Links: Assignments and Study Guides
Sample Mid-Term Exam
SAMPLE FINAL EXAM
Phil. 160 Introduction to Ethics Spring 2011
Instructor: Dr. Norman
Lillegard nlillega@utm.edu
Office: H 229
881 7384
Office Hours: 10-ll am TTH and by appointment.
Text: The Moral Domain (In UC and Bradley)
Course Requirements:
!
Attend class and
participate, do the readings, do all written assignments, pass the exams. One
mini-exam, worth 60 pts. Two exams.
(multiple choice, T/F, see sample exams on web page). First exam worth 120 pts,
Final exam is comprehensive, worth 180 pts. Total, 360 pts.
!
Quizzes: there
will be frequent (once a week or so) unannounced quizzes. Missed quizzes cannot be made up. Each quiz will be worth 6 – 12
points, and will consist of multiple choice and T/F questions. Total, 90-120 pts. One half of the quiz
points are extra credit.
!
Study guides are due from time to
time. They must be turned in when
due. They are worth about 100 pts total (10-20 pts each) which is
nearly %20 of the grade, therefore it is essential that they be completed and
turned in on time. One purpose of the study guides is to prepare you for
classes. Therefore late guides do not serve one of the main purposes. Consequently, guides turned in one class late
can receive partial credit only provided you have a legitimate excuse. No guide
will be accepted at all, for any reason, more than one class late.
!
Attendance. Regular attendance and informed participation
in class are essential since (a) not everything covered in class is included in
the text (b) you will need help with this material, and that is what class
sessions, and the instructor, are for. 40 points.
Extra Credit: There are three ways to earn extra credit: 1. Half the quiz points are extra credit. 2. Carefully prepared study questions can earn extra points. 3. Reports on selected films viewed outside of class can earn some points.
Total points ca. 550.
Normally %90 of total points gets you an 'A', %80 a 'B' and so forth,
but significant adjustments for curve are made when necessary.
The purpose of the
study guides is threefold:
1.To ensure that you actually
read the assigned texts, and read them carefully;
2. To assist you in
developing capacities for close reading of difficult texts (development of
reading comprehension);
3. To help you determine what
parts of the texts give you the most difficulty.
#3 will be realized if you come to class prepared to ask about study guide questions which you could not figure out or are very unsure of, AFTER you have made a reasonable effort. Reading the text once does not generally constitute a reasonable effort if you find yourself "stopped" by a question. You may need to go over parts of a text several times, make notes on it, and THINK about it. If, having done that, you still do not "get it" then you should bring up that question in class.
What
the study guides are NOT for: The
study guides are not intended to serve as review material, though you
can use them for that purpose if you think it will be safe.
Rules for Preparation
of the guide;
1. Guides must be prepared on 8.5 x 11 sheets, printed from a PC.
2. you must clearly indicate what chapter and what question you are answering. If you are answering question 2 in ch. 3, you MUST label it clearly, in bold, with ‘3.2’ i.e. chapter number, then question number.
3. Multiple
sheets must be stapled together or in a folder.
How the Study Guides are Graded The guides are
graded generously. If your answers indicate that you have indeed read the
material and made a genuine attempt to understand, you will generally get some
credit even if your answers are wrong!
Exceptions would be very simple questions, including many of the
fill-in-the-blank questions, which may be graded more strictly.
COURSE PAGE, ON-LINE HELP.
Access
the link for the Phil. 160 web page through the UTM page (click on faculty
staff, then on faculty web pages) or by using this address directly: www.utm.edu/norm There you will find a glossary, some sample
quiz and exam material, and links to other helpful sites. I do not use blackboard. Everything
you need will be on the 160 web page. If you use the internet on your own,
understand that it contains an enormous amount of trash and may mislead as much
as or more than it may help.
Class Conduct,
Instructor's Role, etc. What I Expect of
Students.
Academic
Integrity: Any form of cheating, on study guides, quizzes, or
exams, will result in an ‘F’ for the
entire course. NO EXCEPTIONS. Policies regarding academic integrity are further
detailed in the student handbook. Cheating includes plagiarism. DO YOUR OWN
WORK.
Cell Phones: phones must be OFF during classes. You may not make ANY use of cell phones
during any exam or quiz.. Use of cell phones in such circumstances counts as
cheating and results in an F for that exam
.
Class
format: Classes will consist of a
mixture of lecture and discussion. Feel free to interrupt with questions. Always
do so by raising your hand. Acknowledgment may not always be immediate but
it will come. Try to keep your remarks relevant. Listen respectfully to other
students even if you think they are “way off.”
They might be doing better than you think!
You may leave class only in an emergency, or when you have made an arrangement ahead of time
with the instructor. Otherwise, if you leave class you will be counted absent,
no matter how soon you return.
THE
PURPOSE OF THIS COURSE is to help you develop the capacity to READ
difficult texts with COMPREHENSION, and to THINK CRITICALLY about ethical
concepts and issues which should be of concern to all thoughtful persons and
which have figured prominently in the history of ethical reflection up to the
present. The figures and texts we study will be your guides, but they are not
infallible oracles. Take seriously what careful thinkers say, but do your own
thinking too!!
You will be tested on critical reading and
critical thought, on your understanding of the issues raised by the figures you
study, your ability to respond relevantly to arguments, and to identify salient
historical/philosophical facts.
Course Outline: (subject to adjustments)
Week II Jan 25. Goodness, reason and tragedy, moral truth.
Week III Feb. 1: Goodness,
reason, communal norms etc.
Week IV Feb. 8: The good life, reason and virtue (Aristotle) Mini exam, TH. Feb. 10.
Week V Feb. 15: Virtue
and happiness (Aristotle, cont. )
Week VI Feb. 22: Religion
and Ethics. Natural law.
Week VII Mar. 1: Wisdom
and Folly. The principle of double effect. Divine commands.
Review. MIDTERM EXAM, TH
Mar 3.
Week VIII. Mar.8, Evil, a-moralism, vice.
Mar. 14-20
SPRING BREAK
Week IX. Mar. 22, Continue
week VIII
Week X. Mar. 29 Egoism,
Altruism. Sociobiology, etc.
Week XI Apr 5: Feeling, Reason, and Morality (Hume)
Week XII Apr 12: Reason and
Duty (Kant)
Week XIII Apr.19: Rightness, Reason and Consequences (Mill)
Week XIV Apr 26: Reviving
Virtue Ethics Virtues and tradition.
Apr. 28 Review.
Monday, May 2, last day of classes.
FINAL EXAM – Mon May 9th, 10-12 a.m.
CONTRACT
1. I have read and understand the rules for class conduct and
agree to abide by them.
2. I understand the purposes of the Study
Guides, and that Study Guides must be handed in
When due, that any Study Guide handed
in one class late for a legitimate reason
will be accepted,
but with a loss of %10 of the points,
and that no Study Guide will be accepted
more than one week
after the due date.
3. I understand that quizzes will be
unannounced, and cannot be made up, and
that most of them
will be based on material covered in part of a
study guide.
4. I am able to access the Phil. 110
web page, and will use it to keep track of assignments, and for study and
review purposes.
5. I own my own textbook and
dictionary and will bring them to every class.
6. I have read and understand the
list of requirements for this course, consider them fair, and will do my best
to fulfill them.
Signed
______________________________________________
Circle the number that corresponds to your class meeting time: 11:00, 1:00
Print your name
_________________________________________________
Note: all questions to be answered are
in ITALICS in this text.
Week I
by Jan 20,
Read Answer
p. 1-17 questions 1:1 (p.2)and 2 thru 14. (questions 4 and 5 overlap)
Week II
by Jan 25,
Read Answer
p. 17-31 questions 1:16, 18 thru 29, 31 thru 32
by Jan 27,
p. 32-54 questions 2:1 thru 2:17.
Extra Credit : Questions for Antigone film:
1. What do the sets and costumes in this production suggest about Creon and the character of the state that he rules?
2. What are some features of this play that show that Sophocles is NOT a relativist?
Week III
by Feb 1,
Read Answer
p. 54-59 ques. 2:18- 25
by Feb 3,
64-66 (Taylor) ques. 2:37
Week IV
Read by Feb.
8
p. 68-88 ques.
3:1-24
Week V
Read by Feb.
15
p. 89-97 ques.
3.25-52
by
Feb. 22
p. 97-99 ques.
3:53-59
p. 100-02 ques.
3:61-64
Week VI
Read by Mar.
1
107-27 ques.
1-24
Week VII
By
Mar. 8
127-39 ques
25-36
144-48 ques
42-52.
Week VIII
Spring break
Week IX
Read by
Mar.22
149-153 q. 1-4
160-63 q.
16-23
Read by Mar 24
166-73 q.
29, 31-45
Week
X
Read By
Mar. 29
174-188 q.
1-11
By
Mar. 31
188-199 q.
12-32
Week
XI
Read By
Apr 5
201-208 37-47
By
Apr 7
209-218 1-11
221-224 16-18
Week
XII
Read by
Apr 12
229-247 Ques.
1-29
By
Apr 14
249-259 Ques.
35-54
Week
XIII
Read By
Apr 19
262-276 ques
1-17
By
Apr 21
285-289 ques
30-36
291-294 ques
38-44
Week
XIV
Apr
26
295-307 ques.
1-12
By
Apr 28
314-316 ques.
25-28
---------------------------------
Terms and concepts: (understand the following terms /ideas)
Test 1: Relativism
(individual and cultural); the ‘extraterrestrial position’; thin and thick
moral concepts; amoralism; moral incommensurabilities; tragic dilemmas;
‘scientific’ ethics; agent centered and act centered ethics; Aristotle’s
definition of virtue, and proper function.
