Phil/RelSt 380, Justice, Rights,
and Religious Belief Fall 2010
Instructor: Dr. Norman
Lillegard Office: H 229
881 7384 nlillega@utm.edu
Office Hours: 10-ll am TTH and by appointment.
Texts: Justice: Rights and Wrongs , by Nicholas Wolterstorff
Handouts, Sites, etc.
Course Requirements:
!
Attend class and
participate, do the readings, do all written assignments, pass the exams. Two
exams. (multiple choice, T/F, short answers,
essay). First exam worth 120 pts, Final exam is comprehensive, worth 180 pts.
Total, 300 pts.
!
Quizzes: there
will be occasional unannounced quizzes. Missed
quizzes cannot be made up. Each quiz will be worth 6 – 12 points, and will
consist of multiple choice and T/F questions, and possible short answers. One half of the quiz points are extra credit.
Ca. 80 pts.
!
You will be
assigned outlines of chapters or parts of chapters. 4-6 outlines, about 15 pts
each.
!
You
must write TWO short papers (1500 words each). Topic to be selected in
consultation with the instructor. The first paper is due Oct 12. The second is due
Dec. 2. THERE WILL BE NO EXCEPTIONS TO THESE DUE DATES. 100 points each.
!
Attendance. Regular attendance and informed participation
in class are essential since (a) not everything covered in class is included in
the text (b) you will need help with this material, and that is what class
sessions, and the instructor, are for. 40 points.
Total points ca. 700.
Normally %90 of total points gets you an 'A', %80 a 'B' and so forth,
but significant adjustments for curve are made when necessary.
Paper Content, Style, Sources:
Papers are to be analytical.
Take an issue and argue the pros and cons. Argue. An argument is a set of
statements, some of which (the premises) support others (the
conclusion(s)). The conclusions should follow from the premises. Exceptions to this “argument style” are
possible but need special justification.
Papers should contain
relevant documentation in footnotes or endnotes.
You can use the internet to
track down some sources, and you can consult with me. But your sources should
be books or well developed essays by reputable writers. Forget internet blogs
and other internet sources that are not well accredited. You can use our own IEP (Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) edited by Prof. Fieser,
and you can use the Stanford IEP. I
strongly suggest that you check with me regarding the use of any other
resources.
You are encouraged to hand in a version
of your paper(s) early, in order to get instructor feedback.
Class
Conduct, Instructor's Role, etc. What I Expect
of Students.
Academic
Integrity: Any form of cheating on quizzes, exams, or PAPERS
will result in an ‘F’ for the
assignment and probationary status for the entire course. NO EXCEPTIONS. Policies regarding academic integrity are further
detailed in the student handbook. Cheating includes plagiarism. DO YOUR OWN
WORK.
Cell Phones: phones must be OFF during classes. You may not make ANY use of cell phones
during any exam or quiz.. Use of cell phones in such
circumstances counts as cheating and results in an F for that exam
.
Class
format: Classes will consist of a
mixture of lecture and discussion. Feel free to interrupt with questions. Always
do so by raising your hand. Acknowledgment may not always be immediate but
it will come. Try to keep your remarks relevant. Listen respectfully to other
students even if you think they are “way off.”
They might be doing better than you think!
You may leave class only in an emergency, or when you have made an arrangement ahead of time
with the instructor. Otherwise, if you leave class you will be counted absent,
no matter how soon you return.
THE
PURPOSES OF THIS COURSE .The purposes include the following, in order of
importance: To develop a critical appreciation for an argument which concludes
that the concept, and practice of,
Justice require a religious
foundation !! To
develop a critical appreciation for the concept of a right, its history, its current status and disputes regarding that
concept. To get familiar with some of the philosophical
history behind various concepts of justice and rights. To become more familiar with some of the religious history behind
the concept of justice as honoring of rights. To become familiar with arguments which
attempt to show that secular thought cannot (can) account for inherent rights.
To become familiar with an argument which attempts to show
that inherent rights can only be grounded religiously.
You will be tested on critical reading and
critical thought, on your understanding of the issues raised,
your ability to respond relevantly to arguments, and to identify salient
historical/religious/philosophical facts. Likewise for
grading of your papers.
Course Outline: (subject to adjustments) W=Wolterstorff
Week II Sept. 7. W p. 22-43
Week III Sept. 14: W p. 44-64
Week IV Sept. 21: W 65-131.
Week V Sept. 28: W p. 135-148
Week VI Oct. 5: W p. 149-179
Week VII Oct. 12: W p.180-206. Oct.
12: FIRST SHORT PAPER DUE.
MIDTERM EXAM,
TH Oct 14.
Week VIII. Oct. 19, W 207-226. Oct. 23-26: FALL BREAK
Week IX. Oct. 26, W
227-263
Week X.Nov. 2:, W 264-284
Week XI Nov. 9: W
285-322
Week XII Nov. 16: W 323-341
Week XIII Nov. 23:W 342-361 (Thanksgiving break, Nov. 24-28).
Week XIV Nov. 30: 362-393 DEC
2 SECOND SHORT
PAPER DUE
Week XV Dec. 7. Review. Dec. 10, last day of classes.
FINAL EXAM – Thursday, Dec. 16,
10-12 a.m.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Possible paper topics: Secular conceptions of
justice (e.g. Kantian, Rawlsian, Ancient Eudaimonist); The background to the UN declaration;
Feminist conceptions of Justice; Love vs. Justice; Justice as fairness; Justice
as right order; Rights as all legally conferred; Rights as natural; Animal
rights; Gay rights; Rights of the poor; The history of rights.
