philosophical puzzlement and the can of worms

sample exam I

sample exam I

Terms to Define

Study Guides
 

Philosophical Puzzlement in Children and Adults

 Philosophy is sometimes thought of as a very deep complex subject, suitable only for fully mature adults. It is true that there are no youthful philosophical prodigies comparable to what can sometimes be found in math or music. It is also true that there are parts of philosophy that are technical and beyond the ken of children. Yet the problems that have always preoccupied philosophers are problems that both children and adults think about and discuss. Moreover children sometimes prove to be remarkably adept at those discussions. The following example will illustrate that point, as well as the following points: philosophy, Aristotle said, begins in wonder. Wonder may include, but not be exhausted by, wondering about something. Or we might also say it includes puzzlement. For example, we all constantly use and are familiar with the concepts ‘feeling’, ‘desire’, and ‘happiness.’ But when one begins to reflect on these concepts they may begin to seem quite puzzling. We might, for example, begin to “wonder” just what sorts of things could have “feelings” or “be happy.”
 The philosopher Gareth Matthews has spent a good deal of time discussing these and other concepts with children. He recounts a discussion with a group of 8 to 1l year olds about the possibility that plants might have feelings, and even be happy. All of the children are reluctant to immediately ascribe feelings to plants. Yet as they reflect on the matter some find themselves ‘wondering if” there might not be something to the idea that plants can feel. Cases of what appear to be “sensitivity” are mentioned. Venus fly traps seem to sense and respond to the presence of a flies by “trapping” them. Also the hypothesis is advanced that they might communicate with each other in some way. Indeed there is reason to believe it is. Matthews asked “. . .why it is important, in determining whether something can be happy, to find out if it can talk? It seemed clear to the kids that language could reveal mood. But perhaps, they suggested, mood could be revealed in other ways. “In a sort of way a plant shows that it is happy by blooming” David Paul said. The kids then discussed gestures as the expression of mood and feeling.”
 It is clear that we sometimes discern someone’s mood by noticing gestures or posture, but is there some important difference between the “gestures” of plants (blooming, wilting, turning to the sun) and the gestures of humans (slouching, holding ones head, dancing)? Some of the children suggest that plants are more like machines. The Venus flytrap is like a spring which is activated by touch, one child suggests. Another insists that in order for anything to have feelings it must have a brain. And plants do not have brains.  After reflecting on these remarks Matthews devises a story in which “Aunt Gertie” attributes happiness to her flowers while they are flourishing and blooming in the sun. The children enjoy the story but one still feels that plants could not feel happy without a mind (he does not equate having a mind with having a brain).
 This brief review of an hour long discussion between an adult and some children exhibits patterns of thought and imagination which are rich and philosophically suggestive.  We might begin to wonder, with the children, just how to describe the differences between plants and ourselves or other animals. Surely plants do not have anything we would want to call a brain (do they?). But does that show they could not have feelings? Does an insect have feelings? Does a frog? If a frogs brain is mostly removed could it still have feelings?  And, what sorts of feelings would be involved in happiness? The children laugh at the suggestion that happiness is itself some simple feeling, like the feeling of warmth by the stove that heats their room. There is indeed something comical in that suggestion.

1.  What is comical about the idea that happiness consists in some simple sensation or set of sensations?

 The idea that happiness is a state of flourishing, of doing ones best, does seem intuitively plausible, and transferring this idea to a plant may seem fanciful to some, but it is not just silly. A ‘happy’ plant is one that is doing well, realizing its full potential as a plant.

The Can of Worms

If you have ever reached into a can of worms and tried to pull out just one worm, you know it is just about impossible if there are very many of them. They get all tangled up with one another so that when you pull you get the whole pile (or the worm breaks!). Philosophy is like that in this respect; it is very hard to treat philosophical problems and issues in isolation. Philosophers are interested is such questions as, what knowledge is and under what conditions we might be said to have it (epistemology)? what is real, or what basic sorts of entities are there (metaphysics)? what makes an action right or wrong (ethics); what if anything is unique about humans (minds, souls, other)? What is the best kind of life, or, what is happiness (ethics)?  What is involved in thinking? feeling? (Philosophy of mind); How does language work and relate to the world , or, what is the structure of our concepts and how do they map onto the world (Philosophy of language)?. Lets call these sorts of questions 'PQs"(philosophical questions).   Now, if you try to answer a PQ in one of these domains your will very quickly discover that you are forced to deal with questions from other domains. Questions in metaphysics almost always lead to questions in epistemology, for instance.

2. Give an example of a metaphysical question, and of an epistemological question that might be prompted by it.

    The discussion with the children illustrates this "can of worms" phenomenon. The question whether plants can feel forces us to think about our usual assumption that only something with a mind could feel. For in some way plants might seem to feel, but do they have minds? These are questions in the philosophy of mind, more or less. Immediately we see that the children are considering epistemogical questions in trying to figure this out. Namely, how could you know that a plant feels? All of these questions bear on the question whether plants could be happy (ethics). Even though it seems to them that happiness itself could not be simply a 'feeling' (at least in most senses of the term), it seems that only things with feelings could be said to be happy. If plants cannot feel (in what sense?) how could they be happy? But the notion of happiness is itself puzzling.
    So, you cannot 'get at' any one of these metphysical or epistemological or logical issues without dragging along issues from other domains.

