues this point more strongly within the context of the natural virtues. In the same way that the utility of justice is naturally approved of by sympathy, the utility resulting from many natural virtues is also approved of by sympathy. Hume concludes that once justice is established by conventions, "it is naturally attended with a strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing but our sympathy with the interests of society. We need no other explication of that esteem, which attends such of the natural virtues, as have a tendency to the public good" (T 579-580). So, sympathy is the sole basis of approval for all virtues which have utility, natural and artificial alike.
A third criterion of distinction between natural and artificial virtues,
suggested by Ted Ponko, is that an act/rule differentiation underlies the
two: with natural virtues, every act typically benefits an individual whereas
with artificial virtues society benefits only when they are followed as
a rule.(19) Hume clearly advances this
Ponko is correct that this is the most visible difference between natural
and artificial virtues. However, the act-rule distinction may be more of
a symptom of the natural/artificial distinction, rather than the psychological
foundation. Such underlying motivational foundations surface in the following
discussion of justice:
In the first sentence above, Hume considers the counterfactual where justice would be natural, and this amounts to having a natural pursuit of public interest. Also, in the final sentence he argues that rules of justice stem from passional interests which could not be natural and inartificial. The emphasis here on the agent's natural pursuits and passional interests indicate the centrality of the agent's motives.
This leads to a fourth criterion of distinction between natural and artificial virtues which involves the psychological principles which motivate the agent to act. Ken O'Day has recently defended the view that Hume's notion of artificial virtues involve conventions which operate on the motives of the agent.(20) The focus of his study is to use this criterion to rescue Hume from traditional attacks on his theory of justice. However, focusing only on the polemical implications this account of artificial virtues, O'Day does not go far enough in showing how conventions can be psychological causes which motivate the agent to act virtuously. This motivational basis of natural and artificial virtues will next be explained.
Clues to the motivational distinction between natural and artificial virtues are found at T 348-349. Recall Hume's durability argument earlier which maintains that only an agent's durable motives are sufficient to produce feelings of love or hate in the spectator (along with the spectator's feelings of moral approval/disapproval). At T 348-349 he argues that only instinctive character traits and intentions have enough durability to produce love or hate. When we have knowledge of some constant quality instinctive in the agent's character, this by itself may produce feelings of love or hate in the spectator. But, without knowledge of such instinctive qualities we must assume from an agent's actions that they are the result of forethought and design, and these intentions become the object of the spectator's feelings of love or hate. In short, a spectator's feelings of love and hate, as well as her moral approval and disapproval, may arise in response either to an agent's durable instinctive character traits or to her durable intentions (design and forethought).
Focusing first on the natural virtues, there is little dispute that
Hume believes that natural virtues are instinctive; as such, natural virtues
may readily be seen as falling into the instinctive character trait
category of durable moral motives. For Hume, the sign of any natural property
is that it appears the same in all nations and all ages (T 281), and Hume
clearly believes this is so with natural virtues. The instinctive aspect
of natural virtues is vividly seen in the Enquiry where Hume argues
that justice is not instinctive:
Although the point of this passage is to show that justice is not
instinctive and therefore not a natural virtue, the implication here is
that natural virtues involve instincts similar to hunger or resentment.
Natural virtues certainly differ from instincts like hunger if only by
being more other-oriented as opposed to self-oriented. However, the difference
is often down played in Hume's writings where both types of instincts are
grouped together, such as in the above quote from E 201, and in the following
To be precise, the issue addressed in the above passage is instinctive impressions (or feelings), and not instinctive character traits. There is, though, a corresponding issue of the instinctive character traits which produce these instinctive impressions.
The difference between the moral and nonmoral instinctive impressions
listed in the above passage emerges in the following from the Enquiry:
First, there are bodily appetites, which include hunger, thirst,
and lust. Second, there are instinctive mental passions, which include
resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, the desire to punish,
the desire of happiness to our friends, fame, power, and benevolence.(21)
An initial difference between the two groups of instincts, then, is that
the one group originates from a bodily source, and the other from a mental
source. This, though, is not a complete explanation since for Hume the
line between the bodily realm and the mental realm is fuzzy. A more precise
explanation can be found in the following:
The importance of the above is that bodily appetites may involve two impressions: one at the level of sensation, and another at the level of reflection (or the passions). The chain begins with brute sensations of heat, cold, thirst, hunger, and bodily pleasures and pains.(22) These, then, produce ideas in our mind which in turn produce impressions of reflection (or passions).(23) Thus, an "instinctive feeling of hunger" may ambiguously refer to either an initial unpleasant physical sensation in one's stomach, or to a passional desire for food. Commentators such as Kemp Smith,(24) Glathe,(25) Ardal,(26) Mercer,(27) and Neu(28) fail to note this double-level of feeling with bodily appetites, and consequently classify them as impressions of reflections (or passions) exclusively.