You can take any chapter in W,
and write a paper on it. The chapter footnotes will contain secondary
resources.
JUSTICE/RIGHTS
A.Widespread hostility to ‘rights talk’
B. Objections to focus on
Justice/rights by
Xtians
Feminists
Etc.
(illustrate
and explain)
Why A?
(1) some
is silly
(2) some is politically/socially motivated
(3) ‘rights’ are inherently individualist, possessive
(4) 3 is supported by a narrative.
(give Examples of 1-4)
--------------------------------------
Analysis of RIGHTS
Rights are normative social
bonds. (what does that mean?)
A right = a legitimate claim
to being treated so and so - or left alone.
Legitimate
By others
The ‘treatment’ has to do
with ‘life, and history, goods.’ (Give examples of both).
Types of rights legal
‘institutional’
Natural
Inherent
Rights grounded in WORTH
Are fundamental to COMMUNITY
--------------------------------------------------------
Addressing
A.
(1) avoid
(2) too bad for them (illustrate)
(3) problems with claiming and
honoring (illustrate).
(4) show the
history is wrong.
We NEED rights talk, to
preserve the RECIPIENT DIMENSION of morality.
(Explain, illustrate)
CANNOT
reduce recipient dimension to agent dim.
i.e. cannot reduce
rights talk to talk of duties (what does this mean, why is it true?)
-------------------------------------------------
TWO CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE
JR:A
JUST social order =order in which
people’s rights are honored, i.e. they enjoy those goods to which they have a
right.
VS.
JRO:A JUST social order=order which is ‘right’, i.e. conforms
to some ideal or divine structure. E.g. Plato, natural law.
JR-Justice= each person has
those goods to which he/she is entitled, or which are due him/her, etc.
Having a right to X = being
entitled to X, having a claim to X - but, one need not make the claim in order
for justice to be preserved.
P has a right. P could be an
individual, a group, - large or small, or even
something non-human (give examples of each)
JRO- Justice as right order
What is the issue between Right Ord and Inherent
Rts theorists?
INHERENT, not just ‘natural,’ rights.
The issue is WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR RIGHTS? Some are of
course legal, or result from divine law, or etc. Are ALL? The right ord theorist thinks so. The inherent rts
theorist thinks not.
The inherent rights theorist
holds that some rights are inherent, not conferred,
The Right Order theorist
CANNOT ACCOUNT FOR INHERENT RIGHTS. But we need them.
What about Aquinas?
The external aspect of law,
or,
the eternal plan,
(Plato) . Use reason to discern an order entirely independent of this world
vs.
The
‘internal” nature of law in Aquinas.
Use reason to reflect on our
natural inclinations, so as to conform to them.
But rights do not enter the picture.
Why am I obligated not to
steal or murder? Because there is a law of God forbidding it.
Why is there? Because of the way God created – all laws reflect nature of
created order. So, to violate those laws is to violate ones
own nature. (and what is the result of doing that?)
It is not suggested that I
should not murder because in doing so I violate someone’s rights. Rather I
violate an objective ‘right order.’ What I do is not ‘right’ but not because I
violate a subjective right.
_-------------------------------------------------
Replying to the narrative;
The story
about the purportedly disreputable origins of the idea of individual subjective
rights.
Ockham and
the Francisans.
(What is supposed to be the
problem?)
Rights in
the enlightenment.
Hobbes: individuals in a
state of nature recognize need for law. Rights are for protection of individual,
who has no nature other than instinct of self preservation.
Rights and social contract
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau
Pre-social individuals
bargaining for own interest. The interests of others, or of the community, are left out.(so why is that supposed to be bad?)
---------------------------
The COUNTERNARRATIVE
P 54 “Rights” are everywhere (in the
medieval period for instance.) But these
are not necessarily INHERENT rights.
Note especially early xtian ideas in the ‘church fathers.’ Suggestion that the
poor must be treated a certain way for the sake of justice, no matter what laws
or agreements may exist. They are wronged
when the rich keep for themselves what they do not need.
They have rights. Natural rights.
Suggestion
of inherent right - rights language not used.
Where did these ideas come
from? Religious sources? No doubt in this case.
----------------------------------------
Justice and rights in the OT
Rights language not used in
bible. Justice language abounds.
What is prominent in the OT?
Mishpat and tsedeqa
God’s love of justice
God is committed to Justice God requires the same
What God loves is patterns of
behavior that are just prior to his
loving them. His loving them is not what
makes them just.
3 marks of an inherent rights
conception;
1.Recipient dimension
-- wronging
2. Recognition of worth of persons
3. 2 as grounding 1.
Illus 1. Wronging
God. Implied by
forgiveness.
Illus 2. Worth of God
Etc.
God’s rights are obviously
inherent. Not grounded in any rule or law or practice.
Humans also have them – (give
examples of each. see p. 95)
--------------------------------------
De-justicizing the
NT Hauerwas.
Nygren.
Illustrate;
Problem with Nygren (what is it?):
Justice in the gospels
(illustrate)
----------------------------------------------
Locating rights
A theory of rights requires a
conception of the good life. (Why?)
The conception provided by eudaimonism doesn’t fill the bill.
Therefore ancient ethical
theory doesn’t. (explain)
Well, what about the good?
