@

HUME’S WIDE VIEW OF THE VIRTUES: AN ANALYSIS OF HIS EARLY CRITICS

James Fieser

Hume Studies, 1998, Vol. 14, pp. 295-311

Hume discusses about 70 different virtues in his moral theory. Many of these are traditional virtues and have clear moral significance, such as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. However, Hume also includes in his list of virtues some character traits whose moral significance is not immediately obvious, such as wit, good manners, and dialog. Mid-18^th century critics of Hume’s moral theory almost unanimously felt that his notion of virtue was too broad and that Hume should have distinguished between genuine moral virtues, on the one hand, and mere intellectual abilities on the other. According to the critics, grouping the two together devalues the true virtues. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of the virtues was controversial and we know from his letters that he read at least a couple of these critiques. He nevertheless vigorously defended his position. Although Hume sees this as an issue worthy of defending, contemporary Hume scholarship has neither discussed the nature of the 18^th century criticisms nor given adequate attention to the success or failure of Hume’s position. I address these issues here.

I begin by presenting Hume’s defense of his wide view of the virtues as appears in both the Treatise and Enquiry concerning the principles of morals.[1] I then chronologically present early criticisms of Hume’s view including those by Francis Hutcheson, James Balfour, John Leland, and James Beattie. From these early discussions I suggest that we find three criteria to distinguish between genuine moral virtues, such as justice, and less morally urgent intellectual abilities, such as industriousness. The three criteria are: (1) moral virtues are a matter of choice and intellectual abilities are not; (2) moral virtues by themselves aim at a good end and intellectual abilities by themselves do not necessarily do this; and (3) moral virtues are such that the failure to obtain them incites blame, whereas the failure to obtain intellectual abilities does not incite blame. Although the first of these criteria fail, I argue that the second and third of these criteria are indeed viable means of distinguishing between moral virtues and intellectual abilities.

Hume’s Argument

Hume’s first account of the wide scope of the virtues appears in Book Three, Part Three of the Treatise, published in 1740.[2] His main criterion in determining the virtue of an agent’s character trait is whether the action it produces has consequences that trigger sympathetic feelings of moral pleasure[3] in the mind of spectators (T 574-575). In Section Four, titled “Of Natural Abilities”, he argues that the distinction between natural abilities and moral virtues is unfounded since both groups of mental qualities bring forth the same sympathetic moral feelings in the spectator (T 606-614). Anticipating objections, Hume considers several possible points of distinction between natural abilities and moral virtues, but then rejects them all.

First he considers that the precise feelings elicited in the spectator designate two separate classes. Hume’s reply is that the precise feelings elicited by each token virtue (for example, benevolence, charity, justice) are also distinct in minute ways. Nevertheless, we still classify all such elicited responses as feelings of moral approval. Second, he considers that natural abilities are involuntary whereas moral virtues are the result of free will. Hume’s reply is that many involuntary attributes, such as fortitude, have classically been catalogued as virtues. Also, he argues that there is no conceivable reason why an involuntary quality of an agent may not produce sympathetic pleasure in the spectator. Third, Hume considers that habits relevant to moral virtues can be altered through reward and punishment, whereas habits relevant to natural abilities are more fixed and cannot be altered by these means. Hume’s reply is that if we are not biased by such moral systems, then this distinction would not even arise.

In his Enquiry concerning the principles of morals (1751),[4] published 11 years later, Hume presents the broad nature of the virtues with even greater emphasis. At the very outset of the Enquiry he proposes the following as his method of investigation:

... we shall consider every attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred and contempt; every habit or sentiment or faculty, which, if ascribed to any person, implies either praise or blame, and may enter into any panegyric or satire of his character and manners. [E 174]

After compiling his list of virtues in the various sections of the Enquiry, he argues in the Conclusion that the virtues all fall into at least one of four categories according to the consequences that they produce. Hume writes, “personal merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or to others” (E 268; cf. T 590, 604, 611). So, any mental attribute of an agent that brings about such utility or agreeability may be deemed a virtue.

