Phil. 385/RelSt 380
Spring 2008
Sources of the Self
(in 19th and 20t=
h
Century Philosophy, Literature etc.)
Instructor: Dr. Norman Lillegard
Office: Humanities 229 &=
nbsp;
587 7384
nlillega@utm.edu
Office Hours: 10:00 -11.00 a.m. and 1:00 - 2:00 p.m. MWF and by
appointment
Texts: Sources of the Self by Charles Taylor
Additional handouts or on-line
materials.
Some Aims of This Course: At the beginning of the 21st century th=
ere
is a lot of preoccupation wit=
h, and
a lot of confusion about “the self”, “my identity”
(identity crises etc.), individualism and the status of the self vs. societ=
y or
community, and related themes involving selfhood (narrative, the nature of
action etc.). Given the cultu=
ral
history of the last two centuries this should come as no surprise. For in the period since the
enlightenment the settled sense of self, surrounded by definite horizons, w=
hich
persisted as a fairly common inheritance into the renaissance and beyond, h=
as
been torn apart by conflicting visions and by nihilistic tendencies.
In this course we examine the hi=
story
that has produced the present dis-ease.&nb=
sp;
Doing so requires attention to issues in metaphysics, epistemology, =
the
philosophy of language, even a little logic, but the main focus will be on =
ethical or moral philosophy, unde=
rstood
quite broadly so as to include matters sometimes dealt with in literature a=
nd
art courses, the history of culture, the social sciences, as well as in
philosophy of religion or, more broadly, religious studies.
Requirements:
·<=
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Read
all assigned material. There will be two exams, a mid-term worth 100 pts, a=
nd
comprehensive final worth 150 pts.=
total
250 pts.
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There
will be several quizzes, worth 20 pts or so each. The quizzes, as well as exams, will
refer to questions and terms to be defined, listed on the web page. Total Ca. 100 pts.
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Selected
questions will also be collected and graded. Ca. 50 pts.
·<=
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A
short paper, ca. 1500 words, on a topic approved by the instructor, must be
submitted. Topic due Feb. 11. First
Draft due March 3. No exceptions.
100 pts.
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Philosophy
majors are encouraged to submit a long paper (ca. 3000 words). Same schedul=
e.
Majors may substitute a long paper for the final provided the first draft is
adequate. Topic to be determined in consultation with the instructor. (up to 250 pts.)
·<= span style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> = A wide array of topics is possible, including such things as studies of recent films in the light of course content, analysis of literary works, etc. <= o:p>
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Attendance
and class participation are worth ca. 50 pts. Total points =3D ca. 550. (Tentative)
Sample exam questions, definitio=
ns,
and other course related material can be found at www.utm.edu/~nlillega/lilleg=
ard.htm.
on the phil. 385 link.
Questions for the course are ins=
erted
into the COURSE OUTLINE, found on-line. You MUST use it.
Class Procedures: Classes will be a mix of lecture, discussion, viewing of
films and, possibly, viva voce debates worked out ahead of time (possible e=
xtra
credit). Students should give
careful and respectful consideration to each others views and comments. A
premium is placed on argument, rather than on mere statement of opinion. Al=
so,
a premium is placed on sticking to the subject. Only the instructor is allowed to =
wander
all over the place and insert irrelevant jokes.
COURSE OUTLINE: (Approximate. Content and time periods may vary slightly.)
Week 1 = (1/14) Study Taylor ch. 1. Answer question 1.
Week 2 = (1/21) (MLKing day) Study ch. 2 and 3 (in Part I). Note questions in “questions” link.
Week 3
(1/28) Quiz on ch. 1-3. Continue discussion of 1-3.
Week 4 (2/4) Study Chapters 5,6,7. W= rite out answers to q. 5-10 to be handed in.
Week 5 = (2/11) . Chapters 8, 9,10.
Week 6 = (2/18) .11,
Week 7 =
(2/25) =
12&=
nbsp;
Week 8 = (3/3) Outline 13, 14.
Week 9 =
(3/10
– 16 - SPRING BREAK)
Week 10= (3/17) Outline 17. March 21-Good Friday
Week 11= (3/24) 18,19 &n= bsp;
Week 12 (3/31)20 = ;
Week 13 (4/7) 21,22 = ; &n= bsp;
Week 14 (4/14). 23,
Week 15= (4/21) 24, 25 Papers due Monday, 4/2= 1.