Understanding the Good
Non instrumental goods
A good life=life constituted
by right kind and proportion of states of affairs (SAs.)
Good=that which is worthy of
approbation.
THREE CONCEPTIONS
OF THE GOOD LIFE. What SAs
constitute a good life? Three possibilities.
1. experientially
satisfying
2. happy
- well lived life
3. flourishing
- lived well AND goes well
#1
Utilitarianism
Will not
work. (why
not?)
2. Eudaimonism
It cannot serve either.
(WHY NOT?)
Stoic version
A decided
contrast with the peripatetics on the place of
emotion in the good life. (Illustrate)
Contrast the peripatetics.
For the peripatetics,
happiness is hostage to fortune, for stoics it is not. (Explain, illustrate)
THE PROBLEMS FOR THE STOICS
(illustrate, explain)
The sum: according to the
eudaemonist, non-instrumental goods are life goods; life goods are activities; thus the good life is the
well lived (active) life.
But
Rights are ‘passivities.’ What
brings about, or impedes, some life goods, is things done to me, as opposed to things I do,
or fail to do. Thus I may be miserable because of what is done to me.
(Therefore, what follows?)
According to the eud, I should act so as to promote my ‘living well.’ But how about acting so as to ensure your rights, whether it promotes my living well or not.
(note
the account of the Danes on p. 177. What is odd about it?).
How the Justice as rights idea takes hold in the west.
(Must first
get rid of eud. Why?)
Augustine;
breaking the ‘spell of ancient eudaimonism.’
Early Aug – Stoic-rest(tranquility) in that which cannot fail (as opposed to
that which is in ones own control)
Stoics- by our beliefs we put
ourselves at the mercy of that which can fail–
Aug- by our
loves “ “.
Augustine gradually abandons
the stoic ideology. Cf. augustine’s tears.(What about them?)
Love overcomes Stoicism.
Love in Augustine
Neo platonism.
Eros.
Love as eros
Love as attachment
Love as benevolence
What are the relations?
What exposure does each kind
include?
Humans are essentially lovers
Contrast to Stoics (What is
the contrast?
What is the root of the human
problem?
Either_________(augustine) or _________(stoics))
If the object of love is the correct one, is ‘tranquility’ assured? (Answer
this)
Welcoming
sorrow on behalf of others. (What
would the peripatetics say? The
stoics? What does the NT say?cf.
the NT models; Jesus, Paul.
Cf. city of God (p.197))
To love, AND TO GRIEVE, is HUMAN. P. 199 City of God.
What about tranquility then? (Answer
this)
There is no escape from the
external and internal miseries of this life, and to think we CAN escape (by our
own struggle or power) is pride.
The
affirmation of compassion and the break with eudaimonism. (How are they connected?)
Love of neighbor IN love of
God.
---------------------------------
The structure of the Good life/rights
i.
ii.
iii.
i itself is a good in Paul’s life. As is the honoring
of Paul’s rights a good for Peter.
Goods specified by ii and iii
are good in themselves, apart from any rights.
Contrast to eudai.ism. The goods of such things as adequate income are
merely instrumental, not good in themselves, according to the eud.
Moreover enjoying i is not
part of how one lives one’s life.( explain)
And, the goods i - iii could
be misused. But they would still be goods. Not so with the goods instrumental
to virtue.
a. Well lived life
Well being
b. Well-going life
No room for rights in a. On the other hand, there is room for a in b. A life that goes well can include a life that is lived
well. (Illustrate)
Eirenism; shalom, and dependence and
vulnerability.
Characterizing life and history goods:
Desire satisfaction (Util)
can’t do it. All util’s agree
that well being cannot consist simply in desire
satisfaction. The desires have to be of the right kind.
(Explain this, and state the
criticism that follows from this problem)
Proper function theories (Eud)
can’t do it
The goods in a life include e.g friendship. The actual friendship does not manifest
proper function. The capacity for it does. Cf. a person capable of friendship
but forgoes it. No malfunction there.
============
Characterizing human good in terms of divine desire.
(How do you do this?)
==============================
How understand rights?
i.e. how
differentiate goods to which we have rights, and, what accounts for that?
Suppose
x is a good to which I have a R, y is a good to which
I do not. (give Examples.)
Some proposals on general nature of Rs (part III)
1. Rights (Rs) grounded in
duties
2. “
“ respect
1 a. R to those goods nec to doing ones duty (ramsey)
1.b. claim Rs grounded in duty
(Hohfield)
(Illustrate
I a and I b. Give some criticisms of each)
Strong Hohf thesis; Weak thesis, plus if duties then rights
Apparent examples of duties without corresponding
rights.
(Give examples. Show how to avoid those
that can be avoided. Show why strong Hohfeld must be
abandoned)
Weak Hohf
still stands. If R, then D
BUT,. Does D
ground, or account for R?
Suppose that in torturing A,
I violate A’s Rs, and that is so BECAUSE (or on
account of the fact that) in torturing A I violated my DUTY. That duty grounds
that R.
This view fits the Right
Order conception of Justice. A matrix of obligations determines Rs,
Rs are derivative.
Nonetheless suppose this is correct; Duties ground
rights.
What then, grounds duties?
a. Social contract
b. Moral authorities
Divine command ethics is a
variety of b.
Suppose God is the authority.
Suppose God’s commands generate Obligs. How do they do that?
Well, How,
in general, do commands do that?
Not by mere utterance of ‘I
command etc.” Mere locutionary act.