Mid Term Exam: Test I
terms, plus, teleology in ethics; practical wisdom vs. ‘ethical science’; moral
education (Aristotle); eudaimonia; acting
in the ‘mean’; reason as substantive in ethics vs reason as merely instrumental
in ethics; facts vs. values; autonomy and moral education; law in Xtian
scriptures; in Aquinas- eternal law, natural law, divine law, human law; natural
law vs. relativism; sins of the patriarchs.
Remainder of
semester:
wisdom vs. folly
(Aquinas, Stump); principle of double effect; deontology; divine command
ethics; Euthyphro dilemma; duty in Stoicism; duty in the Baghavad Gita; natural
evil; different kinds of wickedness (conscientious etc.); evil and bureaucracy;
banality of evil; natural law and state of nature in Hobbes; egoism; altruism;
the prisoner’s dilemma; sociobiology and ethics; sucker/free rider; rational
choice theory; self love, benevolence, particular and general affections,
hedonistic paradox, (Butler); feelings vs. reason, emotivism; projectivism; duty, the categorical
imperative vs inclination in Kant; persons as ends or as means; act
utilitarianism; hedonistic calculus (Betntham); rule utilitarianism; higher and lower
pleasures; virtue theory and
tradition/narrative; community and ethics; the people of Le Chambon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T or F
1. It follows logically that if two cultures, A and B,
have different standards of right and wrong, then there can be no universal
(cross-cultural) standards of right and wrong.
#I
In one place, men feed upon human flesh.
In another, it is reputed a holy duty for a man to kill his father at a certain
age. Elsewhere, the fathers dispose of their children while yet in their
mothers’ wombs, some to be preserved and carefully brought up, and others to be
abandoned or made away. Elsewhere the old husbands lend their wives to young
men . . .
2. #I is
a. a
quote from Montaigne
b.
supposed to support cultural relativism
c.
supposed to support the idea that moral principles are the same for all people
d.
none of these
e. a
and b.
Quiz 1 (9/8)
1. Differences in moral beliefs prove relativism.
2. People who are immoralists (deny any need to follow
moral rules) are often people who want to stress individual freedom, according
to Midgeley.
Multiple choice:
3. Some apparent moral differences are in fact
differences in
a.
religious beliefs
b.
scientific beliefs (beliefs about how the world works)
c.
particular circumstances
d.
all of these separately or in combination.
Qz II 9/15
1. The UN Declaration of Universal Rights obviously
involves a relativist view of morality.
2. The following are “thick” moral concepts:
a.
right
b.
wrong
c.
immoral
d.
none of these
e. a
and b.
3. The “extraterrestrial position” is
a.
the attempt to avoid morality altogether
b. the
moral position of extraterrestrials
c.
may involve “false universality”
d. a
and c
Quiz III (9/22)
1. In Sophocle’s Antigone
a conflict arises between duties to God and duties to the state.
2. Plato’s notion in the Protagoras is that ethical disputes
a.
could be resolved by a kind of calculating
b.
arise due to the fact that some people are ignorant or stupid
c.
could never be resolved
d. a
and b.
3. The ‘ring of Gyges’ is a famous wedding ring.
QZ IV 9/29
1. Aristotle treats ethics as discussion of the
highest good for humans.
2. Aristotle thinks that a human being is functioning
in the way proper to a human when he/she is
a.
following the best desires
b.
using reason to guide all desire, feeling and activity
c. in
good bodily health
d.
none of these
3. A virtue, in Aristotle, is a kind of power or
strength or excellence.
Qz V (10/6)
1. Aristotle thinks of practical wisdom as being like
a.
what Plato thought it was in his dialogue Protagoras
b. an
exact system for calculating how to act
c.
something that is acquired largely through contact with good examples
d.
none of these.
2. Both Aristotle and Aquinas claim that good
community is essential to human fulfillment.
3. According to Aristotle, a virtue is a disposition
to choose the mean relative to oneself, therefore Aristotle is a relativist.
Qz VI (10/13)
1. Natural law is that part of eternal law that can be known apart from
revelation, through conscience.
2. Aristotle and Aquinas both think about the good
teleologically, i.e. in terms of what would fulfill a person’s human nature.
3. The following would be morally permissible, on some
version of the principle of double effect:
a.
bombing a munitions factory and unintentionally killing some civilians living
nearby
b.
executing an innocent person with the intention of saving the lives of
thousands of other people
c.
removing a uterine cancer and killing a fetus in the process
d. a
and c.
Qz. VII (10/22)
1. According to
Scotus, what makes an action right is simply that God has commanded it.
2. The death camp
doctors came to believe that what they were doing was right, by
a. being stupid
b. paying attention to certain facts
and completely ignoring others
c. taking a path that fit with their
ambitions
d. b and c.
3. The Bhagavad Gita
is part of the scriptures of Hinduism.
Qz VIII (10/27)
1. Dostoevsky’s Ivan (in The
Brothers) seems to think that evil deeds fit into God’s ultimate harmonious
plan for the universe.
2. Camus claims that in the long run there must be political solutions
to human evil.
3. Camus seems to hold
a. that there are no
values common to all people
b. a position
Montaigne also held
c. that there are
truths of general moral significance
d. all of these
Qz IX (11/3)
1. According to
Hobbes,
a. reason tells us that justice is
valuable in itself
b. reason can help us to figure out
how to get what we instinctively want
c. reason can tell us what is the
best way to survive
d. b and c.
2. The relationships
between the boys in Lord of the Flies comes
to resemble what Hobbes calls ‘the state of nature.’
3. In Hobbes’
account, there would be no industry, arts, or science in the ‘state of nature.’
QZ X (11/10)
1. Butler argues that
a. selfishness should be
distinguished from self-love
b. self love could include love of
others
c. self love is not a “particular
affection”
d. all of these.
2. A society
consisting of human beings with no rules against lying would not be a viable
society.
3. The prisoner’s
dilemma shows that in many situations a society of rational egoists cannot
maximize their own interests.
Qz.XI (11/17)
1. Huck Finn has
feelings about people that
a. have been learned from his
culture
b. seem to be instinctive or natural
c. motivate him to act in a way we
would consider right
d. all of these.
2. An emotivist
claims that ethical utterances such as “murder is wrong” are
a. merely expressions of feeling
b. are neither true nor false
c. have no cognitive significance
d. all of these.
3. According to Hume, the entire basis for
morality lies in
a. reason
b. feeling or sentiment
c. a combination of reason and
feeling
d. none of these.
QZ XII (11/24)
1. Kant agreed with his
predecessors that moral acts are motivated by desires or inclinations.
2. If it is your duty
to do X, then you should decide to do X only if it pays or has good
consequences.
3. Dr. Whortle says
that ‘he could not bring his conscience and his inclination to come square
together’ In this quote
a. it appears that ‘conscience’
represents ‘duty’
b. it appears that ‘inclination’
represent what a person wants or desires
c. Dr. Whortle is referring to his
desire to keep Peacocke on as a teacher
d. referring to his sense that he
must dismiss Peacocke
e. all of these.
Qz. XIII Dec. 1
1. Kant probably
thinks that even though someone who feels generous and sympathetic feelings
when helping someone in need, is admirable for that reason, that admiration is
not moral admiration.
2. Mill argues that
a. we should always weigh the consequences of our actions when deciding what
action would be right
b. we should weigh the consequences
of acting one way rather than another when the moral rules conflict
c. there are no moral rules
d. all of these.
3. Utilitarians appear to have a problem with
a. justice
b. the nearly universal sense that
certain actions, such as enslaving another person, are always wrong (unjust), no matter what the consequences
c. the fact that acting unfairly is
wrong even if doing so makes everyone happy
d. all of these.
QZ. XIV (Dec. 8)
1. According to
MacIntyre, human lives have a narrative form, and are therefore well
represented by stories, sagas, etc.
2. The upper class
society in which Lily Bart lives emphasizes
a. justice
b. equality for women
c. the idea that a ‘good’ marriage
requires love
d. all of these
e. none of these.
Class Outlines Phil 160
Intro. to Ethics.
·
ETHICS in the
news. Examples
·
Ethics NOT in the
news. Examples
The
SHEER SIZE of it.
Philosophers have sometimes
tried to offer specific advice or views on what sorts of conduct or character traits
should be counted as good or bad, morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Normative ethics addresses such matters.
But it is perhaps more typical of philosophers in particular that they should
expend a lot of energy trying to answer such questions as the following when
doing ethics;
1. Is there really
such a thing as moral knowledge , as
opposed to opinion?
2. If
there is moral knowledge, how is it acquired? Could the use of reason unclouded
by feelings lead to moral knowledge, or are feelings required for such
knowledge?
3. Are
there important differences between disagreements about morals and
disagreements about history or science or how long it takes to drive from
Boston to New York City?
4.
Assuming that moral beliefs are really beliefs, that are either true or false,
what makes them true or false? Do they reflect facts of nature? Are they true
because they originate in a God who is the source of all truth? Are they about
properties that are directly perceptible?
5. If
there is no such thing as moral knowledge, then what am I doing when I claim
that it is “true” that the shedding of innocent blood is wrong? That certainly sounds like a knowledge claim.
6. What
are the relationships between ethics and the rest of culture? Are my beliefs
about right and wrong “merely” a cultural inheritance and might they have been
quite different if I had been born in a different time or place?
These
and related questions belong to what is sometimes called metaethics. They arise in attempts to reflect systematically about ethics, rather than within it, so
to speak. Answers to them do not necessarily help us in our quest for moral
advice.
1. Do you think it is wrong to judge other people’s conduct?
Your own conduct?
2. Is there something about moral judgments or claims
that makes them “subjective” or “just a matter of opinion?” Does it follow that we should keep our moral
judgments to ourselves?
3. Do you
believe that there are any “moral universals,” that is, moral claims or
judgments that apply to all people at all times? For example, is it always, at all times and
places, wrong to kill an innocent person just for the fun of it? Discuss some
other possible examples.
