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Class Conduct, Instructor’s Role, etc. What I Expect of Students.

1.Treat each other with respect.

2.Treat the instructor with respect.

3.Do not talk unless called on.

4. Do not leave the room without permission except in extreme emergency.

5. Be on time.

6. Be eager to learn. The best indication of progress is engagement with the issues and ideas we deal with.

7. Do not be afraid to say "I don't understand."

8. Expect the same of me as I expect of you. (Except for #2 and #3, and #4, of course. You will see that I follow #7 a lot.)

9. Stay awake. If you need to sleep, do it elsewhere.

[NOTE: "Any student eligible for and requesting academic accommodations due to a disability is requested to provide a letter of accommodation from P.A.C.E. or Student Academic Support Center within the first two weeks of the semester."]

Academic Integrity: Any form of cheating, on your short paper, study questions, quizzes, or exams, will result in an ‘F’ for the entire course. NO EXCEPTIONS. Policies regarding academic integrity are further detailed in the student handbook. Cheating obviously includes plagiarism. DO YOUR OWN WORK.

Cell Phones: phones must be OFF during classes. You may not make ANY use of cell phones during any exam or quiz.. Use of cell phones in such circumstances counts as cheating and results in an F.

Classes will consist of a mix of lecture and discussion,

Students are expected to treat other students in a polite fashion, even though they should feel free to express disagreement on ANY topic or ANY claim that is advanced by anyone, including the instructor. At the same time, each student must attempt to exercise responsibility by keeping discussion focused on the subject at hand and by listening carefully to the responses of the instructor and other participants. Particular value is placed on argument, as opposed to mere expression of opinion. Say what you believe, but be prepared to say why.

QUESTIONS:

Ch. I Misreading the signs of the times

(“N”= Neuhaus)

1. Name a half dozen examples of explicit CONTINUING influence of religion in the “public square.”

2. Name three cases of possible controversial “intrusion” of religion into the public square that are in the news NOW.

3. Discuss the historical background to the fear of religion in the public square. Mention several (three or four) actual historical events or movements in your answer. Must include mention of the French revolution.

*4. Discuss the “American experiment.” Try to say what it is or has been. Mention a few significant “moments” in American history that bear on this.

5. Discuss some possible bad results of EXCLUDING religion from the public square. Mention at least two 20^th century examples.

6. Describe briefly the rise of the “new religious right.” Describe some historical changes in the religious right, name at least three main figures, and five main issues important to them. Cf. p.10

7. Distinguish evangelicals and fundamentalists. Give some historical background. Relate to question #6.

8. Describe the religious “mainline” left. Mention denominations and at least five typical “issues.”

*9. Discuss pro and con. Anti-slavery and civil rights movements were basically religiously inspired.

*10. Discuss pro and con. The abortion issue is a religious issue. Discuss why N. thinks “no other issue so clearly defines” the debate about religion and the public square.

11. Critique the following cliché: “the religious right favors something like a theocracy, the religious left does not.” Give some specific references. (cf. p. 12)

12. What does N. suggest as an account of the relation between the new religious right and “fanaticism?” (cf. p. 16).

*13. Discuss the usual clichés about “authoritarian” vs. “mature” (i.e. autonomous) people. Which is more oppressive, external authority or the “imperial self?” cf. p. 17. Use the “two captains” analogy (p. 18) in your discussion.

14. What is there in Christianity that appears to have a public bearing? What “public matters” has the religious right often emphasized from scripture etc.? The center or left?

15. List of terms:

Ch. II Public Religion and Public Reason

1. Discuss the common confusions about “public religion” and “separation of church and state.”

2. Argue pro and con: it is important to have a democratically legitimate public ethic.

3. Argue pro and con: you cannot have a public ethic without public religion.

4. What so far as you know did folk like Madison, Adams, Jefferson, think about #2 and #3? Cf. p. 22. Distinguish the notion of religion as providing a shared ethic with the notion of religion helping to enforce a public ethic.

5. How have public schools been involved in “public religion?” Mention, in your discussion, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the WASP consensus.

6. Discuss the breakdown of the consensus. Illustrate by reference to the extremes of Rowe, on the one hand, and the Humanist manifesto on the other (Quote both).

7. H. claims that the ideal of a “secular society” is recent in America. He also claims that it is promoted non-democratically, through the courts. Discuss these claims, and reference your answers to relevant earlier questions (e.g. 9 and 10).

8. Explain and discuss the difference between more conservative and more liberal government in terms of “experienced assault level.” Cf. p. 33-34

9. N. claims that the views of liberal Christians on public issues tend to be close to the views of those who have no religion or are anti-religious, whereas the views of conservative Christians tend to clash more with the views of the non-religious. Try to assess this claim. Could the liberal claim that this is a “happy convergence” or is it rather a case of “cultural captivity?”

