AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING I. OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY A. Two types of moral philosophy 1. Easy philosophy a) Born for action, influenced by taste and sentiment, borrows from poetry and eloquence b) Observations from common life 2. Abstract philosophy a) Examines those principles which regulate our understanding B. Benefits of easy philosophy 1. Accepted easier a) Enters more into common life b) Abstract philosophy vanishes when the philosoher leaves the shade 2. Lasts longer a) Abstract philosophy is easlily lead astray, and can continue uncorrected b) Easy philosopher corrects errors by renewing its appeal to common sense c) e.g. the fame of Cicero flourishes, but Aristotle is utterly decayed 3. In accord with our natural design a) The most perfect character is between ignorance and extreme scepticism b) Humans are social and active beings, and the mind cannot always support its bent to care and industry c) Human mind is by nature a mixed life d) Abstract philosophy makes one melancholy by the endless uncertainties which they involve C. Benefits of abstract philosophy 1. Accuracy are prerequisites for beauty 2. Benefits gradually diffuse throughout the whole society a) e.g. politicians, lawyers, governments 3. Gives pleasure to some people 4. Crit: sometimes metaphysics promotes error a) Pushes investigation beyond the limits of human reason (1) Reply: people will always do this, and true metaphysics must be cultivated to destroy the false (2) Accurate reasoning is the only cure for sloppy metaphysics b) Defends philosophical and religious superstitions (1) Sound metaphysical reasoning is the only cure for superstitious philosophy 5. It maps out a mental geography a) These fall within the bounds of proper investigation (1) e.g. the will, understanding, imagination, passions, and even finer distinctions b) Will discover the secret springs and principles which actuate the human mind (1) Philosophy can have the same kind of accomplishments as astronomy c) Will help uncover unifying principles (1) e.g. a general principle of morality into which all virtues and vices resolve (2) Critics, logicians, and politicians make similar attempts 6. Abstract philosophy should not be considered false, just because it is abstract D. Goal (final paragraph) 1. Unite abstract philosophy with clearness, truth and novelty 2. Undermine the foundations of superstitious abstract philosophy II. OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS A. Distinction of liveliness among perceptions 1. e.g. pain of heat, the pleasure of warmth, and memories of these a) Ideas copy the perceptions of the senses with less vivacity B. Division of perceptions: Ideas (thoughts) Perceptions < Outward Impressions < Inward C. Liveliness thesis 1. Impressions are the more lively perceptions when we hear, see, feel, love, hate or desire 2. Ideas are less lively reflections of these 3. Difference between ideas and impressions is one of kind, and not one of degree a) For Descartes it was a difference in kind D. Copy thesis: all ideas are copied from impressions 1. Although ideas seem limitless, but our invented ideas are all the result of the imagination a) "the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience" 2. e.g. golden mountain 3. First proof: when we examine any idea at its root, it resolves into simple ideas which were copied a) e.g. the idea of God comes from reflecting on our own mind, and augmenting without limit the qualities of goodness and wisdom b) Those who disagree should produce an idea about which this is not true 4. Second proof: an absense of a sensation (e.g. due to the lack of an organ) results in an absense of a corresponding idea a) e.g. "a blind man can form no notion of colors" b) e.g. Laplander or an African's idea of wine 5. Exception to this rule: missing shade of blue a) One's imagination supplies the deficiency b) "this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing" E. Test for meaning 1. Inquire "from what impression is that supposed idea derived ?" F. The issue of innate ideas is a verbal dispute (three meanings) 1. Natural (as opposed to artificial or miraculous): then all ideas are innate 2. Contemporary to birth: it is frivolous to inquire into when thought begins a) On Locke's notion of "idea," instinctive propensities would reasonably be called innate ideas 3. Original or not copied: all impressions are innate, and no idea is innate III. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS A. Three principles of assiciation of ideas by which the memory recalls perceptions and the imagination combines ideas with a method and regularity 1. Resemblance: a picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original 2. Contiguity (adjoining in close proximity): the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry concerning the others 3. Cause and effect: if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it 4. Proof: run through examples, and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other B. Illustrations of how these principles affect the passions and imagination (withdrawn from later editions) 1. Writers depend on these principles to form a unity in the narrative a) Poets (e.g. Ovid) use resemblance b) Historian uses contiguity (to bring all events of a period together) c) Cause and effect is the most common in any narrative 2. Epic poetry has a closer unity of thought than historical narrative a) Principles of association in poetry help enliven the imagination and inflaming the passions (1) The more closely a story