THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION by William Wainwright Book Outline by James Fieser I. THE NATURE OF GOD A. The basic idea of religion 1. Basis for religious belief a) Rooted in human needs and yearnings (1) William James (a) Visible world is part of a more spiritual one and draws its chief significance from it (b) Our true end is a union with that higher universe (c) Life can be transformed by making proper contact with it b) Suggested by natural design c) Suggested by mystical experience 2. Religion as the object of ultimate concern a) Paul Tillich: To be ultimately concerned about something is to regard that thing as infinitely important (1) Anything can be made the object of ultimate concern (e.g. rocks), but true religion has as its object something deserving of such concern B. Logical distinctions 1. Kinds of propositions a) Logically necessary: 2+2=4, nothing can be larger than itself, A is A b) Logically contingent: may be true or false c) Logically impossible: 2+3=4, some dogs are triangles (1) Different than causally impossible: e.g. traveling faster than the speed of light 2. Concept of possible worlds a) Actual world: contains every proposition or its denial b) Other worlds: the truth value of some world is changed (1) Impossible worlds: contain logically impossible propositions (2) Logically possible worlds: do not include logically impossible propositions C. Maximally perfect reality 1. Thesis: a fully appropriate object of ultimate concern must be maximally perfect (i.e. no actual or possible reality is greater) 2. Crit: an appropriate object of ultimate concern need only be greater than any other existing being a) Reply: compare the idea of the greatest existing being with the greatest possible being (1) We can't be totally committed to the first (limited one) if the second (unlimited one) might have existed b) Reply: we can't have unreserved awe and reverence for a limited being 3. Crit: the concept of a maximally perfect reality is incoherent a) Arg. there are no standards in relation to which something could be said to be more prefect than everything else (Charles Crittendon) (1) "The most perfect pen" presupposes that there is a class of pens which is graduated (2) But, there is no class of "everything" whereby we can say MPR is greater than everything (3) Reply: for every reality X (e.g. a conscious being), there is a class which includes X and MPR and MPR is greater b) Arg. MPR would have logically incompatible perfections (1) e.g. incorporeality (being bodiless) and being the best tennis player (2) Reply: God has only "pure perfections" which contain no defect. He does not have "mixed perfections" which imply a defect (such as repentance which implies a previous sin) (a) Thus, God would not be the best tennis player, since this is a mixed perfection (3) Reply: God would not have every perfection, but only the largest class of coherent perfections c) Arg. MPR's qualities have no upper limit (intrinsic maxima) (1) Qualities such as have no upper limit (a) e.g. largest possible object, or the largest possible integer are incoherent (2) MPR is said to possess properties such as knowledge, power, goodness, happiness and love (a) Knowledge power and goodness have limits (b) Happiness does not (hence the happiest possible being is incoherent) (3) Reply: we can deny that happiness has no upper limit: God's happiness consists in his delight in his own splendor (4) Reply: (Charles Hartshorne) MPR is a being that: (a) Has the upper limit of those perfections which allow it (e.g. knowledge), and (b) With other properties can only be surpassed by itself (e.g. happiness) D. Whether a perfect reality is personal 1. Advaita Vedanta a) Brahman is unity and incomprehensible (1) Brahman is without parts; all difference in Brahman is unreal (2) Since we can only understand things by their properties, then Brahman is incomprehensible b) Brahman is not a person because (1) Knowing and willing are essential to personhood (a) Brahman is beyond cognition since knowing presupposes a distinction between the knower and what is known (b) Brahman is not a causal agent because reality as a whole is an undifferentiated unity and the space-time world (in which causal actions take place) is unreal i) People project the illusion of spatio-temporality onto reality c) Brahman is an infinite ocean of empty, joyous consciousness, which is impersonal, inactive and anonymous d) Impersonalness is also suggested by mystical experiences (1) The mind is emptied of its content and distinctions disappear (a joyous state or consciousness arises) 2. Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhism a) a person is simply a collection of dharmas (interrelated experiences and body states) (1) Consciousness is just another transient dharma (2) The realm of the transient is suffering (duhka) b) Ultimate reality is not a person since it would be impermanent, causally conditioned and unhappy 3. Point: even the basic claim that MPR is a kind of person is subject to dispute E. God's metaphysical attributes 1. Simplicity: each of God's real properties is identical with his other real properties and with his being or nature (Augustine, Aquinas) a) God's power is identical with his wisdom, knowledge and goodness b) A real (or intrinsic property) is one which is essential to the nature of that being (1) An extrinsic property can change without changing the nature of that being 2. Immutability: God can't change (Augustine) a) Follows from simplicity: since all of God's properties are identical, he can't change by losing some and gaining others (since he has only one) 3. Timelessness: God does not have temporal extension or duration (timeless) a) Two concepts of timelessness: (1) Infinite temporal duration (wrong) (2) The concept of time does not apply (right) b) The objects of his knowledge and the contents of his will are in time, but God himself is not. 4. Impassibility: God does not depend on the world in any respect a) Even though the world was created and is sustained by him 5. Crit: metaphysical attributes are not scriptural a) God is described as being in time (1) Contrary to timelessness b) God seems to be affected by