Class Conduct, Instructor’s Role, etc. What I Expect of
Students.
1.Treat each other with respect.
2.Treat the instructor with respect.
3.Do not talk unless called on.
4. Do not leave the room without permission
except in extreme emergency.
5. Be on time.
6. Be eager to learn. The best indication of progress is engagement
with the issues and ideas we deal with.
7. Do not be afraid to say "I don't
understand."
8. Expect the same of me as I expect of you.
(Except for #2 and #3, and #4, of
course. You will see that I follow #7 a lot.)
9. Stay awake. If you need to sleep, do it
elsewhere.
[NOTE: "Any student eligible for and requesting
academic accommodations due to a disability is requested to provide a letter of
accommodation from P.A.C.E. or
Academic
Integrity: Any form of cheating, on your short paper, study
questions, quizzes, or exams, will result in an ‘F’ for the entire course. NO EXCEPTIONS. Policies regarding academic integrity are
further detailed in the student handbook. Cheating obviously includes
plagiarism. DO YOUR OWN WORK.
Cell Phones: phones must be OFF during classes. You may not make ANY use of cell phones
during any exam or quiz.. Use of cell phones in such circumstances counts as
cheating and results in an F.
Classes will consist of a mix of lecture and
discussion,
Students are expected to treat other
students in a polite fashion, even though they should feel free to express
disagreement on ANY topic or ANY claim that is advanced by anyone, including
the instructor. At the same time, each
student must attempt to exercise responsibility by keeping discussion focused
on the subject at hand and by listening carefully to the responses of the
instructor and other participants. Particular value is placed on argument,
as opposed to mere expression of opinion. Say what you believe, but be prepared to say why.
(“N”= Neuhaus)
1. Name a half dozen examples of explicit CONTINUING influence of religion in the “public square.”
2. Name three cases of possible controversial “intrusion” of religion into the public square that are in the news NOW.
3. Discuss the historical background to the fear of religion in the public square. Mention several (three or four) actual historical events or movements in your answer. Must include mention of the French revolution.
*4. Discuss the “American experiment.” Try to say what it is or has been. Mention a few significant “moments” in American history that bear on this.
5. Discuss some possible bad results of EXCLUDING religion from the public square. Mention at least two 20th century examples.
6. Describe briefly the rise of the “new religious right.” Describe some historical changes in the religious right, name at least three main figures, and five main issues important to them. Cf. p.10
7. Distinguish evangelicals and fundamentalists. Give some historical background. Relate to question #6.
8. Describe the religious “mainline” left. Mention denominations and at least five typical “issues.”
*9. Discuss pro and con. Anti-slavery and civil rights movements were basically religiously inspired.
*10. Discuss pro and con. The abortion issue is a religious issue. Discuss why N. thinks “no other issue so clearly defines” the debate about religion and the public square.
11. Critique the following cliché: “the religious right favors something like a theocracy, the religious left does not.” Give some specific references. (cf. p. 12)
12. What does N. suggest as an account of the relation between the new religious right and “fanaticism?” (cf. p. 16).
*13. Discuss the usual clichés about “authoritarian” vs. “mature” (i.e. autonomous) people. Which is more oppressive, external authority or the “imperial self?” cf. p. 17. Use the “two captains” analogy (p. 18) in your discussion.
14. What is there in Christianity that appears to have a public bearing? What “public matters” has the religious right often emphasized from scripture etc.? The center or left?
15. List of terms:
Ch. II Public
Religion and Public Reason
1. Discuss the common confusions about “public religion” and “separation of church and state.”
2. Argue pro and con: it is important to have a democratically legitimate public ethic.
3. Argue pro and con: you cannot have a public ethic without public religion.
4. What so far as you know did folk like Madison, Adams,
5. How have public schools been involved in “public religion?” Mention, in your discussion, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the WASP consensus.
6. Discuss the breakdown of the consensus. Illustrate by reference to the extremes of Rowe, on the one hand, and the Humanist manifesto on the other (Quote both).
7. H. claims that the ideal of a “secular
society” is recent in
8. Explain and discuss the difference between more conservative and more liberal government in terms of “experienced assault level.” Cf. p. 33-34
9. N. claims that the views of liberal Christians on public issues tend to be close to the views of those who have no religion or are anti-religious, whereas the views of conservative Christians tend to clash more with the views of the non-religious. Try to assess this claim. Could the liberal claim that this is a “happy convergence” or is it rather a case of “cultural captivity?”
10. Why does N. think that the new religious right and secular humanism reinforce each other? What, roughly, is the remedy he proposes?
11. A democratically legitimate public argument (an argument regarding public policy that could in principle be accepted by most or all) must be “trans-subjective.” Why? What bearing does this point have on fundamentalist tendencies to privatize religion? To confine it to specific biblical moral teachings?
12. Do you think it is true that we have “in recent decades . . systematically excluded from policy consideration” the religiously grounded values of most Americans (p.37)? Cite evidence pro and con.
Terms
Ch III Turning
1. How do Baptists stand in the current debates about religion and the public square? Consider both historical and current tendencies.
2. What are the two forms of popular religion that have in recent decades often come together, esp. in the electronic church?
3. Critique the claim that the religious right and the left differ over matters of style. What are the supposed differences? What might be the substantive differences?
4. What do you think of the “People for the
5. Who is imposing whose values on whom? Is that the only question in this debate?
Terms
Ch. IV Critical
Patriotism
1. Discuss and compare “anti-fundamentalist” and “anti-Catholic” and more generally anti-religious bigotry to other kinds of bigotry. What makes bigotry bigotry?
2. “Critical patriotism” can be contrasted both
with uncritical patriotism and “blame
3. The notion that
Also mention Oscar Wilde’s jibe.
4. What, according to N, are some common problems with such notions as being “in solidarity with the poor and oppressed”? (67-8)
5. What according to N are the main characteristics of the “American project?” (p.69)
What might be an alternative description of that project? Which, in your judgment, is a better reading?
6. Comment on some different ways of taking such slogans as ‘my country right or wrong’ and ‘love it or leave it.’ P. 74) How might such slogans relate to religious faith?
7. Discuss the quote from
8. How does N describe the “freedom of the naked public square.”? P. 75
9. Discuss two different possible meanings of ‘under God’ in the pledge. Look ahead to p. 90 and “limited govt.”
10. What do you think of N’s “nuanced proposition” p. 72?
Ch. V. The Fragility
of the
1. “The reason why the naked public square cannot remain naked is in the very nature of law and laws” p. 80 Explain and evaluate, mentioning governmental deligitimation.
2. What, according to N, is the basis for state opposition to religion in atheist states?
3. Combine #2 with a discussion of
4. Use the “DeMent injunction” in a discussion of the claims made on p. 86.
5. Solidarity, Solshenitzyn, Sontag, and anti-communism. P. 88 Discuss.(inform yourself
if necessary). Mention
6. N is critical of Schlesinger’s version of liberalism for only one reason. What is it? In your discussion mention both positive and negative freedom, and mediating institutions as sources of “community.”
Ch. VI Denying who we are
1. N mentions five sources of democracy (94-5). List them.
2. Do you agree with N that the demise of religious influence (and other traditional values) in people’s lives is not a fact, but is rather declared to be a fact by those who wish it were a fact? Give evidence, including all that can be found in this chapter.
3. Do you think the man from Mars who only watched TV etc.
would be clueless about the social importance of religion in
1. Argue that the courts have sometimes prohibited the free exercise of religion in the name of prohibiting establishment. V. p 147 and also DeMent (Additional materials).
2. If it is true that religion is the “morality bearing part of culture” (p. 154) and if it is true that “a truly valueless existence is impossible for persons or societies” so that the state must come up with values from somewhere, then it follows that the state must________values from _____________, which has itself been excluded from playing the role of providing values in the _____________________ (v. 154-55)
“purloined” =df.
1. On N’s reading of American history, the state was less expansive at the beginning of the republic than it is now. What does that mean? (cf. 180)
2. The divorce of fact and value (p. 179) has led to the notion that there can be no publicly valid value judgments. The result is that in the public sphere we simply try to balance “interests.” What does that mean?
3. “We cannot at the same time have govt. that is expansive, religiously sanitized, and democratic”(p. 180). Why not?
1. The mainline USED to be as described by Bushnell, p. 208. What is it like now? Give examples that bring out the contrast.
Ch. XVI Law and the
Experiment Renewed.
1. Do you sense a difference between “laws” and “the law?” Explain (v. p 249-53). For example, would you agree with Berman that “there is an all-embracing moral reality, a purpose in the universe, which stealing offends” (p. 251)?
2. The Question, N claims, is “What is the foundation of the authority that the law claims for itself?” (p.254). If you agree why? If not, why not?
3. On p. 25 N seems to argue as follows:
1.Law is entangled with questions of right and wrong.
2. Questions of right and wrong cannot be treated scientifically.
3. Therefore, Law cannot be treated scientifically.
That is a valid argument. Are the premises true? Say, roughly, how you would attack or defend them.
4. With “capricious” law, “naked force displaces legitimate power.”(p. 256). Explain.
What might be an alternative to “capricious law?”
5. Study the middle of p.259 along with readings in Rawls and Sandel.
6. According to N what must evangelicals and fundamentalists do, and what will happen if they don’t? (bottom p. 260 – top 261).
End reading on 261.
E Reserve
Guide B.
Fri. Sept. 30
Intro. questions, 1-5.
Mon. Oct. 3
Augustine, all questions. Study Bud. Preface.
Questions from Bud.
1. Aristotle thinks the end of the state is the perfection of its members. List several objections, and Aristotle’s replies.
2. How does ethics get into politics, according to Aristotle?
Wed. Oct. 5. Golding questions. Hobbes Questions.
1. Aristotle regards politics as partnership in a good life.
a.What is Hobbes’ view?
b. How would Aristotle respond to Hobbes?
Fri. Oct. 7. Baier questions. Pris. Dilemma questions.
Mon. Oct. 10.
Guide B due.
Guide C
By Friday, Oct. 14
C 1 Answer q. 2 in Bud. p. 24.
C 2. Answer q. 5 in Bud p. 25
C 3. Give examples of intellectual and moral virtues (3 each). Why do we need both kinds, according to Aristotle? Mention Lewis’ analogy (p. 27-28) in your answer.
C 4. Why does self control require practical wisdom? Why does practical wisdom require self control?
By Wed. Oct. 19
C 5. q. 3 p. 36
C 6.q. 4 p. 36
C 7. Explain what Aristotle meant by “the common good” by considering families. Study p. 33 to answer this.
C 8, Fill in the matrix on p. 40. What two things does this show about law and morality?
C 9. Lawmakers obviously cannot pass laws requiring people to be friends. Nonetheless the laws can encourage or discourage friendship. How? (cf. p. 44-48)
C 10. q. 4, p. 49.
By Friday, Oct 21
C 11. What can law and custom do that parental training cannot do? Can you think of any laws or customs of ours that do these things? Explain.
C 12. Compare Aristotle to Hobbes. A. What kind of regime does each favor, and why?
B. How does each of them conceive of the role of reason in the best community?
C. In what other ways do they differ about human nature, and how do their differences impact their views about government and law.
By
Monday, Oct. 24 Study Bud.
C 13. Describe a scholastic quaestio.
C 14. Define the following: Substance and type; participation of the rational creature in the eternal law; powers and habits; rational and sensitive appetites (include discussion of will, and of irascible and concupiscible appetite); habit; synderesis; virtue; vicious; fomes; speculative reason; prudence or practical wisdom; perfect community; law (contrast with Hobbes).
C 15. Reproduce the diagram on p. 60 and FILL IN each box with further details. For instance, at the top in the box containing ‘eternal law’ you could add ‘the laws or principles by which God made the universe. Cannot be known directly, but only in its “reflections.”
C 16 Answer all four questions on p. 64.
By
Wednesday, Oct. 26. Study Bud. p.65-69.
C 17. Answer question 1, p. 78. List the common objections given by Bud. first.
Read Aquinas, Q 96 (e reserve. #7384). Answer these questions:
C18. Aquinas holds that even in a state of nature or the prelapsarian state there would be “RULE” or mastership.
a.Give his principal reason.
b. Give the quote from Augustine’s City of God that he cites in support of his position.
c. Compare his position to Hobbes’ in as much detail as you can.
By
Friday, Oct. 28. Study
Aquinas (TA), Q. 90,91.
C 19. State the question in each of the articles of 90 and 91. (The answer is always ‘yes’)
C 20. What is meant by
a. (again!)“natural law is the participation of the rational creature in the eternal law” (be sure to define the main terms)
b. “law is a rule and measure”
C 21. What is the difference between the way in which a plant “participates in eternal law” and the way a rational being (a human) does?
By
Monday, Oct. 31. Finish Bud. ch. 5.
Study TA Q92 and Q93.
C 22. Explain the “law of concupiscence.” Notice oil in crankcase.
C 23. Answer q. 2, p. 78.
By
Wednesday, Nov. 2. Continue
with TA q. 93 and 94.
C 24. In 92 article 2, how does Thomas reply to obj. 4? How does his reply relate to
a. Hobbes
b. Aristotle’s notions about how virtue is aquired?
C. 25 How does the way in which “natural objects” (like stones and trees) “obey” divine law differ from the way in which human beings obey? Give details as found in Q. 93, Art. 5. Try to clarify the notion of “directing something to its end” by giving examples from non-human and human nature.
C. 26. In the light of your answer to C. 25, discuss whether there is anything in the notion that Aquinas confuses “law” in the sense of “laws of nature” and “law” in the sense of something promulgated by a legislator.