Write a paragraph-long essay on happiness.  Try to show that only humans could be happy, and keep track of (make a note of) the way in which different kinds of PQs are tangled up in thinking about this issue.

C. A LITTLE LOGIC

Philosophers come to their views through intuitions, scientific findings, personal self examination, and many other sources. But one thing that stands out in the majority of philosophical writings is argument. It is important to understand what “argument” in this context does not mean. It does not mean the thing that happens when two or more people disagree and start shouting at each other and getting hot under the collar. In philosophy an argument is simply a set of statements, where some are offered as support for others. Consider this example, which we will call “Argument A”:

1. Parking areas 1 through 5 are generally full by 10 a.m..
2. It is now 10.15 a.m..
3. Areas 1 through 5 are full now.

In this set of statements 1 and 2 are offered as reasons for asserting, or believing, 3. Logicians commonly refer to the reasons, such as 1 and 2, as premises, and that which they support, 3, as a conclusion. The whole set, 1-3, is called an argument. We could, alternatively, say that 1 and 2 are an argument for 3. Or we might say that 1 and 2 are the reasons for 3, or for believing 3. We can see from this example that we all use arguments constantly. They are one of the main ways we arrive at our beliefs. That is, we all normally have reasons for believing what we do believe, even when we do not spell them out.

(10) Give your own example of an argument, in the strict sense just explained.

Here is another argument, called “Argument B”:

1’. Areas 1 through 5 are full now.
2’. It is a waste of time trying to find a parking space in areas that are full.
3’. It is a waste of time trying to find a parking space in 1 through 5.

Obviously 1’ is the same is 3 in the previous argument. What that shows is that something which is a conclusion could also serve as a premise in a further argument. And the conclusion of that further argument could be a premise in a further argument, and so forth.

Deductive Arguments and Inductive Arguments
There is an important difference between argument A and argument B. In A, if the premises are true, then probably the conclusion is true also. It is of course possible that there is a parking space in areas 1 through 5 even at 10:15 a.m.. But it is not likely that there is. So, the premises do not give conclusive reasons for believing the conclusion. But they do give quite a bit of support for that belief. The premises could be true and the conclusion false. But probably the conclusion is true, given that the premises are true.
 Argument B is different. If the premises are true, the conclusion will have to be true. Think about it. Is there any way the conclusion of B could be false if the premises are true? If it is not immediately obvious that there is no way, a little thought should show you that in fact it is impossible for both premises to be true and the conclusion false.
 Argument A is an inductive argument, and is in fact an inductively strong argument because the premises offer strong support for the conclusion. B is a deductive argument and is in fact a valid deductive argument. A valid deductive argument is one in which, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Suppose the premises are true. Then argument B is not only valid, it is sound. So, an argument is sound if and only if it is deductively valid and has all true premises. Sound arguments are obviously the strongest kind of arguments there can be. The logician’s uses of the words “valid,” “deduction” and “sound” do not always correspond with the everyday usage. For example, Sherlock Holmes often claims to be deducing a conclusion, when in fact his argument is inductive, rather than deductively valid. Most philosophers follow the logician’s use.

(10) Define: premise; argument; inductive argument; valid deductive argument; sound argument.

(10) Classify each of the following arguments as either deductively valid, inductively strong, or sound (check the definitions):
1. You cannot know A (some statement, such as “it is raining”) unless A is true.
2. A is false.
3. So, you do not know A.

1. Usually democracies work better than other forms of government.
2. The U.S.A. is a democracy, and Cuba is not.
3. The form of government in the U.S.A. will work better than Cuba’s does.

(10) Try to cook up an example of your own of each of the following (check the definitions first): (a) an inductive argument (b) a valid deductive argument (c) a sound argument.

It is important for our living and thinking that our arguments be good ones. That does not mean they must all be deductively valid or sound. But it does mean that we should always look for the best possible arguments for any conclusions we want to hold to or defend. Philosophical writings are good places to look for good arguments – although there are certainly some bad ones there too.
 Philosophy consists to a very large degree of the construction of arguments, both inductive and deductive, and criticism of those arguments, or defense of them against criticism, by using further arguments or in other ways. However, philosophers do not always fully spell out their arguments. Neither do the rest of us. How many of us, while driving to school, would actually spell out arguments A and B as we drive past area 5 and head for area 6 or some more remote area? Nonetheless those arguments are behind what we do. All of us reason, all of us have reasons for what we do and believe, even though it may seem that sometimes we may do something “for no reason.” Argument pervades everyone’s life.
 The next few sections provide some examples of ways in which arguments can be evaluated and critiqued.

Evaluation of Arguments: Refutation by Counterexample.
Philosophers are generally more inclined than most people to spell out their arguments, and more inclined to criticize them. Moreover they have developed techniques for criticizing arguments and some of those techniques or strategies have labels. You will become familiar with some of those techniques and learn some of the labels in the “Logic Boxes” inserted in the following readings. Here is one technique which is quite common. Consider the following argument, which we will call “Pro-Life.”