is unified, the easier it is to transfer passions from one character to another b) The difference between poetry and narrative is in degree, not kind, and perhaps a matter of taste (1) Milton writes more like an historian, but since his stories resemble and are contiguous, there is enough association to make it effective poetry IV. SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING A. Part I: matters of fact, causality, and experience 1. Division of truth inquiry (objects of reason, or propositions) a) Relations of ideas (a priori) (1) In gemoetry, algebra, arithmetic (2) e.g. the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides (3) discoverable by the mere operation of thought b) Matters of Fact (a posteriori) 2. Reasoning about matters of fact is based on causal connections (the philosophical relation of causality) a) e.g. we reason that someone is in France based on letters, and promises of that person b) e.g. By finding a watch on a deserted island, one concludes that it had been inhabited 3. Causal connections are based on experience (a posteriori) a) e.g. without experience, Adam could not conclude that fire would consume him b) This is readily admitted when intricate machinery is involved (e.g. why milk and bread are nutritious for men, but not a lion) c) Experience is also the foundation of causal relations which are thought to be discoverable through reason (e.g. movement of a billiard ball) (1) A purely rational explanation of the billiard ball's movement would be arbitrary (2) Our imagination (the fancy) can't aid us in predicting its motion: "may I not conceive, that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause?" (3) Geometry won't assist us since it only applies the laws, but does not discover the laws B. Part II: reason is not the foundation of our conclusions from experience 1. Example of a conclusion from experience: a) Object O always has effect E b) Therefore, objects similar to O will always have effects similar to E 2. "But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning" a) Reason is of matters of fact, or relations of ideas, and neither is the basis for the above conclusion 3. Above example is not based on relations a) We can deny the conclusion without contradiction 4. Above example is not founded on judgements about matters of fact a) Judgments from experience assume this very point (that the future will be like the past) b) i.e. you can't prove past-future similarity from experience, since experience assumes past-future similarity c) Crit: previous past-future similarities imply that a future event will be like the past (1) Reply: this inference assumes the point to be proven d) Crit: my practice refutes his doubts: (1) Reply: as an agent I am content with past-future assumptions, but as a philosopher, I want to learn the inference V. SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS A. Part I: inferences from experience are based on habit 1. Defense of skeptical philosophy a) Skepticism emphasizes suspending judgment and points out the danger in making hasty conclusions b) Skepticism confines inquiries to narrow bounds and renounces speculations outside common life 2. All inferences from experience are based on habit or custom a) Proof: developmental, based how we come by notions of causality 3. Even discussions of ancient history are based on memory or the senses a) Perhaps we may encounter ruins from the ancient past b) Alternatively, history transfers ideas from memory to memory which are ultimately grounded in the experience of an eye wittness 4. Conclusion: "All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between that and some other object a) This implies that we merely have a belief in regularity (based on instinctive habit), but we don't have knowledge of regularity B. Part II: how belief arises 1. [The issue of belief is important here since custom provides us only with a belief, not knowledge] 2. Difference between fiction and belief: belief is accompanied with a nonvolitional feeling, and fiction is not a) No matter of fact is absolutely certain, hence it can only be a feeling which distinguishes the two 3. Nature of belief a) Our imagination can suggest ideas, but it cannot force us to believe b) Definition: belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of judgment from the fictions of the imagination 4. Belief may be strengthened with the principles of association a) Resemblance: a picture of a freind enlivens the idea b) Contiguity: being close to home enlivens the idea c) Causality: focusing on the effect enlivens our idea of the cause (1) e.g. seeing the son strengthens our idea of the dead father (2) e.g. seeing a relic enlivens our idea of the saint 5. Causal connections are so important to our lives, nature did not trust them to reason (which is slow and liable to error) but made it the result of habit VI. OF PROBABILITY A. Definitions: 1. Chance: a circumstance where particular events are understood to ocur equally a) All the particular events are rendered entirely equal 2. Probability: a circumstanc ewhere one event is understood to occur more frequently than another a) "A superiotiry of chances on any side" B. Probability, chance, and belief 1. Chance and superstitious belief: when oddas are even, and, accidentally, one alternative comes about more than another, this regularity immediately begets the sentiment of belief 2. Probability and belief: a) When we transfer past events into the future, we transfer it in the same proportion as the have appeared b) The greatest number of similar transfered events begets the sentiment which we call belief VII. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION A. The idea of causality in the Treatise 1. Part of Hume's search for the origin of ideas a) Traces back to Locke who explained the empirical origin of ideas which the rationalists considered innate b) The idea of causality was important because of its use in the cosmological argument 2. Three concepts in the notion of causality (where a causes b) a) Priority in time (a is prior to b) b) Contiguity or proximity in space (a is close to b0 c) Necessary connection (b is necessarily connected to a) 3. All three ideas are needed, but the idea of necessary connection is the most important, and difficult to explain B. Part I: failed attempts to explain the origin of the idea of NC 1. Introduction a) Math is clear, but the passions, morality and metaphysics are ambiguous b) This balances out, though, since mathematical reasoning is long and complex, and philosophical reasoning is short c) We can clarity philosophical subjects by defining important terms (1) e.g. the idea of necessary connection, which is also called power, force, and energy 2. Empiricist approach a) Theory of meaning: the meaning of an idea derives from the impressions which produced it (1) Hence, the idea of necessary connection came from some impression b) Impressions are divided between outward and inward 3. Outward impressions a) There is no outward appearance of necessity: we only see that one even follows another b) Contemplation on a single succession of events will not produce the idea (1) Primary qualities of objects (solidity, extension, motion) are complete in themselves, and we cannot discover any power in them through contemplation 4. Inward impressions (a special feeling of necessity) a) Hume's general strategy for criticizing the theories below b) Willing bodily motion (1) Crit (all criticisms follow this pattern): (a) IF this feeling is the source of our idea of NC, THEN we would know the secret union between mind (or soul) and body (b) IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT we know the secret union between mind and body (c) THEREFORE, IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT this feeling is the source of our idea of NC (2) Crit: but to know NC fro this implies that we know the secret union between mind (or soul) and body--which we don't know (3) Crit: we can move can move some bodily parts (e.g. fingers) but not others (heart), and we dont know why--if we experienced this power, we would know (a) Also, when in paralysis, people exert their will and nothing happens, hence it is only through experience that we know the influence of the will, and not through a feeling (4) If we felt a power of the will, we would know exactly what the will was moving--but one look at human anatomy tells us that we don't know where the will first induces a bodily motion c) Physical contact with a resistive force such as a wall (discussed in a note) (1) Crit: things which don't have physical resistance (i.e. God, mind) are said to have causal power, so this is at best an incomplete explanation (2) Crit: the only connecton resistance has with power is known by experience d) Power to raise or dismiss an idea (thought control) (1) Crit: to know power means to know the circumstances and effects of that power, but the connection between the mind and an idea is far from clear (2) Crit: the powers of the will are limited (e.g. controling passions is harder than controling ideas), but if we understood this power, we'd know why (3) Crit: our ability to control thought varies throughout the day, but if we understood this power, we'd know why e) Feeling of occasionalism (God being the active force in all cause-effect relations) (1) Occasionalism traditionally applies to objects, actions and thoughts (2) Crit: while occasionalism has its roots in experience, it applies its conclusions far beyond the bounds of experience (a) Since it is an unjustified hypothesis, we are unjustified in saying it is the impression which gives us our idea of necessary connection (3) Crit: we are completely ignorant of any impression of divine power, as required by occasionalism (i.e. there is no proof of it) C. Part II: the feeling of expectation and the idea of NC 1. Skepticism a) The theory of meaning requires us to produce an inpression, and since, as yet, no theory works, we risk having our idea of NC be meaningless 2. The feeling of expectation a) When A occurs, through habit, we expect B b) "...the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist. This connection, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we from the idea of power or necessary connection" 3. Two definitions of causality built on this notion of NC a) "an object [is] followed another, and where all objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second" (1) e.g. "this vibration is followed by this sound, and that all similar vibrations have been followed by similar sounds" (2) Based on the philosophical relation of causality b) "an object [is] followed by another, and whose apperances always conveys the thought to that other (1) e.g. "this vibration is followed by this sound, and that, upon the appearance of the one, the mind anticipates the senses and forms immediately an idea of the other (2) Based on the principle of association VIII. OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY A. Introduction 1. Volitional theory of action: a) Motives > Will > Action b) Motives influence the will which initiates an action 2. Libertatian: the will can select among any motive