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Phil. 385/RelSt 380=
b>
Spring 2008 =
span>
Sources of the Self
(in 19th and 20t=
h
Century Philosophy, Literature etc.)
Instructor: Dr. Norman Lillegard
Office: Humanities 229 &=
nbsp;
587 7384
nlillega@utm.edu
Office Hours: 10:00 -11.00 a.m. and 1:00 - 2:00 p.m. MWF and by
appointment
Texts: Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor
Additional handouts or on-line
materials.
Some Aims of This Course: At the beginning of the 21st century th=
ere
is a lot of preoccupation wit=
h, and
a lot of confusion about “the self”, “my identity”
(identity crises etc.), individualism and the status of the self vs. societ=
y or
community, and related themes involving selfhood (narrative, the nature of
action etc.). Given the cultu=
ral
history of the last two centuries this should come as no surprise. For in the period since the
enlightenment the settled sense of self, surrounded by definite horizons, w=
hich
persisted as a fairly common inheritance into the renaissance and beyond, h=
as
been torn apart by conflicting visions and by nihilistic tendencies.
In this course we examine the hi=
story
that has produced the present dis-ease.&nb=
sp;
Doing so requires attention to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, =
the
philosophy of language, even a little logic, but the main focus will be on =
ethical or moral philosophy, unde=
rstood
quite broadly so as to include matters sometimes dealt with in literature a=
nd
art courses, the history of culture, the social sciences, as well as in
philosophy of religion or, more broadly, religious studies.
Requirements:
·<=
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style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Read
all assigned material. There will be two exams, a mid-term worth 100 pts, a=
nd
comprehensive final worth 150 pts.=
total
250 pts.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
There
will be several quizzes, worth 20 pts or so each. The quizzes, as well as exams, will
refer to questions and terms to be defined, listed on the web page. Total Ca. 100 pts.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Selected
questions will also be collected and graded. Ca. 50 pts.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
A
short paper, ca. 1500 words, on a topic approved by the instructor, must be
submitted. Topic due Feb. 11. First
Draft due March 3. No exceptions.
100 pts.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Philosophy
majors are encouraged to submit a long paper (ca. 3000 words). Same schedul=
e.
Majors may substitute a long paper for the final provided the first draft is
adequate. Topic to be determined in consultation with the instructor. (up to 250 pts.)
·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> = A wide array of topics is possible, including such things as studies of recent films in the light of course content, analysis of literary works, etc. <= o:p>
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Attendance
and class participation are worth ca. 50 pts. Total points =3D ca. 550. (Tentative)
Sample exam questions, definitio=
ns,
and other course related material can be found at www.utm.edu/~nlillega/lilleg=
ard.htm.
on the phil. 385 link.
Questions for the course are ins=
erted
into the COURSE OUTLINE, found on-line. You MUST use it.
Class Procedures: Classes will be a mix of lecture, discussion, viewing of
films and, possibly, viva voce debates worked out ahead of time (possible e=
xtra
credit). Students should give
careful and respectful consideration to each others views and comments. A
premium is placed on argument, rather than on mere statement of opinion. Al=
so,
a premium is placed on sticking to the subject. Only the instructor is allowed to =
wander
all over the place and insert irrelevant jokes.
COURSE OUTLINE: (Approximate. Content and time periods may vary slightly.)
Week 1 = (1/14) Study Taylor ch. 1. Answer question 1.
Week 2 = (1/21) (MLKing day) Study ch. 2 and 3 (in Part I). Note questions in “questions” link.
Week 3
(1/28) Quiz on ch. 1-3. Continue discussion of 1-3.
Week 4 (2/4) Study Chapters 5,6,7. W= rite out answers to q. 5-10 to be handed in.
Week 5 = (2/11) . Chapters 8, 9,10.
Week 6 = (2/18) .11,
Week 7 =
(2/25) =
12&=
nbsp;
Week 8 = (3/3) Outline 13, 14.
Week 9 =
(3/10
– 16 - SPRING BREAK)
Week 10= (3/17) Outline 17. March 21-Good Friday
Week 11= (3/24) 18,19 &n= bsp;
Week 12 (3/31)20  = ;
Week 13 (4/7) 21,22  = ; &n= bsp;
Week 14 (4/14). 23,
Week 15= (4/21) 24, 25 Papers due Monday, 4/2= 1.
Week 16. Classes end Mon. April 28. Review. FINAL EXAMS, MAY 1-7.
-------= ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= --------------------------------------------------------------
Course Outline&= nbsp; Phil. 385

Sources of th=
e self:
Self invention or
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; Self
discovery or. . .?
Self Invention
Planned Parent= hood vs Casey (US Supreme Court, 1992.) In discussions of this case, this claus= e is referred to, usually with contempt, as the “mystery” clause, for reasons that are obvious.
&nbs=
p; “At the heart of liberty is the=
right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not def=
ine
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
state.” (at 847).
In contrast to this, consider Taylor’s notion of= “inescapable frameworks̶= 1; which are necessary to self-hood (personhood). Such frameworks could not be invented (defined) by individuals (i.e. with refer= ence soley to individual resources), but NEITHER are they “formed under the compulsion of the state” (the court’s crazy false dilemma).
Taylor argues that such frameworks are inextricably intertwined with moral concept= ions., broadly understood; notions of self (self-identity etc.) are therefore moral conceptions, or intertwined with moral conceptions, where ‘moral̵= 7; is understood broadly.
I) &nb=
sp;
Inescapable Frameworks
A) &nb=
sp;
Idea=
s of
the SELF are inextricably connected to “moral” conceptions. Understanding the connection requir=
es
understanding and crediting the role in our lives of strong evaluation,* i.e.
evaluation which is independent of our desires, choices, inclinations, and
which contains criteria for judging
those desires etc. ‘Moral’ here is to be taken broadly. For instance, ‘Your life is =
not
worthwhile’ might not be counted as a moral claim in some uses of
‘moral’ but it is here<=
/i>.
1) =
Example: Re=
spect
for human life produces strong evaluations. This is universal. Some versions may not apply to all
humans, but only to, say, the tribe members, but some version of it is found
everywhere. It is almost like a gut reaction that all
people have. One may not kill=
or
degrade or maim without just cause.
(a) =
Thus, examp=
les of
strong evaluations would be, “it is wrong to kill innocent human
beings” or ‘what the Nazi guards did to Jews when transporting =
them
was horrible and degrading, a violation of their humanity”(cf. Hailli=
e)
2) =
&nb=
sp;
Such a phen=
omenon
seems to call forth articulation i.e. some account of what humans are, o=
r what
the Gods require, some sort of moral ontology must lie back o=
f such
a phenomenon (the phenomenon of very widespread strong evaluation).
(a) It may need to be stated.
(b) It may be implicit.
3) =
&nb=
sp;
That ontolo=
gy
will provide an inescapable framework. Gut reactions are NOT
generally like that.
(a) Error theory: In the modern era this is often
denied. It may be claimed tha=
t all
that is involved in moral reactions is a gut reaction, and that it i=
s an
error to suppose there is some
metaphysical backing for it. =
That
is the error theory, the idea that moral ontologies are simpl=
y a
mistake.
4) =
The need for a moral ontology shows=
that
such phenomena (e.g. strong evaluations relating to respect for life) are not just gut reactions. Compare to nausea. If a certain smell makes me nausea=
ted,
then it just does. If tomorro=
w it
does not, nobody will accuse me of inconsistency. Nor do I feel any demand on me to
account for my nausea. But the moral response is different.=
i> I cannot respect life today and not
tomorrow without being accused of inconsistency, or with having changed my =
mind (not just my feelings) in a
fundamental way. And we all think there must be something about what I resp=
ect
that shows that the respect is mer=
ited,
whether any particular individual feels it or not.
5) =
Thus I am
naturally drawn to intrinsic description , that is, a descrip=
tion
of my reaction which shows how it is required
even where that reaction is missing.(it was required of those guards, even
though missing).
(a) =
So someone =
who
fails to show respect for life has indeed failed at something. Someone who does not feel nausea a=
t a
certain smell has not failed at anything.&=
nbsp;
A rotting stinking piece of road kill is dumped on my dinner plate. I
don’t feel nausea or sick or any other negative feeling. That makes me
odd, different. It doesn̵=
7;t
make me “mistaken.” We might wonder why I lack the
“normal” reaction, but our investigation of why will not require
intrinsic descriptions, but, say, some piece of physiology which shows why =
the
“normal” reaction did not take place.
6) =
Scientists =
(those
among them that are loyal to naturalism) often resist the notion of intrins=
ic
description. Thus they might =
try to
give a sociobiological account of the presence or absence of
certain “moral” reactions, an account which is not fundamentally
different from accounts of things like nausea.
(a) =
&nb=
sp;
What would =
an
evolutionary account of nausea be like? (Please refrain from Lamarckianism!=
)
A) =
1) . =
For
example, respect for persons is required because they are all creatures of
God,(so the existence of God is required), or, respect is required because =
they
are rational beings and such beings have incomparable worth (so there are s=
uch
rational beings (cf. Kant)).