1. A being which is now potentially a human person has the same rights as a human person.
2. This fetus is now potentially an innocent human person.
3. An innocent human person has the right to not be killed.
4. Therefore, this fetus has a right to not be killed.

(10) Do you think “Pro-Life” is inductive, or is it deductively valid? Explain.

Someone might criticize “Pro-Life” by producing a counterexample, which we will label “pro-Choice:”

1’ A being which is now potentially a president of the United States has the same rights as the president of the United States.
2’ This fetus is now potentially president of the United States.
3’ The president of the United States has a right to give orders to the armed forces.
4’ Therefore, this fetus has a right to give orders to the armed forces.

It looks like “Pro-Choice” has the same logical  form as “Pro-Life”. But the conclusion of Pro-Choice is obviously false, whereas the conclusion of “Pro-Life” is not obviously false. Where did things go wrong? The person who advances “Pro-Choice” will claim that something went wrong with premise 1. Pro-Life seems to rely on the idea that if something is potentially X then it has the same rights as X. If “Pro-Life” were fully spelled out then it should include that claim as a premise. But it is clearly not generally the case that if some X is potentially R (e.g. has certain rights) then it must actually have R now. The counterexample makes that fact clear. The role of the missing premise is perhaps even clearer in “Pro choice.” There is a technical term for arguments which are not fully spelled out. They are called “enthymemes.” We often get clearer about the actual force or value of an argument when we succeed in making all the premises explicit.
 Refutations by counterexample are quite common in philosophy. They need to be looked at carefully. Certainly Pro-Choice does not conclusively refute Pro-Life. It might be that Pro-Life only depends upon the claim that in this specific case, the fact that A (a fetus) is potentially X entails that it is X now. Someone who advances “Pro-Life” does not necessarily hold that it is generally true that whatever is potentially X has the same rights as X. However, once the counterexample is produced, they should realize that they need to give some special reason for believing that in the case of the fetus it has the rights now, while still a fetus,  that it has potentially.

(10) Suppose that you are using “Pro-Life” in a discussion and are confronted with “Pro-Choice” as a counterexample. Would you feel that you had to respond by giving some special reason for thinking that in the case of the fetus, it should have the same rights now as it has potentially? Explain.

(10) See if you can critique the following argument by producing a counterexample in which the conclusion is obviously false, even though the premises are true:
1. If Mary is at the party, then Bill is glad.
2. Bill is glad.
3. Therefore, Mary is at the party.
Remember, the counterexample must have the same form as the original argument. That form could be represented as follows:
 1. If A then B
 2. B
 3. Therefore, A.

Confusing necessary and sufficient conditions.
Here is a further technique for criticizing or appraising arguments. Consider the following argument, which has the same form as the argument just discussed:

1. If there is a party at John’s, then liquor is being consumed at John’s.
2. Liquor is being consumed at John’s.
3. Therefore there is a party at John’s

Many people actually accept arguments similar to this one or that derive from arguments similar to this one.. They shouldn’t. What is being claimed in 1 is that liquor’s being consumed at John’s is a necessary condition for there being a party at John’s. But the conclusion, 3, only looks plausible if liquor’s being consumed is sufficient for there being a party at John’s. But that is not so. It is not enough, it is not sufficient, to establish that there is a party at John’s, to establish that there is liquor being consumed there.  Perhaps1 is true just because John, all by himself, is at his place boozing, even though there is no party there and never has been one. This argument thus confuses necessary with sufficient conditions. Such confusions are very common, and philosophers try to be on guard against them. If A is sufficient for B, then whenever you have A, you have B. For example, if a certain electrical-chemical event in the brain were sufficient for the mental event of feeling a pain, that amounts to the claim that if a certain brain event is taking place, pains are occurring. But that does not amount to the claim that if pains are occurring then there is a certain brain event taking place.  Maybe pains can be felt by beings that do not even have brains!
 Generally, if A is necessary for B, then we state this as “if B, then A.” If A is sufficient for B, then we state this as “if A then B.” If A is both necessary and sufficient for B, then, we state that as “A if and only if B.” Consider the following:

1. If Mary is here, Bill is glad.

That tells us that Mary’s being here is sufficient for Bill’s being glad. It is enough to make him glad. But it doesn’t tell us that Bill’s being glad is sufficient for Mary’s being here. It is quite possible that Bill would also be glad if Jane were here, and Mary was absent. Thus an argument like this, to which you have already constructed a counterexample,  would be bad:

1. If Mary is here, Bill is glad.
2. Bill is glad.
3. Therefore, Mary is here.

Likewise, “if pain is occurring, brain C fibers are firing” together with “brain C fibers are firing” certainly does not prove that pain is occurring.

(10) In which of the following is there a confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. (a) All Mothers are Republicans, therefore, if you are a Republican, you are a mother. (b) If George is clever, he will not fail the exam, and he is clever, so he will not fail the exam.

(10) In the arguments in the previous question, indicate which of the following are necessary conditions and which are sufficient: being a mother; being a Republican; being clever; not failing.

