MORAL PHILOSOPHY THROUGH THE AGES

 

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Preface

 

1. Cultural Relativism

Introduction.

Classic Cultural Relativism.

Xenophanes and the Greek Skeptics.

Later Defenders of Cultural Relativism.

The Argument from Social Diversity.

Balfour’s Criticism: Many Customs are Simply Depraved.

Rachels’s Criticism: Some Key Values do not Vary.

Common Arguments Against Cultural Relativism.

Whether Cultural Relativists deny all Moral Values.

Whether Cultural Relativism leads to Horrible Values.

Whether Cultural Relativism rules out Universal Judgments.

Summary.

 

2. Plato’s Moral Objectivism

Introduction.

Background of Plato’s Moral theory.

The Sophists and Socrates.

Protagoras’ Individual Relativism.

 Plato’s Moral theory.

Theory of the Moral Forms.

Recollection and Knowledge of the Forms.

Criticisms of Plato’s theory.

Aristotle’s First Criticism: The Forms do not Add to our Knowledge.

Aristotle’s Second Criticism: Participation is not Explained.

Mackie’s First Criticism: The Concept of the Forms is Queer.

Mackie’s Second Criticism: A Psychological Explanation of Objectification.

The Legacy of Plato’s Moral theory.

Plato’s Influence.

Skepticism About Plato’s Moral Objectivism.

Summary.

 

3. Virtue theory

Introduction.

Early Greek View of Virtues.

Aristotle’s theory.

Appetite-Regulating Habits.

Practical Wisdom.

Good Temper.

Virtue theory After Aristotle.

Traditional Criticisms of Virtue theory.

Grotius’s Criticism: Many Virtues are not at a Mean.

Kant’s Criticism: Without Moral Principles Misapplied Virtues Become Vices.

Mill’s Criticism: Morality Involves Judging Actions and not Character Traits.

Contemporary Discussions of Virtues and Rules.

Feminine Ethics and Virtue theory.

Virtues with Or without Rules?

Contemporary Criticisms.

The Value of Virtue theory.

Incorporating Virtue Theory Into Other Moral Theories.

The Best Teacher of Morality.

Summary.

 

4. Natural Law theory

Introduction.

Origins of Natural Law theory.

Aquinas Natural Law theory.

Four Types of Law: Eternal, Natural, Human, and Divine.

The Synderesis Principle.

Primary, Secondary and Super-Added Principles.

Revisions and Criticisms of Natural Law theory.

Suarez’s Revision: Knowledge of Natural Law is Based on Conscience, not Natural Inclinations.

Grotius’s Revision: Natural Law is Founded only on the Instinct of Sociability.

Hobbes’s and Pufendorf’s Revision: Natural Law is Founded on the Instinct of Self-Preservation.

Hume’s and Bentham’s Criticism: Natural Law Theories Erroneously Derive Ought from Is.

The Value of Natural Law theory. 

Natural Law and Homosexuality.

The Legacy of Natural Law theory.

Summary.

 

5. Morality and the Will of God

Introduction.

Plato and the Euthyphro Puzzle.

Traditional Voluntarism.

Scotus’s Voluntarism.

Voluntarism after Scotus.

Arguments For and Against Voluntarism.

Argument from Revoking Established Moral Standards.

The Argument from Absolute Power.

Criticism: Voluntarism Implies that Divine Goodness is Meaningless.

God and Morality. 

Lingering Problems with Religious Ethics.

Summary.

 

6. Social Contract theory

Introduction.

Hobbes’s theory.

The State of Nature.

The Laws of Nature.

Political Theory and Moral theory. 

Social Contract Theory in the 17 and 18th Centuries.

Criticisms of Hobbes.

Hyde’s Criticism: Hobbes Denies that Morality is Immutable and Eternal.

Clarke’s Criticism: Punishment Alone won’t Motivate us to Always Keep Contracts.

Hume’s Criticism: We don’t even Tacitly Agree to A Social Contract.

Recent Social Contract theory.

The Prisoners’ Dilemma.

Rawls and Social Contract theory.

The Value of Social Contract theory.

Social Contract vs. Social Reciprocation.

Mixing Moral theory and Political theory.

Summary.

 

7. Duty theory

Introduction.

The Development and Popularity of Traditional Duty theory.

Pufendorf’s theory of Duties.

Survival and Mutual Cooperation.

Duties to God, oneself, and Others.

Intuitionism and Other Features of Duty theory.

Revisions and Criticisms of Duty theory.

Kant's Revision: No Duties to God since we cannot Know God.

Mill’s Criticism: Duties to oneself Reduce to only Self-Respect and Self-Development.

Sidgwick’s Criticism: Common Sense Moral Intuitions are Imprecise.

Duty theory today.

Ross’s theory of Prima Facie Duties.

The Value of Duty theory.

Duties and Suicide.

Summary.

 

8. Natural and Human Rights

Introduction.

Natural Rights and Natural Law.

Locke’s theory.

Natural Rights within the State of Nature.