As in the Treatise, Hume also defends his broad conception of the virtues in the Enquiry. Initially he presented his defense in Part 1 of Section 6, “Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves.” However, in 1764 he moved this discussion to a newly added fourth Appendix titled “Of Some Verbal Disputes.” In this Appendix Hume offers two lines of defense for construing the virtues so widely. First, as in the Treatise, he argues that one cannot find a natural basis of distinction between moral virtues and natural abilities. He considers possible points of distinction, such as those between voluntary and involuntary, social and private, moral and intellectual, or heart and head, but argues that in each of these cases such distinctions would misclassify important moral virtues (E 313). He concludes that, in the absence of any clear distinction between moral virtues and natural abilities, moral virtues must include all useful and agreeable qualities that produce moral pleasure in the spectator.

His second argument in the Appendix is based on our broad usage of ethical language, particularly the moral injunctions that we commonly use in reference to moral virtues as well as natural abilities. According to Hume, theologians -- who employ their theological methods in ethics -- advance the restricted and thereby distorted notion of virtue, which excludes natural abilities. This theological method “bends every branch of knowledge to its own purpose, without much regard to the phenomena of nature, or the unbiased sentiments of the mind, hence reasoning, and even language, have been warped from their natural course” (E 322, cf. T 609). Hume’s point here anticipates C.L. Stevenson’s argument that ethical discourse is somewhat vague, and that we must preserve this vagueness in our analysis of ethical terms.[5] However, it would be misleading to see Hume as suggesting that ethical theory should be developed out of language analysis alone. Instead, Hume’s point is that our broad use of ethical language confirms his earlier argument that there is no natural distinction between moral virtues and natural abilities.

Hume’s Early Critics

The first attack on Hume’s broad understanding of the virtues probably came in a private correspondence from Francis Hutcheson in 1739, from whom Hume solicited comments on Book III of the Treatise. Although Hutcheson’s letter is no longer extant, Hume’s reply is:

Whether natural Abilitys be Virtues is a Dispute of Words. I think I follow the common Use of Language. Virtus signify’d chiefly Courage among the Romans. I was just now reading this Character of Alexander the 6th in Guicciardin. In Alessandro Sesto fu solertia & sagacita singulare: consiglio eccellente, efficacia a persuadere maravigliosa, & a tutte le facende gravi, sollicitudine & destrezza incredible. Ma erano queste virtù avanzate di grande intervallo da vitii &c. Were Benevolence the only Virtue no Characters cou’d be mixt, but wou’d depend entirely on their Degrees of Benevolence. Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from Cicero’s Offices, not from the Whole Duty of Man. I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings. [Hume to Francis Hutcheson, Sept. 17, 1739]

Apparently, drawing from Butler’s and his own moral theory, Hutcheson maintained that benevolence is the source of all virtue. Since many of the attributes that Hume listed as virtues do not stem from benevolence, then they would be better classified as “natural abilities.” In response, Hume argues that calling them “virtues” follows a common use of language, especially when considering how classical writers such as Cicero used the term.

Almost immediately after the publication of the Enquiry, critics attacked the wide view of the virtues which it contained.[6] The first of these appeared in the anonymous pamphlet Some late opinions concerning the foundations of morality examined (1753).[7] The author’s principal argument against Hume is as follows:

[Hume’s] notion is, That whatever, in character or conduct, is approved as useful, is virtue .... We approve of many inanimate things, in the view of their being useful; useful herbs, useful medicines, houses &c. Is this sort of approbation then sufficient to characterise virtue? or may we call these inanimate objects virtuous? No, says our author; for, as he tells us, though there is indeed a species of approbation attending inanimate objects, when beneficial; yet it is so weak, and so different from the approbation bestowed upon beneficial magistrates or statesmen, that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation. But let us now take a view of that variety of different objects and qualities which he ranks under the same class of moral approbation; and let us enquire, whether the sentiments they produce in us do not differ as widely as the approbation of inanimate from that of rational objects.