Reduction to Absurdity(Latin: reductio ad absurdum)
Suppose you believe all of the following;
1. Most Europeans like Americans but hate George Bush, America’s president, because of his personality and his performance as president.
2. %70 of Americans approve of Bush’s personality and performance as president.
3. People who dislike a country’s leader also dislike the people of that country whenever those people  approve of that leader (for example, most Americans not only despised Hitler, but they also despised those Germans that approved of and supported Hitler).
If you believe all of 1-3, then you are in a real logical pickle.  For it follows from 3 and 2 that Europeans dislike Americans. Right? And that contradicts 1. 1-3 imply a contradiction. A contradiction is an “absurdity.” It is absurd to believe both that most Europeans like Americans and that most Europeans dislike Americans. But if you believe all of 1-3, then you are committed to believing a contradiction. We have just “reduced to absurdity” that set of beliefs.  So, in order to get rid of the absurdity you will have to give up at least one of 1-3.

(10) Which of 1-3 would you most likely give up believing, and why?

(10) Could the following set of beliefs be criticized by a reduction to absurdity? Explain exactly how.
1. Combustion is caused by the release of phlogiston
2. Anything weighs less without its phlogiston then with it.
3. X was “combusted”
4. X weighed more after being combusted than before.

The technique of reductio ad absurdum can be applied to any set of beliefs, whether they are an argument or not. However, remarkably, many arguments can be reduced to absurdity. But they are usually enthymemes. Usually the person who accepts or advances such arguments will give them up when all the premises have been stated, since then the absurdity will become evident. Likewise for sets of beliefs generally. For example there are people who believe 1, but they give it up when someone points out to them that they also believe 2 and 3.  Notice that in this case, however, it is at least possible that it is the Europeans who have the absurd set of beliefs, and they manage that by ignoring or not noticing 2, or by trying to explain it away.

Other Kinds of Critiques
The various techniques for constructing and criticizing arguments which are used by philosophers are used by people generally, but often without a clear awareness of what they are doing, and of what the pitfalls are. Here are some common ways of criticizing arguments:
 1. We try to show that even if the premises are true, the conclusion does not have to be true (that is, it does not follow).
 2. We may claim that even if the premises are true, they do not make the conclusion very probable.
 3. We may point out that one or more of the premises is in fact not true.
As a variant on #1, we might criticize an argument by claiming that the premises are not even relevant to the conclusion. If you claim that
 (2) Luther’s theological views are unworthy of consideration, because
 (1) he was a “filthy monk,”
you have a bad argument, since the fact that someone doesn’t bathe too often is not relevant to the claim that their theology also stinks. (This particular argument was in fact used by an enemy of Luther’s!)
 There are many other ways of attacking or defending arguments, and we will discuss some of them in the Logic Boxes. Some arguments are complex and may elicit several kinds of criticism all at once. The construction and criticism of arguments is central to philosophy; it is what being logical actually amounts to, and for the most part philosophers have been quite concerned to be logical.
 
 

Questions for Exam I   Phil. 120

1. Define the following: determinism; indeterminism; soft determinism or compatibilism.
2. The soft determinist claims that as long as I act from my own desires and intentions, my actions are free. How does the determinist reply to this claim?
4. Explain the following: “the self is a relation which relates itself to itself.”  In your explanation mention the notion of what is “necessary in the self” and “possibility.”
5. What does Kierkegaard mean by “despair?”
6. Define the following: alienation; homo faber; capitalist.
7. How, according to Marx, does labor under capitalism alienate the worker from (a) the product of his work (b) his work itself (c) other workers (d) capitalists?
8. Why, according to Nietzsche, do “venerations” get in the way of  self-assertion?
9. What does Naess mean by “deep ecology?”
10. With what should I identify my “self” according to Naess?
11. What is problematic in Darwin’s claim that a “dog can feel shame, as opposed to fear?”
12. How does Darwin’s account of the way a pike learns supposedly support his view that there is no fundamental difference between humans and other animals?
 

Machines and Humans
Quiz 6.
1. Huxley argues for the idea that humans are basically machines by showing how much a frog, or a human, can do without “consciousness.”

2. Ziff argues that a machine could feel tired, just as the number 17 could.

3. Searle argues that mere implementation of a formal program could never produce intentionality.

4.By linguistic “holism” Haugeland means that the interpretation and understanding of language requires familiarity with a ‘whole’ system, rather than familiarity with a pile of ‘entries’ (like a dictionary).

5. Thinking about the following might help us understand Haugeland’s idea of existential holism:
(a) the inability of a dog to feel shame
(b) the inability of a being that does not care about winning to be ashamed of losing a game
(c) the fact that humans are concerned about life and death and only for that reason are able to understand and appreciate stories in which there is danger, death, mourning, etc.
(d) all of these.

6. ‘Her pants seemed painted on’ could possibly mean ‘her pants were very ______’ or ‘her pants had ____on them.’