C. 27. According to Q. 94, Art 2, what are some of the main precepts of the natural law, and what is natural about them?
By
Friday, Nov. 4. Study Q. 94
LOTS
C. 28. Neither the “truth nor rectitude” of the particular conclusions of practical reason is the same for all. Give an example of each.
a. example where the truth is not the same for all.
b. example where the rectitude is not the same for all.
Does that imply some kind of relativism?
C 29. Fill in the blanks:
a. “Do good, avoid evil” is a ________precept of the natural law.
b. “Be sociable” is also a _________precept of the natural law, from which it follows that one should not do ____________ to ones neighbor.
c. The primary precepts are ______________to all and are ______________ for all.
d. Assuming that “do no harm” is a general secondary (or immediate) principle of natural law, it follows that if someone says they do not KNOW that is it wrong to kill an innocent person, their reason (rational faculties) must be __________________.
C. 30. Reason can be corrupted or perverted in five ways, according to Aquinas: list them and give YOUR OWN examples of each. Can you think of any OTHER way reason could be perverted? If so describe it (them). See Bud. ch. 5
1
2
3
4
5
C. 31. How does Aquinas handle the problem of the “sins of the patriarchs?” (see Q. 94 Art. 5, obj. 2). Give examples.
By Monday, Nov. 7. Study Q. 95, Review Bud. ch. 5. Study Bud. ch. 6.
C. 32. According to Aquinas (and Aristotle) one can determine what the “good” that all should pursue IS, by considering the purposes of our human living and human “inclinations.” The “good” will simply be the fulfillment of our purpose(s). Humans are meant to live reasonably (reason is the distinctive capacity of humans and reason’s purpose, at the practical level, is to guide behavior). People who do that will be good. (You cannot be truly reasonable and be evil too). How do you suppose Aquinas would respond to each of the following objections to these ideas:
a. A person could use “reason” to guide his behavior and still be evil. Consider the very smart criminal who uses his reason “to the max” in stealing a precious diamond from a heavily guarded museum. So it follows that using reason to guide behavior does NOT guarantee goodness at all. It could even be used to make people more successfully evil.
b. People have different sorts of inclinations. Some people are heavily “inclined” to eat too much, others do not have such inclinations. Some type A personalities are inclined to be rude and pushy, whereas some people are just naturally kind. Some people may be born with violent tendencies, others are naturally gentle. Some people have homosexual inclinations, some do not. And so forth. Since there are so many conflicting inclinations, it is meaningless to speak of “the” purposes of “our” inclinations, and impossible to argue that guiding our inclinations with reason would lead to particular kinds of behavior as opposed to other kinds. (see Q 94 art. 4)
C. 33. Can natural law vary? Explain. See Q. 94 Art. 5.
C. 34. There are two ways human laws can be derived from natural law. What are they? See Q 95 Art. 2.
For Wed. Nov. 9th. Study TA q. 96 and 97.
C. 35 Make an outline of Q. 96. Include a description of the examples used and their purposes (cf. art. 6, the case of shutting the gates of the city. )
C. 36 Even unjust laws may still “oblige in the court of conscience.” When do they and when don’t they? (v. 96 art. 4)
C. 37. Explain how the points made in 97 can be used to argue against relativism. Remember that relativism usually gets started when it is noticed that different peoples or cultures have varying laws and customs. How, according to Aquinas, is that fact consistent with, and even to be expected, given that the natural law itself at least in its primary precepts does not change at all.
Fri. Nov. 11 Study Q 100
Art 1, Q 105 art 1. Review Bud.
C 38.
Under what circumstances can human laws be changed?(cf.
Q 97 and Bud. p. 80-83. )
C 39.
What should be the relation of law to custom? (cf. Bud. 84-86, Q 97 art 3)
C.40 Answer Bud q. 2,3,4 p 94. Consult Bud and Q 105.
Study Guide
D.
For Wednesday, Nov. 16 Study Bud. ch. 7
1. What is the most striking difference between Locke’s notion of the “state of nature” and Hobbes’ notion? What is the basis for the difference?
2. Hobbes thinks that in order for the social contract to work, people must give up their power or right to kill, etc. and transfer it to the “state” in some sense, in order to achieve safety or “peace.” Does Locke agree, disagree, or, in a way, both? Describe and compare their views.
3. How, according to Locke, does the community of the family differ from political community? By way of contrast, bring in the ideas of Filmer and radical feminists, as portrayed by Bud.
4. Answer q. 1, p. 107
5. Answer q. 2 “
For Mon Nov. 21. Study
Bud ch. 8
1. Lockean politics is like modernist matrimony, Aristotelian politics is like traditional matrimony. P.113. Explain this thoroughly. What you need to show is the fundamental differences between Locke and Aristotle/Aquinas. So for example you need to discuss the social contract, and the status of pre-political society.
2. What did “rejectionists” reject, and why?
3. Consider the case of Mr. Swanner. How does it show up the differences between Lockean and many typical modern views of “natural rights?”
3. Answer 6,7 and 9 (121-22)
For Mon. Nov. 28 Study Bud. ch. 9 and 10
1. How according to Locke does anything get legitimately taken from the “common stock?”
2. What limits are placed on the acquisition of private property, on Locke’s view?
3. Answer q. 1, p. 132.
4. “ 2
5. What are the criteria for a just war, and how does Locke apply them to revolution?
6. In Bud’s usage, what is the difference between hedonism and utilitarianism.
7. Answer q. 1, p. 143-44
8. q. 2 p. 144. Answer ALL PARTS of this question.
For Wed.
Nov. 30. Study Bud. ch. 11 and 12
and E reserve, Mill.
1.
Mention three problems with utilitarianism, and Mill’s attempted
solutions.
2. One
problem with utilitarianism ala Mill is that it requires a distinction between
higher and lower pleasures. How does Mill make the distinction? Evaluate his
approach, mentioning the five factors described on p. 153, and the problems
with each. Can you think of an additional problem?
3.
Mill admits that there appears to be a conflict between utilitarianism and our
intuitions about justice.
a.What is that conflict?
b. How
does Mill try to avoid it?
c. Why
does Bud. think he does not succeed?
For Friday, Dec. 2.
Study the selection from Rousseau.
1. What are the main differences between Rousseau’s idea of the “general will” and the idea of “rule by the majority.”? Between his idea and the idea of government through counterbalancing forces?
2. According to Locke and other natural law theorists, the law has authority for us because it is grounded in the will of God. What gives the law authority according to Rousseau?
the passing from
the state of nature to the civil state produces in
man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a
moral character which they lacked before. It is then only
that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what
is right, to the incitements of appetite.
3. Compare and contrast this, in every respect that you can see to be relevant, to
a. Hobbes
b. Locke
Man
loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all
which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty,
and proprietorship of all he possesses.
That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations,
we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by
the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or
of the right of the first occupant, from property, which must be founded on a
positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil
state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself;
for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to
obey a law which we prescribe for
ourselves. (Emphasis added).
4.
Compare and contrast this to
a.
Hobbes
b.
Aquinas
c.
Locke
d.
Mill
5.
Rousseau
sees the advantage of community as being nothing less than the production of
real ___________in each member.
But when cabals and partial associations
åre formed at the expense of the great association,
the will of each such association, though general with regard to its members,
is privtate with regard to the State:
it can then be said no longer that there åre as many
voters as men, but only as many as there åre
associations. By this means the differences being less numerous, they produce a
result less general.
6.
What would Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, say about THAT?
7.
Compare Rousseau and Mussolini
For Monday, Dec. 5 Read material in E
reserve on Rawls. Answer Rawls questions.
Rawls
is an egalitarian, Locke a sort of libertarian, Mill a utilitarian, Aquinas an
Aristotelian. Fill in the blanks in the
following statements with whichever terms fit. More than one may fit in a
single blank.
Example:
a ________________ would oppose a tax on income.
Libertarian, and a utilitarian if the tax was very burdensome
for most people and benefited few.
1.
A ______________ would probably favor an
inheritance tax, and __________never would.
2.
A_______________ would be opposed to affirmative action in most cases.
3.
A _______________ would not be opposed to concentration of wealth in the hands
of very few people.
4.
Both a ____________ and a __________________ would probably favor a tax (like
Medicaid) designed to take care of the least well off.
Study
Guide D is due Wed. Dec. 7.
Final
exam is Wed. Dec. 14.
“Natural”
What is “natural”
about natural law?
Two traditions:
1. This law is natural in the
sense that it is accessible to reason without direct access to divine
revelation. And it is natural in the sense that it expresses God’s plan
for nature. But it is still
God’s law, supernatural law in that sense. (The most ancient tradition
and Thomas’ idea)
2. This law is natural to
(for) autonomous human beings. It does not depend on anything
supernatural. (Modern
secular versions, some of which have even been adopted by some Roman
Catholics).
Rousseau – The Social
Contract
what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the oinission of which would be less injurious to others than
the payment would be burdensome to himself; and con-sidering
the moral person which constitutes the State as a creature of the imagi nation, because it is not a man, he may wish to enjoy
the rights of a citizen without being disposed to fulfil
the duties of a subject. Such an injustice would in its progress cause the ruin
of the body politic.
In order, therefore, to prevent the social compact from becoming an ernpty formula, it tacitly comprehends the engagement,
which alone can give effect to the others — that whoever refuses to obey
the general will shall be compelled to it by the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free; for this is the
condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his
absolute personal independence, a condition which gives motion and effect to
the political machine. This alone renders all civil engagements justifiable,
and without it they would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.
(10) So if you are trying to be
”free” by going against the ”general will” it
may be necessary to ____________ you to be free!
(10) On Rousseau’s view, my absolute personal
independence is gauranteed by WHAT? (If the answer to this
question does not bother you, pay attention).
the passing from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. It is then only that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what is right, to the incitements of appetite. Man, who had till then regarded none but himself, perceives that he must act on other principles, and learns to consult his reason before he listens to his inclinations. Although he is deprived in this new state of many advantages which he enjoyed from nature,
he gains in return others so great, his faculties so unfold themselves by being exercised, his ideas åre so extended, his sentiments so exalted, and his whole mind so enlarged and refined, that if, by abusing his new condition, he did not sometimes degrade it even below that from which he emerged, he ought to bless continually the happy moment that snatched him forever from it, and transformed him from a circumscribed and stupid animal to an intelligent being and a man. In order to draw a balance between the advantages and disadvantages attending his new situation, let us state them in such a manner that they may be easily compared. Man loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses. That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations, we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or of the right of the first occupant, from proper ty, which must be founded on a positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves. But I have already said too much on this head, and the philosophical sense of the word
"liberty"
is not at present my subject.
(10)
What did he say freedom is? Does that make sense?
(10) Rousseau sees the advantages of community as
being nothing less than the production of real ___________in each member.
each membf.r
of the community,
at the moment of its formation, gives
himself up to it just ashe is: himself and all his
forces, of which his wealth forms a part. By this act, however, possession does
not change in nature when it changes its master, and become property
the first and most important consequence of the principles already established is
that the general will alone can direct the forces of the .State agreeably to the end of its institution, which is the
common good; for if the clashing of private interests has rendered the
establishing of societies necessary, the
agreement of the same intercsts has made such
establishments possible. It is what is common in these
different interests that forms the social bond; and if there was not
some point in which they all unanimously centered, no society could exist. It
is on the basis of this common interest alone that society must be governed.
I say, therefore, that sovereignty, being only the exercise of the
general will, can never alienate itself, and that the Sovereign, which is only
a collective being, cannot be represented but by itself: the power may
well be transmitted but not the will.
Indeed, if it is not impossible that a private will should accord on some
point with the general will, it is at least impossible that such agreement should be regular and lasting; for the
private will is incllned by its nature to
partiality, and the general will to impartiality.1 It is even more
impossible to guarantee the continuance of this agreement, even if we were to
see it always exist; because that existence must be owing not to art but to
chance. The Sovereign may indeed say: "My will at present actually agrees
with the will of such and such a man, or at least with what he declares to be
his will"; but it cannot say, "Our wills shall likewise agree
tomorrow"; since it would be absurd for the will to bind itself for the
future, and since it does not belong to any will to consent to what might be
injurious to the being from whom the will
proceeds..
it follows from what has been said that
the general will is always right
and tends always to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the deliberations
of the people have always the same rectitude. Our will always seeks our own
good, but we do not always perceive what it is. The people åre
ncver corrupted, but they åre
often deceived, and only then do they seem to will
what is bad.
(10) What do you think of that last sentence?
There is frequently much difference between the will of all and
the general willl.
The latter regards only the
common interest; the former regards private interest, and is indeed but
a sum of private wills:1 but remove from these same wills the pluses
and minuses that cancel each other, and then the general will remains as the
sum of the differences."
If, when the people, sufficiently informed, deliberated, there was to be
no commumcation among them, from the grand total of
trifling differences the general will would always result, and their
resolutions be always good. But when cabals and partial associations åre formed at the expense of the great association, the
will of each such association, though general with regard to its
members, is privale with regard to the
State: it can then be said no longer ttiat there åre as many voters as men, but only as many as there åre associations. By this means the differences being less
numerous, they produce a result less
general. Finally, when one of these associations becomes so large that
it prevails over all the rest, you have no longer the sum of many opinions
dissenting in a small degree from each other, but one great dictating
dissentient; from that moment there is no longer a general will, and the predominating opinion is only an
individual one.
(10) Would
Rousseau be in favor of campaign finance reform?How about political parties?
PLEASURE
Most discussions of pleasure are motivated by a desire to give an account of the springs of human action. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and other ancient and medieval thinkers, and modern empiricists and contemporary psychologists in particular, seem to be so motivated.