5. Apparently the Aztecs thought that human sacrifice
was permissible, and perhaps even a duty. Do you think the Aztecs were wrong?
Immoral? Or were they simply different?
Explain your view, and relate your answer to question #4.
TOLSTOY
What is this story about?
Does Ivan NOT know something everyone else knows, or does
he KNOW something that others fail to know?
If Ivan knows something others fail or refuse to know,
HOW does he know it?
Protagoras is perhaps best known for the
following remark:
A human being is the measure of all things; of the
things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are
not.
To say that a human being is the measure of all things
could be to say that each individual person is the measure or standard or norm
for what is true or right. That would be individual relativism. If something is
sweet to me, then it is sweet (to me), and if the same thing is sour to you
then it is sour (to you). There does not seem to be any truth of the matter
beyond the truth “for the individual.” or “relative to” the individual. Can we
extend that way of thinking to moral differences also? Could it be that child
abuse is right (for me) and wrong (for you)?
(I0) What does Protagoras mean by “measure” in the
statement quoted above?
It is also
possible that Protagoras wanted to say that human groups or cultures provide the measure or standard for what is
right or wrong. In that case he would have been following his Greek
predecessor, the historian Herodotus, who declared that “custom is King,” or
the Greek poet Pindar, who is cited by Montaigne in the next selection.
Herodotus thus held a form of cultural relativism, the view that standards of
right and wrong are simply matters of custom which vary from one culture or
historical period to another, and that these differences are on the same level
as differences in dress or table manners. 2000 years after Herodotus we find
the French thinker Michel de Montaigne proposing a very similar view.
Montaigne, who lived in an age of world exploration
(the 16th century), was aware of differences in morals among remote
peoples, and, like the sophists of old,
became skeptical about the possibility of finding stable moral norms or fixed
moral truths. In his Essais he reports on some of those differences.
{begin line}
In one place, men feed upon human flesh. In another,
it is reputed a holy duty for a man to kill his father at a certain age.
Elsewhere, the fathers dispose of their children, while yet in their mothers’
wombs, some to be preserved and carefully brought up, and others to be
abandoned or made away. Elsewhere the old husbands lend their wives to young
men; and in another place they are in common, without offence. In one place
particularly, the women take it for a mark of honor to have as many gay fringed
tassels at the bottom of their garment, as they have lain with several men.
{end line}

Here is another example, not from Montaigne. The
Aztecs reportedly sacrificed some 20,000 human beings a year, in a violent
ceremony. If someone did “this” now, it
would be a crime. They seemed to view
it as an obligation!
“This” = what?
Montaigne does not consider himself to be simply
telling interesting stories about people who have bizarre conceptions of
morality. Instead, he intends to show how custom totally dominates our lives.
If we think that somehow morality comes from a fixed natural order of things,
or from God, or from universal rational norms, then we are sorely mistaken:
morality rests on custom and nothing more.
{begin line}
To conclude, there is nothing, in my opinion, that she
[i.e., custom] does not, or may not do; and, therefore, with very good reason
it is, that Pindar calls her the queen, and empress of the world. He that was
seen to beat his father, and reproved for so doing, made answer, that it was
the custom of their family: that, in like manner his father had beaten his
grand father, his grandfather his great-grandfather, “and this,” says he,
pointing to his son, “when he comes to my age, shall beat me.” The laws of
conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom;
everyone, having an inward veneration for the opinions and manners approved and
received amongst his own people, cannot, without very great reluctance, depart
from them, nor apply himself to them without applause. [From Essays, “Of
Custom”]
{end line}
Given the sorts of differences mentioned by Montaigne,
what should we infer? Montaigne inferred
that morality is “just a matter of custom,” and that appears to imply that it
is not something about which there could be any objective truth. What is moral
truth for me might be falsehood for you. Even if I feel strongly that the
Colonel’s beating of the Tarter was cruel, perhaps it is just a custom in his
profession. What is right for me or my group, might be wrong for you or your
group. Customs are human inventions which can be changed anytime. On this view
beating ones father is on the same level as wearing whatever style of clothing
is customary, or keeping the salad fork on the outside, or driving on the right
side of the road. “Custom” includes manners, all sorts of local traditions and,
on this view, moral (or “immoral”?) practices as well .
There
are also indications of individual relativism in Montaigne. He claims that he
has found in himself a “ruling pattern” according to which he lives. He does
not suppose that his pattern should fit anyone else. Another person might guide
their life according to a very different “pattern.”
If
Montaigne and Protagoras are right, it follows that any attempt to inquire into
ethics, in an attempt to find correct
answers to questions about the best way to live or act, must be a waste
of time. There could be no correct answer, no best way. There are simply lots
of different ways, and there is no way to compare them, no single measure to
use in determining which “measures up” or constitutes “the best.” Each human, or each culture, is itself the
measure for itself. Another way to put this view is as follows: morality is relative
to particular individuals or to particular societies or historical eras.
Though this view, called, naturally
enough, relativism, has been around for
thousands of years, in recent years various
versions of it have become very popular, partly for reasons discussed
below. In the following selection
American philosopher James Rachels attacks relativism.
(10) Where Protagoras or Montaigne say that morality
is a matter of custom, Ivan’s friends in Tolstoy’s story might say morality is
a matter of ______________.
James Rachels (b.I941) was University Professor of philosophy at the
University of Alabama. He is the author of several books on applied ethics. He
has held the position that philosophy can give genuine guidance in dealing with
ethical dilemmas.
Rachels argues that the initial plausibility of
relativism disappears upon closer examination.
{begin line}
... Cultural Relativism, as it has been called,
challenges our ordinary belief in the objectivity and universality of moral
truth. It says, in effect, that there is no such thing as universal truth in
ethics; there are only the various cultural codes, and nothing more. Moreover,
our own code has no special status; it is merely one among many.
As we
shall see, this basic idea is really a compound of several different thoughts.
It is important to separate the various elements of the theory because, on
analysis, some parts turn out to be correct, while others seem to be mistaken.
As a beginning, we may distinguish the following claims, all of which have been
made by cultural relativists:
1. Different societies have different moral codes.
2. There is no objective standard that can be used to
judge one societal code as better than another.
3. The moral code of our own society has no special
status; it is merely one among many.
4. There is no “universal truth” in ethics; that is,
there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples at all times.
5. The moral code of a society determines what is
right within that society; that is, if the moral code of a society says that a
certain action is right, then that action is right, at least within that
society.
6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the
conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an attitude of tolerance toward the
practices of other cultures.
{end line}
(I0) Rachels gives six claims or ideas commonly
expressed by cultural relativists; the first two are the most important.
Statement number ______ makes a simple factual claim; statement number _____
goes beyond reporting facts and makes a philosophical claim.
I. Moral relativism – two kinds.
a.
Sextus – there is nothing good by “nature” (cf x is cold)
b.
Montaigne – “Custom” is king.
c.
the pattern of argument in Sextus and Montaigne:
i.
people have varying moral customs (beliefs, standards).
THEREFORE
ii. there are no objectively right moral customs (beliefs, standards).
Ques. Does ii follow from i?
d.
ii does not follow deductively from i. But i might give inductive support to
ii.
1.
Moral disagreements are not like disagreements in the sciences, for
example. In what way?
II. Against Relativism (Rachels)
a. relativist ideas are expressed in a
variety of ways: (add your own)
b.
the “cultural differences argument” is unsound.
An argument from analogy: state it!
c.
Some (bad)consequences of taking cultural relativism (CR) seriously.
1.
If CR is true, we could never condemn the practices of a different
society. So, is that so bad?
Examples:
2.
If CR is true, we can determine what is right or wrong just by consulting our
social rules. Examples:
So what?
3.
If CR is true, there can be no such thing as moral progress. Why not?
So what?
d. Cultural relativists overestimate the
moral differences between cultures. Examples;
e. All cultures (societies) have some
moral beliefs in common. Examples:
How come?
MIDGLEY
But
surely it is always wrong to make moral judgments? (how come?)
1. What
do the stories show?
a.
false universality p. 18
b.
immoralist moral reformers (what about the joker?(Batman))
2. The
concern for freedom and privacy p. 21
3. Problems
with knowledge, in general, and in ethics particularly.
i.
can’t know
therefore
can’t judge
a.
relation of 2 to 3. Entangled.
Since no knowledge, no grounds for infringing on
freedom.
p. 19 It is not
possible to be so detached.
DISCUSSION
1. do
q. 23.
2.
Accepting differences –
Postive:
Negative:
Tolerance-
What
does the word mean?
Multiculturalism –
Positive:
Negative:
Thick Ethical Concepts.
The possibility of real moral disagreement.
Chinese cat-skinners
GLENDON: THE UN DECLARATION
Cf. the U.S. declaration of independence (Obama)
1.
similarities
2.
differences
One
(or more) way(s) of grounding ethical claims.
SOPHOCLES, SOCRATES, PLATO
What is THE question?
Focus
on discrete actions
Focus
on character
Antigone –
1. When duties conflict, then what?
a. Duty to family, brother
b. to
larger community
c. Duty to “God” or some higher source of
obligation?
Antigone associates duty to
family with a higher duty, the requirements of the Gods. (cf. UN Declaration)
Such duties override all
others. But, there is also the emotional
attachment.
Notes
Socrates/Plato
Trying to come to grips with
a. tragic dilemmas
b. sophistic relativism
1. The Euthyphro
What sorts of disagreements provoke fighting? How come?
2. The Protagoras
a. getting rid of tragic dilemmas by denying that there are
moral incommensurabilities.
i. how do that? Find a single metric
ii. “pleasure” will work. All pleasures are
“commensurable” Explain.
a. to act rightly is to act so as to
maximize pleasure. E.g.
b. to act wrongly is to miscalculate
pleasures. E.g.
c. miscalculating is a kind of stupidity
or ignorance. So acting wrongly is simply a kind of stupidity or ignorance.