Must perform the illocutionary act of commanding.
(Explain that)
Among the conditions, are,
STANDING
obligations. These come with an OFFICE or POSITION. (Illustrate.)
BUT, the standing Obligs could not be
the result of commands. (Say why not)
Perhaps the standing Obligs are not MORAL Obligs.
Perhaps all MORAL obligs come from God’s commands.
Cf. Obligs
generated by social/linguistic practices. Cf. games. P. 278-79.
W’s reply. Social/linguistic Obs are ALSO moral Obs in the
case of commands and promises.
Why? (Answer this).
It follows that divine
commands do not account for ALL duties/obligs. So divine command theory does not
give a general account of duty/oblig.
(Therefore,
what?).
So, they must be grounded in
respect. Or something like it.
To repeat: What grounds or
accounts for rights
Not duties (not Ramsey, not any authority account
(e.g. divine commands)
Grounded in respect.
How does the respect
account go?
We must show that violating a right is wronging some person(s)
Then we must show that wronging always involves disrespect.
We can then conclude that rights are grounded in respect for
persons.
Consider first the fundamental structure of rights
generally.
The fundamental structure – Rs are Rs to life goods that are due to me (Ulpian). They are
rights to actions or restraints from actions on the part of others. Many
life goods are not DUE to me. All that are, are due from some person or social
entity , i.e. entail obligations on the part of persons (or social entities, I
omit this from now on). My right to the good of having lunch with you tomorrow
when you PROMISED, is a right against you, you undertook an obligation when you
promised. So it is actually a right to
the good of your keeping your promise (not a right to the good of the
lunch-with-you itself). But this involvement of persons –in- relationship
characterizes ALL rights, even though at first glance it might not seem so.
Thus my right to a stroll in the New Haven green is not a right to the stroll
itself (which is not another person’s acting or refraining), but to being FREE
to stroll; other persons/entities may not interfere with my stroll (it is a
permission R). Likewise my right to a monthly SS check is not a right to the
check itself, but a right against certain govt
officials, or govt agency (the SSA), that they send
the check (benefit right). Likewise for permission and
benefit rights generally. The
structure of rights always involves persons, therefore rights are essentially
social. (if
there was only one person in the world, that person would have NO RIGHTS. But
of course there could be lots of life
goods in that world )
Rights are the
correlatives of FULL COGNITION duties or obligations.
What is the difference
between those goods (actions or refrainings) to which
I have a right and those to which I do not have a right? I do not
have a right to your giving me your car (assuming you did not promise etc.)
I do have a right against the dealer
with whom I just contracted that he give me the car. What is the difference? It cannot be that the difference consists in
how much of a good is involved. The good of owning an original Rembrandt would
be greater than virtually all the goods to which I have rights. That fact shows
nothing about whether I have a right to it (I do not have any right at all to
any Rembrandt as a matter of fact). The
goods to which I have rights may contribute less to my life going well, to my
happiness and flourishing, than do many goods to which I do NOT have a right.
The violation of a right
is a wronging. A wronging is always an action or restraint
from action of some other person.
So what is the difference?
We are looking for an
account of MORAL rights, specifically rights within primary justice.
We want this account to cover benefit rights,
permission rights, natural rights, socially conferred rights, linguistically generated rights, inherent
rights.
We want an account that
shows why we get angry when wronged.
We want an account that
recognizes the situated character of rights. (rights
are against specific persons at specific times. On Tuesday when you promised me
lunch, I had a right to your keeping it, but on Wed after you have been
incarcerated, I no longer have that right.)
So, why does no. 1, but
not no. 2, have a right against Frank that he grant
him the prize?
No. 1 has a certain status
within the practice of judging/awarding in which they are all participating. The status of having turned in the best performance in the judgment
of the judge. Who is due what is
defined within that practice; the prize is due no. 1 because he has that status
within that practice. The practice does
not allow for the judge to take anything else into account. Period. In particular, no amount of life goods that
might accrue to anyone (even no. 1!) by giving the prize to no. 2 can be
considered. The judge (Frank) wrongs no.
1 if he gives the prize to no. 2. Even if doing so should somehow make everyone
(including even no. 1) very happy.
Morally Frank
should not give no. 2 the prize. Is that because in doing so he would have
failed in virtue? But it is possible
in giving it to no. 2 that he acts virtuously.
Is it because he would have failed to maximize utility? But considerations of utility were ruled out at the start. By agreeing to
participate in that practice Frank agreed to NOT take into account utility.
Therefore if he does so he betrays those
with whom he covenanted by entering into that practice. The betrayal (of trust)
is what makes giving it to no. 2 morally wrong. That is what makes it a case of wronging no. 1. That is so even if Frank
gave it to no. 2 out of noble motives.
Anger is an appropriate response
to betrayal.
This shows what it means
to say that rights are trumps. And they are supra-practice trumps. Frank cannot put the good of the practice
itself, , along with other utility goods, into the calculation of what to do (that is
what Mill advocated). NO kind of
utility consideration is allowed once you are inside the practice.
An example: suppose a
soccer ref refrains from giving a red card to a player who deserves it, because the
ref thinks that the absence of that player from the game will make it very
boring and lopsided. If others (players, coaches, fans) learn about it, they
can rightly claim they have been betrayed by this ref. And if they do not care
about that, that shows not only that they do not care about the game, (as it is defined by the
rules) but that they do not care about morality very much either.