Outline  for Exam II

I. MINDS, MACHINES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI)
 a. Huxley – animals, and people, can perform many complex actions even when not fully conscious (when brain damaged, when spinal cord is severed, etc.). THEREFORE, it is plausible to assume that consciousness is an insignificant feature of humans. Humans are basically machines.

 b. Wittgenstein and Ziff – both argue that ‘a machine could not think’ is not an empirical claim. We do not know it is true via an empirical study of machines. It is more like ‘the number 17 could not feel tired.’ We know this is true because of our grasp of concepts, of how we use words.  Ziff points out that we could not seriously claim that something which is clearly a machine, could feel tired (for example). KNOW HIS ARGUMENTS FOR THAT CLAIM!

 c. Searle – Focuses on intentionality of the mental. Thoughts, beliefs, etc. (and also the sentences or utterances we use to express them) are about something, directed upon an object. His thought here is close to Brentano. The “Chinese room” argument shows that a Turing machine, a device which processes input according to some program and produces appropriate output, could not have intentionality.  If its output consisted of written or spoken words, it could not know what those words were about or what they meant. That would be so even if the machine passed the “Turing test” i.e. we could not distinguish its behavior from that of a native speaker of a language. KNOW SEARLE’S ARGUMENTS FOR THIS CLAIM!

 d. Lycan – agrees with Searle that merely instantiating a program (processing input, producing output etc) is not sufficient for thought or belief. But, a machine or robot that has a structure that mimicked that of the human brain might have thoughts. A difference in the kind of stuff used to build the robot should not make a difference to the possibility of thought. What is required is a complex thing which interacts with the environment in complex ways that are similar to the ways we interact.

 e. Haugeland – he wants to show the limitations of AI, by showing that no machine could handle language the way humans do.  Linguistic knowledge is “holistic.” In order to understand individual words I must understand how they fit in sentences. In order to understand that, I must have a pretty good grasp of how sentences fit into larger “wholes” such as stories or essays. Certain difficulties with language translation programs show that computers or robots or androids cannot relate parts to wholes in the ways necessary for linguistic understanding.  He distinguishes four different “holisms.” KNOW WHAT THEY ARE. BE ABLE TO ILLUSTRATE EACH.
 
 
 
 
 

EPISTEMOLOGY
 Epistemology is the study of knowledge, what it is, how we get it.  It is completely obvious that when I know that, for example,  the sun is shining (call ‘the sun is shining’  ‘S’ for short) then it is the case that
 1. I believe S
 2. S is true.
However, I could believe S because it was reported to me by a very unreliable source, or because I dreamed it and didn’t realize it was a dream, or for all sorts of other bizarre reasons. Even though such sources of my  belief that S are unreliable, they might in this instance be right, since maybe the sun IS shining. But do I KNOW it? Most people would say NO, since I am not JUSTIFIED in believing it. I ought not to believe things told me by unreliable people, for example. So it seems natural to add a third element in the definition of knowledge; I know S just in case both 1 and 2 hold, and furthermore
 3. I am justified in believing S.
This analysis or definition of knowledge is called the JTB analysis. Knowledge is Justified True Belief.
 Much of the history of epistemology has consisted in an attempt to show that we can, (or cannot, in the case of skepticism) be justified in at least some of our beliefs, and, to show how we can be justified (or, why we cannot).

One of the most common ways of justifying a belief is by claiming to have seen or, more generally, perceived, something. Thus I would be justified in believing S if I had actually just seen, or am seeing, that the Sun is out.

This section begins with a discussion of perception. It turns out the perception is more complicated than we ordinarily think.

 a. Searle on perception – Empiricists like Locke have supposed that when I perceive a tree, for example, I do not directly perceive the tree; rather, I perceive an “idea” of the tree in my mind, an idea which is supposedly caused, normally, by the tree causally interacting with  my nervous system. They hold this view primarily because of
 SCEPTICISM. Sceptics have pointed out that I can have exactly the same experiences when a tree is present and when it is not. I could be hallucinating, or dreaming, for instance. They also use other arguments. KNOW THEM! These arguments have led empiricists to look for something that true or “veridical” perceptions, on the one hand,  and hallucinations etc.on the other, have in common. They have supposed that what they have in common is the same mental content, the same “idea”, and thus in both cases what is perceived is that idea. I thus never directly perceive a tree, even when there is one right in front of me!
 Searle refuses to let sceptical arguments lead him to the idea that I never directly perceive a tree.  On his view, when I see a tree I directly perceive the tree.  On those rare occasions when I seem to see a tree, but there isn’t one, I simply have a peculiar experience which is like that of seeing a tree, but even then I am not seeing an “idea” of a tree. I am just having an experience similar to the one I have when actually seeing a tree.
 Perception, Searle insists, is intentional. It is directed upon something. Perceptions have conditions of satisfaction, just like beliefs and statements do. When I am perceiving a tree and there is a tree in front of me, then one of the conditions of satisfaction for that perception is fulfilled. When I am hallucinating a tree then one of the conditions of satisfaction for that experience is missing. Similarly, if I have a belief that there is a tree in front of me, one of the conditions of satisfaction is that there be a tree in front of me.
 There is this  difference between beliefs and perceptions; one of the conditions of satisfaction for my perceptions is that they be caused by their content. If my perception that there is a tree is caused by there being a tree, then one of the conditions is met. But if it was caused by a drug, say, then even if there is a tree in front of me, it would not be the case that I see the tree (I am too busy hallucinating to see much of anything).  That is however NOT the case with beliefs. It is not one of the conditions of satisfaction of my belief that there is a tree there that  that belief be caused by a tree being there.
WHY NOT? Give an example.