a) The position of Reid 3. Necessitarian position: the will must respond to the strongest motive a) The position of Hume, Priestley, Crombie 4. Incompatiblist approach in the Treatise: a) Hume defines liberty the way Reid does as "a power over the determination of the will" b) This definition of liberty conflicts with necessity, hence liberty is rejected 5. Compatiblist approach in the Enquiry: a) Dispute owes to ambiguity in definitions, and "a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy" b) Hume adopts Locke's definition of liberty, and shows it to be consistant with necessity B. Part I: 1. Origin of the idea of necessity a) The idea of external causality applied to mental operations b) Two ideas of causality (1) Constant conjunction of similar objects (2) Customary inference of one event from another c) Determinism can be demonstrated by showing both a constant conjunction and inference between motives and actions 2. Regarding the constant conjunction between motives and actions a) "It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men.... The same motives always produce the same actions" b) e.g. motives of ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit self-love, ambition have always caused the same sort of actions c) e.g. we would not believe a traveller who would tell us about a country where people were not motivated by similar virtues and vices (1) This is what allows us to detect forgery in a history book d) e.g. accounts of supernatural courage of Alexander is not believed since it goes against our experience of motives e) Crit: motives for actions vary (between the sexes, with age) (1) Reply: we still see uniformity within these subgroups of motives and actions f) Crit: some actions seem to have no regular connection with motives (1) Reply: the vulgar may attribute an uncertain events to uncertainty of causes, but philosophers presume there are unique and hidden causes (a) e.g. "a peasant can give no better reason for the stopping of any closck or watch tan to say that it does not commonly go right. But an artist easily perceives that the same forece in the spring or pendulum has always the same infulence..." (b) e.g. sickness which produces unusual behavior is like a broken machine, such as someone who has a toothache or has not dined g) Such constant conjunctions are seen both in philosophy and in common life 3. Regarding the inference of actions from motives (conduct from character) a) "It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from motives to voluntary action, from characters to conduct." b) e.g. laborer presumes to be protected from a magistrate, to be given fair market value for his product c) e.g. manufacturers depend on employees as they would machines d) e.g. history, politics, morals, and criticism all require a uniform standard of human behavior e) e.g. a jailer's obstinancy is a sure as the jail's walls, an executioner's motive to perform his action is as sure as any machine f) e.g. the fact that we can count on friends, won't purposefully burn our hand, lost money won't be returned g) "Above one-half of human reasonings contain inferences of similar nature 4. Objections to determinism a) Crit: We don't feel the causal connection (1) Reply: realizing that (a) causation is only constant conjunction and inference, and (b) these accompany motives and actions, then the conclusion is clear b) Crit: determinism goes against some philosophical systems (1) Reply in many cases, "they dissent from it in words only" c) Crit: we have a feeling of liberty or indifference (1) Reply: "...however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions fro our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper..." 5. Reconciling liberty and necessity a) Df. Liberty: "a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will" (1) i.e. "if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may" C. Part II: necessity is required in morality 1. Ethics: people are punished or praised because of the motives of their action, thence, judgment of actions depend on NC with motives 2. Determinism and religion: all causes regress back to God (even causes of bad actions) a) First interpretation: there are no wrong actions (1) Crit: but morality is real, moral feelings are founded in nature b) Second interpretation: God must be evil (1) Reply: no solution IX. OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS A. What has been said about necessity, causality, habit, and experience is confirmed by observing the same processes in animals 1. Animals learn from experience, and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes a) e.g. trained horses will not attempt to further than its known abilities b) e.g. an old greyhound will leave the first part of the chase up to the younger dogs 2. Animals are lead by custom to infer that one event will usually follow another a) This is also so for children, the generality of mankind, and philosophers in the active parts of life B. Areas where human knowledge surpasses that of animals 1. More keen observation and memory 2. sort complicated ideas 3. Avoid convusing ideas 4. recognizing mere correlations 5. Avoid hasty generalization 6. Familiarity with analogy 7. Avoid bial 8. General knowledge X. OF MIRACLES Summary: the testimony of uniform natural law outweighs the testimony of any miracle A. Part I: probability and testimony 1. Introduction a) Tillotson criticizes the real presence arguing that even if it was clearly revealed in scripture, it would be unreasonable since over the centuries, the evidence in favor of it would be weaker