Slavery and the Right to Life.

The Right to Property.

Political Authorities and the Right to Liberty.

Criticisms of Natural Rights theory.

Burke’s Criticism: Abstract notions of Natural Rights are too Simplistic.

Bentham’s Criticism: Legal Rights are Grounded in Fact, Natural Rights are not.

Marx’s Criticism: Natural Rights Emphasize Selfishness and Ignore Community.

Human Rights theory today.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Interrelation Between Human Rights and Legal Rights.

Summary.

 

9. Moral Reason vs. Moral Feeling

Introduction.

Clarke’s Rationalist theory.

Eternal Moral Relations.

Hume’s Criticisms of Clarke.

Hume’s Moral theory.

Early Moral Sense theories.

The Moral Spectator’s Sympathetic Feelings.

Moral Motivation and Morality without God. 

Criticisms of Hume.

Reid’s First Criticism: Hume Abuses Common Moral Language.

Reid’s Second Criticism: Reporting Feelings Differs from Approving.

The Value of Hume’s theory. 

Utilitarianism and the Fate of the Agent and Spectator. 

Summary.

 

10. Kant’s Categorical Imperative

Introduction.

Kant’s Moral theory.

Influences on Kant’s theory.

Motives that Influence our Human Will.

The Formula of the Law of Nature.

The Formula of the End Itself.

Criticisms of Kant’ theory.

Schopenhauer’s Criticism: The Categorical Imperative Reduces to Egoism.

Mill’s Criticism: The Categorical Imperative Reduces to Utilitarianism.

Anscombe’s Criticism: There is no Procedure for Constructing Maxims.

The Value of the Categorical Imperative.

Traditional Duty theory and the Formula of the Law of Nature.

The Value of the Formula of the End Itself.

Summary.

 

11. Utilitarianism

Introduction.

Historical Development of Utilitarianism.

18th Century Contributions.

Bentham’s Utilitarian Calculus.

Limitations of Bentham’s theory.

Mill’s Utilitarianism.

Elements of Mill’s theory.

General Happiness and Higher Pleasures.

Traditional Criticisms of Mill.

Bradley’s Criticism: Utilitarianism Conflicts with Ordinary Moral Judgments.

Grote’s Criticism: Utilitarianism only Perpetuates the Status Quo.

Albee’s Criticism: Higher Pleasures are Inconsistent with Hedonism.

The Continuing Utilitarian Tradition.

Ideal Utilitarianism and Preference Utilitarianism.

Problems with the Bare Bones Utilitarian Formula.

Summary.

 

12. Evolutionary Ethics

Introduction.

19th Century theories of Evolutionary Ethics.

Darwin and the Evolution of Moral Faculties.

Spencer’s Evolutionary Ethics.

Moore’s Criticism of Spencer.

The Naturalistic Fallacy.

Identifying “Goodness” with “More Evolved”.

Identifying “Goodness” with “Universal Pleasure”.

Evolutionary Ethics today.

Lingering Problems with Evolutionary Ethics.

Sociobiology and Moral Ambivalence.

Natural Selection as an Analogy.

Summary.

 

13. Emotivism and Prescriptivism

Introduction.

Ayer’s theory.

Logical Positivism and the Verification Principle.

Descriptive Utterances vs. Performative Utterances.

Emotivism and Prescriptivism.

Criticisms of Ayer.

Ross’s Criticism: Performativism is Based on the Faulty Verification Principle.

Moore’s Criticism: Performativism does not Account For Moral Arguments.

Descriptive and Performative Elements.

Stevenson and Hare.

Additional Performative Functions of Moral Statements.

Skeptical Implications of Extreme Emotivism and Prescriptivism.

Summary.

 

14. Best Reasons Morality and the Problem of Abortion

Introduction.

The Process of Moral Reasoning.

Toulmin’s View of Moral Reasoning.

Baier’s View of Moral Reasoning.

Best Reasons and Applied Ethics.

The Fetus’s Moral Status.

Gathering the Facts.

Extreme Pro-Choice Potentiality Principle.

Extreme Pro-Life and Moderate Potentiality Principles.

Fetus’s Interests Vs. Other’s Interests.

Gathering and Weighing the Facts.

Some Extenuating Circumstances.

Other Extenuating Circumstances.

Conclusion.

Limitations of the Best Reasons Approach.

Summary.

 

15. The Interrelation Between Different Ethical theories

Introduction.

An Ethical Super-theory.

The Duties and Virtues of the Agent.

Rights, Virtues and Consequences Regarding the Receiver.

The Spectator’s Spontaneous and Reflective Assessments.

Moral Reflection and the Source of Moral Intuitions.

Isolationist Ethical Theories vs. an Ethical Super-Theory.

Moral Images.

The Function of Moral Images in Common-Life.

The Normative Image of the Golden Rule.

Philosophical Normative Images.

Common-Life Normative Images.

Metaethical Images.