By contrast, instinctive mental passions, such as attachment to offspring, are only classified as impressions of reflection (or passions). It would be a mistake to say that instinctive mental passions do not trace back to any impression of sensation. To have an instinctive mental passion such as attachment to offspring, one needs the sensory experience that one in fact has offspring. However, it can be said that an instinctive mental passion of a given type (e.g. attachment to offspring) does not trace back to an instinctive bodily appetite which can be meaningfully called by the same name type. It is in this sense that instinctive mental passions originate from a mental as opposed to a bodily source. Natural virtues are related to this group of instinctive mental passions insofar as they are the cause of at least some of these passions (such as attachment to offspring). That is, instinctive character traits (natural virtues) produce certain instinctive mental passions which would in turn motivate willful action. To illustrate, Hume maintains that we have a natural propensity or instinctive character trait to care for our children (T 518, 519). This trait gives rise to an instinctive desire or natural affection for our children (T 319). This instinctive desire (which is an activating motive) in turn influences our will to act affectionately towards our children (T 417). In this illustration, the initial instinctive character trait to care for our children would be a natural virtue.
Granting that natural virtues are instinctive character traits, it would be incorrect to say that they are entirely instinctive. With generosity, for example, our natural inclination is limited to relatives or friends and it is only through sympathy and calm judgments that the sphere of generosity widens (T 602-603). Glathe avoids this problem by arguing that natural virtues can be either originally natural or secondarily natural.(29) An original natural principle is one which is not causally founded on any other principle, while a secondary natural principle is causally dependent on one or more primary natural principles in an unreflective (or unconscious) manner.(30) According to Glathe, then, wide-spread generosity would be a secondary natural virtue since it is the result of limited generosity and sympathy, both of which are primary natural principles. Similarly, justice would be artificial because it is neither a primary nor a secondary natural character trait.(31)
Defined negatively, artificial virtues are those durable motives in
an agent which bring about a spectator's moral approval but are not natural
virtues. Recall earlier that for Hume durable motives are of two types:
(1) instinctive character traits and (2) intentions (involving design and
forethought). Since artificial virtues are durable motives but are
not instinctive, then, they are intentions. This conclusion is verified
in various comments Hume makes about artificial virtues:
The word natural is commonly taken in so many senses and is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute whether justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence be natural to man; if reason and forethought be also natural; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order, fidelity, property, society. [E 307, emphasis is mine]
Each of these passages ties artificial virtues with intentions, design, or forethought. As such, they should be categorized as types of ideas (as opposed to impressions, specifically the passions). The context of his discussion of intentions at T 348-349 makes this especially clear. In that section Hume is seeking the ultimate object of someone's love or hatred toward another person. His discussion of love and hatred opens with the claim that "the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person" (T 331, emphasis is mine). At T 349 he concludes that it must be an intention. Intentions, then, involve thinking and, more specifically, thinking in terms of design and forethought.
Assuming, then, that such intentions are ideas, the next important question is to identify the cognitive faculty which produces them. There are only three candidates: ideas from the memory, ideas from reason, and ideas from the fancy.(32) Although Hume does not tell us which of the three intentions are, the very nature of an intention, as it sets designs for the future, precludes it from being a memory. Intentions would seem, then, to come from either reason or the fancy. Whether intentions come principally from the reason or the fancy, though, is less clear: some of our forethoughts may be rationally grounded (i.e. in truth and falsehood), and others may be completely fanciful. Rather than ruling either one of these possibilities out, the safe conclusion to draw is that some intentions may be rational and others fanciful. The next step is to see how either rational intentions or fanciful intentions serve as motivations for willful action.