2) In=
the
modern era there is much uncertainty about and hesitance in committing to s=
uch
ontologies. That is the ̶=
0;modern predicament.” Given a tight connection between
morality and ideas of the self, we can thus expect to get what we do indeed
have, namely, much confusion and uncertainty about what it is to be a self,=
be somebody.
(a) =
&nb=
sp;
By contrast
consider Dostoevsky’s confident pronouncement, “If God is dead,
everything is permitted.” For
him the inescapable framework for our living was provided by the existence =
of
God. Moral constraints could =
only be made sense of given such an
ontology. And a corresponding=
set
of powerful beliefs about human selfhood can be found in Dostoevsky.
II) &n=
bsp;
Three a=
xes of
the moral life.
A) Respect for others
1) =
Modern vers=
ion
stresses the “right” to respect. Not to respect is to violate a
right. Rights can be claimed OR given up.
a. Thus, there need to be ‘inalienable
rights’ to cover such things as slavery. You cannot give up the right=
to
liberty.
b. Th=
e idea
of rights stresses autonomy (YOU decide to give them up, or keep them, for
instance).
c. Autonomy links to idea of freedom from interfere=
nce in
shaping of ones own life. v. 12. Cf. Casey again.
i. Avoid unnecessary suffering (no cosmic order)
ii. Stress value of everyday life (no heirarchy)
iii. =
Compare to =
natural
law idea. To not respect is to ignore the status of a person. A person cannot give up his/her status. Not
because of anything inalienable, but because of divine law, or the logos, e=
tc.
There is no alternative to that status.
B) Idea of good, worthwhile, meaningful, life (is a=
moral
idea, or at any rate evokes strong evaluation. Thus, ‘your entire lif=
e is
a waste’ is a strong evaluation)
1) cf. links to A i, ii, iii in modern era.
C) Idea of “attitudinal respect”, respe=
ct
demanded by “dignity “ of others. Dignity can consist in
1) Power etc. cf. degradation of those without powe=
r, as
in Darfur. Slavery etc. To be without power is to be without dignity.
2) Being self sufficient etc.
3) Maintaining myself in my station and its duties
(ordinary life theme. Cf. Cinderella man).
(a) Cf. loss of dignity when no longer able to suppo=
rt
self, or family, etc.
III)
Different cultures stress different=
axes;
but, the “axes” (II a,b,c.; the frameworks) are not questioned.=
A) Homeric (heroic) culture stress on C, esp. C1. C3 didn’t exist(?)
B) Second axis (B) questions arise in any culture
1) Warrior living up to promise of his calling (hon=
or,
courage etc.) cf. Captain in Bleak =
House.
2) Religious person living up to call beyond conven=
tional
piety
3) Finding fulfillment through exemplary instancing=
of
familiar norms, etc.(common life theme).
C) Compare B 1 and 2 to B in modern cultures. In the
latter, one threat to fullness of life is the possible lack of any framework whatsoever. (sense of meaninglessness).
1) Compare Luther’s “despair” to =
the
despair of modern nihilist.
2) Some frameworks are gone for good (Plato’s
heirarchy of being?).
3) Some have partial following (honor in the milita=
ry)
4) Some are still strong, (e.g. religious views) bu=
t do
not provide horizon for ALL (entire societies).
D) Contestability of frameworks leads to sense of q=
uest
for something. “Give me something I can live for, live in, a way of
thinking that will enable me to achieve a real life.”
1) The moral meaning of axis 2 comes out in the ban=
ality
of Eichmann. The humdrum life is potentially the terrible life.
“Humdrum” means “without any moral framework, without qualitative distinctions.” The
bureaucrat. A framework of efficient production of anything (e.g. getting r=
id
of Jews, or...) The man without qualities (Robert Musil).
2) Loss of frameworks leads to changes in
psychopathology. P.19
E) Good life as mastery of self;
1) Reason over desire or impulse (Plato)
2) Duty over attachment (Stoics, Kant)
3) Devotion to truth vs. what I would like to be true (cf. Huxley)
F) Good life as striving for what is higher, vs. de=
nial
of qualitative distinctions (there is no “higher”). That is a t=
heme
in utilitarianism (all preferences, desires, are equal). 1) But util. is itself a view motivated, in part, b=
y the
“ideal” of the value of the common life. IV)
Strong
evaluation, moral ideals, and havin=
g an
identity, being a self, or agen=
cy. A) Moral ideals/horizons are necessary for undamaged
personhood. Consider a person who simply does not care about qualitative
distinctions. Mersault in Camus’ The
Stranger. B) Moral framework is like spatial framework. We get
oriented within it, cannot imagine replacing it or going without it. C) To have an identity is to have a stance. Who I
am=3Dwhere I stand. Where I stand is given by strong evaluations, claims ab=
out
what is GOOD. Without this a person is no agent, no author of acts. Agency.=
1) Thus, the idea of (a) Good (b) Agency (c) Identity (who am I?) =
&nb=
sp;
are internally linked. V)
The web=
of
interlocution. A) The self is formed through interchange with othe=
rs
(cf. feral children). B) There must be some group or community which prov=
ides
the qualitative distinctions. 1) Rebels, prophets, etc. still draw on such a comm=
unity,
even if it is only the “saving remnant.” 2) Emersonian “self reliance” looks lik=
e a
denial of community, but in fact belongs in that prophetic tradition (cf.
Cavell on Emerson and Wittgenstein) 3) Compare American individualism to India’s
familial loyalty and sense of self. C) Epicurean friendship as a test case for the
possibility of a naturalist dismissal of qualitative distinctions. Epicurus=
was
a naturalist. How could he account for friendship? He couldn’t. Yet he
considered it of the utmost importance, particularly for the conversation it afforded. D) The web is a “transcendental conditionR=
21;
for agency, selfhood. Means? A transcendental condition is a condition of
sense, i.e. what must be the case to make sense of ordinary distinctions, w=
ays
of thinking, talking, interacting. The “best account” (BA) of w=
hat
we actually have, rather than a
“revisionist” theor=
y that
proposes to replace (in theory at least) what we have. Cf. Kant on Humean
causality. 1) What must be the case for there to be language?<=
o:p> 2) What must be the case for there to be qualitative
distinctions? 3) What must be the case for there to be selves (cf.
Casey again)? VI)
The spa=
ce of
moral reasons, the second axis, and the Good. A) We cannot not CARE where we are in that space (A=
xis
#2) B) The goods by which we orient ourselves ARE the m=
easure
of the worth of our lives. 1) Various forms of “longing for the beyond=
8221; simply
register disappointment in ‘this life as now lived’ (a) Thus, in the “value of common life”
framework, longing for the beyond is not longing for something
“uncommon” but rather longing for a better, more perfect instan=
cing
of those common life values (cf. Feurbach on the holy family). (b) Cf. the desire to “be there” (“=
;I was
there when” or “I’ve been to that place” where
something great happened.) Something higher, in some sense, than life as now lived. VII) &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Narrati=
ve and
the good. A) Lives are always incomplete, always unfolding. <=
o:p> 1) Thus, I must see my identity in terms of a narrative. B) A narrative, to make sense, must connect past,
present, future. Future is “absolute” in the sense that I must
decide, one way or other, what it is to be (existential theme). C) Alzheimer’s is, according to surveys, the =
most
feared disease. Why? Think about that!!! 1) Contrast narrative sense of self with
“punctual” self. What counts as a “self” (mine or
anyone’s ) cannot be understood apart from cares, and the extent to w=
hich
some ideal is achieved. 2) The punctual self is like any object, in fundame=
ntal
ways. What it is (its identity) can be understood “neutrally.” A
rock, a plant, a dog. VIII The ethics of inarticulacy. I)
“=
naturalism”
and “projection.” A) Fact vs. value, prescription vs. description. Do=
we 1) voluntarily impose(project) our values, OR 2) do it involuntarily (sociobiology), just as we c=
annot
help seeing things colored (though they are not, you know!) B) The projection view seems to fail for
“thick” ethical concepts. 1) Examples: cruelty. Kindness. Cannot isolate a
descriptive component. You do not know how to apply such terms if you have =
not
understood the “evaluative” force. 2) The language of assessment is continuous with the
language of description of what people do and feel (57). 3) What it means to not be able to get along withou=
t a
term (57) 4) Explanatory and life (living) uses. Let us explain someone living his =
life.
Can that be done without attending to “the terms in which” he l=
ives
it? Cf. the Martian anthropologist at the football game. J (a) Cannot relegate the subjects own terms of living=
to
mere “phenomena.” C) Naturalists avoid accounts of human life that ta=
ke
seriously what things mean to u=
s,
since it is precisely that which makes “science” possible. The =
scientific
revolution gets rid of teleology, anthropomorphism. 1) Why did the rock go down? Because it meant somet=
hing
to it to do so, it got where it wanted to get (inclined to, found fulfillme=
nt
of nature in ) just like us, 2) The rock is just an external object subject mech=
anical
laws. Nothing means anything to it. II)
A highe=
st
good among high goods.”Hyper-goods.” A) Consider how someone might subordinate other
“high” or even life defining goods to the quest for justice, or
obedience to God, or expressive fulfillment (Gaugin). 1) Do=
ing
“whatever it takes” to achieve racial justice (!!) B) Hyper-goods provide a standard for judgment; this
society is better than that one; my life now is better than it was; etc. Th=
us
hyper-goods are conflictual. C) Revisionist vs. comprehending (Plato vs Aristotle). The comprehending is
difficult to bring off now. We see, e.g., sexist heirarchies of goods as
unredeemable. Not all goods can be combined in some optimal order, since so=
me
“goods” reinforce injustice, bigotry etc. 1) Arguments over competing (hyper)goods require be=
ing
able to show how going from one moral perspective to another is error reduc=
ing.