Very few if any would dispute that we sometimes are motivated to act in particular ways because we suppose that doing so will give us pleasure or reduce pain. That may seem to be a “natural” fact about humans. Even infants draw back from a painful stimulus, and it seems that they naturally pursue pleasant sensations, such as warmth (though it is hardly clear that they pursue such sensations because they are pleasant!). Some have thought that if an infant is drawn to or repelled by something, that shows what is “natural”to humans, since infants have not yet been “corrupted” by adult standards and processes of socialization. These facts have led empiricists in particular to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations. There have been particular philosophical motivations for doing so. Epicurus gave sensation an epistemologically fundamental role, and Bentham gave it a fundamental role in moral theory partly because he thought pleasant sensations could be quantified. Given that the morally right act is the one which maximizes pleasure, questions about what is right could on his view be settled by calculation, a toting up of quantities.
It is however a confusion to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations and to regard them as species of the same genus. Many pains are more plausibly assimilated to types of sensations, but when they are, then it is not obvious that all people would want to avoid them (consider masochists, or those who take pleasure in pursuits such as climbing Mt. Everest, which are, at the level of sensation, mostly painful.) Pleasures, on the other hand, do not seem to be sensations at all. There are of course pleasurable sensations, such as the sensation felt when warming cold hands at the fire. But I will be motivated to act by such sensations only if I take pleasure in them, and it is possible to not take pleasure in just about any of them. Someone might take great pleasure in one’s ability to forego certain pleasant sensations, in fact. Someone might despise those who cannot take a little cold, and take pleasure in one’s ability to refrain from relieving the discomfort of being cold. The pleasure taken in the exercise of such an ability would surely not itself be a sensation or set of them. The general point is that the mere pleasantness of sensation is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to serve as motivator.
Empiricists
have also tended to think of pleasures as processes, and therefore as possible
objects for the kinds of theories about processes which abound in the sciences.
But it is arguable that it is seriously confused to think of pleasures as
processes. The pleasure I take in watching a Bball
game is not a process which accompanies the watching (and which thus might
distract from the watching) and indeed if it were a process it would make sense
to wonder if it were always itself pleasant!
Pleasures seem distinct from some pains in this respect. Aristotle
rightly notes that processes are complete when their end is reached, whereas
activities which I pursue are not. If I want an enjoyable week in
It is useful to consider the many different kinds of pleasures. First, I can take pleasure in activities, things, events. I can also take pleasure in facts. I may take pleasure in the fact that I am talking to the most famous person in the room even though that activity, that conversation, is not itself pleasant, so the distinction is important when thinking about motivation.
Taking pleasure in activities is not usually a matter of having certain sensations. What sensations make up the pleasure people take in playing tennis? In playing the piano well? Even where an activity depends heavily upon having certain sensations, such as the aural sensations necessary to the activity of enjoying a piece of music, the pleasure is not in the sensations, but in the music. If each aural sensation produced by a given piece of music were isolated from the others, or rearranged, there might be no pleasure, even though the “sensation content” was the same. Moreover, as already mentioned, pleasure may be taken in activities which include mostly painful sensations. Sometimes such activities may issue in a general sense of well being (the feeling following upon vigorous and difficult exercise for example) but that feeling of well being is not simply an experience of certain sensations, though some sensations may contribute to it, and empiricists might want to describe it as a “general” sensation.
Some pleasures are apparently constituted by the filling of some lack or the discharge of some surfeit. Eating when hungry may be more pleasant than eating when full, and taking a pee after holding it for a long time more pleasant than taking one for the second time in ten minutes. But, contra Freud; and also Plato, it is hardly the case that all pleasures are like that. What lack is filled , or what surfeit discharged, by the pleasure taken in acquiring mastery of a language, or what lack is fulfilled or surfeit discharged by the pleasure of watching a lovely sunset?
Many philosophical discussions of pleasure have been in the service of ethical or psychological or metaphysical or epistemological theories. The result has often been nonsense, or clearly false claims, such as result from what Wittgenstein called “an insufficient diet of examples.” If the argument is modus ponens (if this theory is correct, then pleasure is such and such, and, this theory is correct, so, pleasure is such and such) then, since pleasure is NOT such and such, modus tollens may make us at least suspicious of the theory, even if we save it by rejecting the hypothetical in the first place. For example, if the theory that all right actions are pleasure maximizing is correct, then pleasure must be a quantifiable process. But it is not, so....
Mill tried to avoid the consequence by denying the conditional. For him, pleasure is not a quantifiable process, even though right action is pleasure maximizing. But with that idea gone, his theory becomes non-empirical and/or tendentious.
Aristotle connects his discussion of pleasure and pain to an account of the good life in quite a different way from the ways proposed by many empiricists and other thinkers.. In particular, we could describe him as claiming that what counts as a pleasure or pain for the good person (the person whose life is good) differs from what counts as pleasure or pain for the bad person. The notion of a good life can only be spelled out by paying attention to the interplay of reason and feeling and the possibilities for shaping that interplay through training of various kinds. Thus on his view taking infants as a kind of model of natural human life is exactly the wrong thing to do. To know what is truly pleasant and truly painful we must consult the mature person (if we can find any!). It doesn’t follow that I can make the sensation of a hot poker being pushed into my eye non-painful by just thinking it so, or as the result of training. What that shows, though, is that pleasure and pain are probably not even species of the same genus. For it is difficult to think of a pleasure, even of the most sensation laden sort, which could not be discounted or regarded as not truly pleasant. The notion of sensation plays a very negligible role in Aristotle’s account. Happily so!
SUMMARY
The main questions:
1. What role
can/should religion (religious belief, religious institutions) play in the
“public square?” (The public square is the “space” of
public life, i.e. law, government generally, public institutions of all sorts,
including schools).
2. What conceptions
of human nature are presupposed in the various answers to
#1?
A. 1. The traditional answer to #1 in the
The history of law, particularly of Court decisions, affords a useful way into this question.
i. the kind of religion in
question, in the
A. 2 A less traditional answer to #1 is “NONE.” This answer has gained a good deal of ground in the last several decades.
i. this answer is often justified by reference to a particular interpretation of the establishment clause of the constitution. An extreme example would be the DeMent injunction (q.v.).
ii. these interpretations of the establishment clause are not consistent with the thinking of the constitution’s framers. But they are sometimes justified on the grounds that we now have a much more pluralistic society, in which the WASP consensus no longer exists.
The Debate Between 1 and 2.
There are many positions on a spectrum stretching from somewhere on the right of 1 (some of the new religious right) to extreme versions of 2 (Americans United for Separation of Church and State). Neuhaus would be on the right side, but avoids the extreme position.
Neuhaus’s Arguments in outline (repeated).
He tries to show that
I. There can be no government without value judgments.
II “Democratic” means - the beliefs of the majority of the citizens count (but not that they always outweigh everything else).
III. The majority of the citizens
of the
i. have religious beliefs
ii. think that their moral beliefs or “values” are grounded in religion
Therefore,
IV. genuine democratic pluralism requires religion in the public square
So, if #I and #II and #III are true, IV follows logically, right?
The reason #I is true, N. argues, lies in the very nature of govt. and law. Laws, like laws against murder, slander, child pornography, all the many different forms of theft, etc. etc. etc. obviously reflect moral or value judgments. Likewise laws that permit things like abortion in effect make or entail moral judgments (for example, the judgment that abortion does NOT amount to murder). Likewise government policies, such as tax policies that take money from richer people and use it to benefit poorer people obviously rest on value judgments, for example, the judgment that a society has the obligation to care for those in need, and the judgment that it is not theft to take money from the rich in order to benefit those not well off. All of the following involve moral or value judgments: tax policies, universal public education, tax exemption for charitable organizations, decisions to go to war (often), anti-trust laws, consumer protection laws, and so on. (Add your own). Moral or value judgments are everywhere.
II seems true by definition.
III seems to be an empirically proven fact.
If #IV is correct then all attempts by supposed civil libertarians and various judges to remove all religious influence from the public square can only have bad results;
The badest of the bad results is this:
V.. The removal of religion from the public square will necessarily (given the truth of #I) require some OTHER source of value to “fill the vacuum.”
a.The only viable candidate to serve as that source would be the state itself.
b. What is bad about that? This; it becomes impossible to criticize the state from a moral perspective. The state becomes the highest. There is no “higher point of view” from which to criticize state law and policy.
c. historically, when the state assumes that “value generating” role you get “monism” and ultimately totalitarianism.
NOBODY WANTS THAT!!!
Therefore, religiously grounded values must be given a place in the public square. QED.
What are the weak
links in these two arguments? Someone might respond to N as follows:
1. One can have a viable society without ANY “ethics” in the substantive sense.
a. Hobbes: social contract, justice and power
i. Hobbes argues that ethical concepts have no grounding other than that of positive law, which is itself grounded in an amoral survival instinct.
ii. various other views of govt. as morally neutral have been argued (not treated in this course).
OR
2. One can have a viable society with an ethics that is NOT religiously based
a. Rousseau – ethics generated by community
i. The social contract embodies a general will, which provides the standards for a good human life. There is no transcendent standard.
b. Mill - utilitarian ideas
i. some have argued that govt is simply an arrangement that is convenient or expedient for most people. The law (and ethics generally) is just the distillation of experience of what does and does not work to produce the best (most pleasant, or preference maximizing) outcome.
c. Rawls – egalitarian ideas
i. some argue that a just society is based on an implicit contract in which principles that tell us what justice IS are adopted. In Rawls, those principles are determined by asking what ANY unbiased person would accept as fair. The notion of “universalization” ala Kant is evident here. Problems with Kant.
Criticisms:
Of 1. Hobbes makes very strong and unproven assumptions about human nature (which may be conceptually confused) and is unable to account for actual cases of cooperation and altruism (cf. the Prisoner’s dilemma. )
Of 2. a. Rousseau argues for a conception of ethics and law as “self legislation” (which may not be coherent). His notion of the general will is susceptible to totalitarian interpretations.
Of 2. b. Mill’s moral theory is full of difficulties. It appears that he cannot take account of the authority of law or the actual character of rules of justice.
Of 2. c. Rawl’s notion of being non-biased is empty. Ignores historical and communal character of life.
SO, if we are not
satisfied with a non-ethical approach, or with an ethical approach that is
non-religious,
Can we work out an approach to law and govt. which draws upon a
religiously informed ethics, and at the same time honors pluralism?
One answer with a long history:
The natural law tradition provides
just such an ethic.
The
tradition in Aristotle (not a theist in a religious sense, but with religious
sounding elements).
1. Aristotle thinks that there is such a thing as “human nature”, that it crucially involves reason, and that human fulfillment thus requires reasonableness in practical activity. The other name for THAT is “virtue.” Otherwise put, the opposite of a virtuous person is a fool.
i. The virtues are not “private”, they concern our relations to others,
for human beings are “political animals.”
2. A good state or community requires civic friendships and justice. The latter is a virtue and the former requires virtues. For example in civic life we, or community leaders, need to see to it that goods and honors are distributed justly, i.e. proportionally. That is what civic friends do anyway, it is part of friendship to see to it that one’s friends are appropriately honored.
3. Good laws, which insure justice, can achieve what good rulers (who are hard to find) achieve, to some extent, such as what is mentioned in 2.
4. The highest aim of the state is the promotion of the common good. The state (polis) is not merely a restrainer of evil. It should avoid actions that interfere with the friendships and sub-communities (e/g/ the family) that make it up. The statesman seeks to encourage virtue, goodness, in the citizens.
So, good law is “natural law”
in the sense that it accords with human nature, and a good community, in which
people can thrive, is “in accord with nature.” Of course, there are no perfect communities.
The
tradition in Aquinas (a centerpiece of the Christian version).
1. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that there is such a thing as human nature, and that it crucially involves reason. He thinks reason can access aspects of “human nature as it was meant to be.’ Who “meant it?” God. Reason accesses the divine plan for human life.
i. ‘natural law’ is the name for that part of the divine plan for life that reason can access unassisted by revelation.
ii. that part of the divine plan is sufficient for such earthly
communities as it is possible to have in a post-lapsarian
world. . Aquinas follows Augustine, who insists that not all of divine law can
be known, leave along followed, in civic life.
Thus there are no perfect EARTHLY
communities.( cf. Aristotle), Theocracy is ruled out (contrary to what the “new religious
right” sometimes seems to claim.)
2. The claim that there is a “natural law” that all people know, and which provides the basis for all legitimate human law, is contested in the light of such facts as the following:
i.
people have varying conceptions of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious.
ii. different communities have different kinds of polities, ranging from dictatorships, to democracies. All of them have seemed “natural” enough at least to some people.
3. Aquinas has replies to these objections (know them!)
4. The claim that civic law is legitimate when based on natural law is contested in the light of such facts as;
i. the civic laws of community A often differ from the laws of community B, C etc. How could that be if they are all based on one natural law?
ii.civic laws can be changed, whereas natural law supposedly does not
5. Aquinas has replies to these points also (know them!)
The
tradition in Locke.
1. In the ‘state of nature’ all people know right from wrong, since that knowledge is given naturally. They know for example that they have a natural right to their own property (what they have produced by their labor).
2. However, the enforcement of the “law of nature and nature’s God” tends to become unfair when left to individuals. If you steal my car, I am likely to want a greater penalty for you than would be just (maybe death, as with horse-stealing in the old west).
3. Therefore, people enter into a social contract, in which they give up their right of enforcement to a government, which exists by their will.