In the section of the Treatise Book II titled "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will," Hume argues that reason (defined as judgments of truth and falsehood) is inert in the sense that it "can never produce any action, or give rise to volition" (T 414-415). Willful actions, then cannot be immediately be preceded by reason, but instead must be prompted by a passion. This suggests the following motivational chain: rational intention--passion--will--action. But, even this is not entirely acceptable. Not only is reason unable to directly prompt willful action, Hume also argues that reason cannot directly give rise to any passion (cf. T 457-458). Hume is silent on whether the fancy is also saddled with this limitation, but we should assume that it is. The principle explanation for reason's inertness is that we must have an independent desire or aversion toward that about which reason informs us, otherwise we would be totally indifferent to it (414). The same argument can be offered regarding the fancy: we must have an independent desire or aversion toward our fanciful notions, otherwise we would be totally indifferent toward such notions. Intuitively, the fictitious concepts of the fancy in and of themselves do not create desires anymore than rationally informed facts. In both cases, a pre-existing desire is needed.
Continuing on this theme, Hume explains at the opening of Book III that reason can indeed excite a passion "by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it [i.e. the passion]" (T 459). As an illustration, he describes how we "may be affected with passion, by supposing a pain or pleasure to lie in an object...." In fact, he continues, we will be passionally prompted toward that object even when our reason is mistaken, and the object in fact does not produce the expected pleasure or pain.
This provides us with a model for seeing how natural virtues as rational or fanciful intentions can peak our passions and prompt us to action. The intention towards political allegiance, for example, may hold out the prospect of pleasure, which will incite a passion to act politically loyal. Similarly, an intention to be unchaste may hold out the prospect of pain, which will incite a passion to act chaste. Even when these respective prospects of pleasure and pain do not always hold true, through habit our virtuous intention will still excite a passion to act, so long as the intention holds out the expectation of pleasure or pain. But why should an intention toward political allegiance hold out the prospect of pleasure for me? For, as noted at the outset, artificial virtues do not benefit me with each act; instead, society benefits when they are followed as a rule.
The answer is found in the artifice behind virtues such as political allegiance and chastity. Hume states that our initial selfish interests are "augmented by a new artifice, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the giving us a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions" (T 533-534).(33) Thus, the intention toward political allegiance holds out the prospect of pleasure for me since I am trained to expect it. Marcia Baron goes so far as to call this artifice a "noble lie" as people are made to believe they are naturally obligated to certain acts or dispositions when they are really not.(34) It is an exaggeration to call this a lie in terms of a purposeful deception. Rather, politicians and educators groom us to consistently expect a personal benefit in cases which do not naturally deliver consistent benefit. Perhaps all that is needed is instilling a sense of loyalty, pride, or dignity which gives us pleasure when we have an intention toward allegiance or chastity.
The most basic cognitive point of difference between natural and artificial virtues is that artificial virtues are ideas of intention (design and forethought) whereas the natural virtues are neither ideas nor impressions but are instead either original or secondary instinctive character traits. Further, natural and artificial virtues differ in how they produce actions. Natural virtues (as instinctive character traits) immediately produce passions which in turn motivate willful actions. Artificial virtues (as rational or fanciful intentions) hold out an artificially instilled prospect of pleasure or pain which evokes a passion; this, in turn motivates willful actions.
1. Copies of Wishart's actual charge no longer exist. However, Hume presents a summary of the charges in A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh, ed. E.C. Mossner, (Edinburgh: University Press, 1967), p. 18.
2. J.B. Schneewind, "The Misfortunes of Virtue" Ethics, 1990, Vol. 101, pp. 42-63. Schneewind argues that Hume "seems to have been convinced that the Grotian tradition, in distinguishing between perfect and imperfect duties, had correctly located a definite pattern in the moral approvals and disapprovals constituting his data [of moral phenomena] and that the pattern had to be explained." Schneewind continues that Hume believed that no natural motives could explain the obligatory force virtues such as justice; thus, Hume explained the perfect/imperfect distinction along artificial/natural lines. Schneewind's observation clarifies the historical context behind Hume's division between natural and artificial virtues. The psychological basis of the distinction, though, is still to be explained.