Week 16. Classes end Mon. April 28. Review. FINAL EXAMS, MAY 1-7.
-------= ---------------------------------------------------------------------------= --------------------------------------------------------------
Course Outline&= nbsp; Phil. 385
![3DPrometheus.jpg](3D"phil385page_files/image002.jpg")
![3Dblake.jpg](3D"phil385page_files/image004.jpg")
Sources of th=
e self:
Self invention or
&=
nbsp; &nbs=
p; &=
nbsp; Self
discovery or. . .?
Self Invention
Planned Parent= hood vs Casey (US Supreme Court, 1992.) In discussions of this case, this claus= e is referred to, usually with contempt, as the “mystery” clause, for reasons that are obvious.
&nbs=
p; “At the heart of liberty is the=
right
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not def=
ine
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
state.” (at 847).
In contrast to this, consider Taylor’s notion of= “inescapable frameworks̶= 1; which are necessary to self-hood (personhood). Such frameworks could not be invented (defined) by individuals (i.e. with refer= ence soley to individual resources), but NEITHER are they “formed under the compulsion of the state” (the court’s crazy false dilemma).
Taylor argues that such frameworks are inextricably intertwined with moral concept= ions., broadly understood; notions of self (self-identity etc.) are therefore moral conceptions, or intertwined with moral conceptions, where ‘moral̵= 7; is understood broadly.
I) &nb=
sp;
Inescapable Frameworks
A) &nb=
sp;
Idea=
s of
the SELF are inextricably connected to “moral” conceptions. Understanding the connection requir=
es
understanding and crediting the role in our lives of strong evaluation,* i.e.
evaluation which is independent of our desires, choices, inclinations, and
which contains criteria for judging
those desires etc. ‘Moral’ here is to be taken broadly. For instance, ‘Your life is =
not
worthwhile’ might not be counted as a moral claim in some uses of
‘moral’ but it is here<=
/i>.
1) =
Example: Re=
spect
for human life produces strong evaluations. This is universal. Some versions may not apply to all
humans, but only to, say, the tribe members, but some version of it is found
everywhere. It is almost like a gut reaction that all
people have. One may not kill=
or
degrade or maim without just cause.
(a) =
Thus, examp=
les of
strong evaluations would be, “it is wrong to kill innocent human
beings” or ‘what the Nazi guards did to Jews when transporting =
them
was horrible and degrading, a violation of their humanity”(cf. Hailli=
e)
2) =
&nb=
sp;
Such a phen=
omenon
seems to call forth articulation i.e. some account of what humans are, o=
r what
the Gods require, some sort of moral ontology must lie back o=
f such
a phenomenon (the phenomenon of very widespread strong evaluation).
(a) It may need to be stated.
(b) It may be implicit.
3) =
&nb=
sp;
That ontolo=
gy
will provide an inescapable framework. Gut reactions are NOT
generally like that.
(a) Error theory: In the modern era this is often
denied. It may be claimed tha=
t all
that is involved in moral reactions is a gut reaction, and that it i=
s an
error to suppose there is some
metaphysical backing for it. =
That
is the error theory, the idea that moral ontologies are simpl=
y a
mistake.
4) =
The need for a moral ontology shows=
that
such phenomena (e.g. strong evaluations relating to respect for life) are not just gut reactions. Compare to nausea. If a certain smell makes me nausea=
ted,
then it just does. If tomorro=
w it
does not, nobody will accuse me of inconsistency. Nor do I feel any demand on me to
account for my nausea. But the moral response is different. I cannot respect life today and not
tomorrow without being accused of inconsistency, or with having changed my =
mind (not just my feelings) in a
fundamental way. And we all think there must be something about what I resp=
ect
that shows that the respect is mer=
ited,
whether any particular individual feels it or not.
5) =
Thus I am
naturally drawn to intrinsic description , that is, a descrip=
tion
of my reaction which shows how it is required
even where that reaction is missing.(it was required of those guards, even
though missing).