Natural law theory is widely dismissed by contemporary politicians, judges, philosophers of law, etc. Nothing makes that clearer than the following famous clause from
Planned Parenthood vs Casey (US Supreme Court, 1992.) In discussions of this case, this clause is referred to, usually with contempt, as the “mystery” clause, for reasons that are obvious.
“At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
state.” (at 847).
It is arguable that the “right” mentioned here is not a right that anyone COULD have, since it requires doing things (like defining ones own concept of meaning etc.) which no one could do even if they should somehow get the idea of trying.
However, the thing to note in connection with natural law is this: this clause assumes that there are two possibilities: either people are under the “compulsion of the state” or they are “under themselves” (their own conceptions). It could not be the case that anyone’s “beliefs about these matters” were formed on the basis of reasoned argument appealing to principles and sources of right and wrong that transcend individual tastes. Thus this clause explicitly rejects the idea that human beings are under any law at all, other than positive law. It carries the notion of autonomy or self legislation one big step further. Not only do we give ourselves the law for how to live, we actually define for ourselves what “living” is by cooking up private views on such grand topics as “the mystery of life” (the court nowhere explains why they think life is a “mystery” to begin with. The real mystery here is, where did Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor ever come up with such weird ideas?)
A clearer rejection of the natural law tradition, from Aristotle through Locke and up to the present day, could hardly be imagined.
Possible paper
topics: (topic must be approved). You
can use films, literature etc. as resources, as well as the text. (Web
sources may prove helpful)
First half of course:
Historical background (European) to nervousness over religion in the public square.
Historical background in the
The “American experiment.” What is it? How does religion figure in?
Major moments in American history relating to the religious CULTURE of this country.
Role of religion in anti slavery movement. In Civil rights movement.
Public religion generally, e.g. prayer, public displays of religious nature etc.
Prayer and other religious activities in public schools.
School Vouchers
Sample Supreme Court decisions in the area of religion and public square.
Roe v. Wade as an illustration of religion and public morality.
The New Religious right. Figures, issues.
Attitudes and actions of “mainline” churches bearing on religion and public life; include discussion of the NCC.
The role of religiously inspired anti communism, and of anti anti communism, in American politics since the ‘50s.
The peculiar situation of Baptists on religion/public square issues.
The “classical Augustinian view” of the xtian churches and the state, culture.
Relativism, post-modernism, and public life as simply a power struggle (may the strongest win).
Public ethics without religion; what are the prospects?
Discuss the claim that the naked public square is a dangerous place because it leaves people without appeal to anything higher than the state.
Individualism, autonomy, the “herd of independent minds,” etc. and religion; some competing views.
Second half of course: (Web resources will not so likely be helpful).
.
ANYTHING ON NATURAL LAW. The instructor can suggest particular issues, particular books or collections of essays
Examples: The function of law includes pursuit of a common good.
Natural law is accessible to religious and irreligious alike (pro and con)
Various versions of natural law theory (NLT).
Applications of NLT to some current controversies.
Week I 380 class outlines
(“N”= Neuhaus)
1. Name a half dozen examples of explicit CONTINUING influence of religion in the “public square.”
2. Name three cases of possible controversial “intrusion” of religion into the public square that are in the news NOW.
3. Discuss the historical background to the fear of religion in the public square. Mention several (three or four) actual historical events or movements in your answer. Must include mention of the French revolution.
Stripping the public square: a state without religion
or tradition.
Glorifying Reason,
Science, freedom from superstition and tradition. David as painter of the revolutionary era.
(Above – Lavoisier and his wife, painted by
Gerard Louis David. )
Voltaire –
anti religious enlightenment intellectual. Author of Candide.
"Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven!"
William Wordsworth
Domestic carnage, now filled the whole year
With feast-days, old men from the chimney-nook,
The maiden from the busom of her love,
The mother from the cradle of her babe,
The warrior from the field - all perished, all -
Friends, enemies, of all parties, ages, ranks,
Head after head, and never heads enough
For those that bade them fall.
William Wordsworth
Three questions:
What has the relation between rel and public square been (here)
What IS “ “ “ “
What SHOULD BE the relations between rel and pub life, here or anywhere.
4. Discuss some possible bad results of EXCLUDING religion from the public square. Mention at least two 20th century examples.
TWO EXTREME
POSSIBILITIES:
1. THEOCRATIC TOTALITARIANISM
e.g.
2. “NAKED SQUARE” TOTALITARIANISM
e.g.
The
*5. Discuss the “American experiment.” Try to say what it is or has been. Mention a few significant “moments” in American history that bear on this.
Mather
The Great Awakening
King, Civil Rights, early version.
6. Describe briefly the rise of the “new religious right.” Describe some historical changes in the religious right, name at least three main figures, and five main issues important to them. Cf. p.10
A. Lincoln, the 2nd Innaugural: “The Almighty has his own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope--fervently do we pray--that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan--to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.”
7. Distinguish evangelicals and fundamentalists. Give some historical background. Relate to question #6.
8. Describe the religious “mainline” left. Mention denominations and at least five typical “issues.”
*9. Discuss pro and con. Anti-slavery and civil rights movements were basically religiously inspired.
*10. Discuss pro and con. The abortion issue is a religious issue. Discuss why N. thinks “no other issue so clearly defines” the debate about religion and the public square.
11. Critique the following cliché: “the religious right favors something like a theocracy, the religious left does not.” Give some specific references. (cf. p. 12)
12. What does N. suggest as an account of the relation between the new religious right and “fanaticism?” (cf. p. 16).
*13. Discuss the usual clichés about “authoritarian” vs. “mature” (i.e. autonomous) people. Which is more oppressive, external authority or the “imperial self?” cf. p. 17. Use the “two captains” analogy (p. 18) in your discussion.
14. What is there in Christianity that appears to have a public bearing? What “public matters” has the religious right often emphasized from scripture etc.? The center or left?
15. List of terms:
Ch. II Public
Religion and Public Reason
1. Discuss the common confusions about “public religion” and “separation of church and state.”
2. Argue pro and con: it is important to have a democratically legitimate public ethic.
3. Argue pro and con: you cannot have a public ethic without public religion.
4. What so far as you know did folk like Madison, Adams,
5. How have public schools been involved in “public religion?” Mention, in your discussion, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the WASP consensus.
6. Discuss the breakdown of the consensus. Illustrate by reference to the extremes of Rowe, on the one hand, and the Humanist manifesto on the other (Quote both).
7. H. claims that the ideal of a “secular
society” is recent in
8. Explain and discuss the difference between more conservative and more liberal government in terms of “experienced assault level.” Cf. p. 33-34
9. N. claims that the views of liberal Christians on public issues tend to be close to the views of those who have no religion or are anti-religious, whereas the views of conservative Christians tend to clash more with the views of the non-religious. Try to assess this claim. Could the liberals claim that this is a “happy convergence” or is it rather a case of “cultural captivity?”
10. Why does N. think that the new religious right and secular humanism reinforce each other? What, roughly, is the remedy he proposes?
11. A democratically legitimate public argument (an argument regarding public policy that could in principle be accepted by most or all) must be “trans-subjective.” Why? What bearing does this point have on fundamentalist tendencies to privatize religion? To confine it to specific biblical moral teachings?
12. Do you think it is true that we have “in recent decades . . systematically excluded from policy consideration” the religiously grounded values of most Americans (p.37)? Cite evidence pro and con.
Terms
Ch III Turning
1. How do Baptists stand in the current debates about religion and the public square? Consider both historical and current tendencies. Cf. the reaction in GA to vouchers.
2. What are the two forms of popular religion that have in recent decades often come together, esp. in the electronic church?
3. Critique the claim that the religious right and the left differ over matters of style. What are the supposed differences? What might be the substantive differences?
4. What do you think of the “People for the
5. Who is imposing whose values on whom? Is that the only question in this debate?
Terms
Ch. IV Critical
Patriotism
1. Discuss and compare “anti-fundamentalist” and “anti-Catholic” and more generally anti-religious bigotry to other kinds of bigotry. What makes bigotry bigotry?
2. “Critical patriotism” can be contrasted both
with uncritical patriotism and “blame
3. The notion that
Also mention Oscar Wilde’s jibe.
4. What, according to N, are some common problems with such notions as being “in solidarity with the poor and oppressed”? (67-8)
5. What according to N are the main characteristics of the “American project?” (p.69)
What might be an alternative description of that project? Which, in your judgment, is a better reading?
6. Comment on some different ways of taking such slogans as ‘my country right or wrong’ and ‘love it or leave it.’ P. 74) How might such slogans relate to religious faith?
7. Discuss the quote from
8. How does N describe the “freedom of the naked public square.”? P. 75
9. Discuss two different possible meanings of ‘under God’ in the pledge.
Ch. V. The Fragility
of the
1. “The reason why the naked public square cannot remain naked is in the very nature of law and laws” p. 80 Explain and evaluate, mentioning governmental deligitimation.
2. What, according to N, is the basis for state opposition to religion in atheist states?
3. Combine #2 with a discussion of
4. Use the “DeMent injunction” in a discussion of the claims made on N p. 86.
5. Solidarity, Solshenitzyn, Sontag, and anti-communism. P. 88 Discuss.(inform yourself
if necessary). Mention
6. N is critical of Schlesinger’s version of liberalism for only one reason. What is it? In your discussion mention both positive and negative freedom, and mediating institutions as sources of “community.”
Ch. VI Denying who we are
1. N mentions five “religious” sources of
democracy (94-5). List them. What did
John Adams think?
2. Do you agree with N that the demise of religious influence (and other traditional values) in people’s lives is not a fact, but is rather declared to be a fact by those who wish it were a fact? Give evidence, including all that can be found in this chapter.
*3. How, according to N, do
4. Do you think the man from Mars who only watched TV etc.
would be clueless about the social importance of religion in
1. Argue that the courts have sometimes prohibited the free exercise of religion in the name of prohibiting establishment. V. p 147 and also DeMent (Additional materials).
2. If it is true that religion is the “morality bearing part of culture” (p. 154) and if it is true that “a truly valueless existence is impossible for persons or societies” so that the state must come up with values from somewhere, then it follows that the state must________values from _____________, which has itself been excluded from playing the role of providing values in the _____________________ (v. 154-55)
“purloined” =df.
1. On N’s reading of American history, the state was less expansive at the beginning of the republic than it is now. What does that mean? (cf. 180)
2. The divorce of fact and value (p. 179) has led to the notion that there can be no publicly valid value judgments. The result is that in the public sphere we simply try to balance “interests.” What does that mean?
3. “We cannot at the same time have govt. that is expansive, religiously sanitized, and democratic”(p. 180). Why not?
1. The mainline USED to be as described by Bushnell, p. 208. What is it like now? Give examples that bring out the contrast.
Ch. XVI Law and the
Experiment Renewed.
1. Do you sense a difference between “laws” and “the law?” Explain (v. p 249-53). For example, would you agree with Berman that “there is an all-embracing moral reality, a purpose in the universe, which stealing offends” (p. 251)?
2. The Question, N claims, is “What is the foundation of the authority that the law claims for itself?” (p.254). If you agree why? If not, why not?
3. On p. 25 N seems to argue as follows:
1.Law is entangled with questions of right and wrong.
2. Questions of right and wrong cannot be treated scientifically.
3. Therefore, Law cannot be treated scientifically.
That is a valid argument. Are the premises true? Say, roughly, how you would attack or defend them.
4. With “capricious” law, “naked force displaces legitimate power.”(p. 256). Explain.
What might be an alternative to “capricious law?”
5. Study the middle of p.259 along with readings in Rawls and Sandel.
6. According to N what must evangelicals and fundamentalists do, and what will happen if they don’t? (bottom p. 260 – top 261).
End reading on 261.
Neuhaus’s Arguments in outline.
He tries to show that
I. There can be no government without value judgments.
II “Democratic” means - the beliefs of the majority of the citizens count (but not that they always outweigh everything else).
III. The majority of the citizens
of the
i. have religious beliefs
ii. think that their moral beliefs or “values” are grounded in religion
Therefore,
IV. genuine democratic pluralism requires religion in the public square
So, if #I and #II and #III are true, IV follows logically, right?
The reason #I is true lies in the very nature of govt. and law. Laws, like laws against murder, slander, child pornography, all the many different forms of theft, etc. etc. etc. obviously reflect moral or value judgments. Likewise laws that permit things like abortion in effect make or entail moral judgments (for example, the judgment that abortion does NOT amount to murder). Likewise government policies, such as tax policies that take money from richer people and use it to benefit poorer people obviously rest on value judgments, for example, the judgment that a society has the obligation to care for those in need, and the judgment that it is not theft to take money from the rich in order to benefit those not well off. All of the following involve moral or value judgments: tax policies, universal public education, tax exemption for charitable organizations, decisions to go to war (often), anti-trust laws, consumer protection laws, and so on. (Add your own).
Moral or value judgments are everywhere.
If #IV is correct then all attempts by supposed civil libertarians and various judges to remove all religious influence from the public square can only have bad results;
The badest of the bad results is this:
V.. The removal of religion from the public square will necessarily (given the truth of #I) require some OTHER source of value to “fill the vacuum.”
a.The only viable candidate to serve as that source would be the state itself.
b. What is bad about that? This; it becomes impossible to criticize the state from a moral perspective. The state becomes the highest. There is no “higher point of view” from which to criticize state law and policy.
c. historically, when the state assumes that “value generating” role you get “monism” and ultimately totalitarianism.
NOBODY WANTS THAT!!!
Therefore, religiously grounded values must be given a place in the public square. QED.