10. Why does N. think that the new religious right and secular humanism reinforce each other? What, roughly, is the remedy he proposes?

11. A democratically legitimate public argument (an argument regarding public policy that could in principle be accepted by most or all) must be “trans-subjective.” Why? What bearing does this point have on fundamentalist tendencies to privatize religion? To confine it to specific biblical moral teachings?

12. Do you think it is true that we have “in recent decades . . systematically excluded from policy consideration” the religiously grounded values of most Americans (p.37)? Cite evidence pro and con.

Terms

Ch III Turning America Around

1. How do Baptists stand in the current debates about religion and the public square? Consider both historical and current tendencies.

2. What are the two forms of popular religion that have in recent decades often come together, esp. in the electronic church?

3. Critique the claim that the religious right and the left differ over matters of style. What are the supposed differences? What might be the substantive differences?

4. What do you think of the “People for the American Way” add (p.50).? Does it trivialize the concerns of religious people? What ARE those concerns, and are differences about them comparable to differences over how to fry an egg?

5. Who is imposing whose values on whom? Is that the only question in this debate?

Terms

Ch. IV Critical Patriotism

1. Discuss and compare “anti-fundamentalist” and “anti-Catholic” and more generally anti-religious bigotry to other kinds of bigotry. What makes bigotry bigotry?

2. “Critical patriotism” can be contrasted both with uncritical patriotism and “blame America for everything bad”ism. How have the latter two played out in American churches, both “left” and “right”?

3. The notion that America is a community to which we have responsibilities, of which we might feel critically proud, which deserves our loyalty, strikes some people as very “problematic” (p. 63). Why? Contrast America with the “little Platoons” of everyday life.

Also mention Oscar Wilde’s jibe.

4. What, according to N, are some common problems with such notions as being “in solidarity with the poor and oppressed”? (67-8)

5. What according to N are the main characteristics of the “American project?” (p.69)

What might be an alternative description of that project? Which, in your judgment, is a better reading?

6. Comment on some different ways of taking such slogans as ‘my country right or wrong’ and ‘love it or leave it.’ P. 74) How might such slogans relate to religious faith?

7. Discuss the quote from Lincoln (p. 75) in relation to a scene from “Remember the Titans.”

8. How does N describe the “freedom of the naked public square.”? P. 75

9. Discuss two different possible meanings of ‘under God’ in the pledge. Look ahead to p. 90 and “limited govt.”

10. What do you think of N’s “nuanced proposition” p. 72?

Ch. V. The Fragility of the Public Square (refer back to parts of II)

1. “The reason why the naked public square cannot remain naked is in the very nature of law and laws” p. 80 Explain and evaluate, mentioning governmental deligitimation.

2. What, according to N, is the basis for state opposition to religion in atheist states?

3. Combine #2 with a discussion of Murray p. 85 and “monism.”

4. Use the “DeMent injunction” in a discussion of the claims made on p. 86.

5. Solidarity, Solshenitzyn, Sontag, and anti-communism. P. 88 Discuss.(inform yourself if necessary). Mention Red Square and Lenin’s tomb.

6. N is critical of Schlesinger’s version of liberalism for only one reason. What is it? In your discussion mention both positive and negative freedom, and mediating institutions as sources of “community.”

Ch. VI Denying who we are

1. N mentions five sources of democracy (94-5). List them.

2. Do you agree with N that the demise of religious influence (and other traditional values) in people’s lives is not a fact, but is rather declared to be a fact by those who wish it were a fact? Give evidence, including all that can be found in this chapter.

3. Do you think the man from Mars who only watched TV etc. would be clueless about the social importance of religion in America?

Ch. IX The purloined authority of the state.

1. Argue that the courts have sometimes prohibited the free exercise of religion in the name of prohibiting establishment. V. p 147 and also DeMent (Additional materials).

2. If it is true that religion is the “morality bearing part of culture” (p. 154) and if it is true that “a truly valueless existence is impossible for persons or societies” so that the state must come up with values from somewhere, then it follows that the state must________values from _____________, which has itself been excluded from playing the role of providing values in the _____________________ (v. 154-55)

“purloined” =df.

Ch. XI Invoking the nightmares we fear.

1. On N’s reading of American history, the state was less expansive at the beginning of the republic than it is now. What does that mean? (cf. 180)

2. The divorce of fact and value (p. 179) has led to the notion that there can be no publicly valid value judgments. The result is that in the public sphere we simply try to balance “interests.” What does that mean?

3. “We cannot at the same time have govt. that is expansive, religiously sanitized, and democratic”(p. 180). Why not?

Ch. XIII The Captivities of the Mainline

1. The mainline USED to be as described by Bushnell, p. 208. What is it like now? Give examples that bring out the contrast.