 

Glossary

 

#PREFACE

 

            On Halloween night in 1997, an 11-year-old boy from Michigan named Nathan Abraham shot to death a young man outside of a convenience store. Dressed in his Halloween costume at the time, Abraham fired a .22-caliber rifle from about 200 feet away from the store. Abraham claimed that he was aiming at trees and accidentally hit his victim, but prosecutors were not convinced. Abraham apparently had continual run-ins with the police and even bragged to his friends that he planned to shoot someone. Tried as an adult, Abraham became one of the youngest murder defendants in the United States. He was eventually found guilty of second-degree murder.

            We are all disturbed by stories of violent juvenile crimes such as this, which are unfortunately becoming all too frequent. They suggest that something has gone seriously wrong in our society and we’ve lost our ability to instill a sense of moral responsibility in our children. Who is to blame for the problem? How can we fix the problem? Although we are not likely to find any quick and easy answers to these questions, we can nevertheless find some help by turning to moral philosophy. The subject of moral philosophy involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. As far back in civilization as we find writing, we find people struggling with ethical questions. At one point in Western civilization -- about 600 BCE -- philosophers began offering theories that clarified the source and content of our moral obligations. This book traces some of the major themes that have emerged in the history of Western moral philosophy, from the earliest days to the present.

            Moral philosophers offer a range of theories to explain the nature and content of our moral obligations. Some theories -- commonly called metaethical theories -- try to explain where morality comes from and what psychologically takes place when we make moral judgments. Does society create morality? Is morality a fixed and objective feature of the cosmos? Am I doing anything more than expressing my feelings when I make moral judgments? Metaethical theories attempt to address these questions. Other theories -- commonly called normative theories -- try to tell us exactly what our moral obligations are. According to some of these theories, there is a specific list of foundational duties that we need to follow. Other theories maintain that there is a single principle that encapsulates our obligations, such as that we should maximize the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Still others maintain that our obligations are grounded in a group of virtuous habits that we develop, such as courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom.

            The variety and complexity of both metaethical and normative ethical theories is sometimes daunting. If we study and slowly understand one theory, we are likely to find that the very next theory criticizes the earlier theory. And this new theory, in turn, is attacked by the next theory. So, not only are the theories themselves challenging, but we face a new challenge in trying to see how these competing theories illuminate the nature and content of our moral obligations. In writing this book I’ve taken measures to make the reader’s philosophical exploration of ethics easier -- or at least less overwhelming -- than it otherwise might be. I’ve minimized the use of technical vocabulary. I’ve also tied each of the chapters to matters of practical moral concern. The opening of each chapter discusses some concrete ethical issue, such as suicide, capital punishment, or abortion, which helps establish the importance of the chapter’s topic and often serves as a consistent example for discussion throughout the chapter.

            When discussing the various ethical theories, I didn’t attempt to evaluate them all from the vantage of a single tradition, such as the utilitarian tradition. To do so would be cumbersome and risk forcing theories into molds that they don’t fit. Instead, I’ve tried to present the various theories in a positive light, defend them against key criticisms if possible, revise them if necessary, and find some central feature of the theory that illuminates the nature of morality. In the final chapter of this book I try to integrate as many of these theories as possible into a single coherent system, which I call an ethical super-theory. I also argue that each ethical theory can have value in our common moral lives by helping us visualize our moral obligations.

            There are many possible topics and figures that an ethics book might cover, and it’s impossible for any single text to adequately touch upon everything of value. The issues selected here are restricted to the Western philosophical tradition that began in ancient Greece and developed in the countries of Western Europe, and later in America. They are also the issues that philosophers today commonly find interesting. Although scholars of moral philosophy today will certainly have their own lists of favorite issues, hopefully the ones presented here will have a common appeal.

            Introductory books in ethics are typically structured in one of two ways. Some are arranged topically, and focus on major themes and issues, such as cultural relativism, virtue, or duty. Although it is interesting to discuss morality from a topical standpoint, the downfall of this approach is that writers often sacrifice historical context and sometimes even present theories that no traditional philosopher actually ever proposed. Other ethics textbooks are structured historically, and present a continuous chronological sequence of theories, beginning in ancient Greece and ending in present times. Although this approach preserves historical context, many historically-oriented ethics books are tedious to read and give us too many picky facts about a philosopher’s theory.

            This book takes a middle ground between the topical and historical approaches. The chapters are topically arranged, but they preserve the flow of history in two ways. First, each chapter explains the historical development of the topic under consideration. Many ethical topics have very ancient beginnings, and by highlighting their history we better grasp how moral philosophers fall into specific traditions. Second, most chapters here focus on a specific famous philosopher who championed a particular tradition, such as Aristotle, Locke, or Kant, and the chapters are chronologically ordered based on when these key philosophers lived. Although chronologically ordered, the chapters in this book are conceptually self-contained, which allows them to be read in any order. To achieve the full benefit of their historical sequence, though, they should be read in the order presented. Many of the sections and subsections of the chapters are also conceptually self-contained discussions. So, a reader who skips some sections will not necessarily be at a loss to understand the remaining sections.