people (is moved to pity) (1) Contrary to impassibility c) Reply: these should not be taken literally (along with other scriptures which has God repent of his actions) 6. Crit: metaphysical attributes do not have roots in religious life and experience a) Reply: but most religious traditions stress the imperfections of the temporal order (the space-time world is in constant flux) (1) MPR must be free from complexity, change, time and dependency b) Reply: many mystics claim they perceive divinity as possessing metaphysical attributes (e.g. undifferentiated unity) 7. Crit: metaphysical attributes conflict with the idea of God being a person (Hartshorne) F. Is God impassible 1. Crit: If God is impassible, then he can't know the world a) Two points of knowledge: (1) Knowledge involves a real modification in the knower, but not in what is known (2) Knowledge depends upon its object, while its object does not depend on it b) Now, God's knowledge of some events is simply a consequence of his willing them c) However, God cannot decree free human actions, hence his knowledge of this is dependent on the world 2. Crit: if God is impassible, then he cannot be compassionate a) A perfect being would be maximally responsive to the joys and sorrows of others. Hence God must be affected by his creatures b) Solution (Anselm): God acts as if he felt compassion although he doesn't actually do so (1) Crit: Compassion without feeling isn't real compassion c) Solution (Bernard of Clairvaux): God became human so he could learn by his own experience how to sympathize with those who suffer and are tempted (1) Crit: not a solution available to non-christian theists (2) Crit: God seems to be compassionate in his own nature d) Solution (Aquinas): God's compassion is only analogous to human compassion (1) Humans: compassion is sympathetic suffering (2) God: humans recognize that some of our pains are contrary to God's love, and we thus construe it as compassion (3) Crit: compassion (when properly understood) still involves sympathetic suffering, not simply a feeling of love G. God's knowledge and power 1. Omnipotence a) Things God can't do (1) Logically impossible tasks (2+2=5) (2) Can't produce things which aren't producible (2+2=4) (3) Can't make me freely choose some action (4) Can't create something more powerful than himself (a) Which is a consequence of his unlimited power (5) Can't destroy himself or divest himself of his power (6) Can God sin? (a) Pike: Yaweh isn't essentially good, i.e. he could choose to do evil i) If he did do evil, then he couldn't' be properly called "God" ii) We have material assurance that God will always be good, since he isn't constrained by ignorance or non-rational factors (b) Crit: but if God could do evil, then he would not be maximally perfect (c) Hence, God is limited by his goodness (7) Concl: God's power is subject to (a) Logical constraints (b) Limitations of his own nature (c) Freedom of human beings 2. Omniscience a) God's knowledge of future contingents (acts of free creatures) (1) Crit: the future is indeterminate (Future contingents are neither true nor false until they come about) (a) God doesn't know future choices, but only makes estimates based on what he does know (b) Reply: indeterminacy is controversial: it seems as though the future contingents are already true or false (2) Crit: foreknowledge of future contingents involves backward causation (a) God's knowledge of our free choices depends on us, hence a future fact would cause something in the past (b) Reply: if God is timeless, then his knowledge wouldn't precede our act (c) Reply: God has middle knowledge: knows what any possible person would freely choose to do (d) Reply: a past fact can depend on a future fact without causally depending on it i) e.g. "Julius Caesar was assassinated before I will have finished my breakfast" i) This fact about the past depends upon my finishing breakfast, but isn't causally dependent ii) God's knowledge of future contingents may be similarly dependent, yet not causally related (3) Crit: there seems to be no basis for God to know the future (a) The future just isn't available for beings who exist in time (b) Middle knowledge would be equally groundless (c) Reply: if God is timeless, then the future is open to him (d) Reply: perhaps God simply knows future contingents the way that we simply know necessary truths (e.g. 1+2=3) b) Foreknowledge and Human freedom (1) If God knows our future contingent actions, then they are necessary, and, hence not free (a) God's foreknowledge of me doing X at T2 entails that I will do X at T2 (b) Our actions would be necessary since they are linked to some past fact (God's foreknowledge of P) and past facts are now necessary (2) Crit: But by choosing y over x at T2, I have the power to bring it about that God Had foreknowledge of Y as opposed to X (a) Each of us may have the power to partly determine what his beliefs will be II. ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE A. The Ontological Argument 1. Introduction a) Proposed mainly by religions intellectuals, unlike the other proofs which are expressions of ordinary religious convictions b) Basic idea: maximal perfection is incompatible with nonexistence 2. The argument [see the book] a) Premise 1: if PN p then NP (1) If it is possible that p is necessarily true, then p is necessarily true (2) Transportation: if P isn't necessarily true, it isn't possible that it is necessarily true (3) Contingent truths, like "Ronald Reagan exists" couldn't be necessary truths (4) If a proposition isn't necessarily true, then there is no possible world in which it is necessarily true b) Premise 2: N (if G then NG) (1) A maximally perfect being must have existence in all possible worlds (2) So, if God exists, he must exist necessarily c) Premise 3: PG (it is possible that God exists) (1) No one has deduced a logical contradiction from the proposition "God exists" d) The argument is valid, and these are the chief premises, which are plausible 3. Criticism a) Guanilo's island: this argument pattern can show the existence of the most perfect anything b) e.g. perfect island, perfect devil, near God c) Works if (1) N (if p then Np), and (2) Pp d) Reply 1: these other objects are not logically possible (1) If a necessary being is possible, then it exists (2) Which implies if it doesn't exist, then it is not a necessary being (3) Things like perfect islands or devils don't exist, hence they are impossible (4) This doesn't work with MPR (a) There are conclusive reasons showing God doesn't exist, so e) Reply 2: these other objects are incoherent (1) Islands depend on things and aren't self-explanatory (2) Devils are evil, and evil is the result of ignorance, dependence or weakness, hence would not be omnipotent or omniscient (3) Near god has limitations; there needs to be an explanation for why it is limited, but there is no explanation. Hence, it is an incoherent concept. 