Ch. XVI Law and the Experiment Renewed.

1. Do you sense a difference between “laws” and “the law?” Explain (v. p 249-53). For example, would you agree with Berman that “there is an all-embracing moral reality, a purpose in the universe, which stealing offends” (p. 251)?

2. The Question, N claims, is “What is the foundation of the authority that the law claims for itself?” (p.254). If you agree why? If not, why not?

3. On p. 25 N seems to argue as follows:

1.Law is entangled with questions of right and wrong.

2. Questions of right and wrong cannot be treated scientifically.

3. Therefore, Law cannot be treated scientifically.

That is a valid argument. Are the premises true? Say, roughly, how you would attack or defend them.

4. With “capricious” law, “naked force displaces legitimate power.”(p. 256). Explain.

What might be an alternative to “capricious law?”

5. Study the middle of p.259 along with readings in Rawls and Sandel.

6. According to N what must evangelicals and fundamentalists do, and what will happen if they don’t? (bottom p. 260 – top 261).

End reading on 261.

E Reserve

Guide B.

Fri. Sept. 30

Intro. questions, 1-5.

Mon. Oct. 3

Augustine, all questions. Study Bud. Preface.

Questions from Bud.

1. Aristotle thinks the end of the state is the perfection of its members. List several objections, and Aristotle’s replies.

2. How does ethics get into politics, according to Aristotle?

Wed. Oct. 5. Golding questions. Hobbes Questions.

1. Aristotle regards politics as partnership in a good life.

a.What is Hobbes’ view?

b. How would Aristotle respond to Hobbes?

Fri. Oct. 7. Baier questions. Pris. Dilemma questions.

Mon. Oct. 10.

Guide B due.

Guide C

By Friday, Oct. 14

C 1 Answer q. 2 in Bud. p. 24.

C 2. Answer q. 5 in Bud p. 25

C 3. Give examples of intellectual and moral virtues (3 each). Why do we need both kinds, according to Aristotle? Mention Lewis’ analogy (p. 27-28) in your answer.

C 4. Why does self control require practical wisdom? Why does practical wisdom require self control?

By Wed. Oct. 19

C 5. q. 3 p. 36

C 6.q. 4 p. 36

C 7. Explain what Aristotle meant by “the common good” by considering families. Study p. 33 to answer this.

C 8, Fill in the matrix on p. 40. What two things does this show about law and morality?

C 9. Lawmakers obviously cannot pass laws requiring people to be friends. Nonetheless the laws can encourage or discourage friendship. How? (cf. p. 44-48)

C 10. q. 4, p. 49.

By Friday, Oct 21

C 11. What can law and custom do that parental training cannot do? Can you think of any laws or customs of ours that do these things? Explain.

C 12. Compare Aristotle to Hobbes. A. What kind of regime does each favor, and why?

B. How does each of them conceive of the role of reason in the best community?

C. In what other ways do they differ about human nature, and how do their differences impact their views about government and law.

By Monday, Oct. 24 Study Bud. Ch. 4

C 13. Describe a scholastic quaestio.

C 14. Define the following: Substance and type; participation of the rational creature in the eternal law; powers and habits; rational and sensitive appetites (include discussion of will, and of irascible and concupiscible appetite); habit; synderesis; virtue; vicious; fomes; speculative reason; prudence or practical wisdom; perfect community; law (contrast with Hobbes).

C 15. Reproduce the diagram on p. 60 and FILL IN each box with further details. For instance, at the top in the box containing ‘eternal law’ you could add ‘the laws or principles by which God made the universe. Cannot be known directly, but only in its “reflections.”

C 16 Answer all four questions on p. 64.

By Wednesday, Oct. 26. Study Bud. p.65-69.

C 17. Answer question 1, p. 78. List the common objections given by Bud. first.

Read Aquinas, Q 96 (e reserve. #7384). Answer these questions:

C18. Aquinas holds that even in a state of nature or the prelapsarian state there would be “RULE” or mastership.

a.Give his principal reason.

b. Give the quote from Augustine’s City of God that he cites in support of his position.

c. Compare his position to Hobbes’ in as much detail as you can.

By Friday, Oct. 28. Study Aquinas (TA), Q. 90,91.

C 19. State the question in each of the articles of 90 and 91. (The answer is always ‘yes’)

C 20. What is meant by

a. (again!)“natural law is the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law” (be sure to define the main terms)

b. “law is a rule and measure”

C 21. What is the difference between the way in which a plant “participates in eternal law” and the way a rational being (a human) does?

By Monday, Oct. 31. Finish Bud. ch. 5. Study TA Q92 and Q93.

C 22. Explain the “law of concupiscence.” Notice oil in crankcase.

C 23. Answer q. 2, p. 78.

By Wednesday, Nov. 2. Continue with TA q. 93 and 94.