What are the weak
links in these two arguments? Someone might respond to N as follows:
1. One can have a
viable society without “ethics” in the substantive sense.
a. Hobbes: social contract, justice
and power
OR
2. One can have a
viable society with an ethics that is NOT religious
a. Rousseau – ethics generated
by community
b. Mill, Rawls - utilitarian and Kantian ideas
VI
Historically, in the
a. Only relatively recently (the last 50 years or so) has the idea of a completely secular public square become prominent.
VII. The religious community has reacted in various ways to the “new secular state.”
a. the New Religious Right (RR) recognizes a problem.
1.
Solution? Christianize
b. the old mainline left/center seems to deny that problem and support secularization, but in fact continues to want input to policy, based on religious values.
c. the best solution? - the “orthodox” or classical solution.
VIII. The
“ORTHODOX” or Augustinian solution.
a. Theocracy is out.
1. The “post-lapsarian”
world requires the use of force, etc.
(Qualified Pessimism)
i. people are enslaved to
“disordered desire.”
ii.
force is necessary to prevent “greater
evils.”
iii. some people
are more capable of self-govt. than others, but even
the best need police in order preserve “peace and society.”
2.
Therefore, The “two cities” cannot be combined.
b. Nonetheless, valid “positive” law is grounded in divine
law. Reason can see that. Reason is substantive.
i. HOW is it grounded? (The question
answered in Aquinas, etc. by a fuller specification of “reason”)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Attacking the Weak
Links in Neuhaus
1. Attacking #I.
A. Viable communities are possible without controversial
“value judgments” as a basis. Examples: Hobbes.
1. A pessimistic account of human nature is essential to Hobbesian conceptions
i. Humans are essentially egoistic seekers
of self preservation.
ii. In that sense, humans are
“naturally” immoral
(though Hobbes twists moral vocabulary to fit these depressing facts, as did Thrasymachus).
2. Lord
of the Flies as an illustration of what people are by nature.
i. Those who think there is some intrinsic
“justice” get swept aside, like Piggy.
ii. There is motivation to establish rules
for life together, agreed upon in a kind of contract or compact.
iii. However, the rules for governance are
fragile conventions. Social relations quickly give way to egoism, rivalries and
struggles for power, UNLESS
3.
i. cf. international relations and the UN!
B. Hobbes. Viable communities arise
through a “social contract”
1. People in the “state of
nature” are never safe.
2. Therefore, people enter the contract
because they see that it is to their advantage, i.e. makes life safer. Again,
“moral” considerations play no role.
3. BUT, the contract will never work
without an enforcer.
i. The words “just” and “unjust”
have no meaning
apart
from enforcement.
4. “Reason”
can do nothing to establish moral truth; reason
only shows
how to get whatever various desires dictate (and they can be quite various! Relativism).
5. The state is a restrainer; it does
nothing to further the “common good” except insofar as
“peace” is for the common good.
i. community has no
“intrinsic value.”
C 1 Answer q. 2 in
Bud. p. 24.
C
2. Answer q. 5 in Bud p. 25
C
3. Give examples of
intellectual and moral virtues (3 each). Why do we need both kinds, according
to Aristotle? Mention Lewis’ analogy (p. 27-28) in your answer.
C
4. Why does self control
require practical wisdom? Why does practical wisdom require self control?
By Wed. Oct. 19
C
5. q. 3 p. 36
C 6.q. 4 p. 36
C
7. Explain what Aristotle meant
by “the common good” by considering families. Study p. 33 to answer
this.
C 8, Fill in the
matrix on p. 40. What two things does this show about law and morality?
C
9. Lawmakers obviously cannot
pass laws requiring people to be friends. Nonetheless the laws can encourage or
discourage friendship. How? (cf. p. 44-48)
C
10. q. 4, p. 49.
By Friday, Oct 21
C
11. What can law and custom
do that parental training cannot do? Can you think of any laws or customs of
ours that do these things? Explain.
C
12. Compare Aristotle to
Hobbes.
A. What kind of regime does each favor, and
why?
B. How does each of them conceive of
the role of reason in the best community?
C. In what
other ways do they differ about human nature, and how do their differences
impact their views about government and law?
D. Aristotle claims that personal goodness
requires a good upbringing. How does that fact distinguish his views from
Hobbes’?
By
Monday, Oct. 24 Study Bud.
C 13. Describe a scholastic quaestio.
C 14. Define the following:
Substance and type;
participation of the rational creature in the eternal law;
powers and habits; rational and sensitive appetites (include discussion of will, and of irascible and concupiscible appetite);
habit;
synderesis;
virtue; vicious;
fomes;
speculative reason;
prudence or practical wisdom;
perfect community;
law (contrast with Hobbes).
C 15. Reproduce the diagram on p. 60 and FILL IN each box with further details. For instance, at the top in the box containing ‘eternal law’ you could add ‘the laws or principles by which God made the universe. Cannot be known directly, but only in its “reflections.”
C 16 Answer all four questions on p. 64.
By Wednesday Oct. 26
C 17. Answer question 1, p. 78. List the common objections given by Bud. first.
Read Aquinas, Q 96 (e reserve. #7384). Answer these questions:
C18. Aquinas holds that even in a state of nature or the pre-lapsarian state there would be “RULE” or mastership.
a.Give his principal reason.
b. Give the quote from Augustine’s City of God that he cites in support of his position. (De Cive…)
c. Compare Aquinas’ position to Hobbes’ in as much detail as you can.
By
Friday, Oct. 28. Study
Aquinas (TA), Q. 90,91.
C 19. State the question in each of the articles of 90 and 91. (The answer is always ‘yes’)
C 20. What is meant by
a.
(again!)“natural law is the participation of the
rational creature in the eternal law” (be sure to define the main terms)
The engine does not consciously participate in. But it still reflects the engineering plan and is intelligible in its light. If it fails to participate in, it fails to function, or, self destructs. It “participates in” only in an analogous fashion, analogous to the following:
------------
Humans “participate in” consciously. Reason in them can grasp, roughly, the (natural) end, and humans can act in accord with reason. Humans reflect the divine plan in their conscience, which shows the reasonable (and only) way to the end. Conscience (synderesis) IS innate habitual understanding of the first principles of conduct.
Humans reflect the divine (engineering) plan and human life is intelligible in the light of that plan (law). And not intelligible otherwise.
b. “law is a rule and measure”
C 21. What is the difference between the way in which a plant “participates in eternal law” and the way a rational being (a human) does?
By
Wednesday, Nov. 2. Continue
with TA q. 93 and 94.
C 24. In 91 article 2, how does Thomas reply to obj. 4? How does his reply relate to
a. Hobbes
b. Aristotle’s notions about how virtue is acquired?
C. 25 How does the way in which “natural objects” (like stones and trees) “obey” divine law differ from the way in which human beings obey? Give details as found in Q. 93, Art. 5. Try to clarify the notion of “directing something to its end” by giving examples from non-human and human nature.
C. 26. In the light of your answer to C. 25, discuss whether there is anything in the notion that Aquinas confuses “law” in the sense of “laws of nature” and “law” in the sense of something promulgated by a legislator.
C. 27. According to Q. 94, Art 2, what are some of the main precepts of the natural law, and what is natural about them?
By
Friday, Nov. 4. Study Q. 94
LOTS
C. 28. Neither the “truth nor rectitude” of the particular conclusions of practical reason is the same for all. Give an example of each.
a. example where the truth is not the same for all.
b. example where the rectitude is not the same for all.
Does that imply some kind of relativism?
C 29. Fill in the blanks:
a. “Do good, avoid evil” is a ________precept of the natural law.
b. “Be sociable” is also a _________precept of the natural law, from which it follows that one should not do ____________ to ones neighbor.
c. The primary precepts are ______________to all and are ______________ for all.
d. Assuming that “do no harm” is a general secondary (or immediate) principle of natural law, it follows that if someone says they do not KNOW that is it wrong to kill an innocent person, their reason (rational faculties) must be __________________.
C. 30. Reason can be corrupted or perverted in five ways, according to Aquinas: list them and give YOUR OWN examples of each. Can you think of any OTHER way reason could be perverted? If so describe it (them). See Bud. ch. 5
1
2
3
4
5
C. 31. How does Aquinas handle the problem of the “sins of the patriarchs?” (see Q. 94 Art. 5, obj. 2). Give examples.
By Monday, Nov. 7. Study Q. 95, Review Bud. ch. 5. Study Bud. ch. 6.
C. 32. According to Aquinas (and Aristotle) one can determine what the “good” that all should pursue IS, by considering the purposes of our human living and human “inclinations.” The “good” will simply be the fulfillment of our purpose(s). Humans are meant to live reasonably (reason is the distinctive capacity of humans and reason’s purpose, at the practical level, is to guide behavior). People who do that will be good. (You cannot be truly reasonable and be evil too). How do you suppose Aquinas would respond to each of the following objections to these ideas:
a. A person could use “reason” to guide his behavior and still be evil. Consider the very smart criminal who uses his reason “to the max” in stealing a precious diamond from a heavily guarded museum. So it follows that using reason to guide behavior does NOT guarantee goodness at all. It could even be used to make people more successfully evil.
b. People have different sorts of inclinations. Some people are heavily “inclined” to eat too much, others do not have such inclinations. Some type A personalities are inclined to be rude and pushy, whereas some people are just naturally kind. Some people may be born with violent tendencies, others are naturally gentle. Some people have homosexual inclinations, some do not. And so forth. Since there are so many conflicting inclinations, it is meaningless to speak of “the” purposes of “our” inclinations, and impossible to argue that guiding our inclinations with reason would lead to particular kinds of behavior as opposed to other kinds. (see Q 94 art. 4)
C. 33. Can natural law vary? Explain. See Q. 94 Art. 5.
C. 34. There are two ways human laws can be derived from natural law. What are they? See Q 95 Art. 2.
For Wed. Nov. 9th. Study TA q. 96 and 97.
C. 35 Make an outline of Q. 96. Include a description of the examples used and their purposes (cf. art. 6, the case of shutting the gates of the city. )
C. 36 Even unjust laws may still “oblige in the court of conscience.” When do they and when don’t they? (v. 96 art. 4)
C. 37. Explain how the points made in 97 can be used to argue against relativism. Remember that relativism usually gets started when it is noticed that different peoples or cultures have varying laws and customs. How, according to Aquinas, is that fact consistent with, and even to be expected, given that the natural law itself at least in its primary precepts does not change at all.
For Wed.
Nov. 9th. Study TA q. 96 and 97.
C. 35 Make an outline of
Q. 96. Include a description of the examples used and their purposes (cf. art.
6, the case of shutting the gates of the city. )
C. 36 Even unjust laws
may still “oblige in the court of conscience.” When do they and
when don’t they? (v. 96 art. 4)
C.
37. Explain how the points made in Q 97
can be used to argue against relativism. Remember that relativism usually gets
started when it is noticed that different peoples or cultures have varying laws
and customs. How, according to Aquinas, is that fact consistent with, and even
to be expected, given that the natural law itself at least in its primary
precepts does not change at all?
Fri. Nov. 11 Study Q 100
Art 1, Q 105 art 1. Review Bud.
C 38.
Under what circumstances can human laws be changed?(cf.
Q 97 and Bud. p. 80-83. )
C 39.
What should be the relation of law to custom? (cf. Bud. 84-86, Q 97 art 3)
C.40 Answer Bud q. 2,3,4 p 94. Consult Bud and Q 105.
Study Guide
D.
For
Wednesday, Nov. 16 Study Bud. ch. 7
1.
What is the most striking difference between Locke’s notion of the
“state of nature” and Hobbes’ notion? What is the basis for
the difference?
2.
Hobbes thinks that in order for the social contract to work, people must give
up their power or right to kill, etc. and transfer it to the
“state” in some sense, in order to achieve safety or “peace.”
Does Locke agree, disagree, or, in a way, both? Describe and compare their
views.
3.
How, according to Locke, does the community of the family differ from political
community? By way of contrast, bring in the ideas of Filmer
and radical feminists, as portrayed by Bud.
4.
Answer q. 1, p. 107
5.
Answer q. 2 “
For Mon Nov.
21. Study Bud ch. 8
1. Lockean politics is like modernist matrimony, Aristotelian
politics is like traditional matrimony. P.113. Explain this thoroughly. What you need
to show is the fundamental differences between Locke and Aristotle/Aquinas. So
for example you need to discuss the social contract, and the status of
pre-political society.
2.
What did “rejectionists” reject, and why?
3.
Consider the case of Mr. Swanner. How does it show up
the differences between Lockean and many typical
modern views of “natural rights?”
3.
Answer 6,7 and 9 (121-22)
For Mon. Nov. 28 Study Bud. ch. 9 and 10
1. How according to Locke does anything get legitimately taken from the “common stock?”
2. What limits are placed on the acquisition of private property, on Locke’s view?
3. Answer q. 1, p. 132.
4. “ 2
5. What are the criteria for a just war, and how does Locke apply them to revolution?
6. In Bud’s usage, what is the difference between hedonism and utilitarianism.
7. Answer q. 1, p. 143-44
8. q. 2 p. 144. Answer ALL PARTS of this question.
For Wed.
Nov. 30. Study Bud. ch. 11 and 12
and E reserve, Mill.
1. Mention
three problems with utilitarianism, and Mill’s attempted solutions.
2. One
problem with utilitarianism ala Mill is that it requires a distinction between
higher and lower pleasures. How does Mill make the distinction? Evaluate his
approach, mentioning the five factors described on p. 153, and the problems
with each. Can you think of an additional problem?
3.