4. God's Possibility and the possibility of other necessary beings a) The existence of both is mutually exclusive (1) MPR is the cause of all concrete beings (2) A necessary concrete being would be both caused by MPR (from (1) above) and not caused by MPR (since it would be necessary) B. The Cosmological Argument 1. Islamic version a) Trace back the causes of the world b) There can't be an infinite series of temporal causes c) Hence, the world has a cause d) Crit: medieval theologians argue that an infinite series of temporal causes is possible 2. Aquinas' version a) Although an infinite series of temporal causes is possible (per accidens), an infinite series of simultaneous causes (per se) is not possible b) Changes occurring now are not possible unless they are grounded in more perfect activities that are occurring t the same time c) Hence, there must be a first cause (per se) for any change to be possible d) Crit: idea of simultaneous causes (per se) is grounded in a theory of ancient and medieval science which is no longer held (1) i.e. the view that there are hierarchies of simultaneously occurring causes of different ontological kinds (2) Effects at lower levels of being were explained by causal activities at higher levels of being 3. Samuel Clarke's version a) The argument: (1) Every being is either logically necessary or contingent (caused by some other being) (2) A contingent being is caused to exist by some other being (3) An infinite series of contingent beings is caused by a necessary being (since the series itself is contingent) (4) Therefore, a necessary being exists and causes contingent beings to exist b) Crit: does an infinite series require a cause? (against premise 3 above) (1) Paul Edwards: the explanation of the collection consists of the explanation of each being (Eskimo e.g.) (2) Reply: misses the point: the question is why is there a series at all (why is there something rather than nothing; why are there humans at all) c) Crit: why is something's existence either self-explanatory, or explained by something else (against premise 1)? (1) Answer: principle of sufficient reason (a) PSR1: For every contingent fact F, some other fact F' obtains such that, given F', F must obtain i) Problem: this means that God's decision is fully determined by his nature, hence he isn't free (b) PSR2: there is a sufficient reason for the existence of every contingent entity (c) PSR3: every contingent fact that requires a sufficient reason has one (d) PSR4: There is at least some reason for every contingent fact (2) The latter three weaker principles are strong enough to show that contingent being is caused by a necessary being; however, they are compatible with God's freedom (3) Why hold PSR? (a) It is an induction (generalization) from human experience i) Crit: this induction isn't justified since some phenomena resists explanation (e.g. human behavior) i) The generalization isn't justified since so much of the universe is unexplored ii) Reply: PSR4 is better confirmed than the other principles (b) It is a presupposition of inquiry i) Crit: may not always be so (i.e. atomic indeterminacy) (c) It is a necessary truth (Clarke, Leibniz) i) Crit: (Hume) its denial contains no logical impossibility (specifically a contradiction) i) i.e. something exists contingently and has not cause ii) Reply: the denied premises need not be a formal contradiction to be logically impossible C. The Design Argument 1. Apparent Design a) Design includes two things (1) Serves an end (2) Does so in an effective manner (a) Efficiency (b) Purpose must be unified (e.g. a poem) b) Apparent design in nature (1) 18th century versions of the design argument focused on things like eyes and hands; but this has been criticized since they are best explained by evolution; (2) Tennant (focuses on larger aspects of the world): (a) Our world provides the right conditions for life and consciousness (b) The world possesses a structure which can be grasped by human thought (c) The world is saturated with beauty (d) The world provides a suitable environment for moral growth and activity (3) Crit: (Nelson) these things are not achieved effectively (a) Evolution is inefficient: has many blind alleys and involves waste (b) Reply: such blind alleys are not necessarily a waste from the perspective of the species which temporarily flourished (c) Reply: inefficiency is not appropriate for measuring effectiveness i) i.e. God's purpose may not have to follow the model of an efficient industry or business ii) Further, older versions of the design argument compared the world to art, and not to machines 2. The inference to a designer (three approaches) a) Analogical inference: the analogy hold if, (1) All objects of design are known to have a designer (a) Paley argues that there are no cases in which we know that design isn't caused by a designer (2) There is a significant similarity between objects of human design and the world (a) Crit: (Hume) the world resembles better a vegetable rather than a machine (b) Reply: many human artifacts do not resemble each other; yet they fulfill the above two qualifications of design b) An inference to the best (or most plausible) explanation (1) From human experience we postulate that the world was created by intelligent design (or evolution was directed by intelligent design) (2) Other explanations are less plausible (that such evolutionary processes arose from chance) (3) Hence, an intelligent designer is the