The right to not be
betrayed is a NATURAL RIGHT (not a right one has only within certain practices
etc.)
What is the connection
between wronging and disrespect? To wrong is to treat someone as though they are
not worth better treatment.
But what does that mean?
When are you treating some person with disrespect?
When, in treating that
person in a certain way
a.
You disregard the
non-instrumental value of that person, or
b.
You ignore or
fail to note the respect/disrespect import of your action, or
c.
You disregard or
fail to note the fact that your action does not FIT the worth of that person,
or,
some
combination of these.
When do you do b? when you ignore that doing X
imposes some life evil or deprives of some life good. Performing the
illocutionary act of insulting someone (saying or doing something that counts as showing disrespect), raping
someone, betraying
trust, knocking out of the way, are examples. Disrespect is shown to a person as such and such (to a woman as dept chair, to
a man as king, to no. 1 as pianist )
The non-instrumental value of
a person is the worth of that person. The worth of persons varies; the worth of
Esperanza as musician is much greater than the worth of Lillegard as musician
etc. To treat Esperanza as having no more value than Lillegard (as musician)
would be to treat her with under-respect. Which features impart worth, and how
much, are matters of controversy.
Some (Hobbes) have held that
the only worth humans have is instrumental worth. “The value of a man is his
price, i.e. whatever would be given for the use of his power.” But surely the worth of Esperanza is not a
function of the uses to which she, or her abilities, can be put (she would have
the same worth as musician even if she had never performed in public). So, perhaps non-instrumental worth is what
matters for respect. Perhaps Kant is
right about that. But is he right in thinking that the non-instrumental worth
of humans is equal, i.
e. each person, by virtue of being a rational agent, has exactly the same worth
as every other? That idea might be
appealing because we may like to think that in addition to the varying worth of
persons as, say , musicians, there is an overall worth of persons simply as
persons. But it is difficult to give content to the idea of the overall worth
of a person.
Disagreements over whether
or not we have treated a person, P, with disrespect, are differences over
what worth P has,
OR differences over
the respect/disrespect import of our
actions.
In the second case, we
disagree over the fit between our action and the worth of the
person. Suppose we agree that Bosnian
women have little worth. We might still disagree as to whether or not raping
them fits whatever worth they have. `Or we might disagree over what worth they
have, while agreeing on what actions fit
what worth, and so forth for all combinations.
In general we should not treat ANYTHING as having
less worth than it actually has, i. e. with under-respect. Thus a great many actions have
respect/disrespect import. Only some of
them have to do with rights. Which ones? Those that involve taking
into account the worth of persons, some social entities, and perhaps a few
other things.
The only way to treat P
with respect/disrespect is by bringing about states of affairs in P’s life. By
treating no. 1 with respect Frank would bring about the states of affairs in no. 1’s
life in which he enjoys prize money, enhanced reputation, etc. . Some of these states of affairs contribute
positively to life, others negatively etc.
Thus THESE actions participate in two dimensions or systems, the
life-goods system, and the human being system, (in which, for example, is brought
about the state of affairs in which no. 1 is respected .
)
What is the relation
between these two ‘systems?’ Answer: the human being system always TRUMPS the
life-goods system. What else COULD we
say about rights? Well, we could say that
the goods to which we have rights are (merely) BOOSTED in
value. That means, we take them very seriously, get very angry when deprived of
them, more so than other goods (it could mean they have very high
utility). Thus no. 1’s right to being
given the award (that is the good to which he has a right) has a lot more value
than, say, the prize money, the press notices, etc.in themselves (apart from their being part of the award). It is
worth more than they are, separately or even taken In combinations, perhaps,
worth more than all
those other goods put together.
But,
there is a problem with this (utilitarian) ‘booster’ principle. Consider Frank’s betrayal, his breaking trust with
people, by giving first place to no. 2. Taken all by itself this amounts to treating someone (no. 1) with
disrespect. But no action occurs all by itself, without accompaniments and
consequences. Now on the assumption that
none of those other goods, such as no. 2’s enjoyment of $100,000, is per se a
right, how could the whole package,
consisting of the breaking of trust, no. 2’s enjoyment of the cash, the
enhanced career etc. fail to have the same negative respect/disrespect import
that the betrayal all by itself has? Some utilitarians
seem to claim that the betrayal has such enormous negative import that NO
amount of life goods could outweigh it.
But for the booster principle to be distinct from the respect principle
it must be the case that any act of disrespect could cease to be an act of disrespect by virtue of consequences. A ‘pure’ version of the booster principle must allow that. P.308 (‘pure’ means
‘utilitarian all the way down’)
What is a HUMAN RIGHT?
(Humans have all sorts of rights, but only some of them are called ‘human
rights’)
Human right=right some
human being has just by virtue of being human.
Are there any positive rights like that? (right
to an education attaches to the status of being educable as well as human etc.)
Any benefit rights? Not many.
Is a human right always a universal right? Cf. right to
nutrition. In a general famine no one has it, since there is no one against
whom one could have the right.
Negative rights are more likely to be human rights and
also universal. The right to not be tortured attaches to the status of being a
human, and does so for every human. (whether it is
universal is controversial. P. 316)
Natural rights might be human rights. Natural=not conferred (or, conferred by God)
Standing rights are human (divine) rights. They are not
conferred (ch. 12) and THEY ARE INHERENT. They inhere
in a certain status – one that has a certain worth.