For the sake of argument, the author grants Hume’s view that a character trait is virtuous if a spectator approves of it because of its utility. Even so, Hume himself recognizes a difference between (a) a spectator’s approval of the utility of an inanimate thing, and (b) a spectator’s approval of human character traits. According to the author, Hume should also recognize the differences in the spectator’s approval of various types of human character traits. First, according to the author, there is a difference between a spectator’s response to true virtues and mere “intellectual abilities” such as penetration, courage, industry, and secrecy. The author criticizes that, although we indeed value these qualities, by themselves they do not make one virtuous since they can each be used for evil purposes. Classic moral philosophers, he argues, discuss such intellectual abilities as virtues only to the extent that they are cultivated for the sake of “worthy and good ends”. As to the ancient historians that Hume cites as authorities, the author charges that they did not use the term “virtue” with philosophical accuracy when describing intellectual abilities as virtues.

Second, the author argues that there is also a big difference between the spectator’s response to true virtues and to what the author calls qualities “of an inferior nature” such as “chearfulness of temper; politeness and good address; wit; decency; and even cleanliness”:

Compare these two together; and I appeal to you, Sir, or to any other man, whether the sentiment of disapprobation and blame in the one case be not very widely different from what it is in the other; and whether we feel the least of that indignation, with respect to the disagreeable or unpolite man, which we feel with respect to the betrayer and the villain?

In the above the author argues that we see a clear distinction between virtues and more inferior qualities when we consider the spectator’s disapproval of an agent who lacks these respectively. That is, the spectator feels indignation towards the person who lacks virtue, but not towards the person who lacks inferior qualities.

The brief review of Some late opinions in the Monthly Review contains a concise summary of the author’s attack on Hume’s wide view of the virtues. This indicates both that the dispute is intrinsically interesting and that, from early on, this problem in Hume’s theory was well publicized.[8] In the same year that Some late opinions appeared, James Balfour made a similar attack against Hume’s moral theory in his anonymously published A delineation of the nature and obligation of morality (1753).[9] In Section four of that work Balfour argues sarcastically,

[Hume] ...has paved the way to enrich mankind with the possession of a thousand virtues that were never once dremt of before. For every minister of pleasure, even of the lowest kind, may put in his claim for virtue, and rise in his demands in proportion as he can increase our sensual gratifications. Strange morality indeed! But it is not confined to those functions common to us with the brutes; it even extends itself to inanimate things; so that the beauty of a flower, and the useful qualities of a plant, may assume the name of moral virtue.

Balfour argues here that Hume’s theory of utility puts us on a slippery slope that ends in extending virtue to useful inanimate objects. Balfour recognizes that Hume in fact denies that virtue applies to inanimate objects. Specifically, for Hume, the term “virtue” can only apply to the mental quality of an agent. Nevertheless, Balfour argues that Hume’s account of utility “will baffle all his subtilty” to avoid ascribing virtue to useful inanimate things. The heart of Hume’s mistake, for Balfour, is that true virtue rests in the proper use that we make of our various useful qualities, and Hume merely lists useful qualities that one might make proper use of. Similar to the point made in Some late opinions, Balfour also points out that classical moral philosophers believed that misapplied virtues would actually be vices. In his Philosophical Dissertations (1782) Balfour continues his attack on Hume’s view and describes more precisely what is required of virtues:

What chiefly distinguishes virtue from other mental qualities is this, that virtue is an active principle, productive of good, from will, intention, and design. It is a living source of good, founded in the two great faculties of the human mind, the will and the understanding. Virtue, therefore, is applicable to man alone, of all the living beings upon earth. It is the proper cause, and not the passive instrument of good, and is estimated not so much from the utility of an action, as the goodness of the principle from which an action proceeds.

In the above Balfour argues that true virtues necessarily involve a good intention and are grounded in both the faculties of the human will and understanding. By contrast, natural abilities, by themselves, do not necessarily reflect a good intention and thus cannot be true genuine virtues. According to Balfour, then, Hume’s main error is that he fails to draw together the various mental qualities under single good purpose. Without doing this, natural abilities cannot properly be classed as virtues.

The review of Balfour’s Delineation in the Monthly Review contained an extended excerpt from this portion of Balfour’s essay,[10] which, again, indicates the importance of this issue at the time. Hume read Balfour’s text and wrote him a warm letter appreciation. Hume responded to some of Balfour’s criticisms, but not those concerning the wide scope of the virtues. However, Hume does state in the letter that, “If I have occasion to give a new edition of the work, which you have honoured with [an] answer, I shall make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate some of your criticisms.”