            I wish to thank friends and colleagues who have generously offered advice on this book’s contents. Alphabetically, they are John Danley, Ken King, Norman Lillegard, Matthew McCormick, James Otteson, Gregory Pence, Louis Pojman, and Laura Roberts.

 

 

#1. CULTURAL RELATIVISM

 

INTRODUCTION.

 

            In the early 20th century journalist Robert L. Ripley traveled around the world gathering stories of strange rituals, which he published in his popular column “Believe It or Not.” Our fascination with bizarre practices of other cultures is no less prominent today. Some foreign practices amuse us, such as that of Japanese men who tattoo their entire bodies. Others make us squeamish, such as a Latin American culinary practice of eating handfuls of live bugs in tortillas. However, other foreign cultural practices make us morally indignant. One of these is female genital mutilation, which is common in East African countries and parts of the Near East. This practice involves removing portions of a young girl’s genitals, including her clitoris and labia. Social scientists estimate that over 100 million women alive today have had this operation performed. An article published by UNICEF describes the situation for one six-year-old girl and her sympathetic aunt:

 

            The lights are dim and the voices quiet. Tension fills the room where Nafisa, a six-year-old Sudanese girl lies on a bed in the corner. Her aunt, 25-year-old Zeinab, watches protectively as her niece undergoes the procedure now known as female genital mutilation (FGM), formerly called female circumcision. In this procedure, performed without anaesthesia, a girl’s external sexual organs are partially or totally cut away. Zeinab does not approve. For the past year she has been trying to persuade her mother and sister to spare Nafisa from the procedure. She lost the battle with her family, but she will stay at her niece’s side. She watches Nafisa lying quietly, brave and confused, and remembers her own experience. Zeinab underwent the procedure twice. At six years old she had the more moderate form of FGM, called Sunni, in which the covering of the clitoris is removed. When she was 15 the older women of her family insisted she have the Pharaonic form, which involves removal of the entire clitoris and the labia and stitching together of the vulva, leaving just a small hole for elimination of urine and menstrual blood. Zeinab still remembers the pain, the face of the women performing the procedure, the sound of her flesh being cut. She also remembers bleeding and being sick for weeks.

 

More extreme cases of female genital mutilation involve sewing closed the vagina, leaving only a small opening for passing urine and blood. The purpose of these procedures is to reduce sexual drive and thus assure a woman’s virginity prior to marriage and her fidelity after marriage. Female genital mutilation is performed as a rite of passage, sometimes involuntarily, in unsterile conditions and without the aid of painkillers and antibiotics. Ironically, older women of the community perform the procedure, who themselves underwent it in their youth. Although this practice is cultural rather than religious, it occurs predominately in Muslim countries.

            In North America, we find the practices of female genital mutilation grossly immoral. They are not only illegal, but there is widespread public outcry against other cultures that endorse this practice. However, while we attack female genital mutilation, East African defenders of this practice charge that American culture has degenerated to the point that promiscuity, infidelity, and childbirth outside of marriage are acceptable behaviors. By guarding against such sexual misconduct, their culture, so they claim, is on morally higher ground. From a philosophical perspective, these foreign practices directly challenge our traditionally held moral views and they make us wonder whether their morality/immorality reduces to mere social convention.

            For centuries, moral philosophers have reflected on the philosophical problems raised by clashing social values. The principal question raised is whether moral values exist independently of human social creations. Cultural relativism is the view that societies create their own traditions, pass them along from one generation to another, and continually reinforce them through rewards and punishments. On this view morality is a distinctly human invention and it makes no sense to look for a foundation of morality outside of human social approval. This is so for the east African practice of female genital mutilation as well as the American condemnation of this practice. This isn’t simply an issue of anthropological curiosity concerning how different people and cultures view morality. Instead, it is an issue of whether my and your specific moral obligations are grounded in nothing other than cultural approval.

            Cultural relativism is a component of a broader moral theory called moral relativism, which holds more generally that moral values are human inventions. This broader theory includes both (a) individual relativism, namely, that each person creates his own moral standards, and (b) cultural relativism, namely that social cultures create moral standards. We will focus here on only the theory of cultural relativism and look at its historical development as well as the key arguments against it.

 

CLASSIC CULTURAL RELATIVISM.

 

            The issue of cultural relativism was one of the first hotly debated issues in Western moral philosophy, and the views of early cultural relativists have trickled down to today largely unchanged.

 

            Xenophanes and the Greek Skeptics. One of the earliest accounts of cultural relativism was offered by the ancient Greek philosopher Xenophanes (570-475 BCE.). His writings were unfortunately lost through time, but enough isolated quotations from his works survive so that we still have a general view of his position. Xenophanes focuses specifically on the culturally relative nature of religious beliefs, rather than ethical beliefs per se. In two fragments, Xenophanes explains how different ethnic groups depict their deities differently:

 

            Ethiopians say that their gods are flat-nosed and dark, Thracians that theirs are blue-eyed and red-haired.