C 24. In 92 article 2, how does Thomas reply to obj. 4? How does his reply relate to

a. Hobbes

b. Aristotle’s notions about how virtue is aquired?

C. 25 How does the way in which “natural objects” (like stones and trees) “obey” divine law differ from the way in which human beings obey? Give details as found in Q. 93, Art. 5. Try to clarify the notion of “directing something to its end” by giving examples from non-human and human nature.

C. 26. In the light of your answer to C. 25, discuss whether there is anything in the notion that Aquinas confuses “law” in the sense of “laws of nature” and “law” in the sense of something promulgated by a legislator.

C. 27. According to Q. 94, Art 2, what are some of the main precepts of the natural law, and what is natural about them?

By Friday, Nov. 4. Study Q. 94 LOTS

C. 28. Neither the “truth nor rectitude” of the particular conclusions of practical reason is the same for all. Give an example of each.

a. example where the truth is not the same for all.

b. example where the rectitude is not the same for all.

Does that imply some kind of relativism?

C 29. Fill in the blanks:

a. “Do good, avoid evil” is a ________precept of the natural law.

b. “Be sociable” is also a _________precept of the natural law, from which it follows that one should not do ____________ to ones neighbor.

c. The primary precepts are ______________to all and are ______________ for all.

d. Assuming that “do no harm” is a general secondary (or immediate) principle of natural law, it follows that if someone says they do not KNOW that is it wrong to kill an innocent person, their reason (rational faculties) must be __________________.

C. 30. Reason can be corrupted or perverted in five ways, according to Aquinas: list them and give YOUR OWN examples of each. Can you think of any OTHER way reason could be perverted? If so describe it (them). See Bud. ch. 5

C. 31. How does Aquinas handle the problem of the “sins of the patriarchs?” (see Q. 94 Art. 5, obj. 2). Give examples.

By Monday, Nov. 7. Study Q. 95, Review Bud. ch. 5. Study Bud. ch. 6.

C. 32. According to Aquinas (and Aristotle) one can determine what the “good” that all should pursue IS, by considering the purposes of our human living and human “inclinations.” The “good” will simply be the fulfillment of our purpose(s). Humans are meant to live reasonably (reason is the distinctive capacity of humans and reason’s purpose, at the practical level, is to guide behavior). People who do that will be good. (You cannot be truly reasonable and be evil too). How do you suppose Aquinas would respond to each of the following objections to these ideas:

a. A person could use “reason” to guide his behavior and still be evil. Consider the very smart criminal who uses his reason “to the max” in stealing a precious diamond from a heavily guarded museum. So it follows that using reason to guide behavior does NOT guarantee goodness at all. It could even be used to make people more successfully evil.

b. People have different sorts of inclinations. Some people are heavily “inclined” to eat too much, others do not have such inclinations. Some type A personalities are inclined to be rude and pushy, whereas some people are just naturally kind. Some people may be born with violent tendencies, others are naturally gentle. Some people have homosexual inclinations, some do not. And so forth. Since there are so many conflicting inclinations, it is meaningless to speak of “the” purposes of “our” inclinations, and impossible to argue that guiding our inclinations with reason would lead to particular kinds of behavior as opposed to other kinds. (see Q 94 art. 4)

C. 33. Can natural law vary? Explain. See Q. 94 Art. 5.

C. 34. There are two ways human laws can be derived from natural law. What are they? See Q 95 Art. 2.

For Wed. Nov. 9^th. Study TA q. 96 and 97.

C. 35 Make an outline of Q. 96. Include a description of the examples used and their purposes (cf. art. 6, the case of shutting the gates of the city. )

C. 36 Even unjust laws may still “oblige in the court of conscience.” When do they and when don’t they? (v. 96 art. 4)

C. 37. Explain how the points made in 97 can be used to argue against relativism. Remember that relativism usually gets started when it is noticed that different peoples or cultures have varying laws and customs. How, according to Aquinas, is that fact consistent with, and even to be expected, given that the natural law itself at least in its primary precepts does not change at all.

Fri. Nov. 11 Study Q 100 Art 1, Q 105 art 1. Review Bud. Ch. 6

C 38. Under what circumstances can human laws be changed?(cf. Q 97 and Bud. p. 80-83. )

C 39. What should be the relation of law to custom? (cf. Bud. 84-86, Q 97 art 3)

C.40 Answer Bud q. 2,3,4 p 94. Consult Bud and Q 105.

Study Guide D.

For Wednesday, Nov. 16 Study Bud. ch. 7

1. What is the most striking difference between Locke’s notion of the “state of nature” and Hobbes’ notion? What is the basis for the difference?

2. Hobbes thinks that in order for the social contract to work, people must give up their power or right to kill, etc. and transfer it to the “state” in some sense, in order to achieve safety or “peace.” Does Locke agree, disagree, or, in a way, both? Describe and compare their views.