REASON WILL ALWAYS TRUMP IMPULSE (DESIRE, ETC.)
Virtue=knowledge.
Vice=ignorance.
REALLY? Puzzle of
the ‘akratic.’
3. The Republic
1. Moral truth exceeds everything this worldly, including
pleasure.

The sun: beyond this world
(earth) but the source of all life etc.
The Good: beyond this world (universe) but the
source of everything that is real.
Problem: what motivates anyone to do what is good, if
goodness is beyond this world? Why be
just, for example, if it gives no advantage in THIS world? (Annas, Murdoch)
2. Why be moral? The ring of Gyges.
Body Heat.
Taylor
ARISTOTLE
Asking THE question:
Ethical “science”’ Aristotle
vs. Plato
Political “science”
Whatever the answer, it must
take account of “what people aim at.” A ‘teleological’ account of the good
life. (telos) For surely people aim at the good (as they, rightly or wrongly,
conceive it).
1. The aim is something
desired for its own sake. Otherwise?
Examples of things desired as means and of things desired
for their own sake.
2. Common views on the “aim”
or goal.
A. Happiness (eudaimonia)
i. Desired for its own sake. Not a means to anything.
ii. Problem: what IS it?
Common
views
3. Happiness and proper and excellent functioning.
a. A
“good” x is one that performs its proper function well. Examples.
i. how to answer this
Fill in the summary of ch. I, on p. 80
4. The concept of a virtue:
a. a
disposition
i.
to feel, act, choose
a.
feeling and pleasure
ii.
the mean
b. what
the “mean” means (and doesn’t mean)
c.
perceptiveness, salience etc.
5. How you get the virtues
Cf.
questions (also 79,1)
6. Choice
a. the
voluntary – actions that originate in the agent. Cf. modern determinism.
i.
involuntary acts involve regret
a.
in between cases – dumping cargo.
ii.
what about actions done
in
ignorance-e.g. when drunk
through
ignorance-particular circumstances
b.
choice and deliberation
choice=df
deliberative desire
cf.
q.
a.
choice and character -
7. examples (joking etc.)
a.
the sheer size of morality
8. Practical wisdom
a.
a master virtue
b.
opposed to technicians. Cf. modern technicians.
c.
the wise persons pursuit of happiness
i.
no method
d.
facts and values
i.
reason as instrument
e.
reason and teleology
9. Incontinence - ???
10. Friendship – kinds
a.
the best kind 126)
b.
its importance for the good life, its ties to community (politics)
c.
friendship and virtue -
11. Aristotle on ethical “science” (Nussbaum)
a.
vulnerability
12. Moral education and autonomy
13. Friendship
a.
self knowledge
b.
vulnerability
RELIGIOUS ETHICS
Orienting Questions
The rise of universities and the Scholastic method
1. Aquinas – natural law.
a. The
idea of “law” not prominent in Plato/Aristotle. Law presupposes a law-maker.
b.
Theistic views have a “lawmaker” in God.
2. Reason/Law – connection between Aquinas and
Aristotle
a. it
belongs to reason to command
i.
reason is superior in a human, by nature (think of Aristotle), therefore fit to
command.
ii.
only the commands of reason make real
law, as opposed to conventions (which may be bad, wrong etc).
1.
consider all the bad laws. Are they all unreasonable?
iii.
that is because reason, as in Aristotle, orders activity towards a proper
end. The commands of reason “direct to
the (proper, real) end” (teleology) (149) so they CAN’T be bad.
3. Law is directed to the COMMON good. This also fits
with Aristotle.
a. the
proper end is life-in-community.
4. Promulgation – law requires it. This fits to the
theistic conception.
Def. of
law =
The
obvious question: where (when, by whom) was it promulgated? See reply to Obj. 1
5. Kinds of law
Eternal
law
Natural
law
Human
law
Divine
law
a.
eternal law-God is “ruler of the entire universe”
i.
the “community” of the universe?
b.
natural law – notice Rom. 2..14.
i.
notice the “strict notion” of law as requiring reason for “participating in”
c.
human law – why do we need it?
Because natural law provides only general principles.
For the actual conduct of daily communal life, we need lots of detail.
i.
human law consists of inferences from, and specifications of, natural law.
e.g. Do
good avoid evil
Be
sociable
ii.
again, relation of human law to “custom”
d.
Divine law – why do we need IT?
Four
reasons
q.
9
e. The
natural law is the same for all (anti relativist; note reply to obj. 3 in art.
4)
i.
both with respect to rectitude and knowledge
=
ii.
particular inferences vary e.g.
iii.
the various origins of differences in custom or belief
a.
permissible differences in details
b.
circumstances
c.
corruption
f. How
it can change.
Note
esp. Art 5, Obj. 2 and the reply!!!
Slavery?
6. The principle of double effect.
a. is
it ever permissible to kill a person?
i.
the three conditions (do q. 22) and Aq version
b. the
A version;
for any action X,
X is morally permissible on the principle of double effect iff
i. X is
itself morally good or neutral
ii. the
bad effect must not be the means by which the good effect is brought about
iii.
the motive for X must be the bringing about of the good effect only
iv. the
good effect must be at least equivalent in importance to the bad effect
Problem: what is ‘x itself’? Actions can come under many descriptions.
Apply to various cases of abortion, euthanasia.
Notice that in applying iv, you do not have to ask
about ‘happiness, well being’ etc.
The ‘Pauline’ principle. What is it?
Does it lie behind each of i-iv?
Double effect and utilitarianism.
X is wrong no matter what, vs. X is wrong
unless it brings about the best overall effects.
Warfare and Murder: what actions of killing innocent
persons in warfare could be justified using the principle of double effect?
Cf. Hiroshima vs. bombing a munitions factory.
Most justifications are in fact utilitarian or
consequentialist.
7. Wisdom and folly:
a.
wisdom is a “gift” (therefore not
available to unbelievers?)
b. you can better
see what wisdom is by considering folly
i.
dullness, unresponsiveness to justified criticism (Turner, the death camp
doctors)
ii.
the fool has misprogramed his own intellect. Stangl, etc. Illustrate how that is done.
DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY
Commands and obligations
The
good vs. the obligatory.
Something might be good, but not be obligatory. Examples.
Something might be obligatory, but not be good. Examples.
Scotus vs. Aquinas? – the obligatory vs. the good.
(Does Aquinas think some actions are absolutely wrong?)
Deontology and the obligatory. Deon=what must be. As opposed to
‘consequentialism.’
X is obligatory vs. X has the best overall
consequences.
What makes any action obligatory?
X
was promised.
X
is commanded by someone in a position to command.
Well, who IS in a position to command?
Hitler
God
Perhaps Hitler’s commands do not produce MORAL
obligations. Perhaps they do not produce any obligation at all?
Surely God’s commands DO generate MORAL obligations.
But there is a problem with God’s commands.
1. cf. the Euthyphro dilemma
2. Duns Scotus
a. God
can will anything except contradictions
b.
compare the Abraham story to ps. 1.
c. will
vs. intellect (Scotus vs. Aquinas)
3. Voluntarism –
a.
Scotus and Luther
b. how
do you get rid of the arbitrariness problem?
i.
maybe by stipulating that only the commands of a GOOD God obligate.
a.
the social nature of obligation
b.
the relationship and social bonds to God.
The Bhagavad Gita
How to
live without being torn apart by moral conflicts. (cf. Antigone)

Arjuna and Krishna (the god).
Your dharma is what is required (deon) or obligatory, with
NO view to consequences. Like Divine
Command ethics in that respect.
(compare to right moves in a game, or a ritual. No
REASON need be given for saying the move is ‘right.’)
That person acts rightly who becomes
a.
detached (from results for example)
b. one
with God.
The Stoics: The wise grieve neither for the living nor
the dead (Gita 2). Emotion is the enemy
in the ethical life.
God is directing a great drama. Accept your role!
Focus
only on what is in your control. What is?
Conform
yourself (your desires, needs, etc.) to what happens. For God wills it.
If you only desire what
actually happens, you will never be disappointed!!!

Epictetus (50-130 CE)
Kiss your wife. How, with
what in mind?
Conform yourself to nature.
What is nature? A divine order or logos.
EVIL AND VICE
Orienting questions; 1, 2, 4, 5.
Plato, Aristotle, (Aquinas). The Good can (will?)
triumph. REASON is on the side of the
good. And reason can (does?) have the upper hand in humans.

Dostoevsky; irrational wickedness. Cruelty for no
“reason.”
The “harmony”??
CAMUS

Once again, evils that seem irrational. But, there is
a setting that encourages evil acts.
Bureaucracy
– efficiency
Abstraction
(means what?) q. 17
Contemporary
examples –
and abstraction – illustrate – kinds of
“groups” that replace real individuals
What Camus cannot accept – 162
What he affirms nonetheless -
Politics – “unfit” to solve human problems 163
Kinds of evil, and wickedness
Evil = in nature, due to frustration of basic needs,
etc. An animal dying of thirst. A child
dying of a terrible disease.
Evil as wickedness:
Wickedness
= evil in persons, (not just acts). Q. 29.
Self centered
forms of wickedness=
Knowing that others count, but ignoring their
interests anyway.
Conscientious wickedness – following an “ideal”
without remorse . (cf. Camus)
Suppose the ideal is a good one.
Such a
person is still dangerous;
Heteronomous wickedness (Autonomous)
(Abraham?)
Malignity – not motivated by what is seen as good. Cf. the Socratic view. Irrationality of
SPITE. Claggart.
Cf. Socrates: virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. A
person who does evil must think it good in some sense.
Benn: Socrates does not recognize malignity.