Mill admits that there appears to be a conflict between utilitarianism and our
intuitions about justice.
a.What is that conflict?
b. How
does Mill try to avoid it?
c. Why
does Bud. think he does not succeed?
For Friday, Dec. 2.
Study the selection from Rousseau.
1. What are the main differences between Rousseau’s idea of the “general will” and the idea of “rule by the majority.”? Between his idea and the idea of government through counterbalancing forces?
2. According to Locke and other natural law theorists, the law has authority for us because it is grounded in the will of God. What gives the law authority according to Rousseau?
the passing from
the state of nature to the civil state produces in
man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a
moral character which they lacked before. It is then only
that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what
is right, to the incitements of appetite.
3. Compare and contrast this, in every respect that you can see to be relevant, to
a. Hobbes
b. Locke
Man
loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all
which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty,
and proprietorship of all he possesses.
That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations,
we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by
the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or
of the right of the first occupant, from property, which must be founded on a
positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil
state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself;
for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to
obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves.
(Emphasis added).
4.
Compare and contrast this to
a.
Hobbes
b.
Aquinas
c.
Locke
d.
Mill
5.
Rousseau
sees the advantage of community as being nothing less than the production of
real ___________in each member.
But when cabals and partial associations
åre formed at the expense of the great association,
the will of each such association, though general with regard to its
members, is privtate with regard to the
State: it can then be said no longer that there åre as
many voters as men, but only as many as there åre
associations. By this means the differences being less numerous, they produce a
result less general.
6.
What would Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, say about THAT?
7.
Compare Rousseau and Mussolini
For Monday, Dec. 5 Read material in E
reserve on Rawls. Answer Rawls questions.
Rawls
is an egalitarian, Locke a sort of libertarian, Mill a utilitarian, Aquinas an
Aristotelian. Fill in the blanks in the
following statements with whichever terms fit. More than one may fit in a
single blank.
Example:
a ________________ would oppose a tax on income.
Libertarian, and a utilitarian if the tax was very
burdensome for most people and benefited few.
1.
A ______________ would probably favor an
inheritance tax, and __________never would.
2.
A_______________ would be opposed to affirmative action in most cases.
3.
A _______________ would not be opposed to concentration of wealth in the hands
of very few people.
4.
Both a ____________ and a __________________ would probably favor a tax (like
Medicaid) designed to take care of the least well off.
SUMMARY
The main questions:
1. What role
can/should religion (religious belief, religious institutions) play in the
“public square?” (The public square is the “space” of
public life, i.e. law, government generally, public institutions of all sorts,
including schools).
2. What conceptions
of human nature are presupposed in the various answers to
#1?
A. 1. The traditional answer to #1 in the
The history of law, particularly of Court decisions, affords a useful way into this question.
i. the kind of religion in
question, in the
A. 2 A less traditional answer to #1 is “NONE.” This answer has gained a good deal of ground in the last several decades.
i. this answer is often justified by reference to a particular interpretation of the establishment clause of the constitution. An extreme example would be the DeMent injunction (q.v.).
ii. these interpretations of the establishment clause are not consistent with the thinking of the constitution’s framers. But they are sometimes justified on the grounds that we now have a much more pluralistic society, in which the WASP consensus no longer exists.
The Debate Between 1 and 2.
There are many positions on a spectrum stretching from somewhere on the right of 1 (some of the new religious right) to extreme versions of 2 (Americans United for Separation of Church and State). Neuhaus would be on the right side, but avoids the extreme position.
Neuhaus’s Arguments in outline (repeated).
He tries to show that
I. There can be no government without value judgments.
II “Democratic” means - the beliefs of the majority of the citizens count (but not that they always outweigh everything else).
III. The majority of the citizens
of the
i. have religious beliefs
ii. think that their moral beliefs or “values” are grounded in religion
Therefore,
IV. genuine democratic pluralism requires religion in the public square
So, if #I and #II and #III are true, IV follows logically, right?
The reason #I is true, N. argues, lies in the very nature of govt. and law. Laws, like laws against murder, slander, child pornography, all the many different forms of theft, etc. etc. etc. obviously reflect moral or value judgments. Likewise laws that permit things like abortion in effect make or entail moral judgments (for example, the judgment that abortion does NOT amount to murder). Likewise government policies, such as tax policies that take money from richer people and use it to benefit poorer people obviously rest on value judgments, for example, the judgment that a society has the obligation to care for those in need, and the judgment that it is not theft to take money from the rich in order to benefit those not well off. All of the following involve moral or value judgments: tax policies, universal public education, tax exemption for charitable organizations, decisions to go to war (often), anti-trust laws, consumer protection laws, and so on. (Add your own). Moral or value judgments are everywhere.
II seems true by definition.
III seems to be an empirically proven fact.
If #IV is correct then all attempts by supposed civil libertarians and various judges to remove all religious influence from the public square can only have bad results;
The badest of the bad results is this:
V.. The removal of religion from the public square will necessarily (given the truth of #I) require some OTHER source of value to “fill the vacuum.”
a.The only viable candidate to serve as that source would be the state itself.
b. What is bad about that? This; it becomes impossible to criticize the state from a moral perspective. The state becomes the highest. There is no “higher point of view” from which to criticize state law and policy.
c. historically, when the state assumes that “value generating” role you get “monism” and ultimately totalitarianism.
NOBODY WANTS THAT!!!
Therefore, religiously grounded values must be given a place in the public square. QED.
What are the weak
links in these two arguments? Someone might respond to N as follows:
1. One can have a viable society without ANY “ethics” in the substantive sense.
a. Hobbes: social contract, justice and power
i. Hobbes argues that ethical concepts have no grounding other than that of positive law, which is itself grounded in an amoral survival instinct.
ii. various other views of govt. as morally neutral have been argued (not treated in this course).
OR
2. One can have a viable society with an ethics that is NOT religiously based
a. Rousseau – ethics generated by community
i. The social contract embodies a general will, which provides the standards for a good human life. There is no transcendent standard.
b. Mill - utilitarian ideas
i. some have argued that govt is simply an arrangement that is convenient or expedient for most people. The law (and ethics generally) is just the distillation of experience of what does and does not work to produce the best (most pleasant, or preference maximizing) outcome.
c. Rawls – egalitarian ideas
i. some argue that a just society is based on an implicit contract in which principles that tell us what justice IS are adopted. In Rawls, those principles are determined by asking what ANY unbiased person would accept as fair. The notion of “universalization” ala Kant is evident here. Problems with Kant.
Criticisms:
Of 1. Hobbes makes very strong and unproven assumptions about human nature (which may be conceptually confused) and is unable to account for actual cases of cooperation and altruism (cf. the Prisoner’s dilemma. )
Of 2. a. Rousseau argues for a conception of ethics and law as “self legislation” (which may not be coherent). His notion of the general will is susceptible to totalitarian interpretations.
Of 2. b. Mill’s moral theory is full of difficulties. It appears that he cannot take account of the authority of law or the actual character of rules of justice.
Of 2. c. Rawl’s notion of being non-biased is empty. Ignores historical and communal character of life.
SO, if we are not
satisfied with a non-ethical approach, or with an ethical approach that is
non-religious,
Can we work out an approach to law and govt. which draws upon a
religiously informed ethics, and at the same time honors pluralism?
One answer with a long history:
The natural law tradition provides
just such an ethic.
The
tradition in Aristotle (not a theist in a religious sense, but with religious
sounding elements).
1. Aristotle thinks that there is such a thing as “human nature”, that it crucially involves reason, and that human fulfillment thus requires reasonableness in practical activity. The other name for THAT is “virtue.” Otherwise put, the opposite of a virtuous person is a fool.
i. The virtues are not “private”, they concern our relations to others,
for human beings are “political animals.”
2. A good state or community requires civic friendships and justice. The latter is a virtue and the former requires virtues. For example in civic life we, or community leaders, need to see to it that goods and honors are distributed justly, i.e. proportionally. That is what civic friends do anyway, it is part of friendship to see to it that one’s friends are appropriately honored.
3. Good laws, which insure justice, can achieve what good rulers (who are hard to find) achieve, to some extent, such as what is mentioned in 2.
4. The highest aim of the state is the promotion of the common good. The state (polis) is not merely a restrainer of evil. It should avoid actions that interfere with the friendships and sub-communities (e/g/ the family) that make it up. The statesman seeks to encourage virtue, goodness, in the citizens.
So, good law is “natural law”
in the sense that it accords with human nature, and a good community, in which
people can thrive, is “in accord with nature.” Of course, there are no perfect communities.
The
tradition in Aquinas (a centerpiece of the Christian version).
1. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that there is such a thing as human nature, and that it crucially involves reason. He thinks reason can access aspects of “human nature as it was meant to be.’ Who “meant it?” God. Reason accesses the divine plan for human life.
i. ‘natural law’ is the name for that part of the divine plan for life that reason can access unassisted by revelation.
ii. that part of the divine plan is sufficient for such earthly
communities as it is possible to have in a post-lapsarian
world. . Aquinas follows Augustine, who insists that not all of divine law can
be known, leave along followed, in civic life.
Thus there are no perfect EARTHLY
communities.( cf. Aristotle), Theocracy is ruled out (contrary to what the “new religious
right” sometimes seems to claim.)
2. The claim that there is a “natural law” that all people know, and which provides the basis for all legitimate human law, is contested in the light of such facts as the following:
i.
people have varying conceptions of right and wrong, virtuous and vicious.
ii. different communities have different kinds of polities, ranging from dictatorships, to democracies. All of them have seemed “natural” enough at least to some people.
3. Aquinas has replies to these objections (know them!)
4. The claim that civic law is legitimate when based on natural law is contested in the light of such facts as;
i. the civic laws of community A often differ from the laws of community B, C etc. How could that be if they are all based on one natural law?
ii.civic laws can be changed, whereas natural law supposedly does not
5. Aquinas has replies to these points also (know them!)
The
tradition in Locke.
1. In the ‘state of nature’ all people know right from wrong, since that knowledge is given naturally. They know for example that they have a natural right to their own property (what they have produced by their labor).
2. However, the enforcement of the “law of nature and nature’s God” tends to become unfair when left to individuals. If you steal my car, I am likely to want a greater penalty for you than would be just (maybe death, as with horse-stealing in the old west).
3. Therefore, people enter into a social contract, in which they give up their right of enforcement to a government, which exists by their will.
Natural law theory is widely dismissed by contemporary politicians, judges, philosophers of law, etc. Nothing makes that clearer than the following famous clause from
Planned Parenthood vs Casey (US Supreme Court, 1992.) In discussions of this case, this clause is referred to, usually with contempt, as the “mystery” clause, for reasons that are obvious.
“At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
state.” (at 847).
It is arguable that the “right” mentioned here is not a right that anyone COULD have, since it requires doing things (like defining ones own concept of meaning etc.) which no one could do even if they should somehow get the idea of trying.
However, the thing to note in connection with natural law is this: this clause assumes that there are two possibilities: either people are under the “compulsion of the state” or they are “under themselves” (their own conceptions). It could not be the case that anyone’s “beliefs about these matters” were formed on the basis of reasoned argument appealing to principles and sources of right and wrong that transcend individual tastes. Thus this clause explicitly rejects the idea that human beings are under any law at all, other than positive law. It carries the notion of autonomy or self legislation one big step further. Not only do we give ourselves the law for how to live, we actually define for ourselves what “living” is by cooking up private views on such grand topics as “the mystery of life” (the court nowhere explains why they think life is a “mystery” to begin with. The real mystery here is, where did Justices Souter, Kennedy, and O’Connor ever come up with such weird ideas?)
A clearer rejection of the natural law tradition, from Aristotle through Locke and up to the present day, could hardly be imagined.
Study
Guide D is due Wed. Dec. 7.
Final
exam is Wed. Dec. 14.
Religion in American History – Some Cases , some defining “moments.”
The Great Awakening (first half of 18th
cent. esp.)
(1) One of the major results of the Great Awakening was to unify 4/5ths of Americans in a common understanding of the Christian faith and life. Americans--North and South--shared a common evangelical view of life.
(2) Dissent and dissenters enjoyed greater respect than ever before. Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians--all non-established groups--took root and grew. Despite the fact that these denominational lines remained, they shared a common evangelical voice. Typical was the sentiment of John Wesley: "Dost thou love and fear God? It is enough! I give thee the right had of fellowship.” This catholicity of spirit became common.
(3) Great emphasis came to be placed on education. George
Whitefield founded the school that would latter become the
(4) A greater sense of responsibility for Indians and Slaves emerged from the revival. George Whitefield, for instance, was among the first to preach to Blacks. The evangelical experience was common to both whites and blacks, making both aware that the ground is level at foot of cross. This led most evangelicals to denounce slavery as sinful, and at the first General Conference of Methodism, slave holding was viewed as grounds for immediate expulsion from the society.
series of religious revivals that swept over the American colonies
about the middle of the 18th cent. It resulted in doctrinal changes and
influenced social and political thought. In
In New England the movement died out rapidly, leaving behind
bitter doctrinal disputes between the "New Lights" and the "Old
Lights," the latter led by Charles Chauncy, a Boston clergyman, who opposed the revivalist
movement as extravagant and impermanent. The theology of the "New
Lights," a slightly modified Calvinism, crystallized into the Edwardian,
or New England, theology that became dominant in W New England, whereas the
liberal doctrines of the "Old Lights," strong in Boston and the vicinity,
were destined to develop into the Universalist or
Unitarian positions. A similar division between "New Sides" and
"Old Sides" took place in the Middle Colonies, causing a schism
(1741—58) in the Presbyterian Church.