In his A view of the principal deistical writers (1755)[11] John Leland criticized Hume’s wide view of the virtues on the same grounds as Balfour. After citing Hume’s wide ranging list of virtues, Leland argues that even if an agent possessed many of these, the agent could still be “really a bad man”:

... But these things make properly no part of moral virtue; nor can a man be said to be good and virtuous on the account of his being possessed of those qualities. He may have wit, eloquence, a polite behaviour, a fine taste in arts, great bodily strength and resolution, and yet be really a bad man. And when these things are separated from good dispositions of the heart, from probity, benevolence, fidelity, integrity, gratitude, instead of rendering a man useful to the community, they qualify him for doing a great deal of mischief.

Leland takes Hume to task not only for the unnecessary attributes he includes under the heading of “virtue”, but also for leaving out key Christian virtues, such as humility. Excerpts from Leland’s discussion appeared in both the Monthly Review, and the newly formed Critical Review.[12]

Perhaps in response to these early criticisms, in the 1764 edition of the moral Enquiry Hume removed the word “virtue” from several key discussions. Most noticeably, he removed the phrase “Virtue or” from the following opening sentence of the Conclusion:

It may justly appear surprising, that any man, in so late an age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that Virtue or Personal Merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself, or to others.

In this same 1764 edition, Hume also moved his defense of his broad conception of the virtues from Section 6 Part 1 to Appendix 4.

However, these changes did not stop the criticisms. In An essay on the nature and immutability of truth (1770) James Beattie also challenged Hume’s wide view of the virtues.[13] Even with some of the references to “virtue” removed from the Enquiry, Beattie hunts down a remaining crucial reference to virtue in a note to Section 8: “It is the nature, and, indeed the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by every one, who considers or contemplates it.”[14] Unlike the above attacks, which focus on Hume’s theory as it appears in the moral Enquiry, Beattie also examines Hume’s account in the Treatise. Like the other early critics, Beattie argues that Hume failed to distinguish between two distinct classes of virtues that were commonly recognized by classical writers: moral virtues, such as justice, and intellectual virtues, such as genius. According to Beattie, the source of Hume’s problem is that Hume first sees that moral virtues, intellectual virtues, and physical beauty all excite approval, and then Hume concludes the qualities in question are all in the same category:

Justice, humanity, generosity, excite approbation; -- a handsome face excites approbation; -- great genius excites approbation: the effect or sentiment produced is the same in each instance: the object, or cause, must therefore, in each instance, be of the same kind.

Beattie then counters that, in reality, we use the term “approbation” in three different senses and, thus, the qualities in question are not all in the same category:

I am conscious, that my approbation of a fine face is different in kind from my approbation of great genius; and that both are extremely different from my approbation of justice, humanity, and generosity: if I call these three different kinds of approbation by the same general name, I use that name in three different significations. Therefore moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtues, are not of the same, but of different kinds.

Again, like his predecessors, Beattie argues that the criterion of distinction between moral virtues and intellectual virtues is that we blame people for failing to cultivate the former, but not the latter. Beattie pushes the issue further and considers precisely why we do not blame people for failing to cultivate intellectual virtues. His answer is that moral virtues are within our power and intellectual virtues are not:

But why are we thought worthy of blame and punishment for being unjust, and not for being homely, or void of understanding? The general conscience of mankind would reply, Because we have it in our power to be just, and ought to be so; but an idiot cannot help his want of understanding, nor an ugly man his want of beauty.

Early critics attacked Hume’s wide view of the virtues not only in philosophical works such as the above, but also in biographical sketches of Hume. For example, a 1773 essay in The Weekly Magazine or Edinburgh Amusement contains the following critique:

Our author’s notion and definition of virtue is very singular. He says, that it is the possession of such qualities as are useful or agreeable to ourselves or others.... This picture of virtue, which our author has drawn, is an unnatural groupe of a strange variety of features, very inconsistent, and badly proportioned.... He makes virtue intirely dependent upon the capricious humours of mankind, and even to take its form the prevailing vices of the age.[15]

A similar attack appeared in the same publication following Hume’s death in 1777.[16] In the late 18^th century and 19^th century, critical discussions of Hume’s moral theory shifted away from Hume’s catalog of virtues and focused instead on his notion of utility. Part of this shift in interest owed to the increasing popularity of utilitarian-type moral theories, first by Paley, and later by Bentham and Mill.