Examples
q. 37
The Banality of evil;(Arendt)
Eichman
q. 39
Self deception:
Strategies for keeping up a good self image:
Remedies: friends?
Cf. Aristotle.
(Dis)advantages of friends in self examination.
Vice and punishment p.172
EGOISM, REASON AND ETHICS
1. Is Lord of the Flies a parable of “how it
really is with people?” If so, how is it, really?
a.
The dominant motives are . . .
b.
the only way to prevent chaos is thru the imposition of law by force . . .Cf.
Glaucon/Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic.
i. think
about Ralph and Jack
ii.
think about Piggy
iii.
what about the conch?
iv.
what about the naval officer?
2.The
Confucian dispute on human nature- inherently evil, or inherently good?
Mencius –goodness is inherent. When people do what is
not good, they are acting against nature.
People are naturally sympathetic, naturally feel
shame, reverence and other moral feelings.
‘Heaven’ implants a kind of natural law, ‘rules of
nature’
Hsun-Tzu
Goodness is ‘artificial.’ The result of training that
goes ‘against the grain.’
The superior or well trained person follows good
customs, but only as result of ‘hard training.’
2. Hobbes:
human nature and “Laws of Nature”
People are . . .

1588-1679
a. The
state of nature – a state of war;
in such
a state life is ____, _____, ___, _____,
and _______.
No one
can “win” because?
Facts
that prove we could be in such a state.
b.
three factors that cause “quarrel”
i.
ii.
iii.
c. What
does “justice” amount to in such a state of nature? Cf. 191 194. cf. Piggy
d.
There is thus a motive for replacing it with a contract and law. “Reason” suggests convenient articles of
peace.
They are “laws of nature” Such as
i.
seek peace
ii.
be willing to lay down the state-of – nature “rights” when others do also
i.e. enter a “SOCIAL CONTRACT”
iii.
KEEP the contract
But . . .how can I trust others to do the same? I can
ONLY WHEN there is a
COERCIVE POWER. Prior to that, there is no right,
wrong, just, unjust.
“Injustice”
= violating the contract
Justice=
a rule of reason. Reason tells me what is necessary for peace, survival.
Reason
is concerned only with MEANS.
e. The
WHOLE OF MORALITY consists in these laws.
Compare
to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Scotus.
Summing up: Egoism and altruism
a.
Hobbes – egoism
1.
Pity – rooted in?
2.
Charity – rooted in?
3.
Tautological egoism (metaphysical)
4.
Psychological egoism
Ques.
How should one respond to a.3? a.4?
3. Butler – self love and altruism are
compatible
a.
self love is a “general affection” – a desire for ?
b.
love of others (altruism) is a particular affection
a.
examples of particular affections.
c.
the “hedonistic paradox”
d.
confusions about the relations between self love and happiness, egoism,
selfishness.
i.
“benevolence” (love of others) may actually increase happiness in benevolent
person.
4.
Butler and Browne 236
6. Self
interest, cooperation, and the Prisoner’s dilemma. See the chart, p.239.
a.
one cannot maximize self interest without cooperation.
b.
looking out for #1 gets in the way of looking out for #1!!
c.
in fact people do cooperate. Are they “irrational.”?
i.
the problem of free riders
and
suckers.
ii.
Once again, rationality is pitted against the common good. Compare to
Aristotle, Aquinas.
d.
saving cooperation thru repeated PDs.
7. A
biological version of the PD.
Does
nature select cooperators, or egoists?
a.
natural selection operates on genes, and only individuals have genes.
i.
individual fitness
i.
inclusive fitness
b.
how free riders get dumped: inclusive fitness and tit for tat. Repeated PD.
7.
Broadie on an Aristotelian view of egoism , reason and justice.
Ch. VII Reason, Feeling, and Morality
1. Huck
Finn
a.
What Huck KNOWS
What
Huck FEELS p. 251
b.
It appears that some of his feelings are natural, i.e. not the result of
training.
i.
what might BE the basis for his feelings towards Jim?
ii.
Conscience, thought, feeling
2.
Hume: there has been a controversy
a.
what exactly IS it? Compare aesthetic
and moral responses.
b.
Evidences of a role for reason
c.
evidences of feeling as necc and suff.
i.
reason is “cool” 215
ii.
what is not unreasonable!
iii.
anti relativism
iv.
moral sentiment compared to sense of beauty.
d.
utility and reason - 216
i.
knowing what to do to get a useful result
ii.
feeling that it IS useful
e.
reason cannot motivate to action.
f.
projectivism – 217
g.
Is – Ought p. 218. q.12
3.
Emotivism and prescriptivism
a.
hurrah x
do x
b.
non statemental uses of language
c.
objections to emotivism – 221
1.If beating cats is cruel, beating Tabby is cruel
2.beating cats is cruel
3. beating Tabby is cruel.
If I am standing on the bank, the river is near
I am standing on the bank
The river is near
4.
Morality and Sentimentality
Bennet
on Himmler, Edwards, Huck.
Types –
222-23
a.
who is worse, Himmler or Edwards, the Walrus or the carpenter?
5.
Projectivism – Blackburn q. 19
i.
thin and thick concepts again. Cf. p. 29-30
DUTY, REASON, DIGNITY
The claims of duty in Trollope’s story. Put aside how
you feel, do what is right, dismiss the bigamist!! But . . . .
1. Duty
and the”must” (deontology)
2. Immanuel
Kant
a.
opposition to Aristotle
b.
to Aquinas etc.
c.
to Hobbes
d.
to Hume
The
main issue – duty vs. “inclination.”
3. The
categorical imperative version 1.
Categorical
and hypothetical imperatives
a.
The golden rule
b.
“law” and impartiality
c.
law and consistency
i.
consistency and contradiction
d.
what about conflicting duties
4.
Categorical imperative version 2
a.
using people (cf. q.17)
b.
making objects of people
5. The
notions of freedom=dignity=law=consistency=
autonomy
Further Discussion
1.
Sorell: natural goodness – what ARE our intuitions? What DO we admire MORALLY?
i.
cf. Aristotle’s great souled man
ii.
Hume’s kindly peasant
2. Kant
on Sex, using people, objectifying people.
The freedom-dignity-autonomy issue.
i.
marriage as the solution (?)p.251
3.
Singer’s response-
i.
manipulation outside of marriage not inevitable
ii.
‘autonomy’ not limited to contracts.
4. Kant
on treatment of animals: animals have no interests or rights. But be kind to
them, or you may end up being cruel to people. “Indirect” duties. Moral
education and principles.
i.
Regan: not so. It is obvious that animals can feel pain.
5. (Kohlberg). Problems with “directive moral
education.”
i.
if education follows natural development, there will be no violation of
“autonomy.”
ii.
what is the natural development? K’s stages, p.255
5.
Gilligan--male bias in Kohlberg. But, Cf. Aristotle, and the woman quoted on
256-57
-------------------------------------------------
UTILITARIANISM
Orienting questions.
Reason,
Consequences, Social Engineering
1.
Raskolnikov as social engineer
a.
“arithmetic” 266-67
b.
problem; what are we adding up?
c.
problem; contingency
i.
foreseeable, but not forseen, consequences.
2. Mill
–
a.
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote ----?
i.
“consequentialism”
ii.
kinds of pleasures (pains)
b.
“higher pleasures” How decide which are
higher?
i.
the Hyacinth problem
c.
rejection of virtue theory – what ultimately matters is actions. Remarkable
claims on p.276
i.
nobleness of character and individual vs. overall happiness (q. 12). Aristotle: I cannot achieve happiness while
ignoring society.
ii.
good character producing bad actions – examples
and vice versa.
d.
rule utilitarianism
3.
Criticism-q.17
Williams
a.
Jim case – how should I regard it (not just, what should I DO). Q. 18
b.
George case- q.19
4.
Defense – Hare
a.
contrived and unrealistic examples
b.
consider situations where training, rather than calculating, comes into play.
i.
how would a good utilitarian train up a child?
-------------------------------------------
Virtues and traditions (MacIntyre).
Orienting questions
Wharton; a failed life. How come?
a.
Virtues and the good for a whole life (the nature of a virtue).
b.
human action embedded in story or
narrative q. 85
1.
learning to live virtuously through learning stories.
c.
“quests” as searches for the good of a “whole life.”
d.
virtues, communal stories, and community.
e.
virtues, “practices” and traditions. Cf. the virtues of a chess player and the
“good” that is pursued. Cannot exist without that “practice” or game.
f.
illustration: the people of Le Chambon.
Notice the adjectives used to describe these people. Notice how they
describe themselves.
Relevant
concepts:
1.
virtue (got it?)
2.
a “whole life”
3.
a whole life and narrative
4.
learning to live (well or badly, virtuously or viciously) from examples,
including those given in communally shared stories, traditions.
Notice: 2 and 1 are “made for each
other.” 3 is made for 2. 4 for 3. All are to be understood in relation to one
another.
Planned Parenthood vs. Casey 1992
These matters involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the state.
A false dilemma? What about “community”?
Co-munire.
I mentioned to a friend that I thought the vote in Switzerland
and the defense of the crucifix in Italy were perhaps part of a piece, signs
that, in spite of much evidence to the contrary, the peoples of Europe
apparently still believed in the potency of Christian symbols. He responded
that these protests had little to do with religion, only about culture. But
isn’t that the point? Religion does not exist without culture and culture is a
carrier of religion. When Christianity first came to northern Europe in the
early middle ages, conversion meant a change of public practice and the
creation of a new public space, in architecture, law, calendar, language,
communal rituals, et al.