They do NOT require stepping outside of a particular moral perspective
altogether. (a) Example: I might come to see, by living thru it,=
that
a love that persists thru time trumps even the most passionate and glorious
“affair” that afforded deep “self expression.” But =
that
too could be challenged, etc. 2) Compare confidence in perceptual experience to
confidence in moral experience. I can be wrong in either case. But I cannot
determine that I am wrong by getting OUTSIDE of perception, or morality,
altogether. (a) Corrective activities p. 75 3) Articulating what underlies my actions (frames t=
hem)
is not giving a “basic reason” for them p.77 see summary p. 78 III)
The mot=
ives
of “liberation.” Why do people think of escape from certain mor=
al
perspectives as liberation? A) Escape from frameworks which impose guilt, sense=
of
failure. What liberation! Or, B) Escape from illusions about how well I am doing =
(I am
so much better than those wastrels) can also seem like liberation. Or C) Escape from nature as determinative (cf. Aristot=
le on
realizing my “nature”) can seem like a liberation (I can make u=
p my
own standards for how to be. They are not given in “nature.”) D) A new centrality for a new conception of freedom=
or
liberty. This can lead a thinker away from axis 2, with its stress on a who=
le
life (an Aristotelian idea) to a stress on act centered theories. E) Th=
e place
of theories of moral obligation (action centered theory), as opposed to
theories of the good life. It seems this focus on action can bypass any need
for qualitative distinctions. Thus it is attractive to naturalists and
utilitarians. And even to Kantians. 1) Cf. Rawls on justice. Proceduralism, fairness. T=
he good
society is merely one that keeps people from interfering with one
another’s perfectly private pursuits and ensures that no one gets left
out of doing that. 2) Bentham: no one should tell anyone else how to l=
ive. F) Thus, elevating the right over the good. IV)
Moral
sources: Articulation of them bring=
s us
closer to them. So Taylor hopes. A) They are mostly UNarticulated in our era. Reasons have been suggested alread=
y 1) Articulated sources in Axis 2 have come under su=
spicion
as sources of guilt, bigotry, unfairness, etc. 2) Axis 1 can appear to stand on its own. Respect is
abstract, formal. And it fits with modern notions of freedom and autonomy m=
uch
better than Axis 2. “Respect” means B) HOWEVER, Axis 1, and naturalist and utilitarian
theories, are themselves attached to hyper-goods, and NOT TO NOTICE THAT ca=
n be
damaging. One infringes in the very act of insisting that no one infringe. =
ONE
VALUE becomes dominant. Thus 1) The Utilitarian is very motivated by a hyper-goo=
d of
charity, or the affirmation of everyday life, but ignores that fact and tri=
es
to justify itself by claiming that (a) What anyone values is as good as what anyone else
values, there are no non-subjective, non-arbitrary, hyper-goods. 2) That position is both intellectually and morally
untenable. (a) It is morally untenable because it tries to side=
line
the way people CARE about their own lives, particular other people’s
lives (e.g. family) etc. C) The Nietzschean critiques all morality by claiming that all of it (not just modern morali=
ty)
is mired in unacknowledged sources (e.g. xtianity) AND that honesty requires
dumping Axis 1 just as much as Axis 2 (though Neitzsche may unconsciously c=
ling
to a version of Axis 3). 1) Niet. is suspicious of the whole business; for
example, xtian morality, which emphasizes humility etc. covers up the resentments of the w=
eak
against the powerful. 2) He also rejects rejection; many moralities rejec=
t the
body, sensual passions, the reality of suffering. N. wants to say YES to li=
fe
as he finds it. Morality cripples=
i>
people, he thinks. 3) Nietzsche has his own hyper-good however; the wi=
ll to
power. D) Neither the utilitarian, nor the Neitzschean, ca=
n show
the connections between moral evaluations and self-hood. THAT is above all =
what
makes them damaging. They turn out to be nihilistic with respect to the sel=
f. V)
What we=
need
is an historical path to articulacy. How did we get here? A) We need to trace the development of 1) Our notions of the good 2) Our understanding of the self 3) The kinds of narrative in which we make sense of
ourselves, 4) Conceptions of society B) These develop together, in loose packages. New i=
deas
of the good and the self, new ideas of (new types of) narrativity, new idea=
s of
social bonds, come out of older forms or ideas, and continue to bear the
imprint of the old. Part II I)
Moral
topography A) Idea of the self in the west is a particular
historical idea, not necessarily universal. 1) Distinguishing inside from outside may in some s=
ense
be universal, but cf. Geertz on Java. II)
Plato on
moral sources: A) Hegemony(rule, CONTROL) of reason over desire. R=
eason
gives order to life, produces harmony in the self (produces a “cohere=
nt”
self), gives contentment. B) Passion produces the opposite; disunity, discont=
ent,
etc. 1) The opposition of Homeric to Platonic moral sour=
ces. (a) Homeric: bursts of energy, courage, power (going
“beserk”). Inability to articulate the source of action, etc. (b) Plato: calmness, clear theoretical grasp of what=
makes
a good life possible, centering of the self. (i) reason vs. passion, soul vs. body (ii) =
&nb=
sp;
rational se=
lf is
implicity present, needs to be turned, converted,
towards the “light” which is the Good, and shows what is real. =
2) The Good is external to us, thus not invented by=
us. 3) Thus the Good is not found “within” =
the
individual. (a) The Good can only be discovered by right reason.=
Right
reason is defined by relation to the actual order of the cosmos, which is g=
ood.
Seeing that order correctly requires ascesis, getting out of the cave. (b) Getting out of the cave requires getting turned =
around
(converted). From darkness to light. Loving(?) the light. 4) Aristotle: theoretical contemplation must be
distinguished from practical wisdom. The former is not essential for the la=
ter.
Practical wisdom is not exact, not scientific. 5) The Stoic version: perception of right order has=
no
other purpose than bringing about right conduct. Contemplation is not per se
valuable. III)
Augusti=
ne;
the inner man 1) Recapitulating Plato (a) Light/dark, flesh/spirit, order/disorder, (logos/
a-logos) etc. Conversion. Ordered LOVE. (b) These contrasts go with “inner/outer”=
;,
which is NOT Platonic. V. 130 (c) Two loves 2) Beyond Plato:Radical reflexivity and asymmetry. =
The
first person standpoint. I know my mind as you cannot. More importantly, I =
can
hide me from you. 3) Beyond Plato: the truth is discovered within in =
the
sense that (a) I can know that I exist (cogito, etc.) infallibl=
y (b) I can know that there is a standard above my rea=
son
that governs it, which is “the light within”, rather than a
recollection of forms. (i) The difference between anamnesis and memoria=
i>.
What is “before” (Plato) rather than discovered in the Journey =
thru
the soul. (c) In going into memoria I am led beyond, to God. T=
he
truth is NOT in me, in that sense. Nor is it in the past. (d) Going into the self=3Dstriving. P. 136 4) Choice or “assent” and the will. No
doctrine of the will in Plato. But assent in sceptics and stoics. Cf. Epict=
etus
to the tyrant (137). (a) Plato, Aristotle – all people are motivate=
d by
the good, but some are ignorant, or badly trained. None ”choose”
evil. (b) Augustine – some willfully choose evil. (c) Weak/strong will vs. good/bad will. 5) What is morally crucial in us? A rational princi=
ple
shared with all, OR, assent, choice, will? 137 (a) Evil is misdirection of the will. Our actions ca=
n go against our insight, not just below it or in ignorance. 6) Ethics and epistemology. I must have the idea in=
me of
absolute perfection, in order to grasp my own defects. I)Desc=
artes: A)
A new s=
ense
of “inner” cf. Pl=
ato
and Augustine. The source of truth is outside. Even if we must first go ins=
ide
to access it. B)
Descart=
es:
the source of truth is within in the
sense that it is constructed by a disengaged self. 1)&n=
bsp;
The cri=
teria
for truth are in the subject. What is clear and distinct to my
“mind.” 2+2=3D4 is clearly and distinctly seen to be true, ergo=
IS
true. There is no external guarantee of truth. 2)&n=
bsp;
Knowled=
ge of
the “external world” is really only possible by virtue of follo=
wing
rules that direct the mind to its own method. C)
Ethics:=
Stoic
“control” but without the Stoic vision of a providential order.=
1)&n=
bsp;
There is no “order” in
nature. Nature is DEAD. Devoid of “meaning.” 2)&n=
bsp;
The min=
d can
manipulate nature for its own purposes. The “instrumentalization̶=
1;
of reason in modern science. 3)&n=
bsp;
Similar=
ly,
the mind can manipulate the “passions” so as to achieve
instrumental control of them. 4)&n=
bsp;
Compare
animals (which are “machines” only) to humans, who have passion=
s.
P.150. D)
Thus we
arrive at a high estimate of ourselves as “rational” controller=
s of
our own passions. It is THAT which gives us DIGNITY. P. 152 Looking forward=
to
Kant, and to the dominance of axis 1. 1)&n=
bsp;
The sou=
rce of
morality is reason, understood as controller rather than discoverer of an
external rational order. E)
The mas=
ter
virtue is thus “generosity,” which means, being master of self
(only loosely connected to what we now mean by that word). 1)&n=
bsp;
Closely
connected to the honor ethic, the idea of self mastery which is proud, because able to do great th=
ings
by, for example, conquering fears, or lusts. 2)&n=
bsp;
Contras=
t with
Augustine’s notion of increasing humility as we recognize more and mo=
re
our dependence on an external source of truth, God. The deeper we go into t=
he
self, the more we are driven outward (upward). (a)&=
nbsp;
Platonic
reason achieves mastery over the passions only by humbling itself before the
Good, which it loves. II)Summing up: disengagement, objectification, cont=
rol; A)
“=
objectifying”
involves depriving of normative force (160). 1)&n=
bsp;
How thi=
ngs
are in the world (including the human world) is normed. Things are how they ought to be, when they are “normal.” (a)&=
nbsp;
Plato; =
the
person who loves the forms and is motivated to justice, is “normal=
221;
(NOT statistically of course!) (b)&=
nbsp;
Aristot=
le;
the person who exhibits the virtues (the person of practical wisdom) is
“normal.” Their life is what it “naturally” ought to be (governed by reason).<=
o:p> (c)&=
nbsp;
The hawk
dominating the mouse is “normal”, that’s how it ought to =
be,
normed by natures norms. ETC.
(d)&=
nbsp;
Cf. str=
ip
mining, and ecological views on how things ought to be (shades of an ancient
view). How things ought to be 2)&n=
bsp;
When th=
ings
(including oneself) are mere objects, the normative is removed.
Objectification. 3)&n=
bsp;
The disengaged mind treats everythi=
ng as
objects. Cf. “objectify=
ing
another person.” That involves ignoring the norms that go with
“person” and treating the person as a mere object. Rape.(perhap=
s). B)
Objecti=
fication
enables control. Example: if a disease is sent by God as a just punishment,=
or
is the result of violating natural norms, then there is not much that can be
done to control it. Pray, may=
be.
Try a spell. If on the other hand it is a morally neutral, objective proces=
s,
then real control becomes possible. III) A)
The sub=
ject
of disengagement and control is the “punctual” self. Inherited =
from
Descartes. B)
Such a =
self
can “remake itself” cf. 159 and Casey. Role of modified Stoicism. 1)&n=
bsp;
The rol=
e of
voluntarism/nominalism and idea of God as arbitrary and totally in control.=
2)&n=
bsp;
Social
manifestations of control, in law, military, education, etc. at this time (=
esp.
in protestant countries). C)
Epistem=
ology,
Objectification, and mechanization. If the world is like a morally neutral
machine, then UNDERSTANDING and KNOWING will be proved by being able to ope=
rate
, control,
the machine. 1)&n=
bsp;
Body
technologies (the mother machine, reproductive technologies, parts
replacements, manipulations thru injection of neuro transmitter precursors,
etc.) D)
Epistem=
ology
as disengagement from the world, my own experience. No one experiences the
world, including the body, as what “causes” “ideas”=
in
the mind. I experience it as colored, pained. But that leads to all sorts of
errors according to Descartes/Locke. SO, 1)&n=
bsp;
Objecti=
fy
myself. Reflect on my experience (radical reflexivity) in order to control =
it,
avoid error. E)
Rejecti=
on of
what is “natural” entails, in Locke, rejection of innate ideas.=
F)
The Stu=
ff of
knowledge is particular simple ideas that just land on a passive receptor.<=
o:p> 1)&n=
bsp;
Confusi=
on
between “ideas” as inert objects, and ideas as content-ful, like
propositions. So what inert object goes with the “idea” of a
triangle? An equilateral obje=
ct,
perchance? G)
Knowled=
ge is
thus achieved by each individual by getting her ideas in order through a
method. Knowledge is thus possible only for the autonomous, self governing
individual. There can be no AUTHORITY to guarantee I have the truth. So I
construct it (Casey again). IV)Ethics and the Punctual Self. A)
No obje=
ctive order
or nature, therefore actions must be motivated by pleasure/pain. 1)&n=
bsp;
The imm=
ediate
“mover” is uneasiness. =
For
example, I feel uneasy when what I desire is absent. Uneasiness is occurren=
t,
otherwise it could not cause behavior (all causes act by a kind of contact,
never at a distance). B)
Just as=
in
epistemology, so in ethics. I can become “disengaged” in relati=
on
to myself, and “re-form” myself by controlling myself, avoiding=
the
influence of CUSTOM, FASHION, THE COMMON OPINION (These lead to erroneous o=
pinions
about what is good, and development of harmful “relishes” ). C)
In fact=
, what
is good for me, most pleasant, is conformity to divine law, understood
voluntaristically. (Since God inflicts pain on those who break it, gives
pleasure to the obedient). Thus the motive for obedience is simply to gain
pleasure/avoid pain. The commands of God do not reveal any particular order,
however. D)
The sel=
f that
can disengage from custom and “coldly” figure out what is
advantageous, is the PUNCTUAL SELF. 1)&n=
bsp;
This se=
lf is
nowhere, except in the power to remake. It has no other identity. So it is
“at a point” or “punctual.” 2)&n=
bsp;
It is s=
heer
consciousness, without any criteria of identity outside itself. E)
The eno=
rmous
contemporary power of Locke’s model. “Holding the package toget=
her
. . .” p. 174 1)&n=
bsp;
Cf. the
Freudian “ego” as a pure “point” of control. F)
This
“self” is radically reflexive, i.e. it is pure subjectivity, un=
like
the “self” that the ancients concerned themselves with, which h=
ad a
given structure, or given (natural) relation to something outside itself wh=
ich
provided its moral sources. 1)&n=
bsp;
Cf the =
ruling
(hegemonikon) “part”=
; in
Plato, or Epictetus, which keeps us properly aligned with a cosmic order. In
contrast, the “self” is never a “part” in the modern
understanding. (And there is no cosmic order). I)Montaigne: discovering “myself” in a=
ll my
uniqueness. A)
Montaig=
ne
gives up on trying to find any human essence or nature in terms of which he=
can
understand himself. Each self is different, each is limited by particular
circumstances. 1)&n=
bsp;
It foll=
ows
that each individual is very interesting; thus, keeping journals becomes
popular at this time. 2)&n=
bsp;
Confess=
ional
autobiography becomes popular (Rousseau, etc.) (a)&=
nbsp;
The new=
novel
(Richardson ) B)
At the =
same
time, each individual can become critically aware of “custom and
habit” and work herself free of mere conformity. C)
Above and beyond all abstract views=
of
human nature, all “high” religious demands, and all other societal impositions=
there
is “just me”, finding, and bringing to expression, the unique m=
e. 1)&n=
bsp;
Words,
conversation, are important for the task of self-discovery and
originality. Friendship is th=
us
important. 2)&n=
bsp;
Limits =
to the
self need attention. I cannot be an angel, nor am I a beast (cf. Pascal) II)Inner Nature: new localizations, atomism. A)
Three f=
acets of
modern individualism: self-responsible independence; recognized particularl=
ity;
individual commitment. B)
New
localizations: thoughts, e.g, are “IN” the mind. Ideas, values,=
are
IN the individual mind. 1)&n=
bsp;
This co=
ntrasts
with older view, where e.g. value terms pick out something that is just as =
much
out there as in here. “praise” is just as much in the praisewor=
thy
object as in the praiser. 2)&n=
bsp;
The
“right” praiser is simply in tune with the way existing things
(ontoi) rationallly are (logoi).
The heavens are telling the glory of God. That is not metaphor. C)
In the =
new
localization, values (and other properties) are located in us, and then
projected upon value-neutral objects. Objectification. Cf/ the difference b=
etween
“idea” in Plato and Descartes. 1)&n=
bsp;
The
subject/object split, so common to our thought, is alien to the older
localization. It is thus not as inevitable as we suppose. D)
Example=
: black
bile and the theory of humours.
Where is the “melancholy”? 1)&n=
bsp;
In the =
old view
the bile embodies a significance that we think of as merely psychological. =
It
“means” something in itself, not just in terms of its ability to
Cause certain “feelings”, just as Saturn means something. 2)&n=
bsp;
In the =
new
view, the bile is just a chemical, a mere object, without any
“meaning”, but with properties that enable it to cause
psychological conditions. 3)&n=
bsp;
Cf. the=
witch
craze from this same time period, which jars with the new “scientific
enlightenment.” Perhaps it reflects the difficulty in transitioning f=
rom
the ‘ontic logos’ to the independent self. (a)&=
nbsp;
The wit=
ch is
attuned to an ontic logos, the powers in her are not distinct from the powe=
rs
in things. Things (potions ingredients for example) mean something. E)
Politic=
al
atomism of this same period (.e.g. Hobbes) and the “independent”
individual who must “contract” with others in order to produce a
society. There is no external order (ontic logos) to justify social order.
There is no natural community prior to the contracted order. People as
political atoms. 1)&n=
bsp;
The
justification for whatever order emerges (particular laws, institutions etc=
.)
will be in the consent of
individuals. 2)&n=
bsp;
The authority of rulers must now be something created by consent, rather than
acknowledged as a permanent feature of “human nature” (cf.
Aristotle: humans are by nature political animals). F)
What we=
get
from community is “rights.” That which is protected by the law =
is
something possessed by an individual. Even life and liberty are included as
individual possessions. 1)&n=
bsp;
The sta=
te as
an instrument used by individua=
ls to
guard rights. (compare to the family as community – status is already
given by birth etc. and is NOT an individual possession. One for all and all
for one.) G)
In oppo=
sition
to the instrumental/atomist view we have the notion of the
“citizen” whose identity is communal (e.g. Rousseau). But the
instrumental/atomist view is the default position. H)
Note th=
is
quote: “rather than following the telos
of nature, we become constructors of our own character.” 197. Now
look again at Casey. Construction and imagination. Poiesi=
s. THE AFFIRMATION OF ORDINARY LIFE I)The religious background meets (combines with) t=
he
philosophical scientific background. A)
“=
ordinary
life” means? 1)&n=
bsp;
Contras=
t with
e.g. Aristotle. “production” etc. is merely a necc condition for
the good life. The good life itself is something more exalted. (a)&=
nbsp;
Life of
contemplation (b)&=
nbsp;
Life of
citizen (c)&=
nbsp;
Life of=
a
mere tradesman is a “low life.” B)
With the
reformation and the scientific revolution, a reversal of values. 1)&n=
bsp;
Do away=
with
priests, monastic orders, “mediation” of all kinds, etc. Ordina=
ry
life is the place to meet and serve God. (a)&=
nbsp;
Washing=
the
dishes is just as “high” as being president. 2)&n=
bsp;
Do away=
with
contemplative science, which produces no “fruits.” Use reason to
manipulate the world. Ability to
produce results is the mark of real knowledge. Francis Bacon. 3)&n=
bsp;
=
for the sake of the neighbor, or, to “relieve the condition of
mankind.” (a)&=
nbsp;
Finding=
out
how things work IS finding out “the mind of God in nature.” C)
The hon=
our
ethic also gets thrown out. Why? II)The Augustinian-protestant love of adverbs. Use (instrumentalize) this world.
Don’t become attached to it, glued to it. HOW you live, work, love, is the c=
rucial
thing. A)
Inner
detachment. Shades of the stoic. The world has “fallen” thru wr=
ong
attachment. B)
Calvin:=
get
order back into the world by encouraging piety. C)
The
instrumental stance thus acquires spiritual significance. III) A)
Locke b=
lends
instrumentalization, Puritan ideas, voluntarist idea of God. B)
But, in
obeying God’s commands one does act “according to nature”,
THAT IS, according to the pleasure/pain principle. One has a “reason” for
obeying. Which is? 1)&n=
bsp;
Describe
different senses of ‘according to nature’ in, say, Aquinas, and=
in
Locke. 2)&n=
bsp;
3)&n=
bsp;
Mm C)
Since t=
here
is no created order that God could not override (voluntaristically), IT can=
not
be a guide. D)
The
“adverb” that appeals to Locke is no longer
“worshipfully” or “thankfully” etc. but rather
“rationally.” We serve God by being “rational.” 1)&n=
bsp;
Intelle=
ctually
and morally rational. E)
Locke a=
nd
Deism – the deist view of God; God creates an orderly world in which =
the
various creatures serve each others purposes, and God’s purposes. Rea=
son
figures out what those purposes are. 1)&n=
bsp;
Thus, in
obeying God we are not obeying a capricious tyrant, but rather joining
ourselves to God’s will, acting in accordance with the laws of nature
that enable manipulation for ends. Thus, instrumental reason. 2)&n=
bsp;
Acting
(prudently) for present goods actually earns eternal goods. F)
Two ways
natural good (give examples) needs to be supplemented, according to various
xtian views. 1)&n=
bsp;
Additio=
n of
“supernatural” virtues. To accord with a supernatural end (union
with God). Thus Aquinas. 2)&n=
bsp;
Grace to
overcome fallen condition. G)
Extreme
version of F2=3Dhyper-Augustinianism. Calvinists, Jansenists, are at war wi=
th
enlightenment Deism. The latter stress human self sufficiency. In hyper-Aug=
. it
is greatly emphasized that we are fallen, NOT self sufficient. H)
F1 gets
forgotten. (do you see why it would?). Locke as example. 1)&n=
bsp;
The
alternatives to F2 include Thomist ideas, in which grace completes nature. =
2)&n=
bsp;
F1 is
replaced by deism. The good that God wills is simply “natural”
good. The supernatural is out. But there is still plenty to do “for
God” right here and now. (a)&=
nbsp;
Eternal
reward thus gets to be “more of the same” p. 247. IV)Moral Sentiments
vs. Lockeian deism (read p. 248 – 9 for summary) A)
Hobbesian de facto desire on the Lo=
ckeian
side, linked with command (voluntarist) ethics. B)
Humans =
as
intrinsically connected to God, as in Hutcheson, Cambridge platonists, on t=
he
other side. (a)&=
nbsp;
True re=
ligion
is no art, but an inward nature, which is a transposition of Platonism inwa=
rd.
“Erasmian orthodoxy” C)
Shaftes=
bury
– Stoic stress on inner calm, in which one can behold a harmonious wh=
ole,
a cosmic order that we miss because of our attachments. God=3Dharmonious wh=
ole
(almost) D)
“=
natural
affection” and Stoic citizen of the world, carried beyond, e.g. family
affections. But this “affection” is essentially inward. E)
See ano=
ther
summary, p. 255-6. Intrinsic
loveablity of a rational order is pushed inward, becomes implanted IN the
subject as motivator. It motivates not because of what it is attuned to, bu=
t by
virtue of its own nature. F)
Hutches=
on
– #1. Our ‘moral sense’ (MORAL SENTIMENT) pushes us to
benevolence and #2. Benevolen=
ce
works for our happiness. 1)&n=
bsp;
#1 sugg=
ests
that we are really good at heart (very un-Augustinian). → Rousseau, t=
he
hippies. Universal love. (a)&=
nbsp;
By
recognizing how good we are we actually become better. 2)&n=
bsp;
#2 is t=
rue
because God made us this way, and indeed made the whole universe
“benevolent.” The=
moral
source is still God. (a)&=
nbsp;
Univers=
al
benevolence → utilitarianism. G)
Thus, t=
wo
kinds of Deism; Rational (Locke) Sentimental (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, etc.)=
1)&n=
bsp;
Lockeian
– God has created a natural (naturalistic) or scientifically
comprehensible order. Humans do well, achieve the good by using
“disengaged reason” to figure out how that order works, and by
adapting to it (don’t step off cliffs, help your neighbor, he will he=
lp
you, etc.). (a)&=
nbsp;
The abi=
lity
to use reason in this way confers a dignity on the subject that raises her
above the rest of nature. Autonomy, control. 2)&n=
bsp;
Shaftes=
bury
type deism: need to “re-engage” by going within to recover the
natural “sentiments” which are benevolent. (a)&=
nbsp;
This tu=
rning
within to my “feelings” not only helps me to recover them, it
changes my behavior to accord with them. (b)&=
nbsp;
The fee=
lings
are not irrational; in fact, they work out reasonably (invisible hands). V)The providential order: God’s goodness con=
sists
in his bringing about OUR good. A)
Anthrop=
ocentric-
our good is natural, not supernatural. 1)&n=
bsp;
Gratitu=
de
towards, love of, resignation to, God are all understood in terms of human
happiness. A non-tragic view. B)
A1 is contrary to an important stra=
nd in
most religious traditions, the “Patron-Client” model. Humans are
there for God, not God for humans. <=
/span> 1)&n=
bsp;
We are =
not
entitled to think that God’s ways are our ways. C)
Two way=
s to
draw God and people together; the pagan/ philosophical; the Hebrew 1)&n=
bsp;
Plato &=
#8211;
love of the good/love of the cosmic order/love of God all amount to the same
thing. Stoics-love of the cosmic order (how things go) is love of God. 2)&n=
bsp;
Hebrew;=
some
of the Patron/client idea, but with idea that God not only can be placated;
rather, God’s people can be drawn into God’s purposes. (a)&=
nbsp;
God also
wills the good of that people, even when not obedient (b)&=
nbsp;
Service=
to
God involves justice to people (this thus comes close to the philosophical
view, suggests possible combining; Plato as the “attic Moses”)<=
o:p> 3)&n=
bsp;
To be d=
rawn
into God’s purposes is to be drawn into a power that exceeds morality=
, a
power for love and righteousness beyond human moral capacity. THAT drops out of sight in Deism. =
(a)&=
nbsp;
On deist
view, xtian idea of deification (God became human in order that humans might
become divine) disappears. See III F 1. (b)&=
nbsp;
But III=
F 2
also disappears. Of course no Deist is going to have ANY taste for Augustin=
ian
ideas. (c)&=
nbsp;
a and b thus amount to the denial o=
f any need for grace. (d)&=
nbsp;
However=
, both
denials still have a connection to xtian ideas; denying IIIF1 goes with
affirmation of ordinary life; denial of IIIF2 goes with emphasis on GodR=
17;s
orignal benevolence towards humans (Erasmian humanism). 4)&n=
bsp;
Thus De=
ist
view pulls God away from actual dealings with humans and vice versa. God/wo=
rld
relation is a matter of the order God built into the world (the Newtonian
order, for example). Miracles are thus out. (why ‘thus’?) (a)&=
nbsp;
In fact=
, if
God got to intervening miraculously, he would defeat the value of establish=
ing
a reliable, regular, order in the first place. Cf. pain/fire. Instrumental
rationality requires a reliable design plan. (b)&=
nbsp;
Stress =
on
this naturalistic order also runs contrary to historical dimension of weste=
rn
religions. 5)&n=
bsp;
The not=
ion of
providence that is promoted by Deism is thus entirely connected to the emer=
ging
scientific conception of nature as a system of meshing efficient causes. (a)&=
nbsp;
The mes=
hing
does reflect God’s purpose; thus there is room left for some final
causality; namely in the original creation. Leibniz’ pre-established
harmony. (b)&=
nbsp;
Alexand=
er
Pope as a striking example of how the deist view takes up traditional conce=
pts
but gives them a new meaning that accords with the new science. (c)&=
nbsp;
The ethic that goes with this deist=
view
is one of “marked activities” that fit into the
“natural” design. Instrumental reason enables living according =
to
nature. That contrasts with ancient ideas of what it is to live according to
nature. (nature=3Da heirarchical order, intrinsically reasonable in itself)=
. 6)&n=
bsp;
Feeling=
also
is a guide or moral source, since it is attuned to how things are
“naturally.” Doing what comes naturally will work. V. Pope p.280. Undistorted feeling is the
Hutecheson-type deist’s route of access to the design of things. (a)&=
nbsp;
X is no=
t good
because I feel it is good; I feel it is good because it is (it fits the nat=
ural
order, which is good). 7)&n=
bsp;
Contrast
Aristotle and the 18th cent. sentimentalists on the place of fee=
ling
in morality. Feeling as an independent moral source. Right inner impulses a=
re
no longer right because they have been tutored by reason to “get thin=
gs
right.” VI)The culture of modernity- high value placed on
commerce, family life, feeling. A)
Commerce and the idea of an economic
system, with its own “laws.” B)
Rise of=
the
novel-affirmation of ordinary life (contrast to aristocratic element in anc=
ient
tragedy, and even in Shakespeare. The high, the dignified, is the Prince, t=
he
low, the comic, is the peasant. ) The novel abandons these ways of thinking=
. 1)&n=
bsp;
The nat=
ure of
a thing is now within it, rather than given by its place in a heirarchy.
Particular human lives now are all that matter (contrast the abstractness o=
f,
e.g. Antigone vs. the very particular character of Isabel Archer) 2)&n=
bsp;
Cf. the
a-temporal character of archtypes vs. the life in time of the modern
individual, whose life requires narration (in a diary, in autobiography, in=
a
novel ) to fully make sense. I am what I as an individual become through the
events of my life and what I make of them. (a)&=
nbsp;
This new “self” is dise=
ngaged
from larger patterns (contrast to, e.g., St. Francis as instantiating an
independent, cosmically significant, pattern, the life of Christ). C)
Compani=
onate
marriage and privacy, vs. marriage as a public institution, arranged by and=
for
society, not just the individual. Cf. Rousseau’s St. Preux, p. 290 1)&n=
bsp;
Elevati=
on of
sentiment – affection for spouse, for children. (a)&=
nbsp;
The fam=
ily as
a “haven in a heartless world”, a world made heartless by new
bureaucracies, separation of work and home, etc. The bourgeoise are ahead of
the curve, so to speak. 2)&n=
bsp;
The ele=
vation
of strong feeling – Rousseau, Goethe. The idea that we are
“deep” beings, shown in deep feelings (notably, melancholy, str=
ong
despair over love, etc. ) quote p. 296. D)
The feeling for nature – reas=
on vs.
feeling (the deep inner tangle of me!).&nb=
sp;
In painting, in design of gardens, a new emphasis on deep or sublime
feelings evoked by nature. Nature as a moral source. 1)&n=
bsp;
Gardens:
Versailles Classical-rational. Control. 2)&n=
bsp;
“=
English”
Gardens 3)&n=
bsp;
Nature =
is a
“deep and confused life”
p. 300. THE VOICE OF NATURE I)Fractured Horizons A)&n=
bsp; The normal pre modern horizon was belief of some=
kind
in God. Life without that belief does not make sense. All credible moral sources involve God. B)&n=
bsp;
That ho=
rizon
is fractured in the enlightenment. 1)&n=
bsp;
Unbelief
becomes a live option for some 2)&n=
bsp;
A multi=
plicity
of moral sources becomes available. (a)&=
nbsp;
Spinoza,
pantheism – Romanticism, expressivism (b)&=
nbsp;
Deist s=
tress
on rational power –sense of dignity as rational agent. 3)&n=
bsp;
2 a,b c=
an
become separated from ALL theistic belief. But only by a
“mutation”, not by a simple removal. II)Radical enlightenment- picking up on IB2b. Here =
are
the bad things produced by superstition, tradition: cruelty, repression of =
the
natural, adherence to local, provincial customs that exclude certain people
(races, classes etc.), childish lack of autonomy. The rhetorical force of t=
he
Rad enlig is mainly negative. <=
o:p> 1)&n=
bsp;
Radical
utilitarianism – the positive=
features
of Lockeian deism, without the ‘deus.’ Viz.the pursuit of the
following “life goods” minus the theism that grounds them; (a)&=
nbsp;
Self
responsible reason (freedom from authority) (b)&=
nbsp;
Ordinary
fulfillments are it – no supernatural end (c)&=
nbsp;
Imparti=
al
benevolence 2)&n=
bsp;
Objecti=
ons to
this – deism assumes good natural order, but that is
“Panglossian” =
&nb=
sp;
=
&nb=
sp; =
or =
&nb=
sp; =
=
it
is implausible to think that if everyone follows self interest, the results
will be fine (leveling). 3)&n=
bsp;
The
aufklärer believed in their ow=
n goodness
to a remarkable degree (cf. the quote from Bentham, p. 331) They could love everyone, and woul=
d do
so by enlightening them. (a)&=
nbsp;
It was
particularly important to get rid of religion, which was thought to be a ma=
in
obstacle to benevolence, the happiness of all. Ecrasez l’infame. (i) There are still people who hold that view, despi=
te the
history of the 20th century.&nb=
sp;
4)&n=
bsp;
Science
(disengaged reason) and benevolence – contrast with cruelty of 17th,
18th century state, religious persecution, etc. 5)&n=
bsp;
Emphasis on reduction of suffering
becomes central perhaps for the=
first
time. Utilitarian stress on pleasure/pain fits this agenda. 6)&n=
bsp;
Also po=
ssible
for emphasis on value of pleasure to lead to exaltation of sensuality, in
oppositions to priestly asceticism, etc. (a)&=
nbsp;
Were it=
not
for religion, we could get rid of most laws. Just do what comes naturally m=
an,
and all will be cool. B)&n=
bsp;
The enthusiasm of the aufkläre=
r for
their cause assumes something that does not fit their own scheme – st=
rong
evaluation. 1)&n=
bsp;
Their s=
trong
evaluation =3D the relief of suffering really
matters. Inconsistent with view of nature, and human nature, as morally
neutral stuff. If we are just collections of atoms banging into each other,
where does this strong evaluation come in? (a)&=
nbsp;
The mor=
al
enthusiasm of, e.g. Holbach, which requires self renunciation, perhaps even
loss life, is inexplicable given that pleasure /pain is all that matters. <=
o:p> (b)&=
nbsp;
As Sade
observes (336) nature declares NO (moral ) laws. Therefore, do what you lik=
e! 2)&n=
bsp;
Utilita=
rianism
as parasitic upon xtian ideals. Someone who really hated the entire xtian
culture, viz. Nietzsche, saw clearly the utilitarian debt to xtianity. 3)&n=
bsp;
A year later, Habermas questioned whether secularists had
the honesty to admit their debts to Judaism and Christianity for the basic
formulations of the Enlightenment. Are not our enlightened concepts of equa=
lity
and fairness, he asked, secular distillations of time-honored Judeo-Christi=
an
precepts? Quite obviously, fraternity is, and also modern compassion. What
would secular humanism be without these borrowings? Further, can the
“contract” theories of modern secular philosophy be fully
understood apart from the great prestige attached to the
“covenants” so central to both Jewish and Christian faith and
history? Habermas means not only etymology and conceptual articulation but =
a reverence
for moral obligation as well. In this vein, he asks: “For the normati=
ve
self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than j=
ust
a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which spring=
the
ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous condu=
ct
of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human righ=
ts,
and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the
Christian ethic of love.” C)&n=
bsp; Two
further responses to naturalism: Hume; awe in the face of immensity. 1)&n=
bsp;
Hume: n=
eo
Lucretian; accept limits, do not try to be a super anything, neither super
benevolent, nor super independent of tradition and habit, etc. cf. Montaign=
e 2)&n=
bsp;
The new=
sense
of a “meaningless” cosmos that stretches on to infinity tempora=
lly
and spatially actually produces a feeling of depth. D)&n=
bsp; The faith of the aufklärer, as expressed by
Condorcet (p. 354): it is a semi religious narrative, with an account of how
reason rescues us from “the fall.” 1)&n=
bsp;
The sad=
irony
in Condorcet’s situation as he wrote these words. E) 1)&n=
bsp;
Affirmation of ordinary life and denouncing of
“pride” p.339. 2)&n=
bsp;
Utilitarian outlook is both thin and threatening (a) Thin, because building a new and bet=
ter
order requires knowing what one is for, not just what one is against. (b)Threatening, because the monological
pursuit of “happiness” by instrumental reason generates
“bureaucratic cruelty” and bad government. Examples: The Poor Law Act of 1834 Eg 1.In 1833 Earl Grey, the=
Prime
Minister, set up a Poor Law Commission to examine the working of the poor L=
aw
system in Britain. In their report published in 1834, the Commission made
several recommendations to Parliament. As a result, the Poor Law Amendment =
Act
was passed. The act stated that: Eg 2 Destruction of
“slum” neighborhoods in the 1950s in order to supply
“better” housing for poor people Eg 3Chernobyl. Is this sort of th=
ing a
“necessary” consequence of radical enlightenment
utilitarianism? Not logically
necessary. But, consider some of the “values” that are
“necessarily” overlooked – family goods, religious goods,
local loyalities, the refusal to do certain things because they are unjust,=
no
matter how much utility they may promise.&=
nbsp;
The poor law exhibits all of these. Likewise “urban
renewal.” Likewise
services that replace familial and religious relations with “official
friendship.” (Go to a counselor, they are paid to be nice to you). And, the elevation of “instrumen=
tal
rationality” leads quite naturally to bureaucratic abuses. Cf. also e.g.4 the
Jacobins (v. below on Condorcet), and e.g.5 the history of Marxism. Dickens: Hard Time=
s . F)&n=
bsp;
Two further responses to natu=
ralism,
that include attempts to articulate some new moral sources. : Hume;. 1)&n=
bsp;
Hume: n=
eo
Lucretian; accept limits, do not try to be a super anything, neither super
benevolent, nor super independent of tradition and habit, etc. cf. Montaign=
e.
Our natural life is significant enough just as it is. “Remove the bur=
den
of impossible aspirations” p. 346 2)&n=
bsp;
awe in =
the
face of immensity. The new sense of a “meaningless” cosmos that
stretches on to infinity temporally and spatially actually produces a feeli=
ng
of depth. Intertwining of romantic expressivism with materialism. G)&n=
bsp; Enlightenment “heroism and fame.” Do=
derpt.
352. The faith of the aufklärer, as expressed by Condorcet (p. 354): i=
t is
a semi religious narrative, with an account of how reason rescues us from
“the fall.” 1)&n=
bsp;
The sad=
irony
in Condorcet’s situation as he wrote these words. III) 1)&n=
bsp;
Radical
aufklärer objections to Deism: anti-panglossian (consider VoltaireR=
17;s
Candide); but does not critique=
Deist
leveling. The aufklärer keep the idea that there is no real conflict
between good – evil in the human will. No “fall.” Imparti=
al
benevolence is really there in everyone. 2)&n=
bsp;
Rousseau
emerges as an anti-leveler. But, in contrast to Augustinians. It is not God,
but nature that can rescue me f=
rom my
fallen condition. (a)&=
nbsp;
There i=
s no
original sin – the fall is the result of moving away from what is
natural. Falling into the hands of “society” (b)&=
nbsp;
Enlight=
enment
“reason” is of no help in curing wicked wills. Need conscience,
which is more like instinct, and speaks “the language of nature.̶=
1;
Disengaged reason only takes us further from nature. 3)&n=
bsp;
Rousseau
keeps many Deist ideas (God as
explanation for order of world etc.) But, he denies Deist optimism (e.g. id=
ea
that self love and the social are the same, ) (i) This sounds like the old view; but, the distinct=
ion
between good and depraved, virtue and vice, is equated with the distinction
between dependence on self (virtue) with dependence on others (vice). This =
is
distinctively modern. 1. In Rousseau this guiding inner voice still is in
contact with a universal good; it does not itself define the good. That more radical view emerges in romantic
expressivism (cf. Casey). 2. Nonetheless, the wholeness found in God by Augustine is found within t=
he self by Rousseau. Cf. quote, p. 36=
2. 4)&n=
bsp;
Kant/Ro=
usseau
– freedom or autonomy have essential connection to morality. The leve=
ling
tendency in the enlightenment does not understand that or appreciate the way
appetite or inclination can enslave. (a)&=
nbsp;
To act
morally is to act according to what we truly are – rational/moral age=
nts.
Morality is based in us, not in something outside us. Viz. it is based in
reason. (b)&=
nbsp;
De facto
desires do not really proceed from =
me. I
am essentially rational, not essentially desiring. Anti-utilitarian. (c)&=
nbsp;
So it i=
s only
the voice of reason that counts, not of “nature” even ala Rouss=
eau. 5)&n=
bsp;
Kant; r=
eason
operates according to principles, not impulses. Impulse leads to injustice,=
reason
leads to fairness , justice. Thus reason produces something like a universal benevolence. IV) The
Expressivist Turn A)&n=
bsp; Nature as source in Romanticism. To have a proper
relation to the “providential order” of Deism IS to have access=
to
an inner voice. 1)&n=
bsp;
Thus, w=
hat
matters is not to grasp, say, an argument from design, but to be emotionally
attuned to that order. 2)&n=
bsp;
Cf. the
mixture of ‘joy’ flowing thru nature with a deist God ruling ov=
er
all in “ode to qqworld and life (Novalis). 3)&n=
bsp;
Wordsworth; the object of poetry is
truth, carried alive into the heart by passion. B)&n=
bsp;
Focus on
feeling separated from action:compare to Aristotle, where feeling in tune w=
ith
natural order is shown in virtuous action. Now, what matters is the richnes=
s of
life available thru emotional attunement to nature. 1)&n=
bsp;
Thus, a=
lso a
separation from ethics! Feel-good sensualism. (looking forward to hippies)<=
o:p> C)&n=
bsp; Expressivism; creation (of a poem, a piece of mu=
sic,
etc.) is more than just expression of what is already there. I create out of
myself. 1)&n=
bsp;
Thus, a=
new
sense to the idea of a “self.” Not a ‘nature’ alrea=
dy
given, as in Aristotle, but something that realizes itself uniquely. (a)&=
nbsp;
Herder:
“each human being has his own measure” (b)&=
nbsp;
What the
voice of nature calls us to cannot be known prior to our expression of self=
. (c)&=
nbsp;
Express=
ion=3Dart.
Importance of the arts to this movement. Art is no longer
‘mimesis’(imitation). The arts opposed
to the grip of disengaged reason. Creative. 2)&n=
bsp;
A water=
shed
in the history of literature:=
Blending
of creative force of all of nature, including human nature, together. The
external world is fitted to the mind (Wordsworth). (a)&=
nbsp;
Compare
Shakespeare to Wordsworth. (b)&=
nbsp;
Artist =
as
priest, mediator of spiritual reality to humans. Fancy (merely reproductive)
vs. imagination in Coleridge. The latter a living power that repeats the
eternal act of creation. (c)&=
nbsp;
Friedri=
ch: The forms of nature sp=
eak
directly. (This is not imitation at all) D)&n=
bsp; Two reactions to the inadequacies of enlightenme=
nt
naturalism 1)&n=
bsp;
Kant 2)&n=
bsp;
Nature =
as
source 3)&n=
bsp;
Both at=
tempt
to re-unify what is broken. Cf. contemporary vestige of this, p. 384. Two
approaches to environmentalism. E)&n=
bsp;
Respons=
es to
reason/nature (feeling, sensibility) split, in Holderlin, Schiller. 1)&n=
bsp;
Spiral-
immediacy (unity), division, higher immediacy. Thus Holderlin and Hegel. F)&n=
bsp;
Express=
ivist
philosophy of nature and history; joining to millenarism, Joachim of Fiore,=
(the
age of the Spirit), modern messianism. Secular version in French
revolution. New calendar=3Dbe=
ginning
of a new age. (a)&=
nbsp;
The for=
ces of
evil and good have fought, and good has won. Needs that sense of
polarization. (b)&=
nbsp;
The
revolution depends not so much upon disengaged reason engineering human hap=
piness,
as it does a “spirit” of goodness. (c)&=
nbsp;
Virtue,
patriotism, freedom, vs vice, treason, tyranny. Also “brotherhood.” 2) "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive Danton and Robespierr=
e. Marx combines the
enlightenment “scientism” with millenarism, expressivism.
Alienation vs. work that is fulfilling. Romanticism in Marx! Part V Subtler Languages I) Victorians and us A)&n=
bsp; Same contest between romanticism/enlightenment
rationalism, still being fought out, with variations. B)&n=
bsp;
Same br=
oad consensus 1)&n=
bsp;
Signifi=
cance
of ordinary life (a)&=
nbsp;
Reduce
suffering 2)&n=
bsp;
=
Universal benevolence. C)&n=
bsp; Autonomy, freedom 1)&n=
bsp;
Goes wi=
th
language of ‘rights’ (why?) D)&n=
bsp; Political meaning of B1 and C=3Duniversal spread=
of (or
at least lip service to) “democracy.” 1)&n=
bsp;
Popular
movements, Abolition of slavery, civil rights 2)&n=
bsp;
Spread =
from
west to east and south of democratic ideals E)&n=
bsp;
Explici=
tly
xtian basis for D 1 in particular, contrasted with secularist racism. Xtian
idea of the unity of humanity was not popular with, e.g. Hume. F)&n=
bsp;
The ris=
e of
atheism (anglo-american) as a live and militant option. 1)&n=
bsp;
Reinfor=
ced by
technological advance. 2)&n=
bsp;
Darwin =
and
the popularity of the argument from design. (a)&=
nbsp;
Feeling=
of
many that they are now forced to abandon belief. (cf. Ayer to Dawkins). Naive EPISTEMOLOGY. 3)&n=
bsp;
Scienti=
stic culture
combined with moral fervor; the “ethics of belief” in Clifford,
Putnam (404),Huxley (405). Again, naive epistemology is the engine driving
this. 4)&n=
bsp;
Contemp=
orary
versions may suppress moral dimension altogether. Cf. Wilson, 406-07. (a)&=
nbsp;
What
characterizes this sort of view? You cannot live by it (Taylor). Since you
cannot, you typically end up with ersatz moralizing – Wilson on the
“true Promethean spirit”, human liberation, greater knowledge,
dignity . (b)&=
nbsp;
Breakin=
g free
from parochial allegiances – we are part of a great big history (real=
ly
wow big). Stoic echo. (c)&=
nbsp;
Nobilit=
y and
“manliness” (religion is for women, you know). 5)&n=
bsp;
Movemen=
t away from theism also has a romant=
ic,
non-scientistic version. (a)&=
nbsp;
Prefere=
nce
for pagan (e.g. Greek) myth as expressing greater harmony with nature. Goet=
he.
Emerson. (b)&=
nbsp;
Dover B=
each.
Arnold’s contempt for utilitarianism.Replace religion with
“culture.” Unite reason with the whole personality (thus never
scientistic or narrowly technical). (c)&=
nbsp;
Similar=
ideas
in Marxism, applied to uneducated laborers. 6)&n=
bsp;
Three
sources: 1.faith in God; 2. scient=
istic
atheism or agnosticism; 3. romantic “wholeness.” Any view t=
hat
can combine two of these will have clout. Thus Marx. G)&n=
bsp; Mo=
ral
exceptionalism and the three sources. What explains how wonderfully civiliz=
ed
we are? 1)&n=
bsp;
Judeao-=
xtian
heritage – universal justice and agape,
made possible by grace. 2)&n=
bsp;
Science=
as
liberator – cf. Bentham. Or, “manly” science, facing unaf=
raid
the empty meaningless cosmos, frees
us from petty egoism, self coddling. Cf. Versilov in Raw Youth, Stavrogin in The
Possessed. We wake to a world in which there is no god, no immortality,
just us, which produces in people a great degree of mutual tenderness. A
paradise. Inspired by Lorrain=
e. 3)&n=
bsp;
Roussea=
u; the
substitute for grace is the inner impulse of nature. H)&n=
bsp; Each of the three is vulnerable, and one can bec=
ome
stronger when weaknesses of others are shown up. I)&n=
bsp;
The
vulnerability of instrumental reason/atomism/utilitarian monological pursui=
t of
pleasure, with no view that some pleasures might be unworthy. 1)&n=
bsp;
Though
“liberal” this approach undermines the conditions for genuine
freedom in community.cf. Tocqueville, p. 414. Civic humanism/romanticism. 2)&n=
bsp;
One
alternative is nationalism, ala Rousseau, Herder (volk). (a)&=
nbsp;
Nationa=
lism
based in language, rather than legal/moral etc. traditions. Not much of a
temptation for English speakers (Why?) Language as expressive (Herder). Third reich combines romantic
expressivism with instrumental reason to produce a real monster. 3)&n=
bsp;
Loss of
notion of nature as source with development of science in both directions (=
up
and down, astronomy and biology) revealing a vast and impersonal universe.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Nature begins to seem strange, ali=
en.
Cf. Conrad, p. 417. VS.
“don’t infringe upon” where to infringe is to insist that
some articulated moral source is inescapable, or requires acknowledgement, =
or
etc. 

woodsy, natural.
(a) no able-bodied person was to receive money or other help from the Poor =
Law
authorities except in a workhouse;
(b) conditions in workhouses were to be made very harsh to discourage people
from wanting to receive help;
(c) workhouses were to be built in every parish or, if parishes were too sm=
all,
in unions of parishes;
(d) ratepayers in each parish or union had to elect a Board of Guardians to
supervise the workhouse, to collect the Poor Rate and to send reports to the
Central Poor Law Commission;
(e) the three man Central Poor Law Commission would be appointed by the
government
and would be responsible for supervising the Amendment
Act throughout the country.


But to be young was very heaven!"

=
&nb=
sp;
Domestic carna=
ge, now
filled the whole year
With feast-days, old men from the chimney-nook,
The maiden from the busom of her love,
The mother from the cradle of her babe,
The warrior from the field - all perished, all -
Friends, enemies, of all parties, ages, ranks,
Head after head, and never heads enough
For those that bade them fall.William Wordsworth

(a)&=
nbsp;
=
&nb=
sp; =
:
1. Define: modern predicament; background ontology; intrinsic descrip= tion; strong evaluation; inescapable framework.
2. Define:qualitative distinctions, web of interlocution, orientation, agency, transcendental conditions for having a self.
3. How does Luther’s despair relate to the despair of the modern nihilist?
4. Relate the fear of Alzheimer’s to the idea that selfhood or identity are necessarily tied to narrative. (say why that fear would be so great).
5. Define: hyper-good; projectivism; sociobiology; narrative self-hoo= d or identity; revisionist vs. comprehending moral perspectives; .
6. Why is showing what underlies my actions, choices etc. not the sam= e as giving a “basic reason” for them? See. P. 77.
7. Easy part: explain the difference between action centered and agent centered ethical theories. Hard part: explain why modern ethical theories h= ave tended to be action centered, according to Taylor. What is gained by such theories? Mention utilitarianism and Kantianism.
8. How do typically modern notions of liberty conflict with moral axi= s 2 in particular? What is all th= is stuff about “liberation”, really?
9 What does Taylor think can be achieved by an historical inquiry into moral sources?
10. why does Taylor think you cannot make scientific sense of people, the way y= ou can make scientific sense of a falling stone?
&nbs= p; &= nbsp; 11. Show the (dis)similarities or (dis)continuities between Plato, Augustine, Descartes.
&nbs= p; &= nbsp; 12. Define the following: disengagement, objectification, control, the punctual self, new localizations (give examples), instrumental/atomist &= nbsp; &nbs= p; &= nbsp; view of the state; authority and consent in the modern state vs. ancient views of community; ontic logos; voluntarism and its &n= bsp;  = ; relations to modernity; self construction/self discovery (Locke, Montaigne), instrumentalization of “reason.”
&nbs= p; &= nbsp; 13. Discuss the following in terms of the history Taylor is outlining: the theo= ry of humours; the 17th century witch craze.
&nbs= p; &= nbsp; 14. What is the bearing of each of the terms in #12 on conceptions of the self = and its moral sources? Show how e= ach concept plays a role &nbs= p; in the move from a “natural” telos for humans to a point of consciousness and will that is free to “self construct.”
&nbs= p; &= nbsp; 15. How does the discussion in 14 bear on the idea of inescapable frameworks and the self in moral space?
T=3DTaylor Use= Taylor as primary source. Do not forget Casey.
Literature: Novels (films) of Austin (e.g. Pride and Prejudice), Dickens, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy (particularly the “short” story, The = death of Ivan Illich), James, Wharton, other. Camus’ The Stranger. The film/novel Remains of the Day. The film/play A Man= for all Seasons. Relate to id= eas in T of narrative selfhood, strong evaluation, agency and identity or having a real self, virtues and thick description, historically related items. Recov= ery of memory (thus narrative) in Proust, Remembrance of Things Past. Short sto= ries by Flannery O’Connor.
Philosophy: T’s critique of Utilitarians, Kant, Parfit, emotivists (projectivists), sociobiologists. Self, language, and Wittgenstein. Narrative and selfhood in MacIntyr= e. Existential themes in Taylor (Heidegger, Kierkegaard).
History: Critically discuss some aspect of T’s account of historic= al background to modern conceptions of self.
Religion: Critically discuss T’s account of the place of Christian
ideas in the development of ideas of the self, ethical conceptions, moral
frameworks. Track down some of the “Christian fallout” in, for
example, utilitarianism. Use Literature to find Christian themes
(O’Connor, for instance)