Not all inherent rights are human rights. Cf. parents rights.
Distinguish
Natural (not socially conferred. Possibly divinely conferred)
Inherent (also not conferred. But may attach to some status,
such as being a parent, that not all humans have)
Human (rights attaching to each and every
human. distinct from natural. Natural rights of Kings are not human
rights. Rights of members of the in-group often thought of as natural, but out-
group humans not included. Are there natural human rights?)
What status does x need in
order to have a human right?
That means, what
properties does x have to have in order to have the worth that is needed for
respect?
Another way to put this:
upon what properties does ‘worth’ supervene? A property P supervenes on other
properties just in case no difference in those other properties means no difference in P. ‘Good’ is an example. If x and y have all the same properties, they
cannot differ in goodness.
So, upon what properties does human worth supervene. Just being genetically human? Or are there other
properties (relationships, activities) that ALL humans have that ground worth,
and thus natural human rights.
What sort of property are
we looking for?
We need a property (or
properties) that imply something like the usual schedule of human rights (right
to nutrition, to not be tortured, freedom of movement, etc.)
It could be a degreed
property, so that some humans have more of it, some less.
It will give
non-instrumental worth.
This worth will exceed that
of any non-human animal.
If it is non-degreed,
then, obviously, all humans will have it equally. Only in that way could equality be implied by
the possession of this property.
This property grounds
human worth (that worth supervenes upon it). Worth implies respect. Respect
implies rights. To violate rights is to undervalue, underrespect.
Could this property be
connected in some way to God?
For instance, could it be
a relational property, the property of being in some kind of relation to God?
Some atheists concede that
without God the ideas of human rights, human dignity, infinite worth, etc cannot be grounded or defended,.
since all of these are simply pale substitutes for the
idea of sacredness of humans (cf. Gaita, p. 324)
Nonetheless, we will examine
attempts at secular grounding.
Kant; perhaps the property
in question is a capacity.
‘humanity’=The
capacity to set ends thru reason, and to
compare various ends and organize them in a system. (no
non-human animal has these, he thinks. It involves freedom from impulse,
‘negative freedom’ What about Dolphins?)
Humanity is what makes a
human being an end in himself, worthy of being treated
as such, never as a means only. It is
non-degreed. All have it equally. All humans are thus equal in this fundamental
respect. (other , degreed, properties, such as wealth,
do nothing to ground human worth).
But rational capacity is
also degreed, isn’t it? Some have more, some less, some more at one time, less
at another,etc. Wouldn’t more of it mean more worth, and
thus, inequality?
What Kant should say is
that the mere capacity for rational action grounds worth,
no matter how little one uses that capacity.
Do all humans have it?
Does it imply the usual human rights? Does it imply value for humans only? Does
it imply non-instrumental value?
It is arguable that none
of these holds.
Not all have it. Infants, those suffering from dementia etc. Not all have it
even potentially. At most, all humans belong to the species that has this
capacity. BUT that thinned out property does not seem sufficient to ground many
human rights.
And, it is a less
impressive property than actual possession of rationality; other species may
actually have it (dolphins). They would come out ahead of profoundly retarded
infants, e.g.
In general, - the
capacities chosen are not found in ALL humans.
Dworkin’s approach fails for the same reason, though not a
capacities approach. Many humans are not
‘masterpieces’ of either nature or self creation.
Gewirth’s attempt:
1. every
agent holds that the purposes for which he acts are good (really?)
2. every
agent logically must hold that freedom and well being
are necessary goods for him because they are necc
conditions for his acting for any of his purposes; thus he must have them.
(means,
they are necc for performing any purposive action
whatsoever). From 2 we infer that there is a general human right to freedom. (but see W’s objections, p.337)
3. every agent must accept
that he has a right to freedom and well being; not to
accept this would be to accept that other agents might remove that freedom, and
that he cannot do (not without giving up agency altogether, and thus becoming .
. .what? a blob. )
4. I am compelled, by
virtue of being a purposive agent, to think of myself as having rights to
freedom and well being, and since there is nothing
special about ME, I must think all such
agents have such rights.
Gewirth concludes that all agents must HAVE such rights. That
does not follow.
The options before us.
A
theistic account of natural inherent human rights.
Imago dei? What is it?
Gen 1;26-27
In his
likeness to SERVE as his image (by dominating nature)?
Or,
Are ‘likeness’
and ‘image’ just typical Hebrew parallelism?
As in v.
26 then. The point is to have
dominion …as a consequence of being in the image.
The mandate to have
dominion will determine which traits or capacities of a human are included in
the image. Discrimination, knowledge, morality etc. (cf. Sira
17).
Is it simply having been
given the mandate that elevates human worth (Locke) or is it having the
‘divine’ properties that enable dominion, or both?
In either case, if this is
what gives humans the worth that that explains rights, once again, many humans
will be left out.
Perhaps then the image
simply consists in being a human being by nature, i.e. it is part of human
nature to have reason, etc. Those who lack reason etc. still have the
nature but are malfunctioning.
Problem; those who malfunction seem to have little worth, not enough to ground
rights.
Why not ground rights in
that ‘nature’ and leave God out? Same problem.
Need to avoid grounding
worth, thus rights, in capacities altogether.
Need a relation to God
such that humans get elevated worth from it, regardless of individual
capacities.
Being loved by God would
be such a relation.
A case of bestowed worth.