best explanation for the world c) A probability argument (1) Take two hypotheses (a) Designer hypothesis: an intelligent mind is the cause of natural design (b) Naturalistic hypothesis: no supernatural reality underlies natural processes (2) The probability of each depends on (a) The prior probability of each i) Designer hypothesis is low, but not negligible (e.g. religious experience, alleged revelations) ii) Naturalistic hypothesis is high (given the mass of evidence in support of a natural process) (b) The probability of apparent design on each i) Designer hypothesis is high (since the designer hypothesis entails that God would create the world) ii) Naturalistic hypothesis is low (given the unlikelihood that such improbable occurrences could all have occurred) 3. Conclusion: a) No version of the design argument shows that a single, all powerful being created the world b) Two possible implications (1) Design points to power and intelligence, but leaves open whether such attributes are limited (a) Confirms theism (2) Design points to limited power and intelligence (a) Disconfirms theism (Hume and Mill) III. PROBLEM OF EVIL A. Introduction 1. The problem: a) An all powerful, all knowing, all good God would prevent evil b) Evil exists c) Therefore, God, as described above, does not exist 2. Solutions which modify God's attributes a) Henry Mansel: human standards of moral right and wrong do not apply to God (i.e. God isn't good) (1) Crit: belief in a good God is deeply imbedded in the theistic tradition (2) Crit: persons are moral agents; God is personal, hence must be subject to moral standards (3) Appeal to the divine command theory won't help since (a) If God creates moral standards, then good becomes arbitrary, and the idea of the goodness of God becomes meaningless (b) If moral standards are co-eternal with God, then we must obey those standards, whether God commands them or not b) Peter Bertocci: limit God's power (1) The suggestion is o.k. if the limitation is necessary rather than contingent (a) If God has necessary limitations (similar to not making 2+2=5) then he would still be an appropriate object of ultimate concern (b) If God has contingent limitations, then he would not be an appropriate object of ultimate concern (2) The suggestions might be o.k. if the limitations are not too extensive (3) Crit: but evil exists in such quantities, the limitations on God would have to be contingent, and also be quite extensive B. Whether God and Evil are Compatible 1. Logical problem of evil: God's existence is logically inconsistent with evil a) Terms: (1) Explicit contradiction: this object is red, this object is not red (2) Inconsistency: this object is red, this object is not colored b) Two propositions (1) An omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect being exists (2) Evil exists c) There is no explicit contradiction d) There may be an inconsistency if a third proposition (necessary truth) is added (1) A moral being will prevent evil unless he has a morally sufficient reason for not doing so (a) i.e. unless that evil is necessary to produce a greater good (b) Crit: this is not inconsistent with the above (2) Evil exists which God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting (a) Crit: some evils are logically necessary for a greater good 2. Evidential problem of evil: evil constitutes overwhelming evidence for the nonexistence of God (God has no sufficient reason for allowing certain kinds of evil) a) It must be shown that (1) If God had morally sufficient reasons, we would know them (a) Criticisms: i) We are only acquainted with a small quantity of goods ii) We may not be able to grasp the connection between good and evils iii) The explanation may hinge on an inexplicable part of Gods' nature, which God cannot convey (b) Reply: asking for a complete list of God's reasons may be unfair, but asking for a partial list may not be (2) The reasons theists give are inadequate C. Whether Evil is Necessary For Greater Goods 1. Moral Good and the necessity of Evil a) Some moral goods are responses to evils and couldn't exist without them (1) e.g. courage, compassion, fortitude, forgiveness and forbearance (2) Compassion, in particular (a) Not the virtue of compassion i) We still could have a habit of compassion even if no circumstances arise to act that way (b) Not compassionate responses in general i) We can mistakenly be compassionate about another's misfortune (c) Compassionate responses of people who are fully informed of the relevant facts i) Here compassionate responses logically require evil (d) Crit: other moral goods do not require evil, e.g. speaking the truth, keeping promises, courteous responses (3) Moral growth and development requires the existence of evil (a) Specifically, moral growth of individuals, not of the human race (humans are not now any more righteous than before) i) The process through which individuals grow in righteousness or sanctity (b) Righteousness acquired by successfully struggling with evil (c) Crit: other kinds of moral growth do not require the existence of evil b) Rational action requires a consistent natural order which entails possible evil (1) Rational activity involves foresight and deliberation (2) Foresight and deliberation are possible only if one has some expectations regarding the future (3) Such expectations result only when nature behaves consistently (a) This applies only to rational expectations formed from experiencing nature's normal operations (not through clairvoyance or divine revelation) (4) When nature behaves consistently, it will possibly conflict with our wishes, and thus produce suffering (a) C.S. Lewis: if matter has a fixed nature and obeys constant laws, not all states of matter will be equally agreeable to the wishes of a given soul (5) Crit: why can't evil be empirically impossible (go against natural law) (a) Reply: if God made moral evil and empirical impossibility, then we wouldn't freely choose to refrain from harming others (b) Reply: God must make natural evil and empirical possibility also, otherwise we would not have a basic idea of harm (e.g. a heavy object falling on us) 2. Does the value of such goods justify evil? a) No: (1) The