Although 18^th century critics found Hume’s wide view of the virtues so controversial, contemporary Hume scholars typically do not address the issue. Three exceptions are Pal Ardal, Philippa Foot, and J.L. Mackie. Ardal, though, is happy to accept Hume’s final word on the issue:

... [Hume] is perhaps right in thinking that no clear-cut criterion to distinguish the specifically moral is in use by ordinary people. We do not, for example, enquire whether a man’s courage is native to him before we call it a virtue.[17]

Like Hume’s early critics, Foot attacks Hume for failing to distinguish between talents and virtues, but she goes a step further in her attack and credits Hume in part for the demise of virtue theory in later years:

...one does not find in Hume an account of the difference between skills or talents and virtues and he even says that there is no reason to consider virtue as something distinct. I suppose it is partly due to Hume’s influence that this important topic, which was splendidly treated by Aristotle and Aquinas, is hardly discussed by modern moral philosophers.[18]

In spite of these harsh words, Foot does not offer a basis for distinguishing between talents and virtues. Mackie, by contrast, does suggest a possible means of distinction and he suggests the same criterion of distinction that Beattie did. Following Aristotle’s contention that virtues are “dispositions of choice”, Mackie argues that virtues are dispositions that we choose to cultivate, often for reasons of social pressure. Abilities, by contrast, “are not similarly responsive to social pressure or cultivation.”[19]

Analysis of the Proposed Criterion

Hume’s early critics recognized different classes of good qualities and designated these classes with different expressions, including “moral virtues”, “intellectual abilities”, “intellectual virtues”, “natural abilities”, and “corporeal virtues”. To simplify the various categories, we will use the following terminology to group together the various qualities specifically mentioned by Hume and his critics:

§ Moral virtues: probity, benevolence, fidelity, integrity, gratitude, justice, humanity, generosity

§ Intellectual abilities: penetration, courage, industry, secrecy, genius, wit, good manners, dialog, eloquence, polite behaviour, fine taste in arts, resolution, cleanliness

§ Physical qualities: beauty, handsome face, health, bodily strength, sex appeal (i.e., the qualities of “good women’s men”)

Before turning to the criteria of distinction between virtues and other good qualities as offered by the early critics, we may first address the last category above, namely, that of physical qualities. Hume himself offers his own criterion to distinguish these from moral virtues. For Hume, the term “virtue” can only apply to the mental quality of an agent:

The pain or pleasure which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. [T 614]

Consequently, physical qualities cannot be moral virtues. Immediately after this passage Hume offers a detailed account of how we approve of physical qualities such as health, bodily strength, and sex appeal. His reason for discussing these physical qualities is “to justify more fully” his hypothesis about our approval of moral virtues, since the two psychological mechanisms of approval parallel each other. The early critics recognized that Hume offered this distinction, but they were not satisfied with it. According to Beattie in particular, the two psychological mechanisms of approval parallel each other too closely and thus approval of virtue is degraded to the level of approval of physical qualities. However, even if Beattie is correct that the two mechanisms are too close to satisfy more conservative moral philosophers, the fact remains that Hume does offer a clear and decisive way of eliminating physical qualities as virtues.

Setting aside the issue of physical qualities, we turn to the criteria offered by the early critics for distinguishing moral virtues from intellectual abilities. We find three distinct criteria in their discussions: (1) moral virtues are a matter of choice and intellectual abilities are not; (2) moral virtues by themselves aim at a good end and intellectual abilities by themselves do not necessarily do this; and (3) moral virtues are such that the failure to obtain them incites blame, whereas the failure to obtain intellectual abilities does not incite blame. We will consider each of these in turn. The first suggestion -- that moral virtues are acquired by choice but intellectual abilities are not -- may quickly be dismissed. When we consider intellectual abilities such as wit, cleanliness, good manners, and dialog, it is clear that we may cultivate these by choice.