            If oxen and horses and lions had hands and were able to draw with their hands and do the same things as men, horses would draw the shapes of gods to look like horses and oxen to look like ox, and each would make the gods’ bodies have the same shape as they themselves had.

 

In the first of these passages Xenophanes notes that different ethnic groups portray the gods with physical attributes that are unique to their own people. In the second passage he speculates that if animals could draw then they would make the gods look like animals. Xenophanes’ point is that our own cultural experiences shape the things that we say about the gods, and our religious views aren’t really objective descriptions of the gods themselves. Although Xenophanes’ comments are confined to our views about the gods, it isn’t much of a stretch to extend this reasoning to ethical issues and see that morality is also culturally relative. Greek historians after Xenophanes fueled the discussion of cultural relativism in both religion and ethics by providing graphic examples of differing cultural practices in various civilizations of the day. After surveying the traditions of different countries, the Greek historian Heroditus (484-425 BCE) concluded that “Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best.” Heroditus’s point is that, not only do we all adopt the religious and ethical value systems of our respective cultures, but we typically go a step further and denounce foreign value systems as inferior to our own.

            The next big step in the development of cultural relativism was made by ancient Greek philosophers of the skeptical tradition, who were directly influenced by Xenophanes. Once again, we only have sketchy information about the earliest philosophers of the skeptical tradition.  The founder of this tradition was a charismatic and original moral philosopher named Pyrrho (c.365-c.275 BCE), who had several loyal followers, but wrote nothing himself. In one of his few surviving statements Pyrrho argues that in moral matters we cannot determine whether anything is truly good or bad, and, so, we must suspend judgment. As the skeptical tradition continued, followers of Pyrrho developed this line of reasoning and, eventually the views of the skeptics were systematically written down by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus (fl. 200 CE). Sextus presents the definitive statement of cultural relativism. Drawing on anthropological data presented by earlier Greek historians, Sextus gives example after example of moral standards that differ from one society to another. These include attitudes about homosexuality, incest, cannibalism, human sacrifice, killing the elderly, infanticide, theft, and eating animal flesh.

            Sextus believes that this social diversity in and of itself is a good reason to adopt cultural relativism. The differing cultural attitudes are quite extreme and Sextus clearly wants to shock us into thinking seriously about this diversity. Here is his account of differing attitudes concerning the treatment of dead human bodies:

 

Some wrap the dead up completely and then cover them with earth, thinking that it is impious to expose them to the sun; but the Egyptians take out their entrails and embalm them and keep them above ground with themselves. The fish-eating tribes of the Ethiopians cast them into the lakes, there to be devoured by the fish; the Hyrcanians expose them as prey to dogs, and some of the Indians to vultures. And they say that some of the Troglodytes take the corpse to a hill, and then after tying its head to its feet cast stones upon it amidst laughter, and when they have made a heap of stones over it they leave it there. And some of the barbarians slay and eat those who are over sixty years old, but bury in the earth those who die young. Some burn the dead; and of these some recover and preserve their bones, while others show no care but leave them scattered about. And they say that the Persians impale their dead and embalm them with niter, after which they wrap them round in bandages. [Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3:24]

 

In this passage Sextus describes that in different cultures dead bodies are buried in the ground, embalmed above the ground, eaten by various animals, eaten by people, or burned. Sextus concludes from his discussion that “the skeptic, seeing so great a diversity of usages, suspends judgment as to the natural existence of anything good or bad or (in general) fit or unfit to be done.” That is, for Sextus, we should doubt the existence of an independent and universal standard of morality and, instead, see that moral values are the result of cultural preferences.

            Sextus and other Pyrrhonian skeptics have a particular goal in mind when advancing cultural relativism, and that goal is personal tranquility. Suppose that I believe that there exists a fixed and objective standard of truth; suppose further that I follow this standard as a guide for my life. Since I see myself on the side of moral truth, then I will become morally outraged by those who don’t follow these moral standards. I’ll quarrel with other people, angrily condemn them, and ultimately become miserable through my extreme convictions. However, once I seriously reflect on the wide diversity of cultural practices that Sextus describes, I will be more inclined to see that my own cultural practices are rooted in social custom. I will then get off my moral high horse and be content to accept the moral diversity that I see in other cultures.

 

            Later Defenders of Cultural Relativism. In the centuries following Sextus Empiricus, Christian philosophers of the middle ages harshly rejected the skepticism and cultural relativism of their Greek predecessors. According to most medieval Christian philosophers, moral values are eternal principles, mandated by God, and binding on all humans. Although some “heathen” cultures might consistently engage in strange moral practices, such as ceremonial prostitution, medieval philosophers argued that these practices are simply immoral, despite how widespread they are. This Christian view of morals continued for several centuries and was finally challenged by skeptically-minded philosophers in the Enlightenment period, who were inspired by Sextus Empiricus’s writings.

            French philosopher Michel Eyquem de Montaigne (1533-1592) was among the first to resurrect the skeptical views of Sextus Empiricus. Montaigne wholeheartedly endorsed Sextus Empiricus’s cultural relativism, which he articulates in an essay titled “Of Custom, and That we should not Easily Change a Law Received” (1580). In this essay Montaigne describes dozens of strange cultural practices from foreign countries, focusing especially on sexually-related practices. In one culture, unmarried women “may prostitute themselves to as many as they please” and, when they get pregnant, they can lawfully abort their fetuses “in the sight of everyone”. In another culture, male guests at weddings are invited to sleep with the bride even before the groom does, “and the greater number of them there is, the greater is her honor and the opinion of her ability and strength.” Montaigne describes one culture in which gender roles are strangely reversed: houses of prostitution contain young men “for the pleasure of women” and “wives go to war as well as the husbands”.

In addition to sexually-related practices, Montainge lists others from almost every aspect of life:

 

[There are societies] where they boil the bodies of their dead, and afterwards pound them to a pulp, which they mix with their wine, and drink it; where the most coveted burial is to be eaten by dogs ... where they live in that rare and unsociable opinion of the mortality of the soul; ... where women urinate standing and men squatting; where they send their blood in a token of friendship ... where the children nurse for four years, and often twelve; ... where they circumcise the women; ... in another it is reputed a holy duty for a man to kill his father at a certain age; ... where children of seven years old endured being whipped to death, without changing expression ... [Essays, “Of Custom”]

 

Montainge concludes that custom has the power to shape every possible kind of cultural practice. Although we pretend that morality is a fixed feature of nature, morality too is formed through custom: “the laws of conscience, which we pretend to be derived from nature, proceed from custom.” Montaigne argues further that social peer pressure is so strong, that we automatically approve of our society’s customs: “as everyone has an inward veneration for the opinions and manners approved of and received among his own people, no one can, without very great reluctance, depart from them, or apply himself to them without approval.”

            Almost two centuries later, Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) reiterated Sextus’s skeptical view of cultural relativism. Hume presents a fictitious dialog in which the leading character argues that many moral practices are accepted by some cultures, yet condemned by other cultures. Some of these include attitudes about homosexual pedophilia, adultery, infanticide, and euthanasia. The leading character in Hume’s dialog boldly concludes that “fashion, vogue, custom, and law [are] the chief foundation of all moral determinations.”

            Cultural relativism received another boost from sociologists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Perhaps the best example is American sociologist William Graham Sumner (1840-1910). In his classic work Folkways (1906), Sumner argues that the morality of a given society simply amounts to the folkways or traditions of that society. For Sumner, theories that try to ground morality in some absolute standard are misguided:

 

In the folkways, whatever is, is right. ... When we come to the folkways we are at the end of our analysis. ... Therefore rights can never be “natural” or “God-given,” or absolute in any sense. The morality of a group at a time is the sum of the taboos and prescriptions in the folkways by which right conduct is defined. [Folkways, 1:31]

 

Sumner argues that there are no exceptions to this: a society’s values concerning slavery, abortion, killing the elderly, and cannibalism only reflect that society’s traditional taboos and prescriptions.

            One of the most articulate philosophical defenders of cultural relativism in recent years is Australian philosopher J.L. Mackie (1917-1981). Like his skeptical predecessors, Mackie believes that moral values vary from culture to culture. Also like his predecessors, he  believes that there simply are no objective moral values, a view that he calls moral skepticism. For Mackie, this means that morality is something that we invent: “Morality is not to be discovered but to be made: we have to decide what moral views to adopt, what moral stands to take.” From Xenophanes on through Mackie, the key points associated with the tradition of cultural relativism are these:

 

·        Moral values are created by society (cultural relativism)

·        Moral values vary from culture to culture (social diversity)

·        There is no objective moral truth (moral skepticism)

 

THE ARGUMENT FROM SOCIAL DIVERSITY.

 

            A running theme among cultural relativists is that values differ from society to society, and the best explanation for such variation is that societies simply create their own values. We can express this intuition more formally in the argument here:

 

(1) Morally significant values differ from society to society.

(2) These differing moral values are either grounded in objective moral standards or they are grounded only in social custom.

(3) It is difficult to explain how these differing moral values are grounded in objective moral standards.

(4) Therefore, it is more reasonable to believe that these differing moral values are grounded in social custom.

 

To understand this argument we need to go through it premise by premise. Premise 1 advocates the view of social diversity, that is, the view that different cultures in fact have different moral values. Defenders of this claim -- from Sextus down to Mackie -- believed that this is a matter of factual observation. We can directly see differences in values between various cultures. For example, Sumner argues that our observations will clearly reveal that even taboos against incest are “by no means universal or uniform, or attended by the same intensity of repugnance.” Similarly, in our own day, we directly witness that many East African cultures favor the practice of female genital mutilation; by contrast, it is plain that we in North America abhor the practice. If we properly make our observations, then there should be little dispute about the truth of social diversity with at least some morally significant values.

            If we grant premise 1 above as a matter of fact, we can next consider the other two premises of this argument. Premise 2 maintains that there are two contending ways of understanding where moral values come from. Values are either grounded in (a) an objective standard that is independent of human society, or (b) social custom. Over the centuries, moral objectivists have proposed a variety of objective standards of morality. For example, some objectivists hold that moral standards are grounded in eternal truths, or in laws of nature, or in God’s commands. What is in common with all of these views is that, according to moral objectivists, moral standards are grounded in a more stable level of reality beyond mere human social custom. Premise 2, then, is at least a plausible way of seeing the possible foundations of moral standards: they are either grounded in a more stable level of reality beyond social custom, or they are grounded in social custom.

            Finally, premise 3 states that it is hard to see how moral standards are grounded in an objective reality if they change from culture to culture. Moral objectivists believe that our objectively grounded moral beliefs should shape our cultural practices. For example, on the objectivist view, we condemn stealing in our culture because there is an objective standard that tells us that stealing is wrong. However, when we consider the wide variety of conflicting moral values in societies around the world, it does not seem reasonable that these all are grounded in a universal and objective standard. On face value, then, premise 3 also seems credible.

            The conclusion that we draw, then, is that moral values are grounded in social custom, which -- compared to moral objectivism -- more reasonably explains the moral diversity that we see. Suppose, for example, that I believe that polygamy is immoral while my friend from Saudi Arabia believes that polygamy is morally permissible. The more reasonable explanation is that our respective cultures influence our individual beliefs, rather than the objectivist alternative that objectively informed beliefs influence our cultures. Cultural relativism, then, is the most reasonable explanation for why our moral beliefs mimic our culture. Although this argument seems plausible at face value, critics have pointed out some flaws. We will look at two criticisms.

 

            Balfour’s Criticism: Many Customs are Simply Depraved. Over the centuries critics of cultural relativism have attacked the above argument from social diversity on several grounds. One response is to challenge premise 3, which states that “It is difficult to explain how these differing moral values are grounded in objective moral standards.” The entire argument from social diversity will topple if we can offer a cogent explanation as to how differing cultural values might be grounded in an objective reality. In responding to Hume’s statement of cultural relativism, 18th century Scottish philosopher James Balfour (1705-1795) argued that, even if customs do vary throughout time and from place to place, there is still an underlying ideal moral standard that these cultures simply ignore. The whole batch of these cultures are simply corrupt, and these corrupt values only highlight true morality all the more:

 

            Such an opinion leads to this unavoidable consequence, that whatever any set of men, or even any individual person, may think fit to do, however criminal in itself, must yet be deemed a virtue; because it is immediately agreeable to those who practise it.

            But let us suppose that a whole nation should universally countenance a bad practice, this never would alter the nature of things, nor give sanction to vice. ...

            But so far are the depraved customs of the multitude, or even the practices of the great from being the just standard of morality, that virtue shines forth with the greater lustre from amidst bad practices; and even an universal corruption renders it the more conspicuous. [Delineation, 5]

 

Part of Balfour’s attack is plausible, namely his contention that the customs of the multitudes may be depraved. Perhaps there exists an objective standard of morality and our particular moral beliefs become distorted as we try to perceive objective standards through our diverse cultures. So, if I believe that polygamy is immoral and my friend from Saudi Arabia believes polygamy is moral, then at least one of us, and perhaps both of us, might have a distorted understanding of objective morality.

            Even if this is so, we need to know how to determine which of our practices are depraved and which reflects true morality. Balfour’s solution is that the true standard of morality “shines forth with the greater lustre from amid bad practices.” For Balfour, the contrast between depraved practices and true morality is so pronounced that we all can intuitively see the difference. But Balfour’s solution does not work. There is no question that Balfour genuinely believed that some moral values “shine forth” as more legitimate than others. But it probably never occurred to Balfour that the strength of his moral convictions might have been shaped by his 18th century Scottish moral tradition, which was heavily influenced by Calvinistic religious beliefs. In a different culture, other moral values might “shine forth” to those people as more legitimate than those that Balfour holds as true. In short, since our internal intuitions themselves may be products of our respective cultures, then we can’t safely appeal to these intuitions to determine which of our practices are depraved, and which reflect true morality.

            Objectivist moral philosophers have offered a variety of more stringent litmus tests to help distinguish between true morality and depraved values; these proposed tests include rationality, natural law, religious scripture, and human nature. Although these appear to be more rigorous than Balfour’s test, they nevertheless all fall prey to the same problem that Balfour’s did. That is, they all may be products of our respective cultures. A chemical test to determine the pH level of swimming pools will work the same around the world. A mathematical test to determine the structural integrity of bridge designs will also work the same around the world. But notions of rationality, natural law, scripture, and human nature are matters of debate and do not represent uniform standards. Ultimately, if we can’t offer a uniform test to distinguish true morality from depraved values, then we should accept premise 3 in the above argument from social diversity.