3. David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), hereafter abbreviated E. The terms "natural virtue" and "artificial virtue" do not appear in Hume's moral Enquiry. However, there are brief discussions on the artificiality of justice at the close of Section three (pp. 201-204), and in Appendix three (p. 307). The emphasis in the Enquiry is not on the natural or artificial basis of an agent's virtues, but on proving that all virtues are approved by a spectator because of their perceived utility or agreeability.
4. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). The prominence of the natural/artificial virtue distinction in the Treatise is seen most clearly in Hume's discussion of justice. For, the opening section of that discussion immediately raises the issue of whether justice is natural or artificial (T 477). By contrast, the discussion of the utility and agreeability of all virtues, which is central to all sections of the Enquiry, is only briefly analyzed in the Treatise (T 587-591).
5. Letters of David Hume, p. 35; T 575.
6. "Is Hume a Moral Skeptic?," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1989, Vol. 50, pp. 89-106.
7. For an additional formulation of the durability argument see The Letters of David Hume, ed. J.Y.T. Grieg (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), Vol. I, p. 34
8. Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's "Treatise", (Edinburgh: University Press, 1966), pp. 109-133; "Another Look at Hume's Account of Moral Evaluation," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1977, Vol. 15, pp. 405-421.
9. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1106a.
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1105b.
11. The larger implication of this section of the Treatise, though never explicitly stated, is that only the passions have influence on the will. This is suggested by the fact that passions are the only motivators of the will which he lists throughout this section. Besides ideas from reason, the other candidates in the realm of ideas which he does not directly rule out are ideas from the memory and the fancy. But Hume would almost certainly maintain that, like reason, the memory also cannot directly influence the will to action. Instead, our memories would in some way re-kindle passions, and these would prompt willful action. The same would apply to our more fanciful ideas. Thus, in the absence of any compelling textual argument otherwise, it is reasonable to attribute to Hume the position that only the passions can influence the will to action.
12. T.H. Green, Locke and Hume, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), p. 360.
13. Thomas Reid, Essays on the active powers of man, in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh: Maclachlan and Stewart, 1877), Vol. II, p. 652.
14. The Critical Review, 1788, Vol. 66, p. 487.
15. Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, (London: MacMillan and Co., 1941), p. 147.
16. "An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice," in European Magazine and London Review, 1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-424.
17. Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, for the use of students in the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh: W. Creech, 1793.
18. J.L.Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 76
19. "Natural virtue is attributable to those sentiments and passions which, if acted upon, generally tend to yield pleasing results to ourselves or others. On the other hand, we ascribe artificial virtue to actions which constitute a certain practice, the observance of which tends towards the good of mankind." Ted Ponko, "Artificial Virtue, Self-Interest and Acquired Social Concern" Hume Studies, Vol. IX, Number 1, April 1983, 46-58.
20. Ken O'Day, "Hume's Distinction between the Natural and Artificial Virtues," Hume Studies, 1994. Vol. 20, pp. 121-142.
21. Benevolence is included in an additional list of instinctive mental passions at T 417-418 along with resentment, love of life, and kindness to children, the desire of punishment.
22. Hume also discusses bodily pleasures and pains at T 192 and T 275.
23. Hunger, thirst, lust and other bodily appetites also give rise to direct impressions of reflection (T 439). For a more detailed account of how bodily appetites give rise to direct impressions of reflection, see James Fieser, "Hume's Classification of the Passions and its Precursors," Hume Studies, 1992, Vol. 18, pp. 9-12.
24. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 168.
25. Alfred Glathe, p. 30
26. Pall Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's "Treatise", p. 10-11.
27. Philip Mercer Sympathy and Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 22.
28. Jerome Neu, Emotion, Thought and Therapy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 68.
29. Alfred Glathe, Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals, (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950) p. 100.
30. By "unreflective" Glathe means that there is no antecedent idea or reasoning involved.
31. Alfred Glathe, pp. 103-105.
32. For Hume, ideas come from two sources: the memory and the imagination (T 8). The imagination produces ideas in two ways: through reason (judgments about truth and falsehood), and the fancy (re-assembling ideas to form fictions; cf. T 10, 117-118 fn, 1). See James Fieser, "Hume's Pyrrhonism: A Developmental Interpretation," Hume Studies, 15 (1989), 96-97.
33. Hume's point here pertains to distributive justice, although it is just as applicable to other artificial virtues, such as political allegiance and chastity.
34. Marcia Baron, "Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues," in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 12 (1982), 541.