3. How, according to Locke, does the community of the family differ from political community? By way of contrast, bring in the ideas of Filmer and radical feminists, as portrayed by Bud.

4. Answer q. 1, p. 107

5. Answer q. 2 “

For Mon Nov. 21. Study Bud ch. 8

1. Lockean politics is like modernist matrimony, Aristotelian politics is like traditional matrimony. P.113. Explain this thoroughly. What you need to show is the fundamental differences between Locke and Aristotle/Aquinas. So for example you need to discuss the social contract, and the status of pre-political society.

2. What did “rejectionists” reject, and why?

3. Consider the case of Mr. Swanner. How does it show up the differences between Lockean and many typical modern views of “natural rights?”

3. Answer 6,7 and 9 (121-22)

For Mon. Nov. 28 Study Bud. ch. 9 and 10

1. How according to Locke does anything get legitimately taken from the “common stock?”

2. What limits are placed on the acquisition of private property, on Locke’s view?

3. Answer q. 1, p. 132.

4. “ 2

5. What are the criteria for a just war, and how does Locke apply them to revolution?

6. In Bud’s usage, what is the difference between hedonism and utilitarianism.

7. Answer q. 1, p. 143-44

8. q. 2 p. 144. Answer ALL PARTS of this question.

For Wed. Nov. 30. Study Bud. ch. 11 and 12 and E reserve, Mill.

1. Mention three problems with utilitarianism, and Mill’s attempted solutions.

2. One problem with utilitarianism ala Mill is that it requires a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. How does Mill make the distinction? Evaluate his approach, mentioning the five factors described on p. 153, and the problems with each. Can you think of an additional problem?

3. Mill admits that there appears to be a conflict between utilitarianism and our intuitions about justice.

a.What is that conflict?

b. How does Mill try to avoid it?

c. Why does Bud. think he does not succeed?

For Friday, Dec. 2. Study the selection from Rousseau.

1. What are the main differences between Rousseau’s idea of the “general will” and the idea of “rule by the majority.”? Between his idea and the idea of government through counterbalancing forces?

2. According to Locke and other natural law theorists, the law has authority for us because it is grounded in the will of God. What gives the law authority according to Rousseau?

the passing from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. It is then only that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what is right, to the incitements of appetite.

3. Compare and contrast this, in every respect that you can see to be relevant, to

a. Hobbes

b. Locke

Man loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses. That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations, we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or of the right of the first occupant, from property, which must be founded on a positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves. (Emphasis added).

4. Compare and contrast this to

a. Hobbes

b. Aquinas

c. Locke

d. Mill

5. Rousseau sees the advantage of community as being nothing less than the production of real ___________in each member.

But when cabals and partial associations åre formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each such association, though general with regard to its members, is privtate with regard to the State: it can then be said no longer that there åre as many voters as men, but only as many as there åre associations. By this means the differences being less numerous, they produce a result less general.

6. What would Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, say about THAT?

7. Compare Rousseau and Mussolini

For Monday, Dec. 5 Read material in E reserve on Rawls. Answer Rawls questions.

Rawls is an egalitarian, Locke a sort of libertarian, Mill a utilitarian, Aquinas an Aristotelian. Fill in the blanks in the following statements with whichever terms fit. More than one may fit in a single blank.

Example: a ________________ would oppose a tax on income.

Libertarian, and a utilitarian if the tax was very burdensome for most people and benefited few.

1. A ______________ would probably favor an inheritance tax, and __________never would.

2. A_______________ would be opposed to affirmative action in most cases.

3. A _______________ would not be opposed to concentration of wealth in the hands of very few people.

4. Both a ____________ and a __________________ would probably favor a tax (like Medicaid) designed to take care of the least well off.

Study Guide D is due Wed. Dec. 7.

Final exam is Wed. Dec. 14.

“Natural”

What is “natural” about natural law?

Two traditions:

1. This law is natural in the sense that it is accessible to reason without direct access to divine revelation. And it is natural in the sense that it expresses God’s plan for nature. But it is still God’s law, supernatural law in that sense. (The most ancient tradition and Thomas’ idea)

2. This law is natural to (for) autonomous human beings. It does not depend on anything supernatural. (Modern secular versions, some of which have even been adopted by some Roman Catholics).

Rousseau – The Social Contract

what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the oinission of which would be less injurious to others than the payment would be burdensome to himself; and con-sidering the moral person which constitutes the State as a creature of the imagi nation, because it is not a man, he may wish to enjoy the rights of a citizen without being disposed to fulfil the duties of a subject. Such an injustice would in its progress cause the ruin of the body politic.