Kinds of worth:
Worth might supervene upon
aspect(s) of a thing
Some aspects might impart instrumental worth;
examples. The chain of instrumentally good aspects must terminate.
Some aspects might impart
non-instrumental worth.
e.g. a flavor. Or some aspect of a flavor, etc.
This terminates in what is basically good.
And intrinsically, not instrumentally, good.
What makes that basic
aspect of that thing good?
Plato;
participation in the form goodness itself. Not contingent. Could not exist without that
relation. Is intrinsic then.
Xtian Platonism;
BESTOWED WORTH
Humanly bestowed worth;
Relics;e
.g Mt Vernon. A Rembrandt. By treasuring the relic we honor the person.
Being appointed to an elevated position;
Love as attachment; not love as attraction or benevolence. Why not?+-
Love of the velveteen
rabbit.
Gods love of each and every human being, equally.
Rights
and social entities (governments, universities, corporations etc.)
Social entities (SEs) can
act. They can act justly or unjustly. They can wrong people. These are ‘count
actions.’ (When UTM acts, some person or persons do(es) something that ‘counts as’ UTM doing something).
SEs, including groups, can
act.
But do
SEs have lives? They must have in order to have rights? (does
God have a ‘life?’ Not a biological organism)
Let ‘has a life’ cover all
social agents.
SEs get rights from
individuals promising etc. (linguistically generated rights) or from state
action.
Things can go badly for
SEs. They can be wronged. Soviet universities were wronged when faculty were
constrained and courses limited by state ideology.
Entities like mountains,
sculptures, etc. have no ‘life’ in any sense, and so can’t have rights.
Nonetheless they should be treated with respect, etc. Here is a case of duties
without rights. But the principle of correlatives still holds; IF X is the kind
of thing that can have rights etc.
Animals and plants DO have
lives.But are not moral agents. Do they have rights? Consider
various moral evaluations of a case of animal cruelty.
Once again, duties without rights (duties to be kind
to tabby, even though tabby has no rights, since not the right kind of thing to
have them).
The ‘ur principle.’
One should (ought to) treat each x with due respect (not
treat x with under-respect).
‘should’
indicates full cognition moral obligation. The requiredness indicated by ‘should’ which is constitutive of
obligation, is what respect for worth requires.
If respect for your worth requires
that I treat you a certain way, then I am morally
obligated to treat you that way. It is not just that it would be good to
treat you that way. It must be required,
in order for there to be obligation.
We must distinguish what
is required from what would be good. Some very good acts go beyond what I am
obliged to do. Illustrate. They are supererogatory. It seems that ANY account
of moral obligation must allow for works of supererogation, at least in
principle.
An account of obligation
is an account that explains the requiredness of obligations. Explain. Thus this theory that grounds rights
in respect for worth also gives an account of obligation. There are also things
I might do for a person that are not required by respect for that person.
Thus this theory allows for supererogation.
Are there other,
competing, accounts of obligation?
Yes. Social requirement accounts. SR accounts.
Linked with divine command theory in an interesting way (gets rid of the Euthyphro problem).
Our social relations generate
reasons for doing A rather than B.
Consider my relation to my father. Because of all he has done for me,
because of our particular bond, I feel pressure to do what pleases him, avoid
what would offend him. I will feel
pressured to do what he commands(commanding is a way
for him to pressure me), and more generally whatever he wills. Not to do so
would offend him, and make me feel guilty. But my father is not perfectly just,
loving etc. So if he commands me to assist Nazis in rounding up Jews, it seems
obvious that his command does not generate a MORAL obligation. It may be a
‘filial obligation’ but not a moral obligation.
What we need are social relations to a perfect being, (a perfect father,
say) in which case the commands WOULD generate MORAL obligations. The moral
obligation comes into existence at the moment when I am commanded by God.
But what is special about
commands? They are one way to pressure someone. Just stating what one thinks
could be another. Why should we think
that only commands generate obligations? Many things in my relation to my
father, or God, might pressure me to do whatever pleases him, no matter whether
he explicitly commands it.
The
result? No room for
supererogation. Everything that I could do that would please God would become
obligatory. Thus this account does not fit our intuitions about what obligation is.
A related problem: we
think of what we are morally obligated to do as distinct from what we
should do because there is a
preponderance of good reasons for doing it. But the SR view is that I
ought, morally, to do what I am most pressured to do (by a good etc.
agent). i.e. it
collapses what I am morally required to do into what I have the most reasons to
do.
Suppose the SR theorist
argues that the good of pleasing God trumps all other life goods. Thus getting rid of utilitarian calculations of balance of life
goods etc. Only that good generates requirement,
obligation. But, Once
again, no room for supererogation. Everything done to please God would
be obligatory.
What must God be like in
order for him to require us to act in
those ways that are specified in what we think of as moral obligations? Good,
loving. A wicked God should not be obeyed. But, what about ‘just?’ Could God be
just, on the SR view? (even love must be qualified by
justice)
That view claims that
obligations derive from God’s commands. Humans are just when they observe
their obligations by respecting others in honoring their rights. Justice
depends upon rights and obligations being correlative. How then could God be
just? Could he issue commands to himself? If he did then his obligations would
be the result of applying pressure to himself!!
(Surely God has a ‘holy
will.’ He could never need to pressure himself.) The SR theorist cannot, thus, account for the
scriptural descriptions of God as just, as being obligated by his promises,
true to his covenants.
So
much for SR theory (divine command version)
Can the respect theory
account for ‘duties of charity?’