The Great Awakening also resulted in an outburst of
missionary activity among Native Americans by such men as David Brainerd,
Eleazar Wheelock, and Samuel Kirkland;
in the first movement of importance against slavery; and in various other
humanitarian undertakings. It led to the founding of a number of academies and
colleges, notably Princeton, Brown, Rutgers, and
See A. E. Heimert and P. Miller, ed., Great Awakening: Documents Illustrating the Crisis and Its Consequences (1967). J. Tracy, A History of the Revival of Religion in the Time of Edwards and Whitefield (1845, repr. 1969); C. H. Maxson, The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies (1920, repr. 1958); W. M. Gewehr, The Great Awakening in Virginia (1930, repr. 1965); E. S. Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England (1957, repr. 1965); R. L. Bushman, ed., The Great Awakening (1969, repr. 1989); D. B. Rutman, The Great Awakening (1970); C. L. Heyrman, Southern Cross (1997).
The New
Religious Right
There are a wide
variety of practical social and political goals which link groups in the
Religious Right, so it is worth exploring some of those issues. People need to
be particularly careful of how the rhetoric of the radical/religious right is
packaged.
Don Wildmon's American Family
Association
Don Wildmon's American Family Association has been
increasingly on the forefront of the Radical Religious Right and the efforts to
impose a very conservative, evangelical Christian morality on
Has the Christian Revolution Fizzled Out?
James Dobson and Focus on the Family
Too few people have ever heard much about either James Dobson or his
organizations. Those who have, especially those who avidly follow him and his
advice, are unaware that he is not at all what he seems to be. The reality of
James Dobson is very little like the carefully crafted public image which he
jealously guards.
Fellow countrymen: At this second appearing to take the oath of the presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than there was at the first. Then a statement, somewhat in detail, of a course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.
On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were
anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it-- all sought to
avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from this place,
devoted altogether to saving the Union without war, insurgent agents were in
the city seeking to destroy it without war-- seeking to dissolve the
One-eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed
generally over the
Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered--that of neither has been answered fully.
The Almighty has his own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but woe to that man by whom the offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed time, he now wills to remove, and that he gives to both North and South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope--fervently do we pray--that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn by the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."
With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan--to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.
Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream”
Five
score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand signed the
Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light
of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of
withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of
captivity. But one hundred years later, we must face the tragic fact that the
Negro is still not free.
One
hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the
manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One hundred years
later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast
ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro is still
languishing in the corners of American society and finds himself an exile in
his own land.
So we
have come here today to dramatize an appalling condition. In a sense we have
come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the architects of our
republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of
Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was
to fall heir.
This
note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the inalienable rights of
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that
So we
have come to cash this check -- a check that will give us upon demand the
riches of freedom and the security of justice. We have also come to this
hallowed spot to remind
It
would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment and to underestimate
the determination of the Negro. This sweltering summer of the Negro's
legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of
freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning.
Those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content
will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. There
will be neither rest nor tranquility in
The
whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until
the bright day of justice emerges. But there is something that I must say to my
people who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice.
In the process of gaining our rightful place we must not be guilty of wrongful
deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the
cup of bitterness and hatred.
We must
forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. we
must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again
and again we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with
soul force.
The
marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us
to distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced
by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied
up with our destiny and their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom.
We
cannot walk alone. And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall march
ahead. We cannot turn back. There are those who are asking the devotees of
civil rights, "When will you be satisfied?" we can never be satisfied
as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in
the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied
as long as the Negro's basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one.
We can never be satisfied as long as a Negro in
I am
not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and
tribulations. Some of you have come fresh from narrow cells. Some of you have
come from areas where your quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of
persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the
veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned
suffering is redemptive.
Go back
to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana,
go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow
this situation can and will be changed. Let us not wallow in the valley of
despair. I say to you today, my friends, that in spite of the difficulties and
frustrations of the moment, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted
in the American dream.
I have
a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of
its creed: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are
created equal." I have a dream that one day on the red hills of
I have
a dream that one day the state of Alabama, whose governor's lips are presently
dripping with the words of interposition and nullification, will be transformed
into a situation where little black boys and black girls will be able to join
hands with little white boys and white girls and walk together as sisters and
brothers. I have a dream today. I have a dream that one day every valley shall
be exalted, every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be
made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight, and the glory of the
Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it together. This is our hope.
This is the faith with which I return to the South. With this faith we will be
able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith we
will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful
symphony of brotherhood. With this faith we will be able to work together, to
pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for
freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.
This
will be the day when all of God's children will be able to sing with a new
meaning, "My country, 'tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.
Land where my fathers died, land of the pilgrim's pride, from every
mountainside, let freedom ring." And if
When we let freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual, "Free at last! free at last! thank God Almighty, we are free at last!"
The First Amendment
to the
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
Latest News
Congress passed the first federally funded school voucher program on January
22, 2004, allocating $14 million to establish a program for low-income students
in the
Background
On June 27, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its
ruling in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the
The high court ruling ended some longstanding debates and opened new chapters
in others. In part, it shifted the issue back to the states, allowing each
state to decide whether it wishes to implement a voucher program. Fifteen state
legislatures are likely to address voucher proposals during 2002-2003
legislative sessions, according to the American Legislative Exchange Council, a
voucher advocacy group. The majority of states, however, have laws known as
Blaine Amendments. Named for James G. Blaine, a Republican legislator from
Litigation over these state constitutional restrictions has begun, with two
prominent decisions having already been handed down by courts regarding the
The issue of school vouchers will continue to be a topic of public debate over
the next few years, as states and other localities wrestle with ways to improve
education. The Pew Forum has commissioned a number of resources to provide
expert and nonpartisan assessment of where the law on school vouchers currently
stands, as well as to present contrasting arguments on educational policy to
help clarify the issues in dispute.
Read the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
The
Dement Injunction
In the sport of religion jurisprudence, the cats sometimes
catch the mice. In October 1997, for example, federal district judge Ira DeMent issued an injunction forbidding religious activities
in and around public schools in
For the next four years, the injunction would occupy the
attention of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which eventually weakened
it considerably. Even the federal bench could eventually see that there are
more mice than cats and that the mice have clever lawyers.
The DeMent injunction is a token
of the sometimes comical plight of the federal judiciary on religious matters.
How did the august judicial branch of the American government find itself
goaded by teenagers with religious tracts, swamped in litigation that would
boggle even the sharpest exegetes, and forced into applying “tests”
that seem implausible, contradictory, and, what is worse, contemptible for
their weakness? How did it happen that members of the Supreme Court could
routinely refer to one another’s opinions as “totally
incorrect,” “unsound,” “courting anarchy,”
“laying waste venerable customs,” “inherently
ethnocentric,” “outright perverse,” “ridiculous,”
“pure fantasy,” “pernicious,” “absurd and
offensive,” bordering “on paranoia,” and an “Orwellian
rewriting of history”?
James Hitchcock’s new study, The Supreme Court and
Religion in American Life, provides for the general reader a useful road
map through the history and case law. The first of the two volumes tells the
history rather comprehensively, with a minimum of interpretive overlay. The
second tries to understand the story. (from a review
by Russell Hittenger)
Judge's Prayer Ruling in
Alabama Overturned by Court of Appeals
By Art Toalston
CNS Information Services
16 July, 1999
The July 13 ruling is a "major victory for student religious speech in
public schools," said Jay Sekulow, chief counsel
for the
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has sent "a clear message
to the ACLU and its allies that censorship of religious speech will not be
tolerated in our courts," Sekulow said.
"The license to censor has been revoked."
Sekulow added, "This case has generated national
attention and will be examined closely by those on both sides of the
debate."
Pryor said the victory means that children "do not surrender their
constitutional rights when they attend a public school in
As reported by the Birmingham News, Pryor had appealed portions of DeMent's sweeping injunction that Pryor contended infringed
on students' rights. The federal appeals court agreed that DeMent
went too far in prohibiting student-led prayers and religious speech in
However, ACLU attorney Pamela Sumners of
DeMent had prohibited school officials not only from
leading vocal prayers or other religious speech at events such as graduation
exercises and football games but also from permitting students to do so, the
News recapped.
Sumners told the News she will talk to her clients
about whether to appeal and claimed the federal panel's decision amounts to
"judicial activism ... at odds with 30 years of U.S. Supreme Court
precedents."
The ACLU, on behalf of the
The court continued, "Ultimately, the issue in this case is not whether
school officials may prescribe prayer or enlist surrogates to that end.
They may not.
"The first principle must always be that genuinely student-initiated
religious speech must be permitted." The judges also stated that student
religious speech also must be treated the same as secular speech by students in
the public schools.
Rousseau – The Social
Contract
what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the oinission of which would be less injurious to others than
the payment would be burdensome to himself; and con-sidering
the moral person which constitutes the State as a creature of the imagi nation, because it is not a man, he may wish to enjoy
the rights of a citizen without being disposed to fulfil
the duties of a subject. Such an injustice would in its progress cause the ruin
of the body politic.
In order, therefore, to prevent the social compact from becoming an ernpty formula, it tacitly comprehends the engagement,
which alone can give effect to the others — that whoever refuses to obey
the general will shall be compelled to it by the whole body: this in fact only forces him to be free; for this is the
condition which, by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his
absolute personal independence, a condition which gives motion and effect to
the political machine. This alone renders all civil engagements justifiable,
and without it they would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses.
(10) So if you are trying to be
”free” by going against the ”general will” it
may be necessary to ____________ you to be free!
(10) On Rousseau’s view, my absolute personal
independence is gauranteed by WHAT? (If the answer to this
question does not bother you, pay attention).
the passing from the state of nature to the civil state produces in man a very remarkable change, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving to his actions a moral character which they lacked before. It is then only that the voice of duty succeeds to physical impulse, and a sense of what is right, to the incitements of appetite. Man, who had till then regarded none but himself, perceives that he must act on other principles, and learns to consult his reason before he listens to his inclinations. Although he is deprived in this new state of many advantages which he enjoyed from nature,
he gains in return others so great, his faculties so unfold themselves by being exercised, his ideas åre so extended, his sentiments so exalted, and his whole mind so enlarged and refined, that if, by abusing his new condition, he did not sometimes degrade it even below that from which he emerged, he ought to bless continually the happy moment that snatched him forever from it, and transformed him from a circumscribed and stupid animal to an intelligent being and a man. In order to draw a balance between the advantages and disadvantages attending his new situation, let us state them in such a manner that they may be easily compared. Man loses by the social contract his natural liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can obtain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses. That we may not be deceived in the value of these compcnsations, we must distinguish natural liberty, which knows no bounds but the power of tlie individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; and between possession, which is only the effect of force or of the right of the first occupant, from proper ty, which must be founded on a positive title. In addition we might add to the other acquisitions of the civil state that of moral liberty, which alone renders a man master of himself; for it is slavery to be under the impulse of mere appetite, and freedom to obey a law which we prescribe for ourselves. But I have already said too much on this head, and the philosophical sense of the word
"liberty"
is not at present my subject.
(10)
What did he say freedom is? Does that make sense?
(10) Rousseau sees the advantages of community as
being nothing less than the production of real ___________in each member.
each membf.r
of the community,
at the moment of its formation, gives
himself up to it just ashe is: himself and all his
forces, of which his wealth forms a part. By this act, however, possession does
not change in nature when it changes its master, and become property
the first and most important consequence of the principles already established is
that the general will alone can direct the forces of the .State agreeably to the end of its institution, which is the
common good; for if the clashing of private interests has rendered the
establishing of societies necessary, the
agreement of the same intercsts has made such
establishments possible. It is what is common in these
different interests that forms the social bond; and if there was not
some point in which they all unanimously centered, no society could exist. It
is on the basis of this common interest alone that society must be governed.
I say, therefore, that sovereignty, being only the exercise of the
general will, can never alienate itself, and that the Sovereign, which is only
a collective being, cannot be represented but by itself: the power may
well be transmitted but not the will.
Indeed, if it is not impossible that a private will should accord on some
point with the general will, it is at least impossible that such agreement should be regular and lasting; for the
private will is incllned by its nature to
partiality, and the general will to impartiality.1 It is even more
impossible to guarantee the continuance of this agreement, even if we were to
see it always exist; because that existence must be owing not to art but to
chance. The Sovereign may indeed say: "My will at present actually agrees
with the will of such and such a man, or at least with what he declares to be
his will"; but it cannot say, "Our wills shall likewise agree
tomorrow"; since it would be absurd for the will to bind itself for the
future, and since it does not belong to any will to consent to what might be
injurious to the being from whom the will
proceeds..
it follows from what has been said that
the general will is always right
and tends always to the public advantage; but it does not follow that the
deliberations of the people have always the same rectitude. Our will always
seeks our own good, but we do not always perceive what it is. The people åre ncver corrupted, but they åre often deceived, and only then
do they seem to will what is bad.
(10) What do you think of that last sentence?
There is frequently much difference between the will of all and
the general willl.
The latter regards only the
common interest; the former regards private interest, and is indeed but
a sum of private wills:1 but remove from these same wills the pluses
and minuses that cancel each other, and then the general will remains as the
sum of the differences."
If, when the people, sufficiently informed, deliberated, there was to be
no commumcation among them, from the grand total of
trifling differences the general will would always result, and their
resolutions be always good. But when cabals and partial associations åre formed at the expense of the great association, the
will of each such association, though general with regard to its
members, is privale with regard to the
State: it can then be said no longer ttiat there åre as many voters as men, but only as many as there åre associations. By this means the differences being less
numerous, they produce a result less
general. Finally, when one of these associations becomes so large that
it prevails over all the rest, you have no longer the sum of many opinions
dissenting in a small degree from each other, but one great dictating
dissentient; from that moment there is no longer a general will, and the predominating opinion is only an
individual one.