In order, therefore, to prevent the social compact from becoming an ernpty formula, it tacitly comprehends the engagement, which alone can give effect to the others — that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to it by the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free; for this is the condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his absolute personal independence, a condition which gives motion and effect to the political machine. This alone renders all civil engagements justifiable, and without it they would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.

(10) So if you are trying to be ”free” by going against the ”general will” it may be necessary to ____________ you to be free!

(10) On Rousseau’s view, my absolute personal independence is gauranteed by WHAT? (If the answer to this question does not bother you, pay attention).

the passing from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. It is then only that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what is right, to the incitements of appetite. Man, who had till then regarded none but himself, perceives that he must act on other principles, and learns to consult his reason before he listens to his inclinations. Although he is deprived in this new state of many advantages which he enjoyed from nature,

he gains in return others so great, his faculties so unfold themselves by being exercised, his ideas åre so extended, his sentiments so exalted, and his whole mind so enlarged and refined, that if, by abusing his new condition, he did not sometimes degrade it even below that from which he emerged, he ought to bless continually the happy moment that snatched him forever from it, and transformed him from a circumscribed and stupid animal to an intelligent being and a man. In order to draw a balance between the advantages and disadvantages attending his new situation, let us state them in such a manner that they may be easily compared. Man loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses. That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations, we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or of the right of the first occupant, from proper ty, which must be founded on a positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves. But I have already said too much on this head, and the philosophical sense of the word

"liberty" is not at present my subject.

(10) What did he say freedom is? Does that make sense?

(10) Rousseau sees the advantages of community as being nothing less than the production of real ___________in each member.

each membf.r of the community, at the moment of its formation, gives himself up to it just ashe is: himself and all his forces, of which his wealth forms a part. By this act, however, possession does not change in nature when it changes its master, and become property

the first and most important consequence of the principles already established is that the general will alone can direct the forces of the .State agreeably to the end of its institution, which is the common good; for if the clashing of private interests has rendered the establishing of societies necessary, the agreement of the same intercsts has made such establishments possible. It is what is common in these different interests that forms the social bond; and if there was not some point in which they all unanimously centered, no society could exist. It is on the basis of this common interest alone that society must be governed.

I say, therefore, that sovereignty, being only the exercise of the general will, can never alienate itself, and that the Sovereign, which is only a collective being, cannot be represented but by itself: the power may well be transmitted but not the will.

Indeed, if it is not impossible that a private will should accord on some point with the general will, it is at least impossible that such agreement should be regular and lasting; for the private will is incllned by its nature to partiality, and the general will to impartiality.¹It is even more impossible to guarantee the continuance of this agreement, even if we were to see it always exist; because that existence must be owing not to art but to chance. The Sovereign may indeed say: "My will at present actually agrees with the will of such and such a man, or at least with what he declares to be his will"; but it cannot say, "Our wills shall likewise agree tomorrow"; since it would be absurd for the will to bind itself for the future, and since it does not belong to any will to consent to what might be injurious to the being from whom the will proceeds..

it follows from what has been said that the general will is always right and tends always to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people have always the same rectitude. Our will always seeks our own good, but we do not always perceive what it is. The people åre ncver corrupted, but they åre often deceived, and only then do they seem to will what is bad.

(10) What do you think of that last sentence?

There is frequently much difference between the will of all and the general willl. The latter regards only the common interest; the former regards private interest, and is indeed but a sum of private wills:¹but remove from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other, and then the general will remains as the sum of the differences."

If, when the people, sufficiently informed, deliberated, there was to be no commumcation among them, from the grand total of trifling differences the general will would always result, and their resolutions be always good. But when cabals and partial associations åre formed at the expense of the great association, the will of each such association, though general with regard to its members, is privale with regard to the State: it can then be said no longer ttiat there åre as many voters as men, but only as many as there åre associations. By this means the differences being less numerous, they produce a result less general. Finally, when one of these associations becomes so large that it prevails over all the rest, you have no longer the sum of many opinions dissenting in a small degree from each other, but one great dictating dissentient; from that moment there is no longer a general will, and the predominating opinion is only an individual one.

(10) Would Rousseau be in favor of campaign finance reform?How about political parties?

PLEASURE

Most discussions of pleasure are motivated by a desire to give an account of the springs of human action. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and other ancient and medieval thinkers, and modern empiricists and contemporary psychologists in particular, seem to be so motivated.

Very few if any would dispute that we sometimes are motivated to act in particular ways because we suppose that doing so will give us pleasure or reduce pain. That may seem to be a “natural” fact about humans. Even infants draw back from a painful stimulus, and it seems that they naturally pursue pleasant sensations, such as warmth (though it is hardly clear that they pursue such sensations because they are pleasant!). Some have thought that if an infant is drawn to or repelled by something, that shows what is “natural”to humans, since infants have not yet been “corrupted” by adult standards and processes of socialization. These facts have led empiricists in particular to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations. There have been particular philosophical motivations for doing so. Epicurus gave sensation an epistemologically fundamental role, and Bentham gave it a fundamental role in moral theory partly because he thought pleasant sensations could be quantified. Given that the morally right act is the one which maximizes pleasure, questions about what is right could on his view be settled by calculation, a toting up of quantities.