Seems that
the principle of correlatives fails. Duty of charity to X does NOT imply X has a
right to whatever life-good he/she receives.
NOT SO. The duty to forgive, for instance, is a
‘third party duty.’ The duty derives from a command of God, on the respect view
being developed here, and failure to do what God commands violates GOD’s
rights, NOT, the rights of the person whom I refuse to forgive. Illustrate.
What
other sort of account of duties of charity could there be? See note p. 384.
Concluding reflections:
Some examples of my rights:
The right to
1.Get a payment of both principle and
interest on a loan
2. Not be kicked out of the way as I walk down a sidewalk
3. Be declared winner when I have checkmated
4. vote by the time I’m 18
5. have you present at noon today
when you promised to be present
6. operate a motor vehicle
7. get married provided I meet
certain requirements
8. be spoken to politely
9. determine whether my child attends
the game tonight
10. privacy (suitably defined)
11. command my subjects, given that I
am king.
12. not be exposed to vulgar language
against my will
13. not be tortured for someone’s
pleasure
14. to
be obeyed by the recruits in my platoon (I am the commander).
15. to time off.
16. to eternal
salvation
17. to not be tortured
Which of these are
A. legal rights? B. Rights that arise
from a linguistic practice? C. A social practice? D. Inherent? E. Human?
F. Natural? G. Natural human? H. Universal? I.
Moral?
J. Conferred? K. Standing?
Which of these rights are such that, when they
are violated, some person is shown under-respect?
Which are such that their
violation is a moral violation?
The moral subculture
(explain) of rights enables us to assess laws and practices that themselves
confer rights.
Origin of the moral
subculture: Hebrew/Christian. Philosophical?
If secularization should
eliminate any acknowledgement of the religious roots of the moral subculture of
rights, what might happen? Demise of belief in those rights?
Some secular grounding? Or, is there no need for any
grounding?.
‘when
the secret police come . . .’ Rorty p. 391
Maybe natural sympathy will
do it? Oh how lacking it is in so many!
CONVICTION
is needed.
Questions. Mark down your answers
somewhere. Only you will see them.
1. The life that is well lived is the life that goes well.
2. Eudaimonists focus on the
experientially satisfying life as the content of happiness.
3. Agape is the love that confers worth on humans, according
to W.
4. Rights attach to statuses.
5. universal rights could not be
legal rights.
6. rights conferred by legislation
are natural rights.
7. Kantian attempts to ground basic human rights in human
rationality seem to leave out some humans.
8. for a eudaimonist, being
treated a certain way (e.g. being beaten half to death) has ‘moral’ significance
only so far as it is instrumental to living or not living ones
life well.
9. Judeao-Christian scriptures envisage the good life for a
human being as the life that goes well.
10. Ancient ethical theory is almost entirely eudaimonist.
11. It is, strictly speaking,
correct to say that rights are rights to things such as my house or my social
security check, or to activities, such as a pleasant walk on the quad.
12. According to ‘justice as right order’ theorists, murder
is wrong because it involves a violation of an objective obligation.
13. Augustine got rid of ancient eudaimonism
by a return to Plato’s ethics.
14. a nutritious meal for a hungry
person is a good in itself, apart from any rights anyone has.
15. Augustine emphasized the importance of compassion and
thus broke with Stoicism.
16. Compassion is normally directed towards those who are
not living their lives well.
17. Life and history goods are states of affairs in a
person’s life that consist of certain desires being satisfied.
18.The attempt to ground all moral
obligations in divine commands overlooks standing
obligations.
19. Some cases of disrespect involve illocutionary acts.
20. some of our obligations are
obligations to do some specific thing (help P), others are NOT (the general obligation
to obey commands of legitimate authorities, for example.)
21. Natural rights are socially conferred rights.
22. The goods to which we have rights are all goods of being
treated in certain ways (including being left alone).
23. It is not possible to have a legal right to something if
no law grants that right.
24. Hebrew/xtian scriptures make
explicit use of the language of rights.
25. a person whose rights are
ignored has been wronged.
26. rights are boundary markers for
our pursuit of life-goods.
27. Stoics in
particular, and other eudaimonists, downplay the
moral significance of being a victim.
28. Those who deny a place for justice in the New Testament
cannot account for the importance of forgiveness, human and divine, in the NT.
29. Although there is a duty that correlates with every
right, it is not the case that rights are grounded in duties.
30. The property or properties upon which human worth
supervene(s) must belong to all human beings, W argues.
31. The problem with all capacities approaches to an account
of human worth is that people do not agree on what capacities humans have.
32. Kant’s account of human worth is a capacities approach
which makes no mention of God.
33. The ancient formula stating that ‘justice is rendering
to each what is due,’ is compatible with a ‘justice as inherent rights’ account
of justice.
34. The UN declaration of rights included the claim that
universal human rights are grounded in the need of people for happiness.
35. To refuse to forgive those who have wronged us could be
to treat God with disrespect, and thus violate a right of God.
Some reminders on types of rights:
Inherent rights; rights that inhere in some status; e.g.
parental rights inhere in the status ‘parent’ Human rights inhere
in the status ‘human’ Inherent rights are never conferred rights, per se.
Natural rights; rights that are not
socially conferred. Standing rights would have to be natural rights
(why?) Some natural rights might be divinely conferred (.e.g
rights of kings). But most natural rights are inherent.
Human rights; rights that attach to the status ‘human’