only appropriate standard for evaluating the quality of human existence is happiness (or the balance of pleasure over pain) b) Yes: (1) If virtue (not goodness) is the standard, then the world is better off by having this extra kind of moral value c) The issue hinges on what the standard for evaluating the quality of human existence is D. Free Will Defense 1. Summary: a) Easy summary: (1) God could not create free creatures who would be guaranteed to always do good b) Hard summary: (1) If a person's sinful action is genuinely free, then the fact that the person would act sinfully in those circumstances isn't necessitated by the person's essence, by his or her character and past decisions, by natural causes, or by God 2. Crit: God's determination of human behavior might be compatible with human freedom (hence God would be responsible for all moral evil) a) Given Locke's definition of freedom (power to act according to our motives), our actions may be determined, yet we still would be free (1) Locke would be a compatibilist b) Reply: Locke's account of freedom is not real freedom (1) There is no genuine alternative to the agent's action (2) Given Reid's concept of freedom (power over the determination of the will), God could not make us avoid moral evil (a) Reid is an incompatibilist 3. Crit: the free will defense is incompatible with God's sovereignty and omnipotence a) God himself is not free since he can't choose to do evil (1) Reply: God is not free to choose evil, but he is free to choose between various goods b) God could have made humans so they would choose between goods (similar to himself), rather than between good and evil (1) Reply: even though this would make human freedom more similar to God's freedom in one way, it would be less similar in another way (a) God's own freedom (to choose between various goods) is significant (b) Human freedom, if limited only to various goods, would be insignificant 4. Crit: the FWD undermines God's power a) God's sovereignty would be impaired since our free actions restrict his choices (1) History is the product of innumerable decisions, only some of which are God's (2) Reply: the concept of omnipotence has no universally accepted definition; i.e. it is flexible enough to take these constraints into account (a) Many ancient traditions of God's power have him limited by human freedom b) Unless God is fully in control of events, we have no guarantee that good will ultimately triumph over evil (1) The world may contain the same ambiguous mixture of sorrow and joy until the end of time (a) Even in heaven we might revolt again, or still feel pain for those in hell (2) Reply (James): Given God's superior power, we have a virtual assurance that he will succeed in bringing history to splendid conclusion (a) This is analogous to a master chess player going against a novice (3) Reply: revelation tells us that good will triumph over evil in the end E. Whether God Must Choose the Best World 1. Assumption: God must act for the best a) Both sides assume this (1) The critic assumes this when arguing that God has no morally sufficient reason for permitting evil (2) The theist assumes this when explaining what God's reasons might be 2. This assumption rests on a further assumption that there is a best possible world a) Crit (Aquinas): any possible world would reflect God's being, and would be good (1) They would just be alternative ways of mirroring divine perfections (a) But, no created order can reflect this adequately (2) Hence, God cannot be criticized for not creating the best possible world, for there isn't any b) Reply: why didn't God create a world that is at least better (1) Response: this reply is inappropriate since God would always be exposed to a similar complaint 3. God's obligations a) Create a world with no evil (1) Crit: doesn't follow if there is no best possible world (according to the above discussion) (a) W1 may have less evil than W2, but W2 may on the whole be better than W1 b) Create a world with no pointless evil (1) Since God is just, there can be no gratuitous evil (a) e.g. experiencing physical pain is necessary for the protection of us c) Create a world where evil is necessary for a greater good (1) If God can bring about the same good results with less suffering, then he should choose the one with the least evil (e.g. a lumpectomy vs. a masectomy) (2) Crit: but if there is not best possible world, then God has no obligation to create a world with less suffering (so long as there is a point to suffering, then God is being just) IV. CHAPTER 4: IMMORTALITY A. Background 1. General assumption a) Salvation heals the whole person b) The whole person must survive death 2. Western traditions a) The body is essential to full human existence b) Implies that bodies must be resurrected 3. Eastern traditions a) The true self is non-empirical b) No body is needed for immortality B. The possibility of immortality 1. Mind-body problem (two relevant issues): a) Whether minds exist apart from bodies (1) If God exists, then at least one mind exists independent of a body b) Identity of ourselves in another body (1) If some of my thoughts survive death, then why identify these as me (as opposed to a replica) 2. Empirical theories: theories based on some perceivable quality of existence a) Various criteria (1) Bodily (spacio-temporal) continuity (a) Spacio-temporal gaps between the existence of one's body from one moment to the next (b) This requires a body for immortality (2) Temporal continuity (a) Spatial gaps are allowable, but temporal gaps are not (b) e.g. a person who suddenly reappears on Mars (c) This requires a body for immortality (3) An appropriate causal story linking A's body with B's body (a) e.g. encoding A's brain chemistry and recreating it at a later time (b) This requires a body for immortality (4) Apparent memory (Locke) (a) Memory and similarity of one's character (b) Does not require a body for immortality b) Criticisms of empirical theories (1) Crit: all the above criteria have degrees continuity (a) Either personal identity has degrees, or i) This is counter-intuitive (b) A necessary and sufficient degree of continuity must be stipulated for personal identity