It is however a confusion to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations and to regard them as species of the same genus. Many pains are more plausibly assimilated to types of sensations, but when they are, then it is not obvious that all people would want to avoid them (consider masochists, or those who take pleasure in pursuits such as climbing Mt. Everest, which are, at the level of sensation, mostly painful.) Pleasures, on the other hand, do not seem to be sensations at all. There are of course pleasurable sensations, such as the sensation felt when warming cold hands at the fire. But I will be motivated to act by such sensations only if I take pleasure in them, and it is possible to not take pleasure in just about any of them. Someone might take great pleasure in one’s ability to forego certain pleasant sensations, in fact. Someone might despise those who cannot take a little cold, and take pleasure in one’s ability to refrain from relieving the discomfort of being cold. The pleasure taken in the exercise of such an ability would surely not itself be a sensation or set of them. The general point is that the mere pleasantness of sensation is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to serve as motivator.

Empiricists have also tended to think of pleasures as processes, and therefore as possible objects for the kinds of theories about processes which abound in the sciences. But it is arguable that it is seriously confused to think of pleasures as processes. The pleasure I take in watching a Bball game is not a process which accompanies the watching (and which thus might distract from the watching) and indeed if it were a process it would make sense to wonder if it were always itself pleasant! Pleasures seem distinct from some pains in this respect. Aristotle rightly notes that processes are complete when their end is reached, whereas activities which I pursue are not. If I want an enjoyable week in New York, my pursuit does not end the second I start enjoying New York, although once I get to New York the process of getting there does end, getting there being the end or goal of that process. Activities are not processes and are valued in themselves, rather than for what they end up as.

It is useful to consider the many different kinds of pleasures. First, I can take pleasure in activities, things, events. I can also take pleasure in facts. I may take pleasure in the fact that I am talking to the most famous person in the room even though that activity, that conversation, is not itself pleasant, so the distinction is important when thinking about motivation.

Taking pleasure in activities is not usually a matter of having certain sensations. What sensations make up the pleasure people take in playing tennis? In playing the piano well? Even where an activity depends heavily upon having certain sensations, such as the aural sensations necessary to the activity of enjoying a piece of music, the pleasure is not in the sensations, but in the music. If each aural sensation produced by a given piece of music were isolated from the others, or rearranged, there might be no pleasure, even though the “sensation content” was the same. Moreover, as already mentioned, pleasure may be taken in activities which include mostly painful sensations. Sometimes such activities may issue in a general sense of well being (the feeling following upon vigorous and difficult exercise for example) but that feeling of well being is not simply an experience of certain sensations, though some sensations may contribute to it, and empiricists might want to describe it as a “general” sensation.

Some pleasures are apparently constituted by the filling of some lack or the discharge of some surfeit. Eating when hungry may be more pleasant than eating when full, and taking a pee after holding it for a long time more pleasant than taking one for the second time in ten minutes. But, contra Freud; and also Plato, it is hardly the case that all pleasures are like that. What lack is filled , or what surfeit discharged, by the pleasure taken in acquiring mastery of a language, or what lack is fulfilled or surfeit discharged by the pleasure of watching a lovely sunset?

Many philosophical discussions of pleasure have been in the service of ethical or psychological or metaphysical or epistemological theories. The result has often been nonsense, or clearly false claims, such as result from what Wittgenstein called “an insufficient diet of examples.” If the argument is modus ponens (if this theory is correct, then pleasure is such and such, and, this theory is correct, so, pleasure is such and such) then, since pleasure is NOT such and such, modus tollens may make us at least suspicious of the theory, even if we save it by rejecting the hypothetical in the first place. For example, if the theory that all right actions are pleasure maximizing is correct, then pleasure must be a quantifiable process. But it is not, so....

Mill tried to avoid the consequence by denying the conditional. For him, pleasure is not a quantifiable process, even though right action is pleasure maximizing. But with that idea gone, his theory becomes non-empirical and/or tendentious.