An important point made by Searle is that perception is not simply a passive reception of data, but is active and involves background and expectations. The TOOT example, and the gestalt drawings, illustrate that point. WHAT I see usually depends upon my background, other things I know or have experienced, what I am expecting, and so forth.
Thus, an illiterate person COULD NOT see the TOOT drawing as an English word.
WHY NOT?

COHERENTISM VS. FOUNDATIONALISM in epistemology.
Dancy:
Foundationalism says any knowledge claim, such as the claim that the sun is shining (S), will only BE knowledge if it traces back either to some experience, or to some rational intuition. Experience, for instance, might be “foundational” in the sense that there is nothing more basic “beneath” it. I might infer that the sun is shining from my belief that George reports the weather reliably plus the fact that George told me it is shining. They support my belief that it is shining. But if I am actually seeing the shining sun, I do not INFER that it is shining from anything. I just see it. My belief does not need any other support. The actual perception, or the belief that arises from it, is foundational.

A coherentist denies that there are foundational beliefs or statements. What makes a belief into knowledge is not that it is foundational or can be traced back to something foundational. Rather, what makes it knowledge is that it coheres well with other beliefs. Thus even if  I am seeing the sun shining, I should not believe it is if the belief that it is does not cohere with other beliefs. Suppose I believe it is raining, and believe that all the people around me deny the sun is shining. Since my belief that it is shining does not cohere with those beliefs, then I probably should reject it, even though it seems certain to me that I am seeing a shining sun. On the coherentist view no statement is any more foundational than any other.
Coherence means
 consistency
 mutually explanatory
The best beliefs increase the coherence of my set of beliefs.

Problem: why could there not be more than one coherent set of beliefs, and if there was, how could we choose between them?
HOW DOES DANCY SOLVE THIS PROBLEM?

Supposed advantages of coherence theory of justification;
It reflects the way we actually go about justifying our beliefs
It explains how knowledge grows
It is just as compatible with empiricism as foundationalism is.

BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN EACH OF THOSE.

Skip Sosa.

BE ABLE TO GIVE A GETTIER-LIKE COUNTEREXAMPLE TO THE CLAIM THAT KNOWLEDGE IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF.

Plantinga:
Associates internalism (DEFINE) with notion of knowledge as justified belief. He rejects this. There is no strong connection between justification and knowledge (WHY NOT?). What is required for knowledge, besides True Belief, is warrant. My beliefs are warranted just in case they come about in some proper or reliable way. But I do not have to know how my belief was produced in order to be warranted in my belief. Warrant is or could be “external” to anything else I know. So this position is “externalist.”

Lehrer:
Externalist ideas work pretty well for perceptual knowledge (WHY?)  Not so well for knowledge that all humans are mortal, or that neutrinos have zero rest mass. (WHY?)
If my belief that the sun is shining was caused by a shining sun, then it is warranted or justified, the externalist says. But Lehrer thinks this will not work. Objections – Information is not the same as knowledge. I can possess true information without having knowledge (GIVE THE TEMPU-COMP EXAMPLE)
The cause of a belief must be distinguished from the justification for it. (GIVE THE RACO EXAMPLE).
Externalists, Lehrer says, tend to confuse knowledge with possession of true information, or to think one has knowledge when ones beliefs have been caused in a certain way. But what matters he claims, is not how it is caused, but how it is justified. And of course I will myself KNOW how my beliefs are justified, so Leher’s position is internalist.

ONCE MORE, DEFINE “EXTERNALISM” AND “INTERNALISM” IN EPISTEMOLOGY.

Zagzebski. class outline.
Kuhn. class outline
Code   class outline
Soakal class outline
 

Terms to know, Concepts to Define

*Relativism
* Intentionality
Identity theory
Logical behaviorism
Determinism
Simple indeterminism
Compatibilism (soft determinism)
AI research
*Deontology
*Consequentialism
Utilitarianism
Categorical Imperative
Hypothetical Imperative
Virtue Ethics
Ecological philosophy
*Holism
*Coherentism
* Foundationalism
Internalism in epistemology
Externalism in epistemology
*Social constructionism
Virtue epistemology
Functionalism (in the philosophy of mind)
Alienation (Marx)
Criteria of personal identity
Paradigm
Sentience
Anthropomorphism
*Folk Psychology
Eliminative materialism
Scepticism
Turing Machine
 
 
 
 

Phil. 120, Test 1

True(a) or False (b)

1. According to Naess and Ghandi, if I identify deeply with all of nature, I will be reluctant to kill insects.
2. Determinists hold that strictly speaking humans cannot be held responsible for their actions.
3. Compatibilists claim that human actions are free since they are uncaused.
4. Kierkegaard and Nietzsche both assume free will, the capacity for self-formation
5. Valid arguments are arguments in which, if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
6. Darwin argued that there is no sharp qualitative difference between humans and other animals.
7. To anthropomorphize is to attribute animal qualities to humans.
8. Nietzsche thought that most people are weak and need to belong to a “herd” in order to feel strong.
9. Kierkegaard thinks that what makes a person a "self" is the
struggle to attain to some ideal.
10. According to Darwin ants run around and play like puppies do.
11. An enthymeme is an argument with a part missing
12. Taylor criticises soft determinism.
13.  Soft determinism is the view that all our actions are caused by factors external to ourselves.
14.  Compatibilists hold that universal causation does not imply complete lack of freedom.
15. Marx is interested in communism primarily as the solution to the problem of alienation.