i) Such stipulations are arbitrary (2) Crit: possibility of duplication (a) e.g. severed brain, cloning machine (b) Reply: fourth criteria is added that no other person fulfills the criteria of identity i) Thus, neither new people would count as the continuer (c) Reply: ad hoc, it also implies that the first person does not survive the operation (3) Conclusion: (a) Empirical criteria are seen as evidence of continuity, but not the essential constituents of it (b) A bodily resurrection is required by an empirical criteria 3. Non-empirical theories a) Criteria of enduring substance or transcendental ego (1) All qualities of the empirical self belong to a transcendental ego (2) The ego expresses itself in empirical qualities, but is not identified with these qualities b) Criticisms (1) Crit: problems of personal identity (e.g. cloning machine) cannot be resolved by appealing to empirical criteria (a) Reply: we can appeal to God's omniscience (2) Crit: ignores the apparently essential relation between empirical qualities and one's continued identity (a) e.g. losing one's memory amounts to losing one's identity c) Conclusion: (1) This implies a mind-body dualism C. Arguments for immortality 1. Empirical arguments a) e.g. Jesus' resurrection (1) crit: this is miraculous, and its reality is disputed b) e.g. paranormal phenomena (1) Crit: fraud (2) Crit: the medium might have acquired the information in normal ways (3) Crit: accounts of the afterlife by medium are childish or silly (a) Even if they do indicate an afterlife, it is not the splendid afterlife described by religion 2. Argument from the soul's simplicity (McTaggart) a) The argument (1) A soul can be destroyed only by annihilation or by the separation of its parts (2) Science provides no instances of annihilation (3) The self doesn't have parts that could be separated (4) Hence, the soul is probably immortal b) Criticisms (1) The self is made of parts (C.D. Broad) (2) There are cases of annihilation (e.g. pain, dreams) 3. Moral argument (Kant) a) The argument (1) We are obligated to perfectly conform our lives to the moral law (2) Ought implies can (3) Thus, moral perfection is possible [from 1 and 2] (4) Moral perfection isn't possible in this life (5) Therefore, the moral self must survive death b) Criticisms (1) Perhaps moral perfection can be attained in this life (against premise 2) (a) e.g. total honesty is difficult, but not impossible (b) Reply: we may be able to control our evil inclinations on particular occasions, but not permanently (2) We are only obligated to strive for moral perfection (against premise 1) (a) Reply: "moral perfection is a duty" is equivalent to "we ought always to act morally," the latter of which is true i) [Response: the latter is only a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition for the former] (3) The critic may offer the reverse of Kant's argument: (a) There is no afterlife (b) Moral perfection in this world is impossible (c) Ought implies can (d) We have no obligation toward moral perfection 4. Argument from our kinship with the divine a) The argument (1) The human soul is akin to the divine soul (or eternal truths, the world of forms) (2) The divine soul is eternal (3) Therefore the human soul is eternal b) Criticisms (1) The human soul isn't and need not be like the divine soul in every respect (2) The nature of the soul's divine kinship may preclude personal immortality (e.g. vedanta) 5. Argument from justice a) The argument (1) There are instances of injustice in this world (2) The universe is a just place (3) Therefore there must be an afterlife which addresses the injustice on earth b) Criticism (1) The universe may not be a just place 6. Argument from the desire for happiness and perfection a) The argument (1) We have a longing for a transcendent good (2) This is not satisfied in this life (3) Goodness underlies reality (4) Therefore, there must be an afterlife in which our longing will be satisfied V. MYSTICISM AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE A. Background 1. James: the roots of religious belief are experiences, not arguments 2. Issue: do religious experiences justify religious belief a) Do these experiences have cognitive value 3. Three notions a) Noetic quality of experiences (1) Claim to involve knowledge b) Cognitive value of experiences (1) Whether they are either true or false c) Corrigibility of experiences (1) Whether they are falsifiable d) Veridicality of experiences (1) Whether their reports are true B. The nature of religious experience 1. Religious experiences a) Visionary experiences: see images b) Numinous experiences: completely overwhelming, awe c) Mystical experiences (1) Nature mysticism: see yourself as included in nature as a whole (2) Monistic mystical consciousness: empty consciousness where nothing remains but consciousness itself (3) Theistic mystical experiences: mind empties except for the most general and abstract concepts of being, presence, or love 2. Noetic (knowledge) quality of religious experiences: a) Involve an intuitive, perception-like, sense of objective reality or presence b) The sense that we perceive reality as it really is 3. Issue: are these experiences veridical a) Features of ordinary perception (1) The given: visual sensations caused by stimulating the optic nerve (2) The phenomenological object: the appearance of a hat like surface (a) I see a hat-like object (3) The apparent object: I see a hat (4) Perceptual claims based on belief: I see John's hat b) Veridical nature of ordinary experiences (1) Is the phenomenological object perceived 4. Veridical nature of mystical experiences a) Must distinguish between the phenomenological and apparent objects of the mystic's experience (1) Phenomenological object: an overwhelming loving presence (2) Apparent object: Christ, Vishnu b) Mystical experiences are veridical if their phenomenological objects are really perceived C. Do Religious experiences have cognitive value 1. Ordinary noetic experiences a) They have a phenomenological object (i.e. are experiences of something) b) Include the conviction that the phenomenological object exists and one is perceiving it 2. Principle of presumptive validity a) All judgments and experiences should be considered valid unless there are good reasons for thinking otherwise b) A principle of this sort is needed to avoid an infinite regress (1) i.e. judgment J is valid based on J1, and J1 is valid base on J2... 