The second criterion of distinction is that moral virtues by themselves aim at a good end and intellectual virtues by themselves do not necessarily do this. This criterion has much in its favor. When we consider the above list of moral virtues, they appear to be unified in some underlying notion of good. An indicator of this is that each of the moral virtues appears inconsistent with the corresponding moral vices of the other moral virtues. For example, if I have the moral virtue of integrity, it does not seem possible for me to be malevolent, unjust, or inhumane. By contrast, it appears that I could have any of the intellectual abilities, such as industry, and consistently have a major moral vice such as malevolence. Balfour vividly illustrates this point in a passage that he quotes from Maximilien de Béthune.[20] In this passage, de Béthune describes a man that he met who excelled in every imaginable intellectual ability. The passage is so extraordinary that it is worth quoting in full:

His genius, says he, was so lively that nothing could escape his penetration, his apprehension was so quick, that he understood every thing in an instant, and his memory so prodigious, that he never forgot any thing. He was master of all the branches of philosophy, the mathematics; particularly fortification and designing. Nay, he was so thoroughly acquainted with divinity, that he was an excellent preacher, when he pleased, and could manage the controversy for, or against, the Protestant religion with the greatest ability. He not only understood the Greek, Hebrew, and other learned languages, but all the jargons of the moderns. He entered so exactly into their accent and pronunciation, to which he joined such a perfect imitation of their air and manners, that not only the people of the different nations in Europe, but of the several provinces of France, would have taken him for a native of the country. He applied this talent to imitate all sorts of persons, which he performed with wonderful dexterity; and was accordingly the best comedian in the world. He was a good poet, an excellent musician, and sung with equal art and sweetness. He said mass; for he would do every thing, as well as know every thing. His body was perfectly proportioned to his mind. He was well made, vigorous and agile, formed for all sorts of exercises. He rode a horse well, and was admired for dancing, leaping, and wrestling. He was acquainted with all kinds of sports and diversions, and could practice in most of the mechanical arts.

However, after listing the man’s intellectual abilities, de Béthune continues by listing the same man’s vices:

Reverse the medal, says Sully: He was a liar, false, treacherous, cruel, and cowardly, a sharper, drunkard and glutton. He was a gamester, an abandoned debauchee, a blasphemer and Atheist. In a word, he was possessed of every vice, contrary to nature, to honour, to religion, and society: he persisted in his vices to the last, and fell a sacrifice to his debaucheries, in the flower of his age; he died in a public stew, holding the glass in his hand, swearing, and denying God.

Balfour comments on this bizarre portrait that the man described “must appear so thoroughly vicious; and the more dangerous from all those extraordinary qualities both of mind and body which accompanied it....”

Critics such as Balfour have indeed detected something that is mysteriously missing from Hume’s moral theory. A running theme in the history of moral philosophy concerns whether each moral virtue must be grounded in or serve some higher moral principle. Plato holds this view insofar as he argues that the four main virtues of courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice rest on a properly developed reason. Thus, for Plato, if I have one virtue, then I must have them all. Plato illustrates this view in the Laches in which Socrates argues that the true virtue of courage requires wisdom and for that reason courage cannot serve an evil end. 17^th and 18^th century moral philosophers followed Plato’s lead and commonly held that duties and their corresponding virtues are grounded in eternal and immutable general principles of natural law. Hutcheson, as we have seen, argued that genuine virtues derive from benevolence. Hume’s response to Hutcheson is perhaps the only indication of why Hume departed from the traditional theory of unified virtues. Again, his response to Hutcheson is that “Were Benevolence the only Virtue no Characters cou’d be mixt, but wou’d depend entirely on their Degrees of Benevolence.” Although cryptic, it appears that Hume here denies the theory of unified virtues since he believes that each virtue has its own special characteristics. By reducing them to degrees of benevolence, as Hutcheson does, they lose their special characteristics.