Multiple Choice (choose the best answer)
16.Reid defends the notion that
    (A) we have the ability to produce our own actions
    (B) something like Taylor's "theory of agency" must be correct
    (C) we can held responsible for what we do, usually
    (D) all of the above.
17. The appeal in compatibilism or soft determinism resides in
    (A) the fact that we naturally tend to think of those actions which arise from our own desires, etc. as free
    (B) the common sense notion that some actions are uncaused
    (C) the common sense notion that no events are caused or determined
    (D) all of these
18. Marx condemns capitalism partly because
 (A) it emphasizes possessions, private property, rather than human
development
  (B) it alienates the worker from the product of his labor,
making it the property of another
  (C)it alienates workers from each other and causes true community to degenerate
  (D)all of these.

19. Atheism naturally goes together with
 (A)theism
  (B)materialism
 (C)bromidism
 (D)all of these.

Study the following numbered quotes, and answer the questions about each
which follow.

#1 "The self is a relation which relates itself to itself..."

20. What Kierkegaard is claiming in this statement is that
 (A)to be a self is to be actively involved in pursuing some ideal
 (B)the finite particular "self' which I actually am at any moment is
constantly reaching out to some imagined self (trying to "be like so and so", for instance).
 (C)selves are related to themselves like brother to sister
  (D)A and B.

21. The view of the self suggested by this quote is
 (A)incompatible with the notion that a human is a machine
 (B)incompatible with the notion that people are simply the product of heredity and environment
 (C)incompatible with the claim that immediate health of spirit is possible
  (D)all of these.

#II "We must also admit that there is a much wider interval in mental power between one of the lowest fishes, as a lamprey or lancelet, and one of the higher apes. than between an ape and man; yet this interval is filled up by numberless gradations.

22.This quote is from
 (A) Keirkegaard
 (B)Darwin
 (C)Nietzsche
 (D)none of these

23.The author of this quote is trying to show that
 (A)human intelligence could have developed out of lower level animal
intelligence
 (B)there is no sharp qualitative difference between humans and other
animals even with respect to intelligence
 (C)intelligence in lower animals is continuous with, not sharply separatedfrom, intelligence in higher animals and in humans
 (D)all of these.

#III "one could imagine a delight and a power of self determining, and a freedom of will whereby a spirit could bid farewell to every belief, to every wish for certainty, accustomed as it would be to support itself on slender cords and possibilities, and to dance even on the verge of abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit par excellence.

24.This quote is quite obviously from
 (A)Holbach
 (B)Nietzsche
 (C) Taylor
 (D)all of these.

25.The point of the remarks in #III is that
 (A) in order to achieve true freedom a person must give up all reliance on “certainties” of all kinds
 (B) in order to achieve true freedom of will one must will on ones own, without relying on any help from systems of belief (religious, ethical, scientific etc.)
 (C) even heavy people should be able to support themselves on slender cords
 (D) A and B

IV.
26.
27.

V.
28
29.

#VI "As a result, therefore, man (the worker) no longer feels himself to be freely active in any but his animal functions-eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal.
What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.

30.The author of #VI
 (A)is complaining about the effects of capitalist modes of production upon the workers
 (B)is Karl Marx
 (C)thinks humans can turn into dogs and cats
 (D)A and B

31. What is being claimed in #VI is part of an argument which tries to show that
 (A) people only feel human when they are doing the least human things
 (B) we cannot achieve human fulfillment by having fun on weekends
 (C) our human functions are specifically our functions as workers or
producers, not our functions as eaters, procreators, etc.
 (D)all of these
 (E)none of these

#Vll "There can, I think, be no doubt that a dog feels shame, as distinct from fear..."

32.If what is claimed in #VII is true then
(A) a dog might feel ashamed of something it did last week
(B) a dog might feel ashamed of something it did even though it was not caught or
blamed for doing it
(C) a dog might feel ashamed of being glad that another dog got run over
(D) a dog is a very different sort of critter than we all, with good reason, suppose it to be
 (E)all of these

33.#VII is part of
(A) a feeble attempt by Darwin to show that humans are not all that different in their emotions from dogs and other animals
(B) a feeble attempt by Marx to show that dogs are capitalists
(C) a feeble attempt by Nerkegaard to show that aesthetes are dogs
(D) a feeble attempt by a dog to show how human it is.
 
 

key
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Key, Test I
 

Phil. 120       SAMPLE  EXAM II

True(a) or False(b)

1. Searle argues that computerized robots could not be in intentional states.
2. Epistemology is the study of knowledge.
3. Since Data can carry on a conversation in English, it is obvious  that he understands the meaning of English words.
4. Data could be programmed to act tired after lifting a feather.
5. Kuhn argued that there is steady progress in science.
6. Code denies that what counts as knowledge has anything to do with power relations.
7. An externalist in epistemology holds that a person can be warranted in a belief, even though they do not know what provides the warrant.
8. Searle points out that the Chinese room actually knows Chinese.
9. Soakal agrees that some knowledge, particularly in the social sciences, may be “socially constructed.”
10. The “ social construction” of knowledge would be illustrated by the way in which some people have explained the discovery of the Hudson river.
11. The claim that a machine could feel is, according to Ziff, absurd.
12. It is obvious that knowledge of atoms or quarks is socially constructed.
13. If I possess information that P, then clearly I know that P.
14. To believe something or desire something is to be in an intentional state.
15. To forget something is to be in an intentional state.