3. Mystical experiences should be granted the principle of presumptive validity since we grant this to sensory experiences a) Crit: the dissimilarities between mystical experience and sense perception (discussed below) suggest that the principle of presumptive validity should not be given to mystical experiences D. Criticisms based on dissimilarities with sense perception 1. C.B. Martin: sense perceptions are corrigible (i.e. falsifiable) a) First person psychological reports (including mystical experiences) are incorrigible (i.e. unfalsifiable) b) Crit: mystical experiences are corrigible (1) Their claim may be false if the reality they allegedly perceive doesn't exist (2) Their claims are false if they aren't perceiving what they claim to be perceiving c) Traditional texts for mystical experiences (1) Does it promote charity, humility, psychological integration, community spirit 2. Sense perceptions involve common agreement and predictability a) A mystic's experiences are often compared to paradigm experiences (1) Agreement isn't important as are the consequences of his experiences (2) Predictability is even less important, since they seldom base predictions on their experiences b) Tests for the cognitive value of an experience should be based in the nature of its alleged object (1) Physical objects are public, and lend themselves to agreement and predictability (2) Such tests are inappropriate for spiritual, and physical God (the object of the mystic's experience) c) The above tests used to judge mystical experience are appropriate for their object (1) i.e. beneficial consequences, profound insights 3. Absence of independent justification a) Mystical experiences fail the basic criteria of first person psychological reports (e.g. a toothache) (1) We can touch teeth b) The argument (1) First person psychological reports are credible only if we have independent access to those facts and know that the experiences are reliable signs of them (2) We don't have independent access to the objects of mystical experience (and thus have no independent check) (3) Hence mystical experience are not credible c) Criticism (1) We may have independent access to the object of mystical experience through special revelation (a) [reply: these themselves come from alleged mystical experiences] (2) Mystical experiences are special cases of first-person psychological reports (a) The primary access to information about toothaches is the teeth E. Criticism based on conflicting claims 1. Distinctions a) Some claims are based on religious experiences (1) Involves the claim merely to perceive the phenomenological object b) Some claims are not based on religious experience (1) These claims can be infected with error c) Some claims are merely different (1) e.g. nature mysticism, monistic mysticism d) Some claims are incompatible (1) e.g. visions of Buddha, and visions of Jesus 2. Reply a) Some mystics claim that numinous and mystical experiences (which are nonvisionary) are primary (1) These are only loosely connected with mystical ones b) It is not clear that these more fundamental experiences conflict F. Criticisms based on natural explanations 1. Mystics are psychotics a) Reply: the critic must show that (1) The person is in fact psychotic (2) That psychosis produces the experience b) Reply: most mystics are not psychotic c) Nevertheless, if religious experiences are produce by unreliable mechanisms, we could discount them 2. Other reductionist explanations: unreliable psychological, neurological, mechanisms a) These may be only some of the sufficient conditions responsible for the experience (1) It is not clear that God's existence is not the main sufficient condition b) God could still work through these natural causes G. Conclusion 1. Since religious experience is cognitive, then the principle of presumptive validity applies 2. Religious experiences should be rejected only if a) We prove God's nonexistence b) The claims of religious experience are inconsistent c) These experiences are known to be based on unreliable physiological mechanisms 3. Religious experience strengthens religious belief a) It is not clear, though, that these alone can justify religious belief VI. ANTI-EVIDENTIALISM A. Fideism 1. Blaise Pascal and the Sense of the Heart a) Failure of traditional arguments b) He sees "too much to deny, and too little to be sure" (1) The evidence is good for people who approach the situation with the right need c) Faith is contrary to reason, and is supported by evidence d) Christianity explains our situation (1) Our littleness: finitude (2) The ambiguity of the evidence for God's existence (a) Three orders: body, mind and heart (b) Human corruption (c) God's wish to respect our free will e) Pascal's Wager (1) Rational actions vs. rational beliefs (a) An act is rational if it achieves a reasonable end (b) Beliefs are rational when they meet certain standards (consistency, due consideration on the relevant evidence) (2) Point of the wager (a) Doesn't prove that god exists (b) Doesn't prove that believe in God is rational (c) Shows that to believe in God is a rational action (3) Criticisms: (a) Different religions claim to give eternal life (b) The wager cannot produce sincere belief i) Reply: the person may be more receptive to religious influences from self-interests f) Pascal's attitude toward reason is ambiguous 2. Soren Kierkegaard and Religious Commitment a) Objective thinking is inappropriate with self-related things (1) It works with science (2) We cannot be objective about self-related issues (a) What if I should die tomorrow (b) How should I live in the face of the fact that I must die (3) Such decisions and commitments are based on one's passions and concerns b) Religious alternatives (1) Aesthetic stage (principle of enjoyment) (a) The person doesn't consciously know he is following this (2) Ethical stage (a) Conscious adherence to some ethical idea (b) Carries it out in the public world (3) Religious stage (a) Religion A i) Based on the idea of Eternity (God and eternal life) ii) Result: complete guilt i) God requires total conformity, which our finite nature cannot live up to (b) Religion B: Christianity i) Governing idea is a paradox (god becoming man), not the eternal ii) Sin consciousness replaces guilt consciousness iii) One depends on God, but also on Christ as a teacher c) Religion involves absurdity (because of the paradox) (1) Absurdity is necessary to faith (2) Without risk there is no faith 3. D.Z. Phillips and the Autonomy of Religion a) Non-factual status of religious claims (1) It is superstitious to treat religious beliefs as factual assertions (a) Immortality: really about how we should treat people (b) Final judgment: reflection on the meaning of life and death b) Implications (1) Basic beliefs of religion are not true or false (2) There are no non-rational ways for evaluating religion (a) Religion is logically autonomous, for many religious pictures relate to other pictures c) Religion is a commitment to a picture of reality and a form of life d) Criticisms (1) Most religious people believe they are making factual assertions (a) Phillips thinks he is describing what the average person thinks (b) According to him, different religions would merely be different pictures of reality, but most religions think they are more than that (2) True worship and prayer does not seem possible if simply act as though we are communicating with God (yet not asserting that he exists) e) Phillips view is best seen as a recommendation for sophisticated believers who do not believe that their creeds express propositions B. William James and the Will to believe 1. What to do when reason is neutral a) Clifford: our duty is to abstain from belief (1) Works well with scientific belief b) James: our duty is to believe (1) Justification: we may miss out on obtaining knowledge which we would otherwise gain (a) Cooperation with others in a group (b) Belief in certain general hypotheses help contribute to the truth of those positions i) Optimism, pessimism, meliorism (the belief that life can be improved by human effort) (2) Requirements for the will (or right) to believe (a) Reason must be neutral (b) The choice must be living, momentous (opportunity won't recur) and forced i) Such beliefs are the expression of our willing or passional nature (c) There is a broader concept of "rational" which includes these willful responses (d) Will not work with absurd beliefs, and does not allow for wishful thinking (e) There are several possible beliefs (determinism, indeterminism, pessimism, optimism, naturalism, supernaturalism) i) None can be determined by rational means C. Alvin Plantinga and Properly Basic Beliefs 1. Evidentialism: evidence is needed for belief in God 2. Anti-evidnetialism: no evidence is needed for belief in God a) Plantinga is the best contemporary example (but he does not appeal to passional nature) 3. Foundationalism: rational belief is either supported by evidence or is "properly basic" a) Basic beliefs: aren't accepted on the basis of other beliefs b) Properly basic: a person is rationally entitled to hold it c) Classic criterion: (1) Self-evident, incorrigible (can't be mistaken), or evident to the senses d) Implications of classic foundationalism on religion: (1) Religion would not be properly basic (a) it is not self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses (2) Hence, it must be based on evidence (a) i.e. foundationalism classically supports evidentialism e) Criticism of foundationalist criterion (1) Foundationalism itself is not a rational belief (a) It is not supported by evidence nor is it properly basic (2) The criteria are false (a) Many basic beliefs have grounds, and are defeasible (i.e. corrigible) f) Plantinga's criteria (1) There is no real criterion of properly basic beliefs, yet we still recognize some beliefs as properly basic (a) Belief is basic if they aren't inferred from other beliefs (b) Properly basic it arises spontaniously in the circumstances in question (2) Belief in God is properly basic, along with other beliefs such as "I had breakfast this morning" (3) Crit: makes belief in absurdities properly basic (e.g. the Great Pumpkin) (a) Reply: there is a disposition to believe in God, but not the great pumpkin g) Crit: Gary Gutting: there is a disagreement in the religious propositions that some people find basic (hence they cannot be proper) (1) Some simply fail to form a theistic belief when in the same circumstances (a) If a belief is properly basic, a person is in a special situation to have a privileged access to truth (b) i.e. any properly qualified person would discern their truth in those circumstances (c) Plantinga's characteristic circumstances do not provide privileged access to the truth (2) Reply (Plantinga): these people are not really qualified since sin has weakened our ability to have the appropriate circumstances trigger our belief (Alston: the proper spiritual growth is required) (a) Response: many theists do not think the appropriate circumstances trigger belief i) Counter (Plantinga): these believers are immature since true belief requires God as the foundation of their system i) Counter counter (Wainwright): strong faith can be based on evidence ii) The belief arrived at is the result of some kind of inference (3) The same circumstances may produce contrary religious beliefs for different people (a) Hence, neither belief system is reliable (or proper) since the same mechanism produces them (b) Reply: there may be no real conflict i) "the spatio-temporal world is rooted in a divine reality" (c) Reply: other religions are not epistemic peers (their views are weakened by sin) (d) Reply: the triggering mechanism are different D. CONCLUSION 1. All five philosophers discussed are anti-evidentialists 2. Fideists a) Pascal (1) Theistic arguments are ambiguous b) Kierkegaard (1) Religion is irrational since it involves a paradox c) Phillips (1) Religious claims are non-propositional 3. Rationalists a) James (1) Our passionate nature sometimes justifies us in believing b) Plantinga (1) Humans have a natural (rational) capacity to apprehend God's existence