However, even if Hume’s response successfully answers Hutcheson’s theory of benevolence, it does not fully address the larger issue of unified virtues as pressed by Balfour. One might still hold to a theory of unified virtues without reducing them to benevolence or any other higher moral principle as Hutcheson does. One might simply recognize as a matter of experience that moral virtues comprise a consistent set of values, each of which has its own special characteristic. We may also recognize as a matter of experience -- as Balfour does -- that intellectual abilities do not comprise a consistent set of values. It appears, then, that the victory goes to Hume’s critics concerning this criterion of distinguishing between moral virtues and intellectual abilities.

The third criterion of distinction is that moral virtues are such that the failure to obtain them incites blame, whereas the failure to obtain intellectual abilities does not incite blame. On this criterion, moral virtues do appear to differ in kind from intellectual abilities. Although this may not be immediately evident when considering benevolence and cleanliness as virtues, it becomes more pronounced when grouping malevolence and uncleanliness as vices. Accordingly, a spectator’s pleasurable response to an agent’s benevolent act and clean appearance may not differ significantly (cf. T 608). However, we would expect the spectator’s painful response to differ significantly regarding a malevolent act in contrast to an unclean appearance. This raises a further problem about punishment; for without a natural basis to distinguish vices such as malevolence from personal defects such as uncleanliness, punishing one and not the other would be at worst capricious and at best artificially imposed. Thus, by blurring the distinction between vices such as malevolence and personal defects such as uncleanliness, Hume creates problems for a natural theory of retribution.

Naturally-based theories of punishment were common in 18^th century discussions of morality. For example, in his Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue (1736), Joseph Butler discusses the natural tendency to punish some actions rather than others:

And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If the association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing: but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavouring to explain it away.

Interestingly, within Hume’s writings we can also find a natural basis for punishment insofar as Hume groups resentment and the desire to punish one’s enemies as instinctive desires (T 417, 439, E 201). This inclination to punish is specific to an agent’s provoking action, and not merely a reaction we have against enemies in general:

When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself. [T 418]

From this instinctive desire we can establish a natural distinction between moral vices and personal defects: an agent’s character trait is a moral vice only if, (a) it produces feelings of moral pain in the spectator and, (b) it incites the spectator’s desire for punishment. By contrast, a character trait would be a personal defect only when (a) obtains but (b) does not. It would then be a small step to establish a natural distinction between moral virtues and intellectual abilities. A moral virtue is a character trait such that its corresponding vice is a “moral vice” (as defined above). By contrast, an intellectual ability is a motive such that its corresponding defect is a “personal defect” (as defined above).

Once again, it seems that the victory goes to Hume’s critics concerning this final criterion of distinguishing between moral virtues and intellectual abilities. These two successful criteria may in fact be two sides of the same coin. If we see that true moral virtues are unified either in a common value or simply as a consistent package, then we can better see the urgency in adopting them -- even to the point of punishing those who fail to acquire them. In any event, the possibility of distinguishing moral virtues from intellectual abilities was open to Hume. Had he adopted it, his moral theory could have stood much as it is now, with only a few classificatory alterations. Given the fact that he held firm on his position for at least 36 years in the face of numerous criticisms, we may speculate about why this was so important to him. First, in the Natural History of Religion, Hume contends that it is very easy for us to be virtuous and indeed requires little effort: “all virtue, when men are reconciled to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable.”[21] From that perspective, all of the virtues that Hume lists fall into a single group with nothing to differentiate them with respect to their difficulty. Second, and more importantly, in the conclusion to the Enquiry, Hume insists that the sole criteria of moral virtue, or “personal merit,” consist of utility and agreeability:

It may justly appear surprising, that any man, in so late an age, should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasoning, that personal merit consists altogether in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself, or to others.

If these are the only criteria of virtue, then any character trait that has these effects must be deemed virtuous. To the extent that these are the only criteria of virtue, then there is no basis for making further distinctions between “intellectual abilities” and genuine “moral virtues”. Perhaps it is Hume’s drive for a simple criterion of moral virtue that inclined him to hold his ground on the broad nature of moral virtues. This, at least, is the explanation for Hume’s error that the anonymous author of Some late opinions offers:

You seem pleased with him [i.e., Hume] for having reduced the system of morals into a narrow compass, by resolving the whole into a single principle. But here we must differ; for I am afraid, the love of simplicity has betrayed him, as it has many before him, into considerable errors.