Multiple choice.
16. Searle’s account of perception emphasizes that a perceiver
 (a) is a passive recipient of data
 (b) brings a background of knowledge and expectations to perception
 (c) is only directly aware of ideas in the mind
 (d) all of these
17. According to Plantinga
 (a) I can be justified in what I believe without having knowledge
 (b) what makes a belief of mine knowledge is that it has warrant
 (c) I cannot always know how a belief is warranted or what gives it warrant
 (d) all of these.
18. People may think that Data (in Star Trek) is conscious because
 (a) he converses in a sensible way
 (b) he runs on batteries
 (c) he can perform complicated mental tasks
 (d) A and C.
19. Some epistemologists think that you only have knowledge when
 (a) your beliefs are based on some solid foundation, such as sense perception
 (b) your beliefs are completely certain and free of doubt
 (c) you have a belief which you think is true, but which is in fact false
 (d) a and b.
20. A coherentist claims that
 (a) knowledge grows by adjusting beliefs to one another
 (b) knowledge requires foundational beliefs
 (c) knowledge is impossible
 (d) a and b.

I. Learning to speak, and learning to sing, are processes by which the vocal mechanism is set to new tunes. A song which has been learned has its molecular equivalent, which potentially represents it in the brain, just as a musical box, wound up, potentially represents an overture. Touch the stop and the overture begins; send a molecular impulse along the proper afferent nerve and the singer begins his song.

21. The author of this quote is trying to show that
 (a) humans are basically machines
 (b) that “knowing” a tune is nothing more having a brain in a certain state
 (c) that humans are no different than music boxes
 (d) a and b.
22. a
According to I in coming to learn a tune, what happens is that the brain gets set up or configured in such a way that
 (a) under certain prompts my vocal chords etc. will start to move in such a way as to produce the tune
 (b) that configuration amounts to a representation in some sense of the tune itself
 (c) I will need to be wound up to sing
 (d) A and B.

II What sorts of beliefs might a thermostat have? Well, it records input (temperature changes), processes that input, and provides output (reading on a dial, plus activation of an air conditioner or heater). So, when the temperature goes up by a certain amount, it’s reaction could be said to amount to the “belief” that “it is too hot in here.”
Anyone who thinks strong Al has a chance as a theory of the mind ought to ponder the implications of that remark. We are asked to accept it as a discovery of strong Al that the hunk of metal on the wall that we use to regulate the temperature has beliefs in exactly the same sense that we, our spouses, and our children have beliefs,

23. #II is or includes
 (a) an attack on strong AI
 (b) a description of what some advocates of strong AI believe
 (c) a description of a thermostat as a Turing machine
 (d) all of these
24. The author of #II
 (a) obviously believes that thermostats have beliefs
(b) wants to deny that the mere implementation of a program is sufficient for having beliefs
(c) is John Searle
(d) b and c.

III. This theory holds that a belief is justified to the extent to which the belief-set of which it is a member is coherent. Each belief is to be evaluated by appeal to the role it plays in the belief-set. If the coherence of the set would be increased by abandoning the belief and perhaps by replacing it by its opposite, the belief is not justified. If the set is more coherent with this belief as a member rather than with any alternative, the belief is justified.

25. #III is
 (a) a statement of the coherence theory of justification in epistemology
 (b) a statement of the coherence theory of truth
 (c) more coherent than anything
 (d) all of these
26. #III could be illustrated by
(a) the way a detective arrives at a justified belief about “who did it” when she pieces together various bits of evidence and keeps those pieces that fit together with the largest number of other pieces
(b) the way some scientists ignore disconfirming evidence when it does not fit with many other beliefs about which they have great confidence
(c) the way most people try to figure out what is going on in a movie or novel
(d) all of these.

IV. Essentialist attributions work both normatively and descriptively. Not only do they purport to describe how women essentially are, they are commonly enlisted in the perpetuation of women’s (usually inferior) social status. Yet essentialist claims are highly contestable. Their diverse manifestations across class, race, and ethnicity attest to their having a sociocultural rather than a “natural” source. Their deployment as instruments for keeping women in their place means that caution is always required in appealing to them-even though they often appear to designate women’s strengtbs.
27. The author of IV is
(a) referring to claims like “women are by nature more intuitive, men more logical”
 (b) advocating caution about claims like the one in (a)
 (c) advocating caution about essentialist claims
 (d) all of these
28. The author of IV
(a) although a feminist, would be sceptical about claims for the inherent intellectual superiority of women
(b) stresses that differences between men and women with respect to knowledge acquisition are most likely due to social factors rather than genetic or “natural” factors.
(c) thinks that claims about how women are “by nature” are typically used to oppress women
(d) all of these.
 
 
 
 

KEY
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Key Sample Exam II