For the Swiss, erection of minarets taller than church steeples would alter the
skyline of cities and towns, visibly severing links to the past. The
construction of minarets was seen as an assault on memory and memory is
attached to things. Without memory a people have no sense of who they are. In
Italy the assault on memory had to do with the central Christian symbol in the
west. In a historic Christian culture wrote Barbieri, “the symbol of a naked,
suffering, unjustly condemned man in whom all that is good and worthy of
worship and respect . . . is centered, is buried deep in their souls.” In Italy
even atheists and Communists respect the Crucifix “because it means so much
about the condition and value of a man.”
The issue is not human rights or religious freedom, but respect for cultural
traditions and fealty to those who have gone before. There is no reason to
think that prohibiting the erection of minarets in Swiss cities will jeopardize
the rights of Muslims to practice their religion. But if a society loses all
memory of its Christian traditions, there is a real question whether those
things that made Western civilization unique will endure. Juergen Habermas once
wrote: “Christianity and nothing else, is the ultimate foundation of liberty,
conscience, human rights and democracy, the benchmarks of Western civilization.
To this we have no other options. We continue to nourish ourselves from this
source. Everything else is postmodern chatter.”
Robert Louis Wilken, a member
of the editorial advisory board of First
Things, is the William
R. Kenan Jr. Professor Emeritus of the History of Christianity at the
University of Virginia.
1. If someone believes in relativism then they cannot consistently believe in moral progress.
2. Plato pursued a “science” of ethics.
3. Midgeley thinks it is OK to make moral judgments.
4. Aristotle is more interested in the morality of particular acts than in character.
5. Aquinas and divine command moralists agree that what is right is right simply because God wills it.
6. Thick ethical concepts have a lot of descriptive content.
7. Although the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not mention God as the source of rights, many of the rights enumerated have been emphasized by political movements with religious roots.
8. Aristotle argues that young people are not likely to have highly developed virtues.
9. The ring of Gyges was a ring that made it possible to move at great speeds.
10. Sophocles obviously believes that all values are commensurable.
Multiple Choice
11. The following would be examples of “thick” ethical concepts
a. wrong
b. cruel
c. morally right
d. none of these
12. The following are conclusive reasons for believing relativism is correct:
a. different cultures have conflicting views on right and wrong
b. moral judgments are impossible
c. no one can give anyone else moral advice
d. none of these.
13. Aquinas thinks that “real” law
a. is directed to the common good
b. ultimately emanates from the supreme ruler of the entire universe
c. includes natural law
d. all of these.
14. “Teleological” is an adjective used to describe
a. explanations in terms of aims or goals
b. Aristotle’s account of goodness in terms of flourishing or fulfillment
c. mechanistic explanations
d. a and b.
15. Tolstoy’s After the Ball is a story that supports
a. relativism
b. the view that the dominant moral conventions of a society are usually morally good
c. the view that people can discern cruelty, hypocrisy etc. on their own
d. all of these.
Study the following numbered quotes, and answer the questions about each of them
'Oh
yes, we know all about how you're no good for anything,' said one of us. 'But
tell us: how many men would be no good for anything if it weren't for the likes
of you?'
16. This quote is from
a. a story by Tolstoy
b. a story that expresses the idea that morality is all relative
c. a story that makes plausible the idea that moral beliefs are merely a product of local cultures
d. all of these.
17. The main character, who is the ‘I’ in this quote
a. is unable to “fit in” to societal norms and ideas of right and wrong
b. has himself been changed for the better by his own experience
c. has a good moral influence on others
d. all of these.
#II In one place, men feed upon human flesh. In
another, it is reputed a holy duty for a man to kill his father at a certain
age. Elsewhere, the fathers dispose of their children, while yet in their
mothers’ wombs, some to be preserved and carefully brought up, and others to be
abandoned or made away. Elsewhere the old husbands lend their wives to young
men; and in another place they are in common, without offence.
18. this quote from Montaigne is supposed to support
a. ethical/cultural relativism
b. the claim that infanticide is considered right in all societies
c. the idea that old husbands are very generous
d. none of these.
19. This quote is the beginning of an argument
a. that concludes that morality is relative to certain cultures
b. that is deductively valid (the conclusion is established with certainty by the truth of the premises)
c. that is commonly used by anti-relativists
d. all of these.
#III Consider the following: its [the UN
Declaration of Rights] pervasive emphasis on the "inherent dignity"
and "Worth of the human person"; the affirmation that the human
person is "endowed with reason and conscience"; the right to form
trade unions; the worker's right to just remuneration for himself and his
family; the recognition of the family as the "natural and fundamental
group unit of society" entitled as such to "protection by society
and the state"; the prior right of
parents to choose the education of their children; and a provision that
motherhood and childhood are entitled to "special care and
assistance."
. . .where did the politicians get
their ideas about the family, work, civil society, and the dignity of the
person? The answer is: mainly from the social encyclicals Rerum novarum (1891)
and Quadragesimo anno (1931) [documents of the Roman Catholic Church]. And
where did the church get them? The short answer is that those encyclicals were
part of the process through which the church had begun to reflect on the
Enlightenment, the I8th-century revolutions, socialism, and the labor question
in the light of Scripture, tradition, and her own experience as an "expert
in humanity."
20. This quote suggests that
a. there are no universal rights
b. the rights mentioned are based on atheist assumptions
c. there is no answer to the question ‘where do these rights come from?”
d. none of these.
21. The suggestion here is that many of the things considered to be “rights”
a. actually have a religious basis
b. have come to be matters of concern largely due to Christian teachings
c. are of concern to everyone even though they are based on religious teachings
d. all of these.
#IV Suppose now that there were two such magic
rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be
imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No
man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take
what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his
pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be
like a God among Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the
unjust; they would both come at last to the same point. And this we may truly
affirm to be a great proof that a man is just, not willingly or because he
thinks that justice is any good to him individually, but of necessity, for
wherever any one thinks that he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For
all men believe in their hearts that injustice is far more profitable to the
individual than justice, and he who argues as I have been supposing, will say
that they are right. If you could imagine any one obtaining this power of
becoming invisible, and never doing any wrong or touching what was another’s,
he would be thought by the on-lookers to be a most wretched idiot.
22. In this quote the speaker is arguing that
a. virtue is its own reward
b. people are all self seeking; they put themselves first and moral considerations are ignored or given second place
c. a reasonable or rational person will ignore the rules of justice when he thinks he can get away with it
d. b and c.
23. This argument
a. makes reference to “the ring of Gyges”
b. represents a view presented by some sophists
c. denies any intrinsic value to such rules as ‘do not steal’
d. all of these.
#V _[Euthyphro:] Yes, I should say
that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all
hate, impious.
[Socrates:] Ought we to enquire into the truth of this,
Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that
of others? What do you say?
[Euthyphro:] We should enquire; and I believe that the
statement will stand the test of enquiry.
[Socrates:] We shall know better, my good friend, in a
little while. The point which I should first wish to understand is this:
Is the pious or holy beloved by the
gods because it is holy, or,
Is it holy because it is beloved of
the gods?
24. Socrates presents a dilemma which
a. might be restated as “either what is right is commanded by the Gods because it is right, or what is right is right because the Gods command it”
b. may upset the attempt to base ethical beliefs on the will of God
c. has become famous in the history of philosophy
d. all of these.
25. This dilemma IS a dilemma because most people
a. would be uncomfortable or could not accept the idea that there is a standard higher than God that God must consult in determining what is right or wrong
b. would be uncomfortable or could not accept the idea that merely because God (or anyone else) commands something, that automatically makes it right
c. there is no third alternative between that mentioned in a and b
d. all of these.
#VI Dwellers by the house of Cadmus and of
Amphion, there is no estate of mortal life that I would ever praise or blame as
settled. Fortune raises and Fortune humbles the lucky or unlucky
26. The stress on “fortune” or “luck” in this remark
a. would offend Plato
b. is typical of the tragic poets
c. is not compatible with the idea that anyone who is virtuous can have the best kind of life
d. all of these.
27. This quote stresses
a. the vulnerability of human life
b.
something that Aristotle tried to acknowledge in his Ethics]
c. something that Plato stressed
in the Republic\
d. a and b.
#VII It is therefore evident that, as regards the
general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or
rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper
conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is
not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a
triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to
all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the
truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally
known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and
from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to
another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of
cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and
therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they
are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country. And this
principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail,
e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such
and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number
of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may
fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
Consequently
we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for
all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail,
which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same
for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and
yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain
obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some
few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the
reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of
nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural
law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De
Bello Gall. vi).
28. Aquinas is arguing here that
a. there is a single natural law that applies to all people
b. there may be variations in what is right that arise from particular circumstances
c. even though there is a single natural law for all people, it is not always known
by all people
d. all of these.
29. Aquinas’ position here
a. shows how to avoid relativism while admitting the existence of moral diversity
b. includes the idea that some moral diversity may be due simply to the fact that
some people (some cultures) are immoral or have immoral practices
c. allows that there are exceptions to the general principles of natural law
d. a and b .
Qz 1.
1. F
2.T
3. D
QZ 2
1. F
2. D
3. D
QZ. 3
1. T
2. D
3. F
QZ 4
1. T
2. B
3. T
QZ 5
1. C
2. T
3. F
Qz 6.
1. T
2. T
3. D
QZ 7
1. T
2. D
3. T
QZ 8
1. F
2. F
3. D
QZ 9
1. D
2. T
3. T
QZ 10
1. D
2. T
3. T
QZ. 11
1.D
2. D
3. B
QZ 12
1. F
2. F
3. E
QZ. 13
1. T
2. B
3. D
QZ 14
1. T
2. E
3. E
|
1. T |
16. A |
|
2. T |
17. D |
|
3. T |
18. A |
|
4. F |
19. A |
|
5. F |
20. D |
|
6. T |
21. D |
|
7. T |
22. D |
|
8. T |
23. D |
|
9. F |
24. D |
|
10.F |
25. D |
|
11. B |
26. D |
|
12. D |
27. D |
|
13. D |
28. D |
|
14. D |
29. D |
|
15. C |
|
True (a) or False (b)
1. Aristotle argues that
morality is all relative.