(a) =
So someone =
who
fails to show respect for life has indeed failed at something. Someone who does not feel nausea a=
t a
certain smell has not failed at anything.&=
nbsp;
A rotting stinking piece of road kill is dumped on my dinner plate. I
don’t feel nausea or sick or any other negative feeling. That makes me
odd, different. It doesn̵=
7;t
make me “mistaken.” We might wonder why I lack the
“normal” reaction, but our investigation of why will not require
intrinsic descriptions, but, say, some piece of physiology which shows why =
the
“normal” reaction did not take place.
6) =
Scientists =
(those
among them that are loyal to naturalism) often resist the notion of intrins=
ic
description. Thus they might =
try to
give a sociobiological account of the presence or absence of
certain “moral” reactions, an account which is not fundamentally
different from accounts of things like nausea.
(a) =
&nb=
sp;
What would =
an
evolutionary account of nausea be like? (Please refrain from Lamarckianism!=
)
A) =
1) . =
For
example, respect for persons is required because they are all creatures of
God,(so the existence of God is required), or, respect is required because =
they
are rational beings and such beings have incomparable worth (so there are s=
uch
rational beings (cf. Kant)).
2) In=
the
modern era there is much uncertainty about and hesitance in committing to s=
uch
ontologies. That is the ̶=
0;modern predicament.” Given a tight connection between
morality and ideas of the self, we can thus expect to get what we do indeed
have, namely, much confusion and uncertainty about what it is to be a self,=
be somebody.
(a) =
&nb=
sp;
By contrast
consider Dostoevsky’s confident pronouncement, “If God is dead,
everything is permitted.” For
him the inescapable framework for our living was provided by the existence =
of
God. Moral constraints could =
only be made sense of given such an
ontology. And a corresponding=
set
of powerful beliefs about human selfhood can be found in Dostoevsky.
II) &n=
bsp;
Three a=
xes of
the moral life.
A) Respect for others
1) =
Modern vers=
ion
stresses the “right” to respect. Not to respect is to violate a
right. Rights can be claimed OR given up.
a. Thus, there need to be ‘inalienable
rights’ to cover such things as slavery. You cannot give up the right=
to
liberty.
b. Th=
e idea
of rights stresses autonomy (YOU decide to give them up, or keep them, for
instance).
c. Autonomy links to idea of freedom from interfere=
nce in
shaping of ones own life. v. 12. Cf. Casey again.
i. Avoid unnecessary suffering (no cosmic order)
ii. Stress value of everyday life (no heirarchy)
iii. =
Compare to =
natural
law idea. To not respect is to ignore the status of a person. A person cannot give up his/her status. Not
because of anything inalienable, but because of divine law, or the logos, e=
tc.
There is no alternative to that status.
B) Idea of good, worthwhile, meaningful, life (is a=
moral
idea, or at any rate evokes strong evaluation. Thus, ‘your entire lif=
e is
a waste’ is a strong evaluation)
1) cf. links to A i, ii, iii in modern era.
C) Idea of “attitudinal respect”, respe=
ct
demanded by “dignity “ of others. Dignity can consist in
1) Power etc. cf. degradation of those without powe=
r, as
in Darfur. Slavery etc. To be without power is to be without dignity.
2) Being self sufficient etc.
3) Maintaining myself in my station and its duties
(ordinary life theme. Cf. Cinderella man).
(a) Cf. loss of dignity when no longer able to suppo=
rt
self, or family, etc.
III)
Different cultures stress different=
axes;
but, the “axes” (II a,b,c.; the frameworks) are not questioned.=
A) Homeric (heroic) culture stress on C, esp. C1.
B) Second axis (B) questions arise in any culture
1) Warrior living up to promise of his calling (hon=
or,
courage etc.) cf. Captain in Bleak =
House.
2) Religious person living up to call beyond conven=
tional
piety
3) Finding fulfillment through exemplary instancing=
of
familiar norms, etc.(common life theme).
C) Compare B 1 and 2 to B in modern cultures. In the
latter, one threat to fullness of life is the possible lack of any framework whatsoever. (sense of meaninglessness).
1) Compare Luther’s “despair” to =
the
despair of modern nihilist.
2) Some frameworks are gone for good (Plato’s
heirarchy of being?).
3) Some have partial following (honor in the milita=
ry)
4) Some are still strong, (e.g. religious views) bu=
t do
not provide horizon for ALL (entire societies).
D) Contestability of frameworks leads to sense of q=
uest
for something. “Give me something I can live for, live in, a way of
thinking that will enable me to achieve a real life.”
1) The moral meaning of axis 2 comes out in the ban=
ality
of Eichmann. The humdrum life is potentially the terrible life.
“Humdrum” means “without any moral framework, without qualitative distinctions.” The
bureaucrat. A framework of efficient production of anything (e.g. getting r=
id
of Jews, or...) The man without qualities (Robert Musil).
2) Loss of frameworks leads to changes in
psychopathology. P.19
E) Good life as mastery of self;
1) Reason over desire or impulse (Plato)
2) Duty over attachment (Stoics, Kant)
3) Devotion to truth vs. what I would like to be true (cf. Huxley)
F) Good life as striving for what is higher, vs. de=
nial
of qualitative distinctions (there is no “higher”). That is a t=
heme
in utilitarianism (all preferences, desires, are equal). 1) But util. is itself a view motivated, in part, b=
y the
“ideal” of the value of the common life. IV)
Strong
evaluation, moral ideals, and havin=
g an
identity, being a self, or agen=
cy. A) Moral ideals/horizons are necessary for undamaged
personhood. Consider a person who simply does not care about qualitative
distinctions. Mersault in Camus’ The
Stranger. B) Moral framework is like spatial framework. We get
oriented within it, cannot imagine replacing it or going without it. C) To have an identity is to have a stance. Who I
am=3Dwhere I stand. Where I stand is given by strong evaluations, claims ab=
out
what is GOOD. Without this a person is no agent, no author of acts. Agency.=
1) Thus, the idea of (a) Good (b) Agency (c) Identity (who am I?) =
&nb=
sp;
are internally linked. V)
The web=
of
interlocution. A) The self is formed through interchange with othe=
rs
(cf. feral children). B) There must be some group or community which prov=
ides
the qualitative distinctions. 1) Rebels, prophets, etc. still draw on such a comm=
unity,
even if it is only the “saving remnant.” 2) Emersonian “self reliance” looks lik=
e a
denial of community, but in fact belongs in that prophetic tradition (cf.
Cavell on Emerson and Wittgenstein) 3) Compare American individualism to India’s
familial loyalty and sense of self. C) Epicurean friendship as a test case for the
possibility of a naturalist dismissal of qualitative distinctions. Epicurus=
was
a naturalist. How could he account for friendship? He couldn’t. Yet he
considered it of the utmost importance, particularly for the conversation it afforded. D) The web is a “transcendental conditionR=
21;
for agency, selfhood. Means? A transcendental condition is a condition of
sense, i.e. what must be the case to make sense of ordinary distinctions, w=
ays
of thinking, talking, interacting. The “best account” (BA) of w=
hat
we actually have, rather than a
“revisionist” theor=
y that
proposes to replace (in theory at least) what we have. Cf. Kant on Humean
causality. 1) What must be the case for there to be language?<=
o:p> 2) What must be the case for there to be qualitative
distinctions? 3) What must be the case for there to be selves (cf.
Casey again)? VI)
The spa=
ce of
moral reasons, the second axis, and the Good. A) We cannot not CARE where we are in that space (A=
xis
#2) B) The goods by which we orient ourselves ARE the m=
easure
of the worth of our lives. 1) Various forms of “longing for the beyond&#=
8221; simply
register disappointment in ‘this life as now lived’ (a) Thus, in the “value of common life”
framework, longing for the beyond is not longing for something
“uncommon” but rather longing for a better, more perfect instan=
cing
of those common life values (cf. Feurbach on the holy family). (b) Cf. the desire to “be there” (“=
;I was
there when” or “I’ve been to that place” where
something great happened.) Something higher, in some sense, than life as now lived. VII) &=
nbsp; &nbs=
p;
Narrati=
ve and
the good. A) Lives are always incomplete, always unfolding. <=
o:p> 1) Thus, I must see my identity in terms of a narrative. B) A narrative, to make sense, must connect past,
present, future. Future is “absolute” in the sense that I must
decide, one way or other, what it is to be (existential theme). C) Alzheimer’s is, according to surveys, the =
most
feared disease. Why? Think about that!!!