Aristotle connects his discussion of pleasure and pain to an account of the good life in quite a different way from the ways proposed by many empiricists and other thinkers.. In particular, we could describe him as claiming that what counts as a pleasure or pain for the good person (the person whose life is good) differs from what counts as pleasure or pain for the bad person. The notion of a good life can only be spelled out by paying attention to the interplay of reason and feeling and the possibilities for shaping that interplay through training of various kinds. Thus on his view taking infants as a kind of model of natural human life is exactly the wrong thing to do. To know what is truly pleasant and truly painful we must consult the mature person (if we can find any!). It doesn’t follow that I can make the sensation of a hot poker being pushed into my eye non-painful by just thinking it so, or as the result of training. What that shows, though, is that pleasure and pain are probably not even species of the same genus. For it is difficult to think of a pleasure, even of the most sensation laden sort, which could not be discounted or regarded as not truly pleasant. The notion of sensation plays a very negligible role in Aristotle’s account. Happily so!

SUMMARY

The main questions:

1. What role can/should religion (religious belief, religious institutions) play in the “public square?” (The public square is the “space” of public life, i.e. law, government generally, public institutions of all sorts, including schools).

2. What conceptions of human nature are presupposed in the various answers to

#1?

A. 1. The traditional answer to #1 in the USA is that some kind of religion, does, and MUST, play a significant positive role. That is the view of Madison, Jefferson, Washington, etc. and for the most part most others up till fairly recently, with Lincoln being a significant figure in the history of this question.

The history of law, particularly of Court decisions, affords a useful way into this question.

i. the kind of religion in question, in the USA, has been a generalized Protestantism, the “WASP consensus.” It is “non-sectarian.”

A. 2 A less traditional answer to #1 is “NONE.” This answer has gained a good deal of ground in the last several decades.

i. this answer is often justified by reference to a particular interpretation of the establishment clause of the constitution. An extreme example would be the DeMent injunction (q.v.).

ii. these interpretations of the establishment clause are not consistent with the thinking of the constitution’s framers. But they are sometimes justified on the grounds that we now have a much more pluralistic society, in which the WASP consensus no longer exists.

The Debate Between 1 and 2.

There are many positions on a spectrum stretching from somewhere on the right of 1 (some of the new religious right) to extreme versions of 2 (Americans United for Separation of Church and State). Neuhaus would be on the right side, but avoids the extreme position.

Neuhaus’s Arguments in outline (repeated).

He tries to show that

I. There can be no government without value judgments.

II “Democratic” means - the beliefs of the majority of the citizens count (but not that they always outweigh everything else).

III. The majority of the citizens of the USA

i. have religious beliefs

ii. think that their moral beliefs or “values” are grounded in religion

Therefore,

IV. genuine democratic pluralism requires religion in the public square

So, if #I and #II and #III are true, IV follows logically, right?

The reason #I is true, N. argues, lies in the very nature of govt. and law. Laws, like laws against murder, slander, child pornography, all the many different forms of theft, etc. etc. etc. obviously reflect moral or value judgments. Likewise laws that permit things like abortion in effect make or entail moral judgments (for example, the judgment that abortion does NOT amount to murder). Likewise government policies, such as tax policies that take money from richer people and use it to benefit poorer people obviously rest on value judgments, for example, the judgment that a society has the obligation to care for those in need, and the judgment that it is not theft to take money from the rich in order to benefit those not well off. All of the following involve moral or value judgments: tax policies, universal public education, tax exemption for charitable organizations, decisions to go to war (often), anti-trust laws, consumer protection laws, and so on. (Add your own). Moral or value judgments are everywhere.

II seems true by definition.

III seems to be an empirically proven fact.

If #IV is correct then all attempts by supposed civil libertarians and various judges to remove all religious influence from the public square can only have bad results;

The badest of the bad results is this:

V.. The removal of religion from the public square will necessarily (given the truth of #I) require some OTHER source of value to “fill the vacuum.”

a.The only viable candidate to serve as that source would be the state itself.

b. What is bad about that? This; it becomes impossible to criticize the state from a moral perspective. The state becomes the highest. There is no “higher point of view” from which to criticize state law and policy.

c. historically, when the state assumes that “value generating” role you get “monism” and ultimately totalitarianism.

NOBODY WANTS THAT!!!

Therefore, religiously grounded values must be given a place in the public square. QED.

What are the weak links in these two arguments? Someone might respond to N as follows:

1. One can have a viable society without ANY “ethics” in the substantive sense.

a. Hobbes: social contract, justice and power

i. Hobbes argues that ethical concepts have no grounding other than that of positive law, which is itself grounded in an amoral survival instinct.

ii. various other views of govt. as morally neutral have been argued (not treated in this course).

2. One can have a viable society with an ethics that is NOT religiously based

a. Rousseau – ethics generated by community

i. The social contract embodies a general will, which provides the standards for a good human life. There is no transcendent standard.

b. Mill - utilitarian ideas

i. some have argued that govt is simply an arrangement that is convenient or expedient for most people. The law (and ethics generally) is just the distillation of experience of what does and does not work to produce the best (most pleasant, or preference maximizing) outcome.

c. Rawls – egalitarian ideas