that that which appeared first hand to the disciples b) Hume wishes a similar argument to "check all kinds of superstition and delusion" 2. Reasoning about matters of fact a) Are true only with degrees of probability b) Some reasoning is more probable than others c) "A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence" d) Df. probability: an opposition of observations where one side is found to overbalance the other 3. Testimonies a) The most common and useful type of reasoning b) No testimony is necessarily connected with any event c) Experience teaches us that testimonies cannot always be trusted d) Reasons for not trusting testimonies (1) The opposition of contrary testimony (a) e.g. when witnesses contradict each other (2) The character or number of the witnesses (a) e.g. too few or of a doubtful character (3) The manner of delivering the testimony (a) e.g. when delivered wth bias, hesitation, violent declaration e) Conflicting testimonies weigh against each other in force, and the weaker diminishes the stronger in that degree (1) "I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato" (2) "The indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts" (3) Uniform experience counts as evidence against marvellous testimonies f) Miraculous testimonies (1) Df.: "a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature" (a) More accurate definition: "a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposotion of some invisible agent" (b) "A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not" (e.g. the raising of a house vs. a feather) (2) Uniform experience of nature amounts to a direct and full proof against the existence of any miracle g) General maxim about testimonies: a testimony is reasonable only if its truth is more likely (miraculous) than its falsehood (1) Reject the greater miracle B. Part II: 1. Four reasons for discrediting testimonies about miracles a) Wittnesses lack integrety (against the individuals) (1) No miracle is "attested by a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good-sense, education and learning as to secure us against all delusion in themselves" b) Humans by nature enjoy propagating sensational stories c) They abount chiefly among ignorant and barbarous nations (against the social environment) d) Miracles support rival religious systems (1) "In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established" 2. Examples of miracles recoreded by credible sources a) Tacitus' report of Vespasian curing a blind man b) Cardinal de Retz's story of a doorkeeper who recoverd his missing leg by rubbing the stump with holy oil (1) De Retz himself discredited it c) Miracles at the tomb of Abbe Paris 3. Even these testimonies are discredited by the nature of the testimony itself, weighing against established laws of nature a) People are skeptical about those who report miracles and speak for God b) Many miracles have been detected in their time, others have sunk into oblivion c) Truth is hard to uncover during one's day, and much more so in later times when all wittnesses are dead d) "...no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof; and that even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another proof; derived from the very nature of the fact, which it would endeavour to establish e) We do not need to show precisely where the falsehood of a miracle testimony rests (the fact that it is contrary to nature is enough) 4. Ascribing a miracle to an almighty God does not help a) We cannot know his attributes outside of the usual course of nature 5. Miracles in the Bible a) Christianity is founded on faith, not reason b) Those like Locke who argue for the reasonableness of Christianity do a disservice c) The miracle and prophecies in the Bible are not rational d) "Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." XI. OF A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE AND OF A FUTURE STATE A. Background 1. "Particular providence" 2. Teleological-moral argument a) From observing a machine (or object of human design) we may infer a human designer b) Many natural parts of the universe resemble machines c) Therefore, a benevolent and just God created the universe d) Some human actions are good and others are evil e) Therefore, God rewards or punishes human actions either in his life or the next XII. OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY A. Speculative vs. actional skeptic (hinted at) B. What are the limits of skeptical uncertainty? C. Antecedent skepticism 1. Excessive (Cartesian) 2. Moderate D. Consequential skepticism 1. Excessive (Pyrrhonian) a) Arguments against the senses (1) Trite topics from imperfections of organs (a) Crooked oar in water (b) Objects at different distances (c) Double image from pressing one eye (2) Profound arguments (a) Realism vs. dualism (b) Primary and secondary qualities b) Arguments against reason (or the understanding) (1) Relations of ideas (a) Infinite divisibility of space (b) Infinite divisibility of time (2) Matters of fact (a) Popular objections (a) Differing opinions in different times and places (b) Judgmental variations owing to age, illness, wealth (c) Perpetual conflicts between opinions and feelings (b) Philosophical objections (a) Empirical knowledge ultimately based on habit 2. Moderate (academic) skepticism: result of excessive skepticism a) Doubt, caution and modesty b) Confine inquiries to common life E. The proper subjects of science and inquiry 1. Abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number 2. Experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence