phil415page

Phil. 385/RelSt 380 Spring 2008

Sources of the Self <= /span>

(in 19^th and 20^t=
h Century Philosophy, Literature etc.)

Instructor: Dr. Norman Lillegard   Office: Humanities 229  &= nbsp; 587 7384   nlillega@utm.edu

Office Hours: 10:00 -11.00 a.m. and 1:00 - 2:00 p.m. MWF and by appointment

Texts: Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor

Additional handouts or on-line materials.

Some Aims of This Course: At the beginning of the 21^st century th= ere is a lot of preoccupation wit= h, and a lot of confusion about “the self”, “my identity” (identity crises etc.), individualism and the status of the self vs. societ= y or community, and related themes involving selfhood (narrative, the nature of action etc.). Given the cultu= ral history of the last two centuries this should come as no surprise. For in the period since the enlightenment the settled sense of self, surrounded by definite horizons, w= hich persisted as a fairly common inheritance into the renaissance and beyond, h= as been torn apart by conflicting visions and by nihilistic tendencies.

In this course we examine the hi= story that has produced the present dis-ease.&nb= sp; Doing so requires attention to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, = the philosophy of language, even a little logic, but the main focus will be on = ethical or moral philosophy, unde= rstood quite broadly so as to include matters sometimes dealt with in literature a= nd art courses, the history of culture, the social sciences, as well as in philosophy of religion or, more broadly, religious studies.

Requirements:<= /b>

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    Read all assigned material. There will be two exams, a mid-term worth 100 pts, a= nd comprehensive final worth 150 pts.= total 250 pts.

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    There will be several quizzes, worth 20 pts or so each. The quizzes, as well as exams, will refer to questions and terms to be defined, listed on the web page. Total Ca. 100 pts.<= /b>

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    Selected questions will also be collected and graded. Ca. 50 pts.

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    A short paper, ca. 1500 words, on a topic approved by the instructor, must be submitted. Topic due Feb. 11. First Draft due March 3. No exceptions. 100 pts.

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    Philosophy majors are encouraged to submit a long paper (ca. 3000 words). Same schedul= e. Majors may substitute a long paper for the final provided the first draft is adequate. Topic to be determined in consultation with the instructor. (up to 250 pts.)=

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    A wide array of topics is possible, including such things as studies of recent films in the light of course content, analysis of literary works, etc. <= o:p>

·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'>      =    Attendance and class participation are worth ca. 50 pts. Total points =3D ca. 550. (Tentative)

Sample exam questions, definitio= ns, and other course related material can be found at www.utm.edu/~nlillega/lilleg= ard.htm. on the phil. 385 link.

Questions for the course are ins= erted into the COURSE OUTLINE, found on-line. You MUST use it. =

Class Procedures: Classes will be a mix of lecture, discussion, viewing of films and, possibly, viva voce debates worked out ahead of time (possible e= xtra credit). Students should give careful and respectful consideration to each others views and comments. A premium is placed on argument, rather than on mere statement of opinion. Al= so, a premium is placed on sticking to the subject. Only the instructor is allowed to = wander all over the place and insert irrelevant jokes.

COURSE OUTLINE: (Approximate. Content and time periods may vary slightly.)

Week 1 = (1/14) Study Taylor ch. 1. Answer question 1.

Week 2 = (1/21) (MLKing day) Study ch. 2 and 3 (in Part I). Note questions in “questions” link.

Week 3 (1/28) Quiz on ch. 1-3. Continue discussion of 1-3.

Week 4 (2/4) Study Chapters 5,6,7. W= rite out answers to q. 5-10 to be handed in.

Week 5 = (2/11) . Chapters 8, 9,10.

Week 6 = (2/18) .11,

Week 7 = (2/25) = 12&= nbsp;

Week 8 = (3/3)   Outline 13, 14.

Week 9 = (3/10 – 16 - SPRING BREAK) Outline 15,16.

Week 10= (3/17) Outline 17. March 21-Good Friday

Week 11= (3/24) 18,19      &n= bsp;

Week 12 (3/31)20      = ;

Week 13 (4/7) 21,22     = ;            &n= bsp;

Week 14 (4/14). 23,

Week 15= (4/21) 24, 25 Papers due Monday, 4/2= 1.

Week 16. Classes end Mon. April 28. Review. FINAL EXAMS, MAY 1-7.

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&n= bsp;

Course Outline&= nbsp; Phil. 385

=

=

Sources of th= e self: Self invention or

        &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp; Self discovery or. . .?

Self Invention

Planned Parent= hood vs Casey (US Supreme Court, 1992.) In discussions of this case, this claus= e is referred to, usually with contempt, as the “mystery” clause, for reasons that are obvious.

   &nbs= p;        “At the heart of liberty is the= right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not def= ine the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the state.” (at 847).

In contrast to this, consider Taylor’s notion of= “inescapable frameworks̶= 1; which are necessary to self-hood (personhood). Such frameworks could not be invented (defined) by individuals (i.e. with refer= ence soley to individual resources), but NEITHER are they “formed under the compulsion of the state” (the court’s crazy false dilemma).

Taylor argues that such frameworks are inextricably intertwined with moral concept= ions., broadly understood; notions of self (self-identity etc.) are therefore moral conceptions, or intertwined with moral conceptions, where ‘moral̵= 7; is understood broadly.

I)          &nb= sp;    Inescapable Frameworks

A)          &nb= sp;      Idea= s of the SELF are inextricably connected to “moral” conceptions. Understanding the connection requir= es understanding and crediting the role in our lives of strong evaluation,* i.e. evaluation which is independent of our desires, choices, inclinations, and which contains criteria for judging those desires etc. ‘Moral’ here is to be taken broadly. For instance, ‘Your life is = not worthwhile’ might not be counted as a moral claim in some uses of ‘moral’ but it is here<= /i>.

1)      =             Example: Re= spect for human life produces strong evaluations. This is universal. Some versions may not apply to all humans, but only to, say, the tribe members, but some version of it is found everywhere. It is almost like a gut reaction that all people have. One may not kill= or degrade or maim without just cause.

(a)      =           Thus, examp= les of strong evaluations would be, “it is wrong to kill innocent human beings” or ‘what the Nazi guards did to Jews when transporting = them was horrible and degrading, a violation of their humanity”(cf. Hailli= e)

2)      =             &nb= sp;     Such a phen= omenon seems to call forth articulation i.e. some account of what humans are, o= r what the Gods require, some sort of moral ontology must lie back o= f such a phenomenon (the phenomenon of very widespread strong evaluation).

(a)    It may need to be stated.

(b)   It may be implicit.

3)      =             &nb= sp; That ontolo= gy will provide an inescapable framework. Gut reactions are NOT generally like that.

(a)    Error theory: In the modern era this is often denied. It may be claimed tha= t all that is involved in moral reactions is a gut reaction, and that it i= s an error to suppose there is some metaphysical backing for it. = That is the error theory, the idea that moral ontologies are simpl= y a mistake.

4)      =       The need for a moral ontology shows= that such phenomena (e.g. strong evaluations relating to respect for life) are not just gut reactions. Compare to nausea. If a certain smell makes me nausea= ted, then it just does. If tomorro= w it does not, nobody will accuse me of inconsistency. Nor do I feel any demand on me to account for my nausea. But the moral response is different. I cannot respect life today and not tomorrow without being accused of inconsistency, or with having changed my = mind (not just my feelings) in a fundamental way. And we all think there must be something about what I resp= ect that shows that the respect is mer= ited, whether any particular individual feels it or not.

5)      =       Thus I am naturally drawn to intrinsic description , that is, a descrip= tion of my reaction which shows how it is required even where that reaction is missing.(it was required of those guards, even though missing).

(a)      =           So someone = who fails to show respect for life has indeed failed at something. Someone who does not feel nausea a= t a certain smell has not failed at anything.&= nbsp; A rotting stinking piece of road kill is dumped on my dinner plate. I don’t feel nausea or sick or any other negative feeling. That makes me odd, different. It doesn̵= 7;t make me “mistaken.” We might wonder why I lack the “normal” reaction, but our investigation of why will not require intrinsic descriptions, but, say, some piece of physiology which shows why = the “normal” reaction did not take place.

6)      =             Scientists = (those among them that are loyal to naturalism) often resist the notion of intrins= ic description. Thus they might = try to give a sociobiological account of the presence or absence of certain “moral” reactions, an account which is not fundamentally different from accounts of things like nausea.

(a)      =             &nb= sp;   What would = an evolutionary account of nausea be like? (Please refrain from Lamarckianism!= )

(b)What would an evolutionary (sociobiological) acc= ount of moral reactions be like?

A)      = Background Ontology: But people generally (normally) feel the need for a background ontology in terms of w= hich they can make sense of (articulate) their reactions. (An “ontology”=3D def. an account of what is, or exists, or what kinds of things exist.)=

1)      . = For example, respect for persons is required because they are all creatures of God,(so the existence of God is required), or, respect is required because = they are rational beings and such beings have incomparable worth (so there are s= uch rational beings (cf. Kant)).

2)      In= the modern era there is much uncertainty about and hesitance in committing to s= uch ontologies. That is the ̶= 0;modern predicament.” Given a tight connection between morality and ideas of the self, we can thus expect to get what we do indeed have, namely, much confusion and uncertainty about what it is to be a self,= be somebody.

(a)      =             &nb= sp;   By contrast consider Dostoevsky’s confident pronouncement, “If God is dead, everything is permitted.” For him the inescapable framework for our living was provided by the existence = of God. Moral constraints could = only be made sense of given such an ontology. And a corresponding= set of powerful beliefs about human selfhood can be found in Dostoevsky.

II)          &n= bsp;     Three a= xes of the moral life.

A) Respect for others

1)      =             Modern vers= ion stresses the “right” to respect. Not to respect is to violate a right. Rights can be claimed OR given up.

a.    Thus, there need to be ‘inalienable rights’ to cover such things as slavery. You cannot give up the right= to liberty.

b.   Th= e idea of rights stresses autonomy (YOU decide to give them up, or keep them, for instance).

c.    Autonomy links to idea of freedom from interfere= nce in shaping of ones own life. v. 12. Cf. Casey again.

i.      Avoid unnecessary suffering (no cosmic order)

ii. Stress value of everyday life (no heirarchy)

iii.      =      Compare to = natural law idea. To not respect is to ignore the status of a person. A person cannot give up his/her status. Not because of anything inalienable, but because of divine law, or the logos, e= tc. There is no alternative to that status.

B)   Idea of good, worthwhile, meaningful, life (is a= moral idea, or at any rate evokes strong evaluation. Thus, ‘your entire lif= e is a waste’ is a strong evaluation)

1)      cf. links to A i, ii, iii in modern era.

C)   Idea of “attitudinal respect”, respe= ct demanded by “dignity “ of others. Dignity can consist in

1)      Power etc. cf. degradation of those without powe= r, as in Darfur. Slavery etc. To be without power is to be without dignity.<= /o:p>

2)      Being self sufficient etc.

3)      Maintaining myself in my station and its duties (ordinary life theme. Cf. Cinderella man).

(a)    Cf. loss of dignity when no longer able to suppo= rt self, or family, etc.

III)     Different cultures stress different= axes; but, the “axes” (II a,b,c.; the frameworks) are not questioned.=

A) Homeric (heroic) culture stress on C, esp. C1. C3 didn’t exist(?)

B)   Second axis (B) questions arise in any culture

1)      Warrior living up to promise of his calling (hon= or, courage etc.) cf. Captain in Bleak = House.

2)      Religious person living up to call beyond conven= tional piety

3)      Finding fulfillment through exemplary instancing= of familiar norms, etc.(common life theme).

C)   Compare B 1 and 2 to B in modern cultures. In the latter, one threat to fullness of life is the possible lack of any framework whatsoever. (sense of meaninglessness).

1)      Compare Luther’s “despair” to = the despair of modern nihilist.

2)      Some frameworks are gone for good (Plato’s heirarchy of being?).

3)      Some have partial following (honor in the milita= ry)

4)      Some are still strong, (e.g. religious views) bu= t do not provide horizon for ALL (entire societies).

D) Contestability of frameworks leads to sense of q= uest for something. “Give me something I can live for, live in, a way of thinking that will enable me to achieve a real life.”

1)      The moral meaning of axis 2 comes out in the ban= ality of Eichmann. The humdrum life is potentially the terrible life. “Humdrum” means “without any moral framework, without qualitative distinctions.” The bureaucrat. A framework of efficient production of anything (e.g. getting r= id of Jews, or...) The man without qualities (Robert Musil).

2)      Loss of frameworks leads to changes in psychopathology. P.19

E)   Good life as mastery of self;<= /p>
1)      Reason over desire or impulse (Plato)=

2)      Duty over attachment (Stoics, Kant)

3)      Devotion to truth vs. what I would like to be true (cf. Huxley)<= /o:p>

F)    Good life as striving for what is higher, vs. de= nial of qualitative distinctions (there is no “higher”). That is a t= heme in utilitarianism (all preferences, desires, are equal).<= /p>
1)      But util. is itself a view motivated, in part, b= y the “ideal” of the value of the common life.

IV)     Strong evaluation, moral ideals, and havin= g an identity, being a self, or agen= cy.

A) Moral ideals/horizons are necessary for undamaged personhood. Consider a person who simply does not care about qualitative distinctions. Mersault in Camus’ The Stranger.

B)   Moral framework is like spatial framework. We get oriented within it, cannot imagine replacing it or going without it. <= /o:p>

C)   To have an identity is to have a stance. Who I am=3Dwhere I stand. Where I stand is given by strong evaluations, claims ab= out what is GOOD. Without this a person is no agent, no author of acts. Agency.=

1)      Thus, the idea of

(a)    Good

(b)   Agency

(c)    Identity (who am I?)

        =             &nb= sp; are internally linked.

V)          The web= of interlocution.

A) The self is formed through interchange with othe= rs (cf. feral children).

B)   There must be some group or community which prov= ides the qualitative distinctions.

1)      Rebels, prophets, etc. still draw on such a comm= unity, even if it is only the “saving remnant.”

2)      Emersonian “self reliance” looks lik= e a denial of community, but in fact belongs in that prophetic tradition (cf. Cavell on Emerson and Wittgenstein)

3)      Compare American individualism to India’s familial loyalty and sense of self.

C)   Epicurean friendship as a test case for the possibility of a naturalist dismissal of qualitative distinctions. Epicurus= was a naturalist. How could he account for friendship? He couldn’t. Yet he considered it of the utmost importance, particularly for the conversation it afforded.

D) The web is a “transcendental conditionR= 21; for agency, selfhood. Means? A transcendental condition is a condition of sense, i.e. what must be the case to make sense of ordinary distinctions, w= ays of thinking, talking, interacting. The “best account” (BA) of w= hat we actually have, rather than a “revisionist” theor= y that proposes to replace (in theory at least) what we have. Cf. Kant on Humean causality.

1)      What must be the case for there to be language?<= o:p>

2)      What must be the case for there to be qualitative distinctions?

3)      What must be the case for there to be selves (cf. Casey again)?

VI)     The spa= ce of moral reasons, the second axis, and the Good.

A) We cannot not CARE where we are in that space (A= xis #2)

B)   The goods by which we orient ourselves ARE the m= easure of the worth of our lives.

1)      Various forms of “longing for the beyond&#= 8221; simply register disappointment in ‘this life as now lived’<= /span>

(a)    Thus, in the “value of common life” framework, longing for the beyond is not longing for something “uncommon” but rather longing for a better, more perfect instan= cing of those common life values (cf. Feurbach on the holy family).

(b)   Cf. the desire to “be there” (“= ;I was there when” or “I’ve been to that place” where something great happened.) Something higher, in some sense, than life as now lived.

VII)          &= nbsp;           &nbs= p; Narrati= ve and the good.

A) Lives are always incomplete, always unfolding. <= o:p>

1)      Thus, I must see my identity in terms of a narrative.

B)   A narrative, to make sense, must connect past, present, future. Future is “absolute” in the sense that I must decide, one way or other, what it is to be (existential theme).<= /span>

C)   Alzheimer’s is, according to surveys, the = most feared disease. Why? Think about that!!!

1)      Contrast narrative sense of self with “punctual” self. What counts as a “self” (mine or anyone’s ) cannot be understood apart from cares, and the extent to w= hich some ideal is achieved.

2)      The punctual self is like any object, in fundame= ntal ways. What it is (its identity) can be understood “neutrally.” A rock, a plant, a dog.

VIII The ethics of inarticulacy.

I)   “= naturalism” and “projection.”

A) Fact vs. value, prescription vs. description. Do= we

1)      voluntarily impose(project) our values, OR<= /o:p>

2)      do it involuntarily (sociobiology), just as we c= annot help seeing things colored (though they are not, you know!)

B)   The projection view seems to fail for “thick” ethical concepts.

1)      Examples: cruelty. Kindness. Cannot isolate a descriptive component. You do not know how to apply such terms if you have = not understood the “evaluative” force.

2)      The language of assessment is continuous with the language of description of what people do and feel (57).<= /p>
3)      What it means to not be able to get along withou= t a term (57) <= /p>
4)      Explanatory and life (living) uses. Let us explain someone living his = life. Can that be done without attending to “the terms in which” he l= ives it? Cf. the Martian anthropologist at the football game. J

(a)    Cannot relegate the subjects own terms of living= to mere “phenomena.”

C)   Naturalists avoid accounts of human life that ta= ke seriously what things mean to u= s, since it is precisely that which makes “science” possible. The = scientific revolution gets rid of teleology, anthropomorphism.

1)      Why did the rock go down? Because it meant somet= hing to it to do so, it got where it wanted to get (inclined to, found fulfillme= nt of nature in ) just like us, VS.

2)      The rock is just an external object subject mech= anical laws. Nothing means anything to it.

II)          A highe= st good among high goods.”Hyper-goods.”

A) Consider how someone might subordinate other “high” or even life defining goods to the quest for justice, or obedience to God, or expressive fulfillment (Gaugin).

1)      Do= ing “whatever it takes” to achieve racial justice (!!)

B)   Hyper-goods provide a standard for judgment; this society is better than that one; my life now is better than it was; etc. Th= us hyper-goods are conflictual.

C)   Revisionist vs. comprehending (Plato vs Aristotle). The comprehending is difficult to bring off now. We see, e.g., sexist heirarchies of goods as unredeemable. Not all goods can be combined in some optimal order, since so= me “goods” reinforce injustice, bigotry etc.

1)      Arguments over competing (hyper)goods require be= ing able to show how going from one moral perspective to another is error reduc= ing. They do NOT require stepping outside of a particular moral perspective altogether.

(a)    Example: I might come to see, by living thru it,= that a love that persists thru time trumps even the most passionate and glorious “affair” that afforded deep “self expression.” But = that too could be challenged, etc.

2)      Compare confidence in perceptual experience to confidence in moral experience. I can be wrong in either case. But I cannot determine that I am wrong by getting OUTSIDE of perception, or morality, altogether.

(a)    Corrective activities p. 75

3)      Articulating what underlies my actions (frames t= hem) is not giving a “basic reason” for them p.77 see summary p. 78

III)     The mot= ives of “liberation.” Why do people think of escape from certain mor= al perspectives as liberation?

A) Escape from frameworks which impose guilt, sense= of failure. What liberation! Or,

B)   Escape from illusions about how well I am doing = (I am so much better than those wastrels) can also seem like liberation. Or<= /o:p>

C)   Escape from nature as determinative (cf. Aristot= le on realizing my “nature”) can seem like a liberation (I can make u= p my own standards for how to be. They are not given in “nature.”)

D) A new centrality for a new conception of freedom= or liberty. This can lead a thinker away from axis 2, with its stress on a who= le life (an Aristotelian idea) to a stress on act centered theories.

E)   Th= e place of theories of moral obligation (action centered theory), as opposed to theories of the good life. It seems this focus on action can bypass any need for qualitative distinctions. Thus it is attractive to naturalists and utilitarians. And even to Kantians.

1)      Cf. Rawls on justice. Proceduralism, fairness. T= he good society is merely one that keeps people from interfering with one another’s perfectly private pursuits and ensures that no one gets left out of doing that.

2)      Bentham: no one should tell anyone else how to l= ive.

F)    Thus, elevating the right over the good.

IV)     Moral sources: Articulation of them bring= s us closer to them. So Taylor hopes.

A) They are mostly UNarticulated in our era. Reasons have been suggested alread= y

1)      Articulated sources in Axis 2 have come under su= spicion as sources of guilt, bigotry, unfairness, etc.

2)      Axis 1 can appear to stand on its own. Respect is abstract, formal. And it fits with modern notions of freedom and autonomy m= uch better than Axis 2. “Respect” means
“don’t infringe upon” where to infringe is to insist that some articulated moral source is inescapable, or requires acknowledgement, = or etc.

B)   HOWEVER, Axis 1, and naturalist and utilitarian theories, are themselves attached to hyper-goods, and NOT TO NOTICE THAT ca= n be damaging. One infringes in the very act of insisting that no one infringe. = ONE VALUE becomes dominant. Thus

1)      The Utilitarian is very motivated by a hyper-goo= d of charity, or the affirmation of everyday life, but ignores that fact and tri= es to justify itself by claiming that

(a)    What anyone values is as good as what anyone else values, there are no non-subjective, non-arbitrary, hyper-goods.=

2)      That position is both intellectually and morally untenable.

(a)    It is morally untenable because it tries to side= line the way people CARE about their own lives, particular other people’s lives (e.g. family) etc.

C)   The Nietzschean critiques all morality by claiming that all of it (not just modern morali= ty) is mired in unacknowledged sources (e.g. xtianity) AND that honesty requires dumping Axis 1 just as much as Axis 2 (though Neitzsche may unconsciously c= ling to a version of Axis 3).

1)      Niet. is suspicious of the whole business; for example, xtian morality, which emphasizes humility etc. covers up the resentments of the w= eak against the powerful.

2)      He also rejects rejection; many moralities rejec= t the body, sensual passions, the reality of suffering. N. wants to say YES to li= fe as he finds it. Morality cripples people, he thinks.

3)      Nietzsche has his own hyper-good however; the wi= ll to power.

D) Neither the utilitarian, nor the Neitzschean, ca= n show the connections between moral evaluations and self-hood. THAT is above all = what makes them damaging. They turn out to be nihilistic with respect to the sel= f.

V)          What we= need is an historical path to articulacy. How did we get here?=

A) We need to trace the development of <= /span>

1)      Our notions of the good

2)      Our understanding of the self<= /p>
3)      The kinds of narrative in which we make sense of ourselves,

4)      Conceptions of society

B)   These develop together, in loose packages. New i= deas of the good and the self, new ideas of (new types of) narrativity, new idea= s of social bonds, come out of older forms or ideas, and continue to bear the imprint of the old.

Part II

I)   Moral topography

A) Idea of the self in the west is a particular historical idea, not necessarily universal.

1)      Distinguishing inside from outside may in some s= ense be universal, but cf. Geertz on Java.

II)          Plato on moral sources:

A) Hegemony(rule, CONTROL) of reason over desire. R= eason gives order to life, produces harmony in the self (produces a “cohere= nt” self), gives contentment.

B)   Passion produces the opposite; disunity, discont= ent, etc.

1)      The opposition of Homeric to Platonic moral sour= ces.

(a)    Homeric: bursts of energy, courage, power (going “beserk”). Inability to articulate the source of action, etc.

(b)   Plato: calmness, clear theoretical grasp of what= makes a good life possible, centering of the self.

(i) reason vs. passion, soul vs. body

(ii)      =             &nb= sp; rational se= lf is implicity present, needs to be turned, converted, towards the “light” which is the Good, and shows what is real. =

2)      The Good is external to us, thus not invented by= us.

3)      Thus the Good is not found “within” = the individual.

(a)    The Good can only be discovered by right reason.= Right reason is defined by relation to the actual order of the cosmos, which is g= ood. Seeing that order correctly requires ascesis, getting out of the cave.=

(b)   Getting out of the cave requires getting turned = around (converted). From darkness to light. Loving(?) the light.=

4)      Aristotle: theoretical contemplation must be distinguished from practical wisdom. The former is not essential for the la= ter. Practical wisdom is not exact, not scientific.

5)      The Stoic version: perception of right order has= no other purpose than bringing about right conduct. Contemplation is not per se valuable.

III)     Augusti= ne; the inner man

1)      Recapitulating Plato

(a)    Light/dark, flesh/spirit, order/disorder, (logos/ a-logos) etc. Conversion. Ordered LOVE.

(b)   These contrasts go with “inner/outer”= ;, which is NOT Platonic. V. 130

(c)    Two loves

2)      Beyond Plato:Radical reflexivity and asymmetry. = The first person standpoint. I know my mind as you cannot. More importantly, I = can hide me from you.

3)      Beyond Plato: the truth is discovered within in = the sense that

(a)    I can know that I exist (cogito, etc.) infallibl= y

(b)   I can know that there is a standard above my rea= son that governs it, which is “the light within”, rather than a recollection of forms.

(i) The difference between anamnesis and memoria. What is “before” (Plato) rather than discovered in the Journey = thru the soul.

(c)    In going into memoria I am led beyond, to God. T= he truth is NOT in me, in that sense. Nor is it in the past.=

(d)   Going into the self=3Dstriving. P. 136

4)      Choice or “assent” and the will. No doctrine of the will in Plato. But assent in sceptics and stoics. Cf. Epict= etus to the tyrant (137).

(a)    Plato, Aristotle – all people are motivate= d by the good, but some are ignorant, or badly trained. None ”choose” evil.

(b)   Augustine – some willfully choose evil.

(c)    Weak/strong will vs. good/bad will.

5)      What is morally crucial in us? A rational princi= ple shared with all, OR, assent, choice, will? 137

(a)    Evil is misdirection of the will. Our actions ca= n go against our insight, not just below it or in ignorance.

6)      Ethics and epistemology. I must have the idea in= me of absolute perfection, in order to grasp my own defects.
I)Desc= artes:

A) A new s= ense of “inner” cf. Pl= ato and Augustine. The source of truth is outside. Even if we must first go ins= ide to access it.

B)   Descart= es: the source of truth is within in the sense that it is constructed by a disengaged self.
1)&n= bsp;     The cri= teria for truth are in the subject. What is clear and distinct to my “mind.” 2+2=3D4 is clearly and distinctly seen to be true, ergo= IS true. There is no external guarantee of truth.

2)&n= bsp;     Knowled= ge of the “external world” is really only possible by virtue of follo= wing rules that direct the mind to its own method.

C) Ethics:= Stoic “control” but without the Stoic vision of a providential order.=

1)&n= bsp;     There is no “order” in nature. Nature is DEAD. Devoid of “meaning.”

2)&n= bsp;     The min= d can manipulate nature for its own purposes. The “instrumentalization̶= 1; of reason in modern science.

3)&n= bsp;     Similar= ly, the mind can manipulate the “passions” so as to achieve instrumental control of them.

4)&n= bsp;     Compare animals (which are “machines” only) to humans, who have passion= s. P.150.

D) Thus we arrive at a high estimate of ourselves as “rational” controller= s of our own passions. It is THAT which gives us DIGNITY. P. 152 Looking forward= to Kant, and to the dominance of axis 1.

1)&n= bsp;     The sou= rce of morality is reason, understood as controller rather than discoverer of an external rational order.

E)   The mas= ter virtue is thus “generosity,” which means, being master of self (only loosely connected to what we now mean by that word).

1)&n= bsp;     Closely connected to the honor ethic, the idea of self mastery which is proud, because able to do great th= ings by, for example, conquering fears, or lusts.

2)&n= bsp;     Contras= t with Augustine’s notion of increasing humility as we recognize more and mo= re our dependence on an external source of truth, God. The deeper we go into t= he self, the more we are driven outward (upward).

(a)&= nbsp; Platonic reason achieves mastery over the passions only by humbling itself before the Good, which it loves.

II)Summing up: disengagement, objectification, cont= rol;

A) “= objectifying” involves depriving of normative force (160).

1)&n= bsp;     How thi= ngs are in the world (including the human world) is normed. Things are how they ought to be, when they are “normal.”

(a)&= nbsp; Plato; = the person who loves the forms and is motivated to justice, is “normal= 221; (NOT statistically of course!)

(b)&= nbsp; Aristot= le; the person who exhibits the virtues (the person of practical wisdom) is “normal.” Their life is what it “naturally” ought to be (governed by reason).<= o:p>

(c)&= nbsp;   The hawk dominating the mouse is “normal”, that’s how it ought to = be, normed by natures norms.   ETC.

(d)&= nbsp; Cf. str= ip mining, and ecological views on how things ought to be (shades of an ancient view). How things ought to be

2)&n= bsp;     When th= ings (including oneself) are mere objects, the normative is removed. Objectification.

3)&n= bsp;     The disengaged mind treats everythi= ng as objects. Cf. “objectify= ing another person.” That involves ignoring the norms that go with “person” and treating the person as a mere object. Rape.(perhap= s).

B)   Objecti= fication enables control. Example: if a disease is sent by God as a just punishment,= or is the result of violating natural norms, then there is not much that can be done to control it. Pray, may= be. Try a spell. If on the other hand it is a morally neutral, objective proces= s, then real control becomes possible.

III)Locke

A) The sub= ject of disengagement and control is the “punctual” self. Inherited = from Descartes.

B)   Such a = self can “remake itself” cf. 159 and Casey. Role of modified Stoicism.

1)&n= bsp;     The rol= e of voluntarism/nominalism and idea of God as arbitrary and totally in control.=

2)&n= bsp;     Social manifestations of control, in law, military, education, etc. at this time (= esp. in protestant countries).

C) Epistem= ology, Objectification, and mechanization. If the world is like a morally neutral machine, then UNDERSTANDING and KNOWING will be proved by being able to ope= rate , control, the machine.

1)&n= bsp;     Body technologies (the mother machine, reproductive technologies, parts replacements, manipulations thru injection of neuro transmitter precursors, etc.)

D) Epistem= ology as disengagement from the world, my own experience. No one experiences the world, including the body, as what “causes” “ideas”= in the mind. I experience it as colored, pained. But that leads to all sorts of errors according to Descartes/Locke. SO,

1)&n= bsp;     Objecti= fy myself. Reflect on my experience (radical reflexivity) in order to control = it, avoid error.

E)   Rejecti= on of what is “natural” entails, in Locke, rejection of innate ideas.=

F)    The Stu= ff of knowledge is particular simple ideas that just land on a passive receptor.<= o:p>

1)&n= bsp;     Confusi= on between “ideas” as inert objects, and ideas as content-ful, like propositions. So what inert object goes with the “idea” of a triangle? An equilateral obje= ct, perchance?

G) Knowled= ge is thus achieved by each individual by getting her ideas in order through a method. Knowledge is thus possible only for the autonomous, self governing individual. There can be no AUTHORITY to guarantee I have the truth. So I construct it (Casey again).

IV)Ethics and the Punctual Self. =

A) No obje= ctive order or nature, therefore actions must be motivated by pleasure/pain.=

1)&n= bsp;     The imm= ediate “mover” is uneasiness. = For example, I feel uneasy when what I desire is absent. Uneasiness is occurren= t, otherwise it could not cause behavior (all causes act by a kind of contact, never at a distance).

B)   Just as= in epistemology, so in ethics. I can become “disengaged” in relati= on to myself, and “re-form” myself by controlling myself, avoiding= the influence of CUSTOM, FASHION, THE COMMON OPINION (These lead to erroneous o= pinions about what is good, and development of harmful “relishes” ).

C) In fact= , what is good for me, most pleasant, is conformity to divine law, understood voluntaristically. (Since God inflicts pain on those who break it, gives pleasure to the obedient). Thus the motive for obedience is simply to gain pleasure/avoid pain. The commands of God do not reveal any particular order, however.

D) The sel= f that can disengage from custom and “coldly” figure out what is advantageous, is the PUNCTUAL SELF.

1)&n= bsp;     This se= lf is nowhere, except in the power to remake. It has no other identity. So it is “at a point” or “punctual.”

2)&n= bsp;     It is s= heer consciousness, without any criteria of identity outside itself.<= /span>

E)   The eno= rmous contemporary power of Locke’s model. “Holding the package toget= her . . .” p. 174

1)&n= bsp;     Cf. the Freudian “ego” as a pure “point” of control.

F)    This “self” is radically reflexive, i.e. it is pure subjectivity, un= like the “self” that the ancients concerned themselves with, which h= ad a given structure, or given (natural) relation to something outside itself wh= ich provided its moral sources.

1)&n= bsp;     Cf the = ruling (hegemonikon) “part”= ; in Plato, or Epictetus, which keeps us properly aligned with a cosmic order. In contrast, the “self” is never a “part” in the modern understanding. (And there is no cosmic order).

I)Montaigne: discovering “myself” in a= ll my uniqueness.

A) Montaig= ne gives up on trying to find any human essence or nature in terms of which he= can understand himself. Each self is different, each is limited by particular circumstances.

1)&n= bsp;     It foll= ows that each individual is very interesting; thus, keeping journals becomes popular at this time.

2)&n= bsp;     Confess= ional autobiography becomes popular (Rousseau, etc.)

(a)&= nbsp; The new= novel (Richardson )

B)   At the = same time, each individual can become critically aware of “custom and habit” and work herself free of mere conformity.
C) Above and beyond all abstract views= of human nature, all “high” religious demands, and all other societal impositions= there is “just me”, finding, and bringing to expression, the unique m= e.

1)&n= bsp;     Words, conversation, are important for the task of self-discovery and originality. Friendship is th= us important.

2)&n= bsp;     Limits = to the self need attention. I cannot be an angel, nor am I a beast (cf. Pascal)

II)Inner Nature: new localizations, atomism.

A) Three f= acets of modern individualism: self-responsible independence; recognized particularl= ity; individual commitment.

B)   New localizations: thoughts, e.g, are “IN” the mind. Ideas, values,= are IN the individual mind. =

1)&n= bsp;     This co= ntrasts with older view, where e.g. value terms pick out something that is just as = much out there as in here. “praise” is just as much in the praisewor= thy object as in the praiser.

2)&n= bsp;     The “right” praiser is simply in tune with the way existing things (ontoi) rationallly are (logoi). The heavens are telling the glory of God. That is not metaphor.

C) In the = new localization, values (and other properties) are located in us, and then projected upon value-neutral objects. Objectification. Cf/ the difference b= etween “idea” in Plato and Descartes.

1)&n= bsp;     The subject/object split, so common to our thought, is alien to the older localization. It is thus not as inevitable as we suppose.

D) Example= :         black bile and the theory of humours. Where is the “melancholy”?

1)&n= bsp;     In the = old view the bile embodies a significance that we think of as merely psychological. = It “means” something in itself, not just in terms of its ability to Cause certain “feelings”, just as Saturn means something. =

2)&n= bsp;     In the = new view, the bile is just a chemical, a mere object, without any “meaning”, but with properties that enable it to cause psychological conditions.

3)&n= bsp;     Cf. the= witch craze from this same time period, which jars with the new “scientific enlightenment.” Perhaps it reflects the difficulty in transitioning f= rom the ‘ontic logos’ to the independent self.
(a)&= nbsp; The wit= ch is attuned to an ontic logos, the powers in her are not distinct from the powe= rs in things. Things (potions ingredients for example) mean something.

E)   Politic= al atomism of this same period (.e.g. Hobbes) and the “independent” individual who must “contract” with others in order to produce a society. There is no external order (ontic logos) to justify social order. There is no natural community prior to the contracted order. People as political atoms.

1)&n= bsp;     The justification for whatever order emerges (particular laws, institutions etc= .) will be in the consent of individuals.

2)&n= bsp;     The authority of rulers must now be something created by consent, rather than acknowledged as a permanent feature of “human nature” (cf. Aristotle: humans are by nature political animals).

F)    What we= get from community is “rights.” That which is protected by the law = is something possessed by an individual. Even life and liberty are included as individual possessions.

1)&n= bsp;     The sta= te as an instrument used by individua= ls to guard rights. (compare to the family as community – status is already given by birth etc. and is NOT an individual possession. One for all and all for one.)

G) In oppo= sition to the instrumental/atomist view we have the notion of the “citizen” whose identity is communal (e.g. Rousseau). But the instrumental/atomist view is the default position.

H) Note th= is quote: “rather than following the telos of nature, we become constructors of our own character.” 197. Now look again at Casey.

Construction and imagination. Poiesi= s.

THE AFFIRMATION OF ORDINARY LIFE

I)The religious background meets (combines with) t= he philosophical scientific background.

A) “= ordinary life” means?

1)&n= bsp;     Contras= t with e.g. Aristotle. “production” etc. is merely a necc condition for the good life. The good life itself is something more exalted. <= /span>

(a)&= nbsp; Life of contemplation

(b)&= nbsp; Life of citizen

(c)&= nbsp;   Life of= a mere tradesman is a “low life.”

B)   With the reformation and the scientific revolution, a reversal of values.

1)&n= bsp;     Do away= with priests, monastic orders, “mediation” of all kinds, etc. Ordina= ry life is the place to meet and serve God.

(a)&= nbsp; Washing= the dishes is just as “high” as being president. =

2)&n= bsp;     Do away= with contemplative science, which produces no “fruits.” Use reason to manipulate the world. Ability to produce results is the mark of real knowledge. Francis Bacon. <= /p>
3)&n= bsp;     = for the sake of the neighbor, or, to “relieve the condition of mankind.”

(a)&= nbsp; Finding= out how things work IS finding out “the mind of God in nature.”

C) The hon= our ethic also gets thrown out. Why?

II)The Augustinian-protestant love of adverbs. Use (instrumentalize) this world. Don’t become attached to it, glued to it. HOW you live, work, love, is the c= rucial thing.

A) Inner detachment. Shades of the stoic. The world has “fallen” thru wr= ong attachment.

B)   Calvin:= get order back into the world by encouraging piety.

C) The instrumental stance thus acquires spiritual significance.

III)Rationalized Christianity

A) Locke b= lends instrumentalization, Puritan ideas, voluntarist idea of God.

B)   But, in obeying God’s commands one does act “according to nature”, THAT IS, according to the pleasure/pain principle. One has a “reason” for obeying. Which is?

1)&n= bsp;     Describe different senses of ‘according to nature’ in, say, Aquinas, and= in Locke.

2)&n= bsp;     &n= bsp;

3)&n= bsp;     Mm=

C) Since t= here is no created order that God could not override (voluntaristically), IT can= not be a guide.

D) The “adverb” that appeals to Locke is no longer “worshipfully” or “thankfully” etc. but rather “rationally.” We serve God by being “rational.”

1)&n= bsp;     Intelle= ctually and morally rational.

E)   Locke a= nd Deism – the deist view of God; God creates an orderly world in which = the various creatures serve each others purposes, and God’s purposes. Rea= son figures out what those purposes are.

1)&n= bsp;     Thus, in obeying God we are not obeying a capricious tyrant, but rather joining ourselves to God’s will, acting in accordance with the laws of nature that enable manipulation for ends. Thus, instrumental reason.

2)&n= bsp;     Acting (prudently) for present goods actually earns eternal goods.

F)    Two ways natural good (give examples) needs to be supplemented, according to various xtian views.

1)&n= bsp;     Additio= n of “supernatural” virtues. To accord with a supernatural end (union with God). Thus Aquinas.

2)&n= bsp;     Grace to overcome fallen condition.

G) Extreme version of F2=3Dhyper-Augustinianism. Calvinists, Jansenists, are at war wi= th enlightenment Deism. The latter stress human self sufficiency. In hyper-Aug= . it is greatly emphasized that we are fallen, NOT self sufficient. <= /span>

H) F1 gets forgotten. (do you see why it would?). Locke as example.<= /p>
1)&n= bsp;     The alternatives to F2 include Thomist ideas, in which grace completes nature. =

2)&n= bsp;     F1 is replaced by deism. The good that God wills is simply “natural” good. The supernatural is out. But there is still plenty to do “for God” right here and now.

(a)&= nbsp; Eternal reward thus gets to be “more of the same” p. 247.

IV)Moral Sentiments vs. Lockeian deism (read p. 248 – 9 for summary)

A) Hobbesian de facto desire on the Lo= ckeian side, linked with command (voluntarist) ethics.

B)   Humans = as intrinsically connected to God, as in Hutcheson, Cambridge platonists, on t= he other side.

(a)&= nbsp; True re= ligion is no art, but an inward nature, which is a transposition of Platonism inwa= rd. “Erasmian orthodoxy”

C) Shaftes= bury – Stoic stress on inner calm, in which one can behold a harmonious wh= ole, a cosmic order that we miss because of our attachments. God=3Dharmonious wh= ole (almost)

D) “= natural affection” and Stoic citizen of the world, carried beyond, e.g. family affections. But this “affection” is essentially inward.

E)   See ano= ther summary, p. 255-6. Intrinsic loveablity of a rational order is pushed inward, becomes implanted IN the subject as motivator. It motivates not because of what it is attuned to, bu= t by virtue of its own nature.

F)    Hutches= on – #1. Our ‘moral sense’ (MORAL SENTIMENT) pushes us to benevolence and #2. Benevolen= ce works for our happiness.

1)&n= bsp;     #1 sugg= ests that we are really good at heart (very un-Augustinian). → Rousseau, t= he hippies. Universal love.

(a)&= nbsp; By recognizing how good we are we actually become better.
2)&n= bsp;     #2 is t= rue because God made us this way, and indeed made the whole universe “benevolent.” The= moral source is still God.

(a)&= nbsp; Univers= al benevolence → utilitarianism.

G) Thus, t= wo kinds of Deism; Rational (Locke) Sentimental (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, etc.)=

1)&n= bsp;     Lockeian – God has created a natural (naturalistic) or scientifically comprehensible order. Humans do well, achieve the good by using “disengaged reason” to figure out how that order works, and by adapting to it (don’t step off cliffs, help your neighbor, he will he= lp you, etc.).

(a)&= nbsp; The abi= lity to use reason in this way confers a dignity on the subject that raises her above the rest of nature. Autonomy, control.

2)&n= bsp;     Shaftes= bury type deism: need to “re-engage” by going within to recover the natural “sentiments” which are benevolent.

(a)&= nbsp; This tu= rning within to my “feelings” not only helps me to recover them, it changes my behavior to accord with them.

(b)&= nbsp; The fee= lings are not irrational; in fact, they work out reasonably (invisible hands).

V)The providential order: God’s goodness con= sists in his bringing about OUR good.

A) Anthrop= ocentric- our good is natural, not supernatural.

1)&n= bsp;     Gratitu= de towards, love of, resignation to, God are all understood in terms of human happiness. A non-tragic view.

B)   A1 is contrary to an important stra= nd in most religious traditions, the “Patron-Client” model. Humans are there for God, not God for humans. <= /span>

1)&n= bsp;     We are = not entitled to think that God’s ways are our ways.

C) Two way= s to draw God and people together; the pagan/ philosophical; the Hebrew

1)&n= bsp;     Plato &= #8211; love of the good/love of the cosmic order/love of God all amount to the same thing. Stoics-love of the cosmic order (how things go) is love of God.

2)&n= bsp;     Hebrew;= some of the Patron/client idea, but with idea that God not only can be placated; rather, God’s people can be drawn into God’s purposes.

(a)&= nbsp; God also wills the good of that people, even when not obedient

(b)&= nbsp; Service= to God involves justice to people (this thus comes close to the philosophical view, suggests possible combining; Plato as the “attic Moses”)<= o:p>

3)&n= bsp;     To be d= rawn into God’s purposes is to be drawn into a power that exceeds morality= , a power for love and righteousness beyond human moral capacity. THAT drops out of sight in Deism. =

(a)&= nbsp; On deist view, xtian idea of deification (God became human in order that humans might become divine) disappears. See III F 1.

(b)&= nbsp; But III= F 2 also disappears. Of course no Deist is going to have ANY taste for Augustin= ian ideas.

(c)&= nbsp;   a and b thus amount to the denial o= f any need for grace.

(d)&= nbsp; However= , both denials still have a connection to xtian ideas; denying IIIF1 goes with affirmation of ordinary life; denial of IIIF2 goes with emphasis on GodR= 17;s orignal benevolence towards humans (Erasmian humanism).
4)&n= bsp;     Thus De= ist view pulls God away from actual dealings with humans and vice versa. God/wo= rld relation is a matter of the order God built into the world (the Newtonian order, for example). Miracles are thus out. (why ‘thus’?)<= /o:p>

(a)&= nbsp; In fact= , if God got to intervening miraculously, he would defeat the value of establish= ing a reliable, regular, order in the first place. Cf. pain/fire. Instrumental rationality requires a reliable design plan.

(b)&= nbsp; Stress = on this naturalistic order also runs contrary to historical dimension of weste= rn religions.

5)&n= bsp;     The not= ion of providence that is promoted by Deism is thus entirely connected to the emer= ging scientific conception of nature as a system of meshing efficient causes.

(a)&= nbsp; The mes= hing does reflect God’s purpose; thus there is room left for some final causality; namely in the original creation. Leibniz’ pre-established harmony.

(b)&= nbsp; Alexand= er Pope as a striking example of how the deist view takes up traditional conce= pts but gives them a new meaning that accords with the new science.<= /span>

(c)&= nbsp;   The ethic that goes with this deist= view is one of “marked activities” that fit into the “natural” design. Instrumental reason enables living according = to nature. That contrasts with ancient ideas of what it is to live according to nature. (nature=3Da heirarchical order, intrinsically reasonable in itself)= .

6)&n= bsp;     Feeling= also is a guide or moral source, since it is attuned to how things are “naturally.” Doing what comes naturally will work. V. Pope p.280. Undistorted feeling is the Hutecheson-type deist’s route of access to the design of things.

(a)&= nbsp; X is no= t good because I feel it is good; I feel it is good because it is (it fits the nat= ural order, which is good).

7)&n= bsp;     Contrast Aristotle and the 18^th cent. sentimentalists on the place of fee= ling in morality. Feeling as an independent moral source. Right inner impulses a= re no longer right because they have been tutored by reason to “get thin= gs right.”

VI)The culture of modernity- high value placed on commerce, family life, feeling.

A) Commerce and the idea of an economic system, with its own “laws.”

B)   Rise of= the novel-affirmation of ordinary life (contrast to aristocratic element in anc= ient tragedy, and even in Shakespeare. The high, the dignified, is the Prince, t= he low, the comic, is the peasant. ) The novel abandons these ways of thinking= .

1)&n= bsp;     The nat= ure of a thing is now within it, rather than given by its place in a heirarchy. Particular human lives now are all that matter (contrast the abstractness o= f, e.g. Antigone vs. the very particular character of Isabel Archer)

2)&n= bsp;     Cf. the a-temporal character of archtypes vs. the life in time of the modern individual, whose life requires narration (in a diary, in autobiography, in= a novel ) to fully make sense. I am what I as an individual become through the events of my life and what I make of them.

(a)&= nbsp; This new “self” is dise= ngaged from larger patterns (contrast to, e.g., St. Francis as instantiating an independent, cosmically significant, pattern, the life of Christ).

C) Compani= onate marriage and privacy, vs. marriage as a public institution, arranged by and= for society, not just the individual. Cf. Rousseau’s St. Preux, p. 290

1)&n= bsp;     Elevati= on of sentiment – affection for spouse, for children.

(a)&= nbsp; The fam= ily as a “haven in a heartless world”, a world made heartless by new bureaucracies, separation of work and home, etc. The bourgeoise are ahead of the curve, so to speak.

2)&n= bsp;     The ele= vation of strong feeling – Rousseau, Goethe. The idea that we are “deep” beings, shown in deep feelings (notably, melancholy, str= ong despair over love, etc. ) quote p. 296.

D) The feeling for nature – reas= on vs. feeling (the deep inner tangle of me!).&nb= sp; In painting, in design of gardens, a new emphasis on deep or sublime feelings evoked by nature. Nature as a moral source.

1)&n= bsp;     Gardens: Versailles

Classical-rational. Control.

2)&n= bsp;     “= English” Gardens woodsy, natural.

3)&n= bsp;     Nature = is a “deep and confused life” p. 300.

THE VOICE OF NATURE

I)Fractured Horizons

A)&n= bsp; The normal pre modern horizon was belief of some= kind in God. Life without that belief does not make sense. All credible moral sources involve God.

B)&n= bsp; That ho= rizon is fractured in the enlightenment.

1)&n= bsp;     Unbelief becomes a live option for some

2)&n= bsp;     A multi= plicity of moral sources becomes available.

(a)&= nbsp; Spinoza, pantheism – Romanticism, expressivism

(b)&= nbsp; Deist s= tress on rational power –sense of dignity as rational agent.

3)&n= bsp;     2 a,b c= an become separated from ALL theistic belief. But only by a “mutation”, not by a simple removal.

II)Radical enlightenment- picking up on IB2b. Here = are the bad things produced by superstition, tradition: cruelty, repression of = the natural, adherence to local, provincial customs that exclude certain people (races, classes etc.), childish lack of autonomy. The rhetorical force of t= he Rad enlig is mainly negative. <= o:p>

1)&n= bsp;     Radical utilitarianism – the positive= features of Lockeian deism, without the ‘deus.’ Viz.the pursuit of the following “life goods” minus the theism that grounds them;=

(a)&= nbsp; Self responsible reason (freedom from authority)

(b)&= nbsp; Ordinary fulfillments are it – no supernatural end

(c)&= nbsp;   Imparti= al benevolence

2)&n= bsp;     Objecti= ons to this – deism assumes good natural order, but that is “Panglossian”        =             &nb= sp;              =             &nb= sp;            =          or        =             &nb= sp;            =            =        it is implausible to think that if everyone follows self interest, the results will be fine (leveling).

3)&n= bsp;     The aufklärer believed in their ow= n goodness to a remarkable degree (cf. the quote from Bentham, p. 331) They could love everyone, and woul= d do so by enlightening them.

(a)&= nbsp; It was particularly important to get rid of religion, which was thought to be a ma= in obstacle to benevolence, the happiness of all. Ecrasez l’infame.

(i)    There are still people who hold that view, despi= te the history of the 20^th century.&nb= sp;

4)&n= bsp;     Science (disengaged reason) and benevolence – contrast with cruelty of 17th, 18^th century state, religious persecution, etc.

5)&n= bsp;     Emphasis on reduction of suffering becomes central perhaps for the= first time. Utilitarian stress on pleasure/pain fits this agenda.

6)&n= bsp;     Also po= ssible for emphasis on value of pleasure to lead to exaltation of sensuality, in oppositions to priestly asceticism, etc.

(a)&= nbsp; Were it= not for religion, we could get rid of most laws. Just do what comes naturally m= an, and all will be cool.

B)&n= bsp; The enthusiasm of the aufkläre= r for their cause assumes something that does not fit their own scheme – st= rong evaluation.

1)&n= bsp;     Their s= trong evaluation =3D the relief of suffering really matters. Inconsistent with view of nature, and human nature, as morally neutral stuff. If we are just collections of atoms banging into each other, where does this strong evaluation come in?

(a)&= nbsp; The mor= al enthusiasm of, e.g. Holbach, which requires self renunciation, perhaps even loss life, is inexplicable given that pleasure /pain is all that matters. <= o:p>

(b)&= nbsp; As Sade observes (336) nature declares NO (moral ) laws. Therefore, do what you lik= e!

2)&n= bsp;     Utilita= rianism as parasitic upon xtian ideals. Someone who really hated the entire xtian culture, viz. Nietzsche, saw clearly the utilitarian debt to xtianity.

3)&n= bsp;   A year later, Habermas questioned whether secularists had the honesty to admit their debts to Judaism and Christianity for the basic formulations of the Enlightenment. Are not our enlightened concepts of equa= lity and fairness, he asked, secular distillations of time-honored Judeo-Christi= an precepts? Quite obviously, fraternity is, and also modern compassion. What would secular humanism be without these borrowings? Further, can the “contract” theories of modern secular philosophy be fully understood apart from the great prestige attached to the “covenants” so central to both Jewish and Christian faith and history? Habermas means not only etymology and conceptual articulation but = a reverence for moral obligation as well. In this vein, he asks: “For the normati= ve self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than j= ust a precursor or a catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which spring= the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous condu= ct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human righ= ts, and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love.”

C)&n= bsp;   Two further responses to naturalism: Hume; awe in the face of immensity. <= /o:p>

1)&n= bsp;     Hume: n= eo Lucretian; accept limits, do not try to be a super anything, neither super benevolent, nor super independent of tradition and habit, etc. cf. Montaign= e

2)&n= bsp;     The new= sense of a “meaningless” cosmos that stretches on to infinity tempora= lly and spatially actually produces a feeling of depth.

D)&n= bsp; The faith of the aufklärer, as expressed by Condorcet (p. 354): it is a semi religious narrative, with an account of how reason rescues us from “the fall.”

1)&n= bsp;     The sad= irony in Condorcet’s situation as he wrote these words.

E) = This polemical dis= missal of the past strips away moral sources. Utilitarian Radical enlightenment thrives on attack. But what doe= s it offer that is positive? It lives on old moral sources (xtian affirmation of ordinary life, benevolence) but cannot articulate those sources, of course.= The ethics of inarticulacy. seems to lack moral sources.

1)&n= bsp;    Affirmation of ordinary life and denouncing of “pride” p.339.

2)&n= bsp;   Utilitarian outlook is both thin and threatening

(a) Thin, because building a new and bet= ter order requires knowing what one is for, not just what one is against.<= /o:p>

(b)Threatening, because the monological pursuit of “happiness” by instrumental reason generates “bureaucratic cruelty” and bad government. Examples: The Poor Law Act of 1834

Eg 1.In 1833 Earl Grey, the= Prime Minister, set up a Poor Law Commission to examine the working of the poor L= aw system in Britain. In their report published in 1834, the Commission made several recommendations to Parliament. As a result, the Poor Law Amendment = Act was passed. The act stated that:

(a) no able-bodied person was to receive money or other help from the Poor = Law authorities except in a workhouse;

(b) conditions in workhouses were to be made very harsh to discourage people from wanting to receive help;

(c) workhouses were to be built in every parish or, if parishes were too sm= all, in unions of parishes;

(d) ratepayers in each parish or union had to elect a Board of Guardians to supervise the workhouse, to collect the Poor Rate and to send reports to the Central Poor Law Commission;

(e) the three man Central Poor Law Commission would be appointed by the government and would be responsible for supervising the Amendment Act throughout the country.

<= /span>

Eg 2 Destruction of “slum” neighborhoods in the 1950s in order to supply “better” housing for poor people

<= /span>

Eg 3Chernobyl.

<= /span>

Is this sort of th= ing a “necessary” consequence of radical enlightenment utilitarianism? Not logically necessary. But, consider some of the “values” that are “necessarily” overlooked – family goods, religious goods, local loyalities, the refusal to do certain things because they are unjust,= no matter how much utility they may promise.&= nbsp; The poor law exhibits all of these. Likewise “urban renewal.”   Likewise services that replace familial and religious relations with “official friendship.” (Go to a counselor, they are paid to be nice to you). And, the elevation of “instrumen= tal rationality” leads quite naturally to bureaucratic abuses.=

<= /span>

Cf. also e.g.4 the Jacobins (v. below on Condorcet), and e.g.5 the history of Marxism.

Dickens: Hard Time= s .

F)&n= bsp;     Two further responses to natu= ralism, that include attempts to articulate some new moral sources. : Hume;. <= /o:p>

1)&n= bsp;     Hume: n= eo Lucretian; accept limits, do not try to be a super anything, neither super benevolent, nor super independent of tradition and habit, etc. cf. Montaign= e. Our natural life is significant enough just as it is. “Remove the bur= den of impossible aspirations” p. 346

2)&n= bsp;     awe in = the face of immensity. The new sense of a “meaningless” cosmos that stretches on to infinity temporally and spatially actually produces a feeli= ng of depth. Intertwining of romantic expressivism with materialism.

G)&n= bsp; Enlightenment “heroism and fame.” Do= derpt. 352. The faith of the aufklärer, as expressed by Condorcet (p. 354): i= t is a semi religious narrative, with an account of how reason rescues us from “the fall.”

1)&n= bsp;     The sad= irony in Condorcet’s situation as he wrote these words.

III) Nature= as Source

1)&n= bsp;     Radical aufklärer objections to Deism: anti-panglossian (consider VoltaireR= 17;s Candide); but does not critique= Deist leveling. The aufklärer keep the idea that there is no real conflict between good – evil in the human will. No “fall.” Imparti= al benevolence is really there in everyone.

2)&n= bsp;     Rousseau emerges as an anti-leveler. But, in contrast to Augustinians. It is not God, but nature that can rescue me f= rom my fallen condition.

(a)&= nbsp; There i= s no original sin – the fall is the result of moving away from what is natural. Falling into the hands of “society” =

(b)&= nbsp; Enlight= enment “reason” is of no help in curing wicked wills. Need conscience, which is more like instinct, and speaks “the language of nature.̶= 1; Disengaged reason only takes us further from nature.

3)&n= bsp;     Rousseau keeps many Deist ideas (God as explanation for order of world etc.) But, he denies Deist optimism (e.g. id= ea that self love and the social are the same, )

(i)    This sounds like the old view; but, the distinct= ion between good and depraved, virtue and vice, is equated with the distinction between dependence on self (virtue) with dependence on others (vice). This = is distinctively modern.

1.     In Rousseau this guiding inner voice still is in contact with a universal good; it does not itself define the good. That more radical view emerges in romantic expressivism (cf. Casey).

2.     Nonetheless, the wholeness found in God by Augustine is found within t= he self by Rousseau. Cf. quote, p. 36= 2.

4)&n= bsp;     Kant/Ro= usseau – freedom or autonomy have essential connection to morality. The leve= ling tendency in the enlightenment does not understand that or appreciate the way appetite or inclination can enslave.

(a)&= nbsp; To act morally is to act according to what we truly are – rational/moral age= nts. Morality is based in us, not in something outside us. Viz. it is based in reason.

(b)&= nbsp; De facto desires do not really proceed from = me. I am essentially rational, not essentially desiring. Anti-utilitarian.

(c)&= nbsp;   So it i= s only the voice of reason that counts, not of “nature” even ala Rouss= eau.

5)&n= bsp;     Kant; r= eason operates according to principles, not impulses. Impulse leads to injustice,= reason leads to fairness , justice. Thus reason produces something like a universal benevolence.

IV) The Expressivist Turn

A)&n= bsp; Nature as source in Romanticism. To have a proper relation to the “providential order” of Deism IS to have access= to an inner voice.

1)&n= bsp;     Thus, w= hat matters is not to grasp, say, an argument from design, but to be emotionally attuned to that order. =

2)&n= bsp;     Cf. the mixture of ‘joy’ flowing thru nature with a deist God ruling ov= er all in “ode to qqworld and life (Novalis).

3)&n= bsp;     Wordsworth; the object of poetry is truth, carried alive into the heart by passion.

B)&n= bsp; Focus on feeling separated from action:compare to Aristotle, where feeling in tune w= ith natural order is shown in virtuous action. Now, what matters is the richnes= s of life available thru emotional attunement to nature.

1)&n= bsp;     Thus, a= lso a separation from ethics! Feel-good sensualism. (looking forward to hippies)<= o:p>

C)&n= bsp; Expressivism; creation (of a poem, a piece of mu= sic, etc.) is more than just expression of what is already there. I create out of myself.

1)&n= bsp;     Thus, a= new sense to the idea of a “self.” Not a ‘nature’ alrea= dy given, as in Aristotle, but something that realizes itself uniquely. <= /o:p>

(a)&= nbsp; Herder: “each human being has his own measure”

(b)&= nbsp; What the voice of nature calls us to cannot be known prior to our expression of self= .

(c)&= nbsp;   Express= ion=3Dart. Importance of the arts to this movement. Art is no longer ‘mimesis’(imitation). The arts opposed to the grip of disengaged reason. Creative.

2)&n= bsp;     A water= shed in the history of literature:= Blending of creative force of all of nature, including human nature, together. The external world is fitted to the mind (Wordsworth).

(a)&= nbsp; Compare Shakespeare to Wordsworth.

(b)&= nbsp; Artist = as priest, mediator of spiritual reality to humans. Fancy (merely reproductive) vs. imagination in Coleridge. The latter a living power that repeats the eternal act of creation.

(c)&= nbsp;   Friedri= ch:    The forms of nature sp= eak directly.

(This is not imitation at all)<= /o:p>

D)&n= bsp; Two reactions to the inadequacies of enlightenme= nt naturalism

1)&n= bsp;     Kant

2)&n= bsp;     Nature = as source

3)&n= bsp;     Both at= tempt to re-unify what is broken. Cf. contemporary vestige of this, p. 384. Two approaches to environmentalism.

E)&n= bsp; Respons= es to reason/nature (feeling, sensibility) split, in Holderlin, Schiller.

1)&n= bsp;     Spiral- immediacy (unity), division, higher immediacy. Thus Holderlin and Hegel.

F)&n= bsp;   Express= ivist philosophy of nature and history; joining to millenarism, Joachim of Fiore,= (the age of the Spirit), modern messianism. Secular version in French revolution. New calendar=3Dbe= ginning of a new age.

(a)&= nbsp; The for= ces of evil and good have fought, and good has won. Needs that sense of polarization.

(b)&= nbsp; The revolution depends not so much upon disengaged reason engineering human hap= piness, as it does a “spirit” of goodness.

(c)&= nbsp;   Virtue, patriotism, freedom, vs vice, treason, tyranny. Also “brotherhood.”

2)      "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive
But to be young was very heaven!"
         =             &nb= sp;

Domestic carna= ge, now filled the whole year
With feast-days, old men from the chimney-nook,
The maiden from the busom of her love,
The mother from the cradle of her babe,
The warrior from the field - all perished, all -
Friends, enemies, of all parties, ages, ranks,
Head after head, and never heads enough
For those that bade them fall.

William Wordsworth

Danton and Robespierr= e.

Marx combines the enlightenment “scientism” with millenarism, expressivism. Alienation vs. work that is fulfilling. Romanticism in Marx!

Part V Subtler Languages=

I) Victorians and us

A)&n= bsp; Same contest between romanticism/enlightenment rationalism, still being fought out, with variations.

B)&n= bsp; Same br= oad consensus

1)&n= bsp;     Signifi= cance of ordinary life

(a)&= nbsp; Reduce suffering

2)&n= bsp;     = Universal benevolence.

C)&n= bsp; Autonomy, freedom

1)&n= bsp;     Goes wi= th language of ‘rights’ (why?)

D)&n= bsp; Political meaning of B1 and C=3Duniversal spread= of (or at least lip service to) “democracy.”

1)&n= bsp;     Popular movements, Abolition of slavery, civil rights

2)&n= bsp;     Spread = from west to east and south of democratic ideals

E)&n= bsp; Explici= tly xtian basis for D 1 in particular, contrasted with secularist racism. Xtian idea of the unity of humanity was not popular with, e.g. Hume. <= /span>

F)&n= bsp;   The ris= e of atheism (anglo-american) as a live and militant option. <= /p>
1)&n= bsp;     Reinfor= ced by technological advance.

2)&n= bsp;     Darwin = and the popularity of the argument from design.

(a)&= nbsp; Feeling= of many that they are now forced to abandon belief. (cf. Ayer to Dawkins). Naive EPISTEMOLOGY.

3)&n= bsp;     Scienti= stic culture combined with moral fervor; the “ethics of belief” in Clifford, Putnam (404),Huxley (405). Again, naive epistemology is the engine driving this.

4)&n= bsp;     Contemp= orary versions may suppress moral dimension altogether. Cf. Wilson, 406-07.

(a)&= nbsp; What characterizes this sort of view? You cannot live by it (Taylor). Since you cannot, you typically end up with ersatz moralizing – Wilson on the “true Promethean spirit”, human liberation, greater knowledge, dignity .

(b)&= nbsp; Breakin= g free from parochial allegiances – we are part of a great big history (real= ly wow big). Stoic echo.

(c)&= nbsp;   Nobilit= y and “manliness” (religion is for women, you know).

5)&n= bsp;     Movemen= t away from theism also has a romant= ic, non-scientistic version.

(a)&= nbsp; Prefere= nce for pagan (e.g. Greek) myth as expressing greater harmony with nature. Goet= he. Emerson.
(b)&= nbsp; Dover B= each. Arnold’s contempt for utilitarianism.Replace religion with “culture.” Unite reason with the whole personality (thus never scientistic or narrowly technical).

(c)&= nbsp;   Similar= ideas in Marxism, applied to uneducated laborers.

6)&n= bsp;     Three sources: 1.faith in God; 2. scient= istic atheism or agnosticism; 3. romantic “wholeness.” Any view t= hat can combine two of these will have clout. Thus Marx.

G)&n= bsp; Mo= ral exceptionalism and the three sources. What explains how wonderfully civiliz= ed we are?

1)&n= bsp;     Judeao-= xtian heritage – universal justice and agape, made possible by grace.

2)&n= bsp;     Science= as liberator – cf. Bentham. Or, “manly” science, facing unaf= raid the empty meaningless cosmos, frees us from petty egoism, self coddling. Cf. Versilov in Raw Youth, Stavrogin in The Possessed. We wake to a world in which there is no god, no immortality, just us, which produces in people a great degree of mutual tenderness. A paradise. Inspired by Lorrain= e.

3)&n= bsp;     Roussea= u; the substitute for grace is the inner impulse of nature.

H)&n= bsp; Each of the three is vulnerable, and one can bec= ome stronger when weaknesses of others are shown up.

I)&n= bsp;     The vulnerability of instrumental reason/atomism/utilitarian monological pursui= t of pleasure, with no view that some pleasures might be unworthy.

1)&n= bsp;     Though “liberal” this approach undermines the conditions for genuine freedom in community.cf. Tocqueville, p. 414. Civic humanism/romanticism.

2)&n= bsp;     One alternative is nationalism, ala Rousseau, Herder (volk).<= /p>
(a)&= nbsp; Nationa= lism based in language, rather than legal/moral etc. traditions. Not much of a temptation for English speakers (Why?) Language as expressive (Herder). Third reich combines romantic expressivism with instrumental reason to produce a real monster.

3)&n= bsp;     Loss of notion of nature as source with development of science in both directions (= up and down, astronomy and biology) revealing a vast and impersonal universe.<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Nature begins to seem strange, ali= en. Cf. Conrad, p. 417.

(a)&= nbsp;         =             &nb= sp;            =

&= nbsp;

QUESTION= S

:

1. Define: modern predicament; background ontology; intrinsic descrip= tion; strong evaluation; inescapable framework.

2. Define:qualitative distinctions, web of interlocution, orientation, agency, transcendental conditions for having a self.

3. How does Luther’s despair relate to the despair of the modern nihilist?

4. Relate the fear of Alzheimer’s to the idea that selfhood or identity are necessarily tied to narrative. (say why that fear would be so great).

5. Define: hyper-good; projectivism; sociobiology; narrative self-hoo= d or identity; revisionist vs. comprehending moral perspectives; .

6. Why is showing what underlies my actions, choices etc. not the sam= e as giving a “basic reason” for them? See. P. 77.

7. Easy part: explain the difference between action centered and agent centered ethical theories. Hard part: explain why modern ethical theories h= ave tended to be action centered, according to Taylor. What is gained by such theories? Mention utilitarianism and Kantianism.

8. How do typically modern notions of liberty conflict with moral axi= s 2 in particular? What is all th= is stuff about “liberation”, really?

9 What does Taylor think can be achieved by an historical inquiry into moral sources?

10. why does Taylor think you cannot make scientific sense of people, the way y= ou can make scientific sense of a falling stone?

   &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       11. Show the (dis)similarities or (dis)continuities between Plato, Augustine, Descartes.

   &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       12. Define the following: disengagement, objectification, control, the punctual self, new localizations (give examples), instrumental/atomist         &= nbsp;           &nbs= p;            &= nbsp; view of the state; authority and consent in the modern state vs. ancient views of community; ontic logos; voluntarism and its             &n= bsp;            = ;       relations to modernity; self construction/self discovery (Locke, Montaigne), instrumentalization of “reason.”

   &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       13. Discuss the following in terms of the history Taylor is outlining: the theo= ry of humours; the 17^th century witch craze.

   &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       14. What is the bearing of each of the terms in #12 on conceptions of the self = and its moral sources? Show how e= ach concept plays a role    &nbs= p;         in the move from a “natural” telos for humans to a point of consciousness and will that is free to “self construct.”

   &nbs= p;            &= nbsp;       15. How does the discussion in 14 bear on the idea of inescapable frameworks and the self in moral space?

Paper Topics

T=3DTaylor    Use= Taylor as primary source. Do not forget Casey.

Literature: Novels (films) of Austin (e.g. Pride and Prejudice), Dickens, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy (particularly the “short” story, The = death of Ivan Illich), James, Wharton, other. Camus’ The Stranger. The film/novel Remains of the Day. The film/play A Man= for all Seasons. Relate to id= eas in T of narrative selfhood, strong evaluation, agency and identity or having a real self, virtues and thick description, historically related items. Recov= ery of memory (thus narrative) in Proust, Remembrance of Things Past. Short sto= ries by Flannery O’Connor.

Philosophy: T’s critique of Utilitarians, Kant, Parfit, emotivists (projectivists), sociobiologists. Self, language, and Wittgenstein. Narrative and selfhood in MacIntyr= e. Existential themes in Taylor (Heidegger, Kierkegaard).

History: Critically discuss some aspect of T’s account of historic= al background to modern conceptions of self.

Religion: Critically discuss T’s account of the place of Christian ideas in the development of ideas of the self, ethical conceptions, moral frameworks. Track down some of the “Christian fallout” in, for example, utilitarianism. Use Literature to find Christian themes (O’Connor, for instance)