 

            Rachels’s Criticism: Some Key Values do not Vary. A second approach to attacking the argument from social diversity is to challenge premise 1 above, which holds that “many morally significant values differ from culture to culture.” Some critics of relativism argue that there is less variation than relativists claim. According to critics, although it is true that many values do vary from culture to culture, a large number of these so-called “values” are not truly moral in nature and would be better classified as rules of prudence. That is, they involve personal lifestyle choices that, in spite of their strangeness, don’t warrant moral condemnation by anyone. Many of the culturally relative practices noted by Sextus Empiricus fall into the prudence category, such as his discussion here about men wearing dresses:

 

no man here would dress himself in a flowered robe reaching to the feet, although this dress, which with us is thought shameful, is held to be highly respectable by the Persians. And when, at the court of Dionysis the tyrant of Sicily, a dress of this description was offered to the philosophers Plato and Aristippus, Plato sent it away with the words “A man am I, and never could I don a woman’s garb”... [Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3:24]

 

Even Sextus’s above discussion of the differing cultural rituals surrounding dead human bodies also involves issues of prudence rather than morality. The same goes for many social customs that Montaigne lists.

            Distinguishing between true morality and prudence takes away some of the force from premise 1 in the above argument. But some critics of relativism argue even further that, if we look hard enough, we will actually find basic moral values that are the same in all cultures. In Hume’s “Dialogue” on cultural relativism, one character in the conversation who opposes relativism argues just this point:

 

It appears, that there never was any quality recommended by any one, as a virtue or moral excellence, but on account of its being useful, or agreeable to a man himself, or to others. For what other reason can ever be assigned for praise or approbation? Or where would be the sense of extolling a good character or action, which, at the same time, is allowed to be good for nothing? All the differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced to this one general foundation, and may be accounted for by the different views, which people take of these circumstances. [“A Dialogue”]

 

The point of the above reasoning is that, although there might be some diversity with specific types of conduct, there is one general moral standard that we find in all societies. This uniform moral standard involves the usefulness of conduct and the pleasure that we immediately experience from conduct. Consequently, underlying general moral standards don’t vary from culture to culture.

             In recent years James Rachels made a similar argument for three core common values: caring for children, truth-telling, and prohibitions against murder. For Rachels, these are all necessary conditions for the survival of a society since, if a society consistently violated any one of these, it would disintegrate. As to caring for children, all societies need to replenish its supply of educated and productive citizens, otherwise in only a few generations that society would die out. As to truth telling, the successful operation of industries, businesses, schools and governments all rest on trusting each other’s word. I would not buy groceries at my local store if I couldn’t trust that the grocer would let me take home what I paid for. As to prohibitions against murder, if society allowed us to randomly kill other humans just for sport, then everyone would head for the hills and stay as far from society as possible.

            The list of common values doesn’t need to stop with the three that Rachels mentions. Society would fall apart if there were no prohibition against stealing either privately held or publicly held property. Imagine what would happen, for example, if, to expand my garden, I simply annexed my neighbor’s back yard or the street in front of my house. Society also must commit itself to enforcing its core values, otherwise the values themselves would be empty words.

            So, by distinguishing between issues of morality vs. prudence, and by hunting down common social values, the critic of relativism successfully raises serious questions about the truth of premise 1. What at first seems to be an obvious truth for relativists -- that moral values differ from culture to culture -- now seems more like a hasty generalization. The critic’s victory may not be absolute, though, especially when we consider sexual values such as those concerning pedophilia, incest, homosexuality, adultery, and polygamy. Most of us don’t see these as issues of mere prudence, and attitudes about these practices indeed vary so widely that we can’t link them with a core value. Nevertheless, enough damage is done to premise 1 of the argument from social diversity that the sweeping conclusion of that argument no longer follows. That is, it isn’t necessarily more reasonable to believe that differing moral values are grounded in social custom.

 

COMMON ARGUMENTS AGAINST CULTURAL RELATIVISM.

 

            Even if the argument from social diversity fails as a proof for cultural relativism, this isn’t a decisive loss for the cultural relativist. The issue of cultural variability is not necessarily the central issue behind the cultural relativism/objectivism dispute. For, even if all cultures throughout time consistently endorsed a particular value, such as “murder is wrong,” cultural relativists could still argue that this value is grounded in societal traditions and is not based on objective standards. There may be common factors that prompt all societies to create similar values, such as prohibitions against murder. But this doesn’t make these values any less social creations, and, on this view, moral values would still be grounded in social approval. So, we may distinguish between two ways of viewing cultural relativism:

 

Variable cultural relativism: moral values are grounded in social approval, and these values vary in different cultures.

Nonvariable cultural relativism: moral values are grounded in social approval, and these values do not necessarily vary in different cultures.

 

Nonvariable cultural relativism is a more modest approach to relativism since it grants in principle that moral values might be the same in different cultures. Although this sidesteps the objection that Rachels offered, even this more modest relativism has its critics. We will consider three objections.

 

            Whether Cultural Relativists deny all Moral Values. Critics of cultural relativism sometimes argue that denying an objective basis of morality amounts to