(10) Would
Rousseau be in favor of campaign finance reform?How about political parties?
PLEASURE
Most discussions of pleasure are motivated by a desire to give an account of the springs of human action. Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and other ancient and medieval thinkers, and modern empiricists and contemporary psychologists in particular, seem to be so motivated.
Very few if any would dispute that we sometimes are motivated to act in particular ways because we suppose that doing so will give us pleasure or reduce pain. That may seem to be a “natural” fact about humans. Even infants draw back from a painful stimulus, and it seems that they naturally pursue pleasant sensations, such as warmth (though it is hardly clear that they pursue such sensations because they are pleasant!). Some have thought that if an infant is drawn to or repelled by something, that shows what is “natural”to humans, since infants have not yet been “corrupted” by adult standards and processes of socialization. These facts have led empiricists in particular to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations. There have been particular philosophical motivations for doing so. Epicurus gave sensation an epistemologically fundamental role, and Bentham gave it a fundamental role in moral theory partly because he thought pleasant sensations could be quantified. Given that the morally right act is the one which maximizes pleasure, questions about what is right could on his view be settled by calculation, a toting up of quantities.
It is however a confusion to assimilate pleasures and pains to sensations and to regard them as species of the same genus. Many pains are more plausibly assimilated to types of sensations, but when they are, then it is not obvious that all people would want to avoid them (consider masochists, or those who take pleasure in pursuits such as climbing Mt. Everest, which are, at the level of sensation, mostly painful.) Pleasures, on the other hand, do not seem to be sensations at all. There are of course pleasurable sensations, such as the sensation felt when warming cold hands at the fire. But I will be motivated to act by such sensations only if I take pleasure in them, and it is possible to not take pleasure in just about any of them. Someone might take great pleasure in one’s ability to forego certain pleasant sensations, in fact. Someone might despise those who cannot take a little cold, and take pleasure in one’s ability to refrain from relieving the discomfort of being cold. The pleasure taken in the exercise of such an ability would surely not itself be a sensation or set of them. The general point is that the mere pleasantness of sensation is neither necessary nor sufficient for it to serve as motivator.
Empiricists
have also tended to think of pleasures as processes, and therefore as possible
objects for the kinds of theories about processes which abound in the sciences.
But it is arguable that it is seriously confused to think of pleasures as
processes. The pleasure I take in watching a Bball
game is not a process which accompanies the watching (and which thus might
distract from the watching) and indeed if it were a process it would make sense
to wonder if it were always itself pleasant!
Pleasures seem distinct from some pains in this respect. Aristotle
rightly notes that processes are complete when their end is reached, whereas
activities which I pursue are not. If I want an enjoyable week in
It is useful to consider the many different kinds of pleasures. First, I can take pleasure in activities, things, events. I can also take pleasure in facts. I may take pleasure in the fact that I am talking to the most famous person in the room even though that activity, that conversation, is not itself pleasant, so the distinction is important when thinking about motivation.
Taking pleasure in activities is not usually a matter of having certain sensations. What sensations make up the pleasure people take in playing tennis? In playing the piano well? Even where an activity depends heavily upon having certain sensations, such as the aural sensations necessary to the activity of enjoying a piece of music, the pleasure is not in the sensations, but in the music. If each aural sensation produced by a given piece of music were isolated from the others, or rearranged, there might be no pleasure, even though the “sensation content” were the same. Moreover, as already mentioned, pleasure may be taken in activities which include mostly painful sensations. Sometimes such activities may issue in a general sense of well being (the feeling following upon vigorous and difficult exercise for example) but that feeling of well being is not simply an experience of certain sensations, though some sensations may contribute to it, and empiricists might want to describe it as a “general” sensation.
Some pleasures are apparently constituted by the filling of some lack or the discharge of some surfeit. Eating when hungry may be more pleasant than eating when full, and taking a pee after holding it for a long time more pleasant than taking one for the second time in ten minutes. But, contra Freud; and also Plato, it is hardly the case that all pleasures are like that. What lack is filled , or what surfeit discharged, by the pleasure taken in acquiring mastery of a language, or what lack is fulfilled or surfeit discharged by the pleasure of watching a lovely sunset?
Many philosophical discussions of pleasure have been in the service of ethical or psychological or metaphysical or epistemological theories. The result has often been nonsense, or clearly false claims, such as result from what Wittgenstein called “an insufficient diet of examples.” If the argument is modus ponens (if this theory is correct, then pleasure is such and such, and, this theory is correct, so, pleasure is such and such) then, since pleasure is NOT such and such, modus tollens may make us at least suspicious of the theory, even if we save it by rejecting the hypothetical in the first place. For example, if the theory that all right actions are pleasure maximizing is correct, then pleasure must be a quantifiable process. But it is not, so....
Mill tried to avoid the consequence by denying the conditional. For him, pleasure is not a quantifiable process, even though right action is pleasure maximizing. But with that idea gone, his theory becomes non-empirical and/or tendentious.
Aristotle connects his discussion of pleasure and pain to an account of the good life in quite a different way from the ways proposed by many empiricists and other thinkers.. In particular, we could describe him as claiming that what counts as a pleasure or pain for the good person (the person whose life is good) differs from what counts as pleasure or pain for the bad person. The notion of a good life can only be spelled out by paying attention to the interplay of reason and feeling and the possibilities for shaping that interplay through training of various kinds. Thus on his view taking infants as a kind of model of natural human life is exactly the wrong thing to do. To know what is truly pleasant and truly painful we must consult the mature person (if we can find any!). It doesn’t follow that I can make the sensation of a hot poker being pushed into my eye non-painful by just thinking it so, or as the result of training. What that shows, though, is that pleasure and pain are probably not even species of the same genus. For it is difficult to think of a pleasure, even of the most sensation laden sort, which could not be discounted or regarded as not truly pleasant. The notion of sensation plays a very negligible role in Aristotle’s account. Happily so!
Some Summaries
Religion has played a significant role in
Conspicuous instances: the positive role of religious ideas in Lincoln, King.
The claim that
The attempt to MAKE public life in the
THE NEW REL RIGHT-evangelical/fundamentalist entry into politics (campaigning for specific candidates, etc), departure from older idea that religion is merely private business. The RR became a force partly as the result of a decline in the “mainline” and the explosive growth of non-denominational churches which combined the alliance of religious mission with technological tools and more old fashioned pietism that stressed individual salvation.
Prominent figures and organizations in the new right: Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, Tim LeHaye, the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, the 700 Club, Focus on the Family, The American Family Association.
Focus
issues on the new right:
Defense of the traditional family against various perceived attacks (redefinition of the family, etc.)
Concern with degradation of sexual morality, decline of public standards of decency.
Anti-communism (seen as atheist and therefore as a threat to efforts to “Christianize” the world).
Opposition to abortion and some versions of feminism.
Opposition to welfare programs that are perceived as detrimental to family life and character. (and to the tax schemes that make them possible).
Support for “law and order” and general support for capital punishment.
Support for “free enterprise” which is perceived as integral to American history and allied to the “Protestant spirit.”
Patriotism construed as support for American military adventures abroad, devotion to the flag, affirmation of “the American proposition”(N) in an extreme or uncritical form, etc.
Patriotism in the form of
opposition to “revisionist history” of the
Support for expressions of religion in the public schools, school vouchers, the pledge, etc.
The RR has been outgrowing the old mainline churches and thus gaining in political influence. It has also appealed to concerns of many Americans who are not particularly religious but who sense cultural decline. In recent years there have been growing contacts and cooperation between some parts of the RR and Roman Catholicism (e.g. Evangelicals and Catholics United. Opposition to abortion is a particularly unifying theme). Baptists have moved in the direction of the RR both in theology and political action, with significant holdouts.
THE OLD RELIGIOUS
LEFT/CENTER
The old religious left/center has been in decline numerically and for that reason, as well as others, has declined in influence on the public square. (Example: there are more Roman Catholics in LA than there are Episcopalians in the entire country).At the same time that numbers have declined, the mainline leadership has tended to move leftward, thus alienating even more religious people, who tend to be largely conservative or centrist.
Prominent Organizations on the Old Religious left/center. Typical members would be Presbyterians, Methodists, Congregationalists, United Church of Christ, Episcopalians, some Lutherans. The World Council of Churches (WCC) and the National Council of Churches (NCC) include these denominations, but also others that are not part of the “Protestant Establishment.” For example the Orthodox churches (Eastern, Russian etc.) have been affiliated. (During the soviet era the participation of the Orthodox in the WCC and NCC was tainted by the soviet regime’s use of various church figures to further its own, atheist, ends.) Roman Catholics have never been members (observers only).
Typical issues for the Old Rel. left/center:
Consistently ecumenical (supporting movements for Christian unity, including unity with Catholics).
Justice issues vs. free market capitalism (the latter supposedly rides roughshod over the interests of the poor, the marginalized, the colonized, etc.)
Tendency to be anti-war, anti-military.
Since the ‘60s there has been a lot of focus on racism, sexism, and most recently, “heterosexism” (the latter issue is very divisive and is speeding up the erosion of mainline membership).
Tendency to be pro-choice (even though a significant proportion of members are pro-life or at least opposed to Roe vs. Wade.)
Tendency to support government programs purportedly aimed at improving the lot of the poor etc. Consquently, a tendency to be opposed to vouchers, charitable choice. (thus closer to anti-religious opinion than the views of the RR on these same issues). Agree with the RR on opposition to pornography.
In recent years, promotion of various kinds of “multiculturalism” and “diversity.”
N’s Approach.
Neither the RR or the Mainline left/center grasp the “American proposition” or the classical or Augustinian view on the relation of church and state.
The American Proposition (experiment): liberal democracy, the attempt to allow many “voices” including religious ones to be heard in public debate. Neither “theocracy” nor “establishment of atheism” can be allowed. In the classical liberal conception, the govt. is self limiting. Must allow other sources than itself to determine the “value content” of public debates.
The RR tends to want the theocracy, the left “establishment of atheism.”
The classical Augustinian view also excludes both theocracy and established atheism. It claims however that all govt. is under the judgment of God. The ultimate sources of value of religious.
____________________________________________________________________________________
Neuhaus’s Arguments in outline.
He tries to show that
I. There can be no government without value judgments.
II “Democratic” means - the beliefs of the majority of the citizens count (but not that they always outweigh everything else).
III. The majority of the citizens
of the
i. have religious beliefs
ii. think that their moral beliefs or “values” are grounded in religion
Therefore,
IV. genuine democratic pluralism requires religion in the public square
So, if #I and #II and #III are true, IV follows logically, right?
The reason #I is true lies in the very nature of govt. and law. Laws, like laws against murder, slander, child pornography, all the many different forms of theft, etc. etc. etc. obviously reflect moral or value judgments. Likewise laws that permit things like abortion in effect make or entail moral judgments (for example, the judgment that abortion does NOT amount to murder). Likewise government policies, such as tax policies that take money from richer people and use it to benefit poorer people obviously rest on value judgments, for example, the judgment that a society has the obligation to care for those in need, and the judgment that it is not theft to take money from the rich in order to benefit those not well off. All of the following involve moral or value judgments: tax policies, universal public education, tax exemption for charitable organizations, decisions to go to war (often), anti-trust laws, consumer protection laws, and so on. (Add your own).
Moral or value judgments are everywhere.
If #IV is correct then all attempts by supposed civil libertarians and various judges to remove all religious influence from the public square can only have bad results;
The badest of the bad results is this:
V.. The removal of religion from the public square will necessarily (given the truth of #I) require some OTHER source of value to “fill the vacuum.”
a.The only viable candidate to serve as that source would be the state itself.
b. What is bad about that? This; it becomes impossible to criticize the state from a moral perspective. The state becomes the highest. There is no “higher point of view” from which to criticize state law and policy.
c. historically, when the state assumes that “value generating” role you get “monism” and ultimately totalitarianism.
NOBODY WANTS THAT!!!
Therefore, religiously grounded values must be given a place in the public square. QED.
What are the weak
links in these two arguments? Someone might respond to N as follows:
1. One can have a
viable society without “ethics” in the substantive sense.
a. Hobbes: social contract, justice
and power
OR
2. One can have a
viable society with an ethics that is NOT religious
a. Rousseau – ethics generated
by community
b. Mill, Rawls - utilitarian and Kantian ideas
IV Historically, in
the
a. Only relatively recently (the last 50 years or so) has the idea of a completely secular public square become prominent.
V. The religious community has reacted in various ways to the “new secular state.”
a. the New Religious Right (RR) recognizes a problem.
1.
Solution? Christianize
b. the old mainline left/center seems to deny that problem and support secularization, but in fact continues to want input into policy, based on religious values.
What are the weak links in this argument?
1. “Penultimate” means
a. less
than ultimate
b. not the
thing of last or greatest importance
c. the
thing of greatest importance
d. a and
b.
2. The French Revolution and the ensuing tyranny might
be an illustration of what happens when religion is stripped from the public
square.
Quiz 2.
1. Neuhaus argues that a
genuinely democratic public ethic in the
2. The religious “mainline” left or center
tends to stress such issues as
a. the
economic injustices perpetuated by capitalism
b. the
decline in sexual morality
c. the
need for school vouchers
d. none of
these.
3. The views of
the “mainline” on public issues tend to be more like the views of
those who have no religious beliefs, than do the views of the religious right.