2. The UN Universal
Declaration of Human Rights implicitly draws upon religious sources.
3. Critics of utilitarianism
sometimes claim that it would condone enslaving a few to increase the overall
happiness.
4. Aquinas argues that all
that can be known about right and wrong is directly revealed by God and thus
can be known only by religious believers.
5. Kant claims that sexual
activity is essentially manipulative.
6. According to Kant, the
thing that has the most moral worth in a person is such feelings as kindness,
generosity, etc.
7. Hume claimed that reason
can motivate people to act morally.
8. Projectivists argue that
such moral properties as goodness and cruelty are actually found in good
actions, cruel actions, etc.
9. If Huck Finn had not given
in to his natural feelings he would not have acted morally.
10. Raskolnikov thinks, at
times, like a utilitarian social reformer.
11. Hobbes thought that our
moral beliefs arise naturally in a state of nature.
12. One problem with Kant’s
account of the basic principles of morality is that he does not seem to show us
how to resolve conflicts of duties.
13. The central concept in
Aquinas’ natural law ethics is the concept of duty.
14. The principle of double
effect is a utilitarian principle, since it tells us that some actions are
wrong in themselves.
15. If in the process of
removing a uterine cancer a doctor killed a fetus, he would not be guilty of
murder, according to one version of the principle of double effect.
16. A strict utilitarian
might consider feeding the hungry to be a strict duty.
17. The principles of natural
law, according to Aquinas, are highly specific guides to human law.
18. Midgley argues that even
though moral judgments are sometimes to be avoided due to incomplete knowledge,
it cannot always be wrong to make such judgments.
19. Hume claims that purely
rational considerations cannot motivate us to act one way rather than another.
20.
Multiple choice (choose the
BEST answer)
21. Antigone appeals to a
higher law for human beings
a. that can overule particular human laws
b. that could be accounted for by Christian thinkers like
Aquinas
c. so as to make
all human law worthless
d. a and b.
22. Kant tries to show
that the categorical imperative
(A)requires a kind of rational
consistency
(B) has nothing to do with getting the
best results
(C) is a sure test for the morality of
any action
(D) all of these
23. Gilligan argued that
a. women focus more on abstract principles of justice and
rights than men do
b. women are more concerned with caring and
responsibility than with non-interference
c. theories of moral development which focus on males
sometimes give a biased account of
what moral maturity amounts to
d. B and C.
24. Moral education in public
schools, according to Sher and Bennett
a. does not have to interfere with autonomy
b. can actually lead to greater autonomy in adulthood
c. could rightly include teaching specific Christian
moral ideals
d. all of these
e. a and b.
25. The “Hyacinth problem” is
a problem that arises
a. in utilitarianism as Mill formulates it
b. due to Mill’s drawing a distinction between higher and
lower pleasures
c. for people who reject elitist views of society but
have elitist views about pleasures
d. all of these.
26. The conflict between
Ralph and Jack (in Lord of the Flies) could be taken to illustrate
a. Hobbes’ idea that moral relations only exist where
there is a powerful enforcer of the law
b. Mill’s idea that moral agreement is possible provided
consequences are calculated correctly
c. Kant’s idea that all rational beings can recognize and
act on a fundamental principle
of morality
d.
e. a and b.
27. Plato tried at one point
to provide a moral “calculus”
a. in which all values are ultimately commensurate
b. that can eliminate tragic dilemmas
c. that requires attention to such things as mistaken
judgments about pleasure
d. all of these
28. The prisoner’s dilemma
illustrates the fact that
a. self interested rational choosers cannot always
achieve the result that self-interest would
prefer
b. rational choice, understood in a more or less
Hobbesian sense, cannot achieve certain
“public goods”
c. all rational choosers only look out for #1
d. a and b.
29. Aquinas accounts for some
differences in moral beliefs between some cultures by
a. pointing out that in some cultures reasoning about the
implications of natural law may be more accurate than in other
cultures
b. pointing out that some cultures have become corrupted
to the point where they are no longer aware of the natural law
c. pointing out
that the further we descend from the principles of natural law to specific applications, such as in deciding how much
to punish certain crimes, the greater
the diversity is likely to be
d. all of these
e. none of these.
30. Among ancient and medieval thinkers deontology
is best represented by
a. Aristotle
b. divine command moralists
c. Kant
d. none of these.
31. Hare would agree with
Mill that
a. morally right actions are those that are intrinsically
good
b. early training into habits of action that generally
have high utility can fill the gap when
there is not time to calculate consequences
c. I do not always have time to calculate the
consequences before I act
d, all of these
e. b and c.
32. Since Aristotle thinks
that all actions aim at some good, and that good is happiness, he apparently
a. agrees with Mill that right actions are those that
increase overall happiness
b. disagrees with Mill, since he thinks of happiness not
as pleasure but as optimal human
functioning
c. is a consequentialist
d. all of these.
Study the following quotes, and answer the questions
that follow:
#I "Man and generally any rational being
exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used. .
."
33. # I appears to be arguing
that
(a)such
things as slavery are permissible
(b)nobody
should ever use anybody
(c)nobody
should ever use a person merely as a
means
(d)everyone
has a right to do whatever they want
34. #I obvious reflects the
thinking on morals of
(a)Nietzsche
(b)
(c)
Duns Scotus
(d)
none of these
#II
I speak of moral virtue, as it is moral virtue which
is concerned with emotion and actions, and it is these which admit of excess
and deficiency and the mean. Thus it is possible to go too far, or not to go
far enough, in respect of fear, courage, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure and
pain generally, and the excess and the deficiency are alike wrong; but to
experience these emotions at the right times and on the right occasions and
towards the right persons and for the right causes and in the right manner is
the mean or the supreme good, which is characteristic of virtue.
Similarly
there may be excess, deficiency, or the mean, in regard to actions. But virtue
is concerned with emotions and actions, and here excess is an error and
deficiency a fault, whereas the mean is successful and laudable, and success
and merit are both characteristics of virtue. It appears then that virtue is a
mean state, so far at least as it aims at the mean.
35. This quote is an expression of
a.
the Aristotelian idea that virtue is a disposition to choose the mean
b.
the Platonic idea that virtue is a matter of contemplation of the form of the
Good
c.
the Humean idea that virtue is a matter of detachment
d. none of these.
36. If #II is a good account of virtue then
a. a
person who is addicted to the pleasures of sleeping late could not be virtuous
b. a
person who is willing to do just about anything could be courageous
c.
virtue has to do not just with actions but with feelings
d. A
and C.
III It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole
world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to
choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person
wholly unknown to me. It is as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own
acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for
the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances,
produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable
enjoyment. Nor is there anything more extraordinary in this than in [the field
of] mechanics to see [a] one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage
of its situation [such as by a lever]. In short, a passion must be accompanied
with some false judgment in order to its being unreasonable.
37. What is being claimed
here is that
a. reason cannot decide about what is valuable
b. reason plays no fundamental role in the formation of
ethical ideals and beliefs
c. reason is always “cool” and disengaged from action
d. all of these
e. A and B.
38. The author of XII
a. holds to the view that there is necessarily a great
gap between facts and values
b. would agree with the authors of #III, #VI and #XIII
about the substantive role of reason
in ethics
c. does not agree
with Aristotle that reason is required for determining the ends of action as well as the means to any end
d. does not agree
with David Hume
e. A and C.
#IV. To this war of every man against every man, this
also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong,
justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power,
there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two
cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the [instinctive]
faculties, neither of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man
that were alone in the world, as well as his senses and passions. They are
qualities that relate to men in society, not in solitude. It is consequent also
to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and
thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s that he can get, and for so
long as he can keep it.
39.
The author of #IV
a. evidently believes that prior to
the existence of particular communities with particular laws, nothing is unjust, not even murder or theft.
b. would agree with Aquinas that all
humans have written in their consciences the immutable
laws of God
c. is Hobbes
d. a and b.
e. a and c
40.
The author of #IV
a. would agree with Thrasymachus in
Plato’s Republic, who argued that
someone with the ring of Gyges
would have no reason whatsoever to refrain from crime
b. is describing what he calls the
“state of nature”
c. is a kind of social contract
theorist
d.expresses a view that seems to
correspond to the views of Jack in Golding’s
Lord of the Flies
e.all of these.
V Happiness or satisfaction consists only in
the enjoyment of those objects which are by nature suited to our several
particular appetites, passions, and affections. So that if self-love wholly
engrosses us, and leaves no room for any other principle, there can be
absolutely no such thing at all as happiness, or enjoyment of any kind
whatever, since happiness consists in the gratification of particular passions,
which supposes the having of them. Self-love then does not constitute this or
that to be our interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by
nature and supposed, self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it.
41. #V
is
(a) part of an argument against
Hobbesian egoism
(b) an argument which shows that the view that all our
actions are selfishly motivated is confused
(c) an argument against self love
(d) all of the above
(e) a and b.
42. #V
depends upon the conceptual point that
(a) self-love is not a “particular affection” but
rather a good way of seeing to the satisfaction of particular desires,
interests, etc.
(b) if the only thing a person “loved” were
themselves, they would not be able to be happy, since in order to be happy I
must be getting satisfaction from something that interests me, and that means,
something besides just “me”
(c) the notion that one could love oneself and not
love or care about anything else is nonsense, since loving oneself requires at
a minimum that I satisfy some desire or inclination for some particular thing
(and the self is not “some particular thing”)
(d) all of these.
#VI "Listen,
I want to ask you a serious question," the student said hotly. "I was
joking of course, but look here; on one side we have a stupid, senseless,
worthless, spiteful, ailing, horrid old woman, not simply useless but doing
actual mischief, who has not an idea what she is living for herself, and who
will die in a day or two in any case. You understand? You understand?"
