Jennifer A. Herdt's book, Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1997), is a study of Hume's notion of sympathy. It is not, however, just an analysis of the psychological mechanism of sympathy as expounded in Books II and III of the Treatise. For Herdt, sympathy plays a crucial role in Hume's vision of how to combat many social ills, especially the effects of religious fanaticism, and Hume self-consciously drew on the notion of sympathy to secularize discourse about morality and social responsibility. For Herdt, awareness of Hume's use of sympathy illuminates Hume's critique of religion and it also casts new light on the philosophical merits of Hume's History. Herdt notes that, according to most Hume commentators, Hume's attacks on religion were driven by epistemological problems with rationally justifying religion. According to Herdt, though, the unfortunate effects of religion on society more directly motivated Hume's religious critique. Hume exposes these effects in his History, and offers sympathy as an antidote to religious fanaticism. Hume is not merely a vocal philosophical critic of religion, but he is a social reformer attempting to advance peace and prosperity in Scotland.

The key to Herdt's interpretation is Hume's distinction between limited and extensive sympathy (T 384-389). Briefly, for Hume, the degree to which I sympathetically commiserate with you hinges on both the degree of your misery and my relation to you. Herdt refines Hume's notions of sympathy, distinguishing between active/passive sympathy, occurrent/dispositional sympathy, weak/strong sympathy, the sympathetic understanding, and the sympathetic imagination. In essence, there are both bad and good social aspects of the various types of sympathy. A bad social aspect is when sympathy is only a superficial emotional contagion, which can even breed religious fanaticism. The principal good social aspect is when sympathy becomes more generalized and gives rise to a sense of concern for the well-being of others. Herdt's refinement of Hume's sympathy vocabulary is both textually justified and an important aid in understanding the various technical senses of sympathy especially in Hume's Treatise. Herdt argues that, after the moral Enquiry, Hume's use of the term "sympathy" diminished, and when he did use it he meant it mainly in the sense of limited sympathy. Herdt believes, though, that the fundamental conception of extended and general sympathy is a running theme in the History.

Hume's later use of the term "sympathy" is not quite as diminished as Herdt contends. By consulting a text file database of Hume's writings, we can quickly spot the frequency with which Hume used both the term "sympathy" and the related word "compassion":

Treatise: sympathy (150), compassion (8)

First Enquiry: sympathy (6)

Second Enquiry: sympathy (26), compassion (9)

Of Tragedy: sympathy (4), compassion (6)

Dissertation on the Passions: sympathy (3), compassion (8)

Natural History of Religion: sympathy (3).

History: Sympathy (25); compassion (54)

Additionally, about 12 of Hume's essays contain one or two occurrences each of either the words "sympathy" or "compassion." When we examine the various occurrences of these terms, it seems that Hume sometimes had in mind a technical notion of sympathy and other times a colloquial notion. The technical notion typically makes a psychological point, such as the discussion at T 384-389. We find the technical notion largely in the Treatise and the Moral Enquiry, with more isolated discussions in the Natural History of Religion, "Of Tragedy," the "Dissertation on the Passions," and a letter to Adam Smith on July 28, 1759.

By contrast, Hume's more colloquial uses of "sympathy" and "compassion" usually appear along side other terms, such as fellow-feeling, cordial affection, humanity, friendship, mutual attachment, and fidelity. The colloquial use is also sometimes designated in the phrases "sympathy of manners" and "sympathy of character". Hume's use of the terms "sympathy" and "compassion" in the History are virtually all colloquial, such as these: "the queen was engaged, by a sympathy of manners, to take adulterers and fornicators under her protection" (volume 4, chapter 38); "The executioner himself was touched with sympathy" (volume 6, chapter 68); "Lewis received him with the highest generosity, sympathy, and regard" (volume 6, chapter 71). Just as these uses of the "sympathy" and "compassion" are colloquial, many of the more implied sympathy elements of Hume's History are also colloquial, and not technical in the ways the Herdt suggests. Further, many of the other sentimentalist components of Hume's History noted by Herdt may only be a function of lively writing style, as Hume himself prescribes in the lengthy expunged portion of the first Enquiry, section three. Thus, Herdt may exaggerate the History's more technical running theme of sympathy.

Nevertheless, Herdt's book is a well-written and original work of scholarship that breaks new ground both in its analysis of Hume's technical notion of sympathy, and in its social emphasis of Hume's religious critique. It is geared mainly for graduate level and specialist studies of Hume.

James Fieser

University of Tennessee at Martin