"Yes, yes, I understand," answered the
officer, watching his excited companion attentively.
"Well, listen then. On the other side, fresh young
lives thrown away for want of help and by thousands, on every side! A hundred
thousand good deeds could be done and helped, on that old woman's money which
will be buried in a monastery! Hundreds, thousands perhaps, might be set on the
right path; dozens of families saved from destitution, from ruin, from vice,
from the Lock hospitals--and all with her money. Kill her, take her money and
with the help of it devote oneself to the service of humanity and the good of
all. What do you think, would not one tiny crime be wiped out by thousands of
good deeds? For one life thousands would be saved from corruption and decay.
One death, and a hundred lives in
exchange--it's simple arithmetic! Besides, what value has the life of that
sickly, stupid, ill-natured old woman in the balance of existence! No more than
the life of a louse, of a black-beetle, less in fact because the old woman is
doing harm. She is wearing out the lives of others; the other day she bit
Lizaveta's finger out of spite; it almost had to be amputated."
"Of course she does not deserve to live,"
remarked the officer, "but there it is, it's nature."
"Oh, well, brother, but we have to correct and
direct nature, and, but for that, we should drown in an ocean of prejudice. But
for that, there would never have been a single great man. They talk of duty,
conscience--I don't want to say anything against duty and conscience;--but the
point is, what do we mean by them?
43.
The student who is speaking in this passage
a. thinks that the good consequences
of an act of murder might morally justify that murder
b. suggests that having a bad
conscience about killing an innocent person might be old fashioned prejudice, which those who
are “great men” should overcome
c. sounds like a social reformer
d. all of these
44.
The argument in this passage
a. sounds a lot like utilitarian
reasoning
b. sounds like the view that the end
justifies the means
c. sounds like one that Williams
would accept
d. all of these
e. a and b.
#VII
According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as
above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which
all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that
of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as
rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test
of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the
preference felt by those, who in their opportunities of experience, to which must
be added their habits of self-consciousness and self-observation, are best
furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the
utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard
of morality: which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human
conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described
might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to
them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient
creation.
45.
The argument given here concludes that
a. the single standard of morality
is utility
b. claims that the aim of all our
actions is our individual happiness
c. understands happiness as
Aristotle understood it
d. all of these.
46.
The argument in #VI includes the claim that
a. some enjoyments are higher in
quality than others
b. the only judge of which are
higher would be someone who had those higher enjoyments,
as well as “lower” ones, and could thus compare them
c. if some action tends to promote
happiness for as many people as possible, that action is morally the right one
d. all of these.
e. a and b.
VIII . . .if
I yield myself completely to another, and obtain the person of the other in
return, I will win myself back; I have given myself up as the property of
another, but in turn I take that other as my property, and so win myself back
again in winning the person whose property I have become. In this way the two persons become a unity of
will (Lectures on Ethics).
47.
These remarks about marriage are
a. obviously from Mill
b. obviously from Kant
c. obviously from Aristotle
d. all of these
48.
The author of #VIII
a. thinks that the unity of will
supposedly found in marriage rules out the possibility of using the person to whom one is united
as a means
b. thinks that by identifying myself
with my spouse I cannot, by definition, override her freedom
c. thinks that only in marriage can
one avoid violating the categorical imperative when engaging in sexual relations.
d. all of these
e. none of these.
IX. William Graham Sumner summarizes the
essence of Cultural Relativism. He says that there is no measure of right and
wrong other than the standards of one’s society: “The notion of right is in the
folkways. It is not outside of them, of independent origin, and brought to test
them. In the folkways, whatever is, is right.”
Suppose we took this seriously.
What would be some of the consequences?
1. We could no longer say that the
customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own. This, of course, is
one of the main points stressed by Cultural Relativism. We would have to stop
condemning other societies merely because they are “different.” So long as we
concentrate on certain examples, such as the funerary practices of the Greeks
and Callatians, this may seem to be a sophisticated, enlightened attitude.
However, we would also be stopped
from criticizing other, less benign practices. Suppose a society waged war on
its neighbors for the purpose of taking slaves. Or suppose a society was
violently anti-Semitic and its leaders set out to destroy the Jews. Cultural
Relativism would preclude us from saying that either of these practices was
wrong. We would not even be able to say that a society tolerant of Jews is
better than the anti-Semitic society, for that would imply some sort of
transcultural standard of comparison. The failure to condemn these practices
does not seem enlightened; on the contrary, slavery and anti-Semitism seem wrong
wherever they occur. Nevertheless, if we took Cultural Relativism seriously, we
would have to regard these social practices as also immune from criticism. . . Cultural Relativism would not only forbid us
from criticizing the codes of other societies; it would stop us from
criticizing our own. After all, if right and wrong are relative to culture,
this must be true for our own culture just as much as for other cultures.
49. Rachels is arguing here
that if cultural relativism is correct
(a)
it would be impossible to criticize the values and practices of any society.
(b) there would be transcultural standards of conduct
(c) we could still
criticize and improve the moral practices of our own culture
(d) .all of these.
50. The argument in IX
(a) is part of a larger argument against the viability of
relativism
(b) is an attack on a view some versions of which are now
very popular
(c) attacks a view which is sometimes expressed
by such sayings as ‘you should never judge others’ or ‘ what is right for me
might be wrong for you’ or ‘it all
depends on your point of view’
(d) all of the above.
#X [Socrates:] The point which I should first wish to
understand is this:
Is the pious or holy beloved by the gods because it is holy, or,
Is it holy because it is beloved of the gods?
51. The dilemma stated here is known as
a. the piety dilemma
b. the Euthyphro dilemma
c. the utility dilemma
d. none of these.
52. This dilemma suggests a
difficulty
a. for any view that ties moral beliefs to religion
b. that arises when we realize that if something is right
simply because God says so, then anything,
including killing innocent children, could possibly be right
c. that arises when we realize that if God wills what is
right because it is right, then there is
some standard of rightness higher than God’s own will
d. all of these.
XI
"a fool is one
whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is
injured." Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from
"stupor"; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S):
"A fool is one who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved." And
folly differs from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that
folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity
denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly
opposed to wisdom.
53. This account of what it
is to be a fool
a. fits certain war criminals who show no shame when
their deeds are brought to light
b. fits stupid people generally
c. claims that there is no difference between being a
fool and being fatuous
d. all of these.
54. According to Stump, what
we have here is a good description of
a. Ike Turner
b. people who gradually become accustomed to doing evil,
to the point where they don’t care
anymore that that is what they are doing
c. anyone who disobeys the ten commandments
d. a and b.
XII
'It seems a shame,' the Walrus said,
'To play
them such a trick,
After we've brought them out so far,
And made
them trot so quick!'
The Carpenter said nothing but
'The
butter's spread too thick!'
'I weep for you,' the Walrus said:
'I deeply
sympathize.'
With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the largest size,
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his
streaming eyes.
55.
Carroll is here satirizing
a. people who pig out on shellfish
b. sentimentalists
c. walruses
d. none of thee
56.
The serious moral point suggested by XII is that
a. feelings count for nothing if
they are disengaged from corresponding actions
b. a Humean stress on feelings as
the sole source of morality lends itself to self deception
c. there is a strong sense of duty
that always follows upon sympathy
d. all of these
e. a and b.
XIII
2. Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow
money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it, but sees also that
nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a
definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much
conscience as to ask himself: “Is it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to
get out of a difficulty in this way?” Suppose however that he resolves to do
so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: “When I think myself
in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know
that I never can do so.” Now this principle of self-love or of one’s own
advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the
question now is, “Is it right?” I change then the suggestion of self-love into
a universal law, and state the question thus: “How would it be if my maxim were
a universal law?” Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal
law of nature, but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be
a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be
able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his
promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that
one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was
promised to him, but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.
57. The argument in XIII tries to show that
a. immorality is a kind of unfairness
b. immorality consists in partiality to oneself
c. an immoral person could not will that all people act as he does
d. all of these.
58. The argument here amounts to the claim that a lying promise is wrong because
a. the actual consequences if everyone made lying promises would be that no one would believe them
b. it violates our rational natures, since rationality requires consistency
c. it is not a good way to get cash
d. all of these.
XIV
Again: defenders of Utility often find themselves
called upon to reply to such objections as this – that there is not time,
previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of
conduct on the general happiness. The answer to the objection is, that there
has been ample time; namely, the whole past duration of the human species.
During all that time, mankind have been learning by experience the tendencies
of actions, on which experience all the prudence as well as all the morality of
life are dependent. People talk as if the commencement of this course of
experience had hitherto been put off, and as if, at the moment when some man
feels tempted to meddle with the property or life of another, he had to begin
considering for the first time whether murder and theft are injurious to human
happiness.. It is truly a whimsical supposition, that, if mankind were agreed
in considering utility to be the test of morality, they would remain without
any agreement as to what is useful, and would take no measures for having their
notions on the subject taught to the young, and enforced by law and opinion.
59. Mill is here articulating what is known as
a. the principle of equity
b. rule utilitarianism
c. the categorical imperative
d. none of these.
60. The view presented here
a. assumes that moral rules are like rules of thumb
b. assumes that people could have gradually learned, through experience, that lying tends to produce more unhappiness than happiness
c. assumes universal idiocy
d. a and b.
1 F
2T
3T
4F
5T
6F
7F
8F
9T
10T
11F
12T
13F
14F
15T
16 T
17F
18T
19T
20F
21D
22D
23D
24E
25D
26A
27D
28D
29D
30B
31E
32B
33C
34D
35A
36D
37D
38E
39E
40E
41E
42D
43D
44E
45A
46E
47B
48D
49A
50D
51B
52D
53A
54D
